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THESIS ABSTRACT
During the eighteenth century, the Chocó became an
area of great importance to the Viceroyalty of New Granada.
The region's sources of precious metal not only contributed
to the economic recovery of the neighbouring cities of the
Cauca Valley, but also enriched immensely the individual
owners of the Chocô's mines and slaves gangs, the merchants
who traded with them, and the royal officials and priests
who served there.
Despite the region's economic importance, it remained
badly underdeveloped: a combination of climate and terrain
discouraged Spanish settlement. While Spaniards were not
attracted to the Chocô f or the purpose of settlement,
slaves were nevertheless introduced in large numbers to
exploit its gold deposits, and these were supported by the
labour of the region's native inhabitants.
This thesis will show, however, that it took the
Spaniards nearly 300 years effectively to bring the Chocó
under Crown control. Although the region had been known
since the earliest days of conquest - Balboa, Almagro, and
Pizarro had been among the first to explore the area -
Indian resistance prevented the Spaniards from establishing
a firm and lasting foothold in Indian territory until the
1660s. By the 1670s, a Franciscan mission had been
established for the purpose of converting the Indians of
the Chocô to the Christian Faith.
Even at this stage, however, Spanish control was far
from secure. By the 1680s, one of the Indian groups
inhabiting the region - the Citarâ - had rebelled against
the colonists and their increasing demands, and massacred
as many Spaniards as they were able to surprise.
It was the defeat of the rebel leaders which marked a
turning point in the fortunes of the Chocó peoples. After
the region had been finally pacified, Spaniards began to
settle the area in growing numbers, the size of the slave
population grew at a rapid rate, and the exploitation of
gold deposits began in earnest.
But while the Spaniards had undoubtedly established
control of the native peoples by the beginning of the
eighteenth century, the latter continued to resist both
resettlement and conversion by fleeing from their
settlements and refusing to accept the teaching of
Christian Doctrine. Their continuing resistance was
facilitated by the ineffective methods of administration
introduced in the Chocó, controlled by corrupt tenientes,
corregidores, secular priests, and Franciscan missionaries.
These are the main themes that will be taken up in this
study.
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1INTRODUCTION
The area which now constitutes the Departamento of the
Chocô is situated in the northwest corner of Colombia. On
the north, it borders with Panama and the Gulf of Darien;
on the south, with the Departamento del Valle. The region
is separated from the interior by the Cordillera
Occidental, and from the sea by the Serrania de BaudO. Two
great rivers - the Atrato and the San Juan - cut through
the centre of the Chocó, providing direct communication
with the Caribbean and the Pacific. The region is
characterized by a hot, humid climate, by heavy rainfall,
and by a cover of dense tropical rain forest. Human
habitation is generally limited to the banks of the
hundreds of rivers that run through the forest, and that
provide routes of travel from one end of the region to the
other.' In the 1820s, Gaspar Mollien observed that the
Chocó contained so many rivers that "In fifteen days
one may go [by river] from one extremity of the province to
the other, or from Escuande [Iscuandé], to the mouth of the
Atrato" 2
1 William F. Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier:
The Colombian Chocö, 1680-1810 (Norman, 1976), p.9;
Robert C. West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia: A
Negroid Area of the American Tropics (Baton Rouge, 1957),
p.3.
2 Gaspar Mollien, Travels in the Republic of
Colombia, in the Years 1822 and 1823 (London, 1824),
p.302.
2Many historians of Colombia's colonial period have
recognised that, during the eighteenth century, the Chocó
became an area of considerable importance to the
Viceroyalty. 3
 Over the course of the century, the Chocô's
gold mines contributed to the recovery of the economies of
the neighbouring cities of the Cauca Valley and,
consequently, to the fortunes of the New Kingdom as a
whole. Yet despite its importance, the region remained very
underdeveloped - the conquest of the native peoples of this
area did not lead to large-scale Spanish settlement and the
consequent transfer of Spanish political, cultural, and
religious institutions. The region's underdevelopment is
also reflected in the literature. Although in recent years
interest in the Chocó's population has increased, it has
focused mainly on the peoples who inhabit the region
today. 4 The colonial period continues to be little known.
There are, however, some important exceptions to this
general rule. William Sharp, the only historian ever to
have written a full-length history of the Chocá, 5
 focused
his attention on the eighteenth century. Sharp analysed the
See, for example, Anthony McFarlane, "Economic and
Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, with
special reference to overseas trade, 1739-1810" (PhD,
University of London, 1977); German Colmenares, Historia
EconOmica y Social de Colombia, 153 7-1719 (MedellIn,
1975); Cali: terratenientes, mineros y carnerciantes.
Siglo XVIII (Cali, 1975); and his Historia Econômica y
Social de Colombia. Tomo II. Popayân: una sociedad
esciavista, 1680-1800 (Bogota, 1979).
See the Conclusion of this thesis.
Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier.
3development of a mining economy in the region, and examined
the labour system employed by the Spaniards to exploit its
gold deposits. Though undoubtedly a major contribution to
the historiography of the region, Sharp was unable to
provide an accurate account of the sixteenth and
seventeenth century context. The shortage of serious
studies of both the region's pre-conquest population, and
of the process whereby the native peoples of the Chocó were
effectively conquered by the Spaniards in the seventeenth
century, meant that Sharp's section on the pre-eighteenth
century period was beset with inaccuracies.
However, although it is true that very little work has
been done on the region's early history, there are, again,
some important exceptions. The most notable, for the
sixteenth century, are the studies of Kathleen Romoly,
Robert Cushman Murphy, and S. Henry Wassen. 6 The most
useful studies on the seventeenth century - the period that
has received the least attention from historians - are the
6 See, for example, Kathleen Romoly, "El Alto Chocó
en el Siglo XVI", Revista Colornbiana de Antropologla,
Vol.XIX (1975), pp.9-38; "El Alto Chocó en el Siglo XVI.
Parte II: Las Gentes", Revista Colombiana de
Antropologla, Vol.XX (1976), pp.25-78; and "El
descubrimiento y la primera fundación de Buenaventura",
BoletIn de Historia y Antiguedades, Vol.49 (1962),
pp.113-122. See also Robert Cushman Murphy, "The Earliest
Spanish Advances Southward from Panama along the West
Coast of South America", HAHR, Vol.XXI (1941), pp.2-28;
and S. Henry Wassen, "Apuntes Etnohistôricos Chocoanos",
Hombre y Cultura, Vol.1 (1963), pp.4-21; and
"Etnohistoria chocoana y cinco cuentos waunana apuntados
en 1955", Etnologiska Studier, Vol.23 (1963), pp.9-78.
4contributions of Sven-Erik Isacsson. 7 Further contributions
to the Chocó's sixteenth and seventeenth century history
have been made by Robert West and Patricia Vargas
Sarmiento. 8 All of these have been used extensively in the
first three chapters of this thesis.
Murphy, Wassen, and Romoly based their work on a
careful study of the writings of the early chroniclers,
other sixteenth century documents contained in Spanish and
Colombian archives, and a thorough first-hand knowledge of
the region's geography. These studies, as well as those of
Isacsson, are particularly valuable, not only because they
have increased substantially our knowledge of the Chocô's
native peoples, of the territories they inhabited, and of
early Spanish-Indian contacts in Colombia's Pacific
lowlands, but also because they show very clearly that the
situation of the Indian in the Chocó in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries was significantly different from that
of his eighteenth and early nineteenth century counterpart.
The point is an important one, because the picture
presented by late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
observers of the Indians of the Chocó is one of docility,
See Sven-Erik Isacsson, "Fray Matlas Abad y su
diario de viaje por el rio Atrato en 1649", Boletln de
Historia y Antiguedades, Vol.LXI (1974), pp.457-75; and
"Emberá: territorio y regimen agrario de una tribu
selvática bajo la dominación espaflola", in N.S.Friedmann,
Tierra, TradiciOn y Pode.r en Colombia. En.foques
Antropolôgicos (Bogota, 1976), pp.17-38.
8 West, Robert C., The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia;
Vargas Sarmiento, Patricia, "La fundaciôn de pueblos en
la cuenca alta del Atrato", Revista de Antropoloqla, No.1
(1985), pp.56-77.
5mildness, and even cowardice. 9 The Frenchman Gaspar
Molijen, for instance, who travelled through Colombia in
the early 1820s, paid some attention to the Indian
population of the region, and remarked that the peoples of
the Chocó were "very miserable". "Though very mild", he
noted, the Indians were "little better than savages". They
were "not brave", and had a tendency to "fly into the woods
if a stranger enters their village", while the women "weep
and hide their faces with their hands, when spoken to".'°
This interpretation of the "mild" nature of the region's
indigenous people is echoed in some of the reports of
Spaniards travelling through the region towards the end of
the eighteenth century. Don Juan Jiménez Donoso, for
instance, observed in a report of November, 1780, that
unlike the Indians of RIo de la Hacha and Darien, the
behaviour and form of expression of the Chocó Indians was
"docile", "simple", and lacking in ambition. Indeed, were
it not for their tendency to drink heavily, nothing more
could be asked of them."
When we read these eighteenth century observations,
and compare them with the accounts of historians and
anthropologists who have worked on the sixteenth century,
On this point see also Maria Pilar Gonzalvo
Aizpuru, "Historia de los indios Chocô", Trabajos y
Conferencias, Vol.11 (1958), pp.124-25.
'° Mollien, Travels in the Republic of Colombia,
pp.306-7.
h1 
"Relaciôn del Chocô ... en que se manifiesta su
actual estado . . .", in Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, Historia
documental del Chocó (Bogota, 1954), p.210.
6and even with what little work that has been done on the
seventeenth, it becomes clear that the situation of the
Indian in the Chocô changed dramatically between the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. For the sources
indicate that, at least until the end of the seventeenth
century, the Indians had been remarkably successful in
violently resisting Spanish penetrations of their land.
Relations between Indians and the few Spaniards who
attempted to set up operations in the Chocó from the mid-
seventeenth century onwards were very fluid, and the
position of the latter in the former's territory was far
from secure. However, this thesis will show that, even
after Spanish control had effectively been established at
the end of the seventeenth century, Indian resistance to
Spanish occupation continued, albeit in a passive form.
Several years ago, Alastair Hennessy drew attention to
the fact that the experience of Spanish colonization in
frontier regions of empire differed markedly from that in
the core areas. He noted that
"The easy conquest of the Aztec and Inca empires
gives a misleading picture of the powers of
resistance of Amerindians to Spanish rule.
Miscegenation encouraged the view that there was
no Indian problem which hispanization and
christianization could not cure ... It is often
forgotten how long some of these Indians
resisted. i12
on the basis of the experience of Spaniards in regions
as far apart as northern Mexico and southern Chile,
Hennessy also drew attention to the differences between the
12 Alastair Hennessy, The Frontier in Latin American
History (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1978), pp.60-61.
7many different types of frontier colonization in Latin
America.' 3
 Since then, many historians, apart from Sharp,
have focused their efforts on the frontier regions of the
empire.' 4
 Our purpose is not to point to the similarities
and differences between the Chocó and other areas, except
where comparison serves to highlight a particular
characteristic of Spanish colonization in the Chocó, but to
provide another case study of Spanish colonization in the
Americas.
Accordingly, this thesis will focus on the following
main themes. Chapter 1 provides a brief outline of early
Spanish exploration of the region, conducted up the Atrato
from the Gulf of Darien, down the Pacific from Panama, and,
from about the mid-sixteenth century, from the New Granadan
interior. The chapter will show that all early Spanish
efforts to penetrate Chocô territory and conquer its
indigenous population met with failure. It was not until
the l570s, thanks to the cooperation offered by two of the
region's Indian groups, that the Spaniards were able to
found a Spanish settlement in Chocó territory. The chapter
ends by discussing why these successes, too, were
13 Ibid., pp.54-109. From an anthropological point of
view, Elman R. Service also provided a theoretical
framework for understanding the reasons why the native
peoples of some parts of the empire were able to retain
their Indian identity, while those in other parts of the
empire lost theirs completely.
14 See, for example, the cases of the Llanos of
Colombia and of seventeenth century Chile: Jane M.
Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier: The Llanos of
Colombia, 1531-1831 (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1984), and
Fernando Casanueva, "La evangelización periférica en
Chile, 1667-1796", Nueva Historia, Año 2 (1985), pp.3-30.
8temporary, and why later attempts at conquest, undertaken
towards the end of the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, proved equally unsuccessful.
Chapter 2 focuses on seventeenth century penetrations
of the region. It examines the combination of factors - a
drastic fall in Indian numbers, a change of tactics on the
part of the Spaniards, and the threat of a possible
alliance between these and the Noanama Indians - which
enabled a small number of royal officials, miners, slaves,
and missionaries to settle in the area after the mid-
seventeenth century. We will also consider why, despite a
growing Spanish presence in Chocô territory, the colonists
were unable to make any progress in relocating or
"reducing" the dispersed Indian population into permanent
settlements. We will see that, as Iscasson pointed out,
"the Spanish Crown, in introducing its Indian
policy in the Chocó, followed the norms
elaborated during a century and more among the
Andean cultures. This system presupposed [the
existence of] some form of social stratification
and political organization that could be used to
the Spaniards' own advantage. However, it appears
that we have, in the Chocô, a special case, where
the conditions [necessary] for the introduction
of this system did not exist.'5
In a similar vein, Chapter 3 looks at the
establishment of a Franciscan mission in the Chocô in 1673,
and at the friars' attempts to congregate the population
into settlements, where the teaching of Christian Doctrine
was to take place. This chapter will consider why these
efforts also met with failure, and the circumstances that
Isacsson, "Emberá", p.25.
9led some of the missionaries, within a very short period of
time, to conclude that no progress would be made among the
Chocó Indians until force or some form of physical
punishment was applied, and others to abandon the mission
altogether.
Chapter 4 focuses specifically on an entrada
(expedition of entry) carried out, in 1676, by the former
governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés. This entrada
was a response to continuing reports of difficulties from
Franciscan missionaries, Spanish miners, and other
residents in the area. Bueso de Valdés directed his efforts
on this occasion at taking measures to ensure that the
labours and lifestyles of the Chocô's indigenous population
served the interests of the region's Spanish miners. In the
short term, at least, this entrada scored some successes.
Chapter 5, however, will look at the conflict which
arose in 1680-81, as a direct result of the increasing
demands that were made on the Indian population after the
Bueso de Valdés entrada. It will also consider why, despite
the implementation of measures designed to alleviate the
Indians' most immediate grievances, a major rebellion arose
just three years later.
Although the pacification of the Chocó peoples after
the 1684 rebellion marked a turning point for its Indian
population, in the sense that no further rebellions were to
occur, Chapter 6 will show that in fact, Indian resistance
did not end with the Indians' defeat. The native peoples of
the region adopted a new and effective way of resisting the
10
Spanish colonists. Throughout the eighteenth century,
hundreds of Indians repeatedly abandoned their towns to
found alternative communities, or cimarronas, beyond the
reach of the Spaniards.
Indian resistance to Spanish occupation took another
form as well. Chapter 7 examines the reasons for the
failure of nearly a century of Franciscan missionary
activity among the Chocó's indigenous population. It also
examines the record of the ever-increasing number of
secular clerics serving in the Chocó, and at the conflict
which developed between regular and secular clergy, which
paved the way for the eventual secularization of the
region's parishes.
Although the issue of Indian resistance runs through
all seven chapters, linking these together, other themes
are also developed in this study. We will see, for
instance, that it was economic considerations in the
neighbouring regions of Antioquia and Popayán that promoted
repeated attempts at conquest of the Chocô. The clearest
manifestation of this can be seen in the fact that the most
important drives to penetrate Chocó territory coincided
almost exactly with the periods of low productivity in the
mining economies of the neighbouring qobernaciones. The
demands placed by the Spaniards on the Indian population
were intended to facilitate the task of the miners, which
in turn was intended to resolve the effects of crises in
the mining economies of neighbouring regions.
11
This thesis also examines the manner in which
government developed in this frontier region, tracing the
emergence of the system of administration set up by the
Spaniards in the Chocó. Chapters 2 to 5 pay some attention
to the extent to which Crown policy determined the way in
which the region was administered in the second half of the
seventeenth century. Chapters 6 and 7 examine closely the
systems of civil and ecclesiastical administration of the
Chocô in the first four decades of the eighteenth century,
and at the reasons why early attempts to reform the most
inefficient and corrupt aspects of this administration were
unsuccessful.
12
MAP 1
N1W GRANADA IN TIlE EIGHTEENTh CENTURY
Source: Robert C. West, Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia
(Baton Rouge, Lousiana, 1957), Map 3, between pp.10-il.
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CHAPTER 1
EARLY SPANISH EXPLORATIONS
IN THE CHOCO
Carl Sauer's pioneering study of early Spanish
activity in the Caribbean and on the northern coast of
South America shows that the region lying to the north of
the Chocó' had in fact been known since the earliest days
of conquest: the Gulf of Urabá (Darien) was an area of
interest to the Spaniards as early as the first decade of
the sixteenth century. The works of other historians,
geographers, and ethnographers working on this region of
the empire show that, by the l520s, explorations were being
carried out down the Pacific coast of the Chocô, the scene
of early contacts between the Indians of the region and
Spanish explorers such as Diego de Almagro, Francisco
Pizarro, and Pascual de Andagoya, among others. By the
1540s, the region had also become an area of interest to
When the term Chocô was used for the first time, in
1540, it referred to a tribal region - the Province of
Chocô, inhabited by Chocô Indians - situated between the
headwaters of the San Juan and Atrato rivers, to the west
of the district of Anserma, from which it was separated
by the Province of Sima. When, 26 or 28 years later, the
inhabitants of Anserma sought to claim the credit for
discovering the Chocô, the name began to be used to refer
to the entire region lying between Buenaventura and the
Isthmus. See Romoly, "El Alto Chocô", p.12. For some
theories on the origin of the word Chocô, see ibid.,
p.12; Wassen, "Etnohistoria chocoana", pp.10-12; and
Wassen, "Apuntes Etnohistáricos", pp.5-8.
14
the Spaniards' who had successfully established themselves
in the New Granadan interior. However, despite numerous
attempts to penetrate and conquer the Chocó region, known
from the very beginning of the conquest period to contain
immensely rich sources of gold, the Spaniards were not even
partially successful in establishing a foothold in Chocô
territory until the l570s. Indeed, even these successes
proved to be short-lived. By the l590s, the Chocó had
again been abandoned.
Seventeenth century expeditions to the area were
conducted principally from Antioquia and other bases in the
Cauca Valley region. In the first decade of the century,
Spanish efforts were directed primarily towards the regions
which came to be known as the provinces of Barbacoas,
Iscuandé, and Raposo, all of which lie to the south of the
area covered by this study. By the 1623s, her, the
Spaniards again turned their attention to the Chocó.
Several expeditions were undertaken - some of them
unsuccessful - which eventually resulted in the
pacification of the Noanama groups of the San Juan river,
and, by the l660s, of the Indian groups inhabiting the
headwaters of the San Juan and Atrato rivers, and the
eastern tributaries of the Atrato as far north as the
Arquia river.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to examine
the earliest Spanish expeditions to Chocô territory from
all three directions. It will focus, first, on
explorations conducted from the Gulf of Urabâ (Darien) and
15
down the Pacific coast from Panama; and secondly on the
Spanish advance into the New Granadan interior, which
fuelled a further wave of exploration of the Chocó. We
will then proceed to consider why, despite both the heavy
mortality registered during Spanish penetrations of Chocô
territory, and the known aggression and bellicosity of the
region's native population, the Spaniards continued to
attempt their conquest. We will also examine the reasons
for the initial success, and subsequent failure, of the
first Spanish settlements established in the region, and at
the reasons behind the last wave of explorations, begun in
the 1620s. Although many references to the Indian
population of the region will be scattered throughout the
text, this chapter will not join the debate about the early
inhabitants of the Chocó region, or about the origins of
the term "Chocó" and its early uses, or indeed, about the
conflicting and sometimes erroneous interpretations
regarding which Indian tribes inhabited which stretch of
territory during this period, except to indicate the
regions and Indian groups about which there is still some
discussion. Our principal purpose will be to provide a
chronological outline of Spanish penetrations into Chocó
territory, and to place these within the context of the
Spanish advance to Panama, Peru, and interior New Granada.
The crucial point for us is to link the Spaniards' eventual
occupation of the Chocó with the development of the New
Granadan economy during the colonial period. For it was
the problems associated with the colony's mining economy
16
which fuelled repeated Spanish expeditions to the area,
determined the way in which Spanish-Indian relations were
to be conducted there, promoted the importation of African
slaves on a massive scale, and eventually shaped the
development of the region throughout the remainder of the
colonial period and beyond.
Early Spanish Reconnaissance
The Gulf of Urabá (Darien) witnessed considerable
Spanish activity throughout the first decade of the
sixteenth century. The first Spanish contacts with the
Indians of the area were made in 1501 by the Rodrigo de
Bastidas and Juan de la Cosa expedition, undertaken under
a license granted by the future bishop of Seville, Juan
RodrIguez de Fonseca. Fonseca was, as Sauer explains, the
"untitled minister of colonies", with responsibility for
the Indies and their profit to the Crown. In 1499, as part
of his attempt to limit Columbus' claims on the mainland,
and to constrain Portuguese and English activities in that
area, he began issuing licenses for expeditions of trade
and exploration.2
Following rumours of a land of gold, pearls, and gems
heard by Juan de la Cosa on a voyage made to the Guajira
Peninsula with Alonso de Hojeda in 1499, this expedition
2 See Carl Sauer, The Early Spanish Main (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1966), pp.104-lOB, 114. For a shorter
account of events in the Gulf of Tjrabä between 1501 and
1514, see Jorge Orlando Melo, Historia de Colombia. Tomo
I. El establecimiento de la dominaciOn española (Bogota,
1978), pp.73-81.
17
explored the Colombian coast, reached the harbour of
Cartagena, possibly came into contact with the Sinü
peoples, and finally arrived at the Gulf of Urabá. 3
 In
1501, Bastidas and Cosa appear to have had only peaceful
relations with the native inhabitants, but because they had
discovered gold objects in the area, the next expedition
undertaken by Cosa, in 1504, sacked and looted the Indian
settlements of Urabá, and of Darien, situated on the
opposite side of the Gulf. These attacks were justified by
the Queen's order of 1503 permitting the capture of
"Cannibals" who resisted the Spaniards and refused to be
taught the Faith.4
Despite these early Spanish contacts with the Indian
inhabitants of the region, no firm attempt at colonization
was made in the Gulf area until 1510. Further Spanish
activity there followed a conference held by Ferdinand at
Burgos in 1508, which made two territorial concessions to
the east and west of the Gulf of Urabá. The region to the
west was granted to Diego de Nicuesa, while the eastern
section was granted to Alonso de Hojeda, with Cosa as
second in command. 5 According to Sauer, because the
existence of gold in the vicinity had already been
See Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.109-119.
This expedition had previously ravaged Indian
settlements along the coast to the east of the Gulf of
Urabá. Ibid., pp.118, 161-164. See also Melo, Historia de
Colombia, p.33.
Cosa was killed, however, at Cartagena, before
arriving at Urabá. Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.166, 168-
170.
18
established, the main purpose of the establishment of these
settlements was to obtain gold, rather than to colonize.
Nicuesa's attempt proved to be a complete disaster: the
expedition broke up into three parts and suffered heavy
losses. Hojeda managed to build a fort and settlement -
San Sebastian de Urabá - but food shortages and attack by
the Urabá Indians whom the party had repeatedly raided, led
to the settlement being abandoned. 6
 However, as a result
of these abortive attempts, the town of Santa Maria la
Antigua del Darien was established, in 1510, by survivors
of the two expeditions. Relations between Spaniards and
Indians in the region of Santa Maria la Antigua appear to
have been peaceful at this stage, thus providing a base
from which other explorations could be undertaken.7
By April 1511, Vasco Ndñez de Balboa had become the
leader of the new Spanish community at Darien. 8 In the
three years that followed, Balboa - who became an extremely
effective leader and explorer -	 t1
alliances with a number of Indian provinces situated to the
northwest of the town of Santa Maria. Besides furnishing
6 For an account of Hojeda's short-lived settlement
at San Sebastian de Urabá, and Nicuesa's disastrous
activities on the Central American coast, see ibid.,
pp.172-173, 175-176, and 218-219.
For an account of the Spanish transfer to the
Indian town of Darien, see ibid., pp.173-175, 219. By
July 1515, a bishopric had been created, with Santa Maria
la Antigua de Darien as its base. By royal cédula of that
month, Santa Maria was also granted the same privileges
enjoyed by cities in the Kingdoms of Spain. See Ortega
Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.1-4.
8 The following account is based on Sauer, The
Spanish Main, pp.218-237.
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considerable amounts of gold, in the form of ornaments,
these alliances with native provinces provided Balboa with
the information, supplies, and guides necessary to carry
out the crossing of the Isthmus, in 1513. Always searching
for the source of the gold possessed by the Indians of the
surrounding area, apparently processed and traded by the
immensely rich cacique of the land of Dabeiba, in 1512
Balboa set out from Santa Maria to explore the region that
lay to the south of the Gulf of Urabá. Balboa's objective
took him up the Atrato river - which cuts through the Chocô
and empties into the Gulf of Urabá - to the point where
either the River Murri or the River ArquIa meet the Atrato,
and possibly even as far as the vicinity of Quibdó,
described at the time as the country of the "cannibals".9
Two further attempts were made to locate Dabeiba up
the Atrato river in 1515 - this time during Pedrarias
Dávila's disastrous tenure as captain general and governor
of Castilla del Oro, the name given by the King, in 1513,
to the region previously under Balboa's control. Balboa,
who carried out the first of these expeditions, claimed to
have reached the land of Dabeiba and to have ascertained
that the source of the gold produced in Dabeiba lay at a
distance of 10 days' travel into the interior. Food
shortages forced the party - which had also suffered attack
Sauer believed that the gold mining region of
Buriticá. was the source of the gold. See ibid., pp.222-
223, and 225-229, but especially, p.228. For a
seventeenth century account of some early Spanish
activities in the Chocó area, see Ortega Ricaurte,
Historia documental, pp.83-90.
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from Indians along the Atrato - to return to Darien. The
second attempt was made by a businessman from Santa Maria,
Juan de Tavira, but again the Spaniards were repulsed by
Indians who were said to have blocked their route along the
Atrato with canoes. Tavira and many others were drowned
and the remainder of the party - under the leadership of
Francisco Pizarro - returned to Darien.'0
Precolunthian Peo ples of the Northern Chocó Region
The identity of the Indian groups which resided along
the Atrato river - especially those closest to the Gulf of
Urabâ - at the time the Spaniards carried out their first
explorations in the area from the Gulf of Urabá is not
entirely clear. Carl Sauer suggested that the Atrato basin
was occupied primarily by cacicazg'os of Cuevan character,
kinship and speech. According to Sauer, these Cueva
peoples, like their Cuevari neighbours to the north o'f the
Gulf, disappeared during the sixteenth century due to both
raids from Darien and to Spanish expeditions entering the
region from the Colombian Caribbean coast and the interior.
In a similar vein, Trimborn asserted that the Cueva
inhabited a region stretching eastward from the Atrato
'o Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.258-259. With the
exception of Veragua - still being claimed by the heirs
of Columbus - Pedrarias Dávilas was granted complete
freedom of movement in the region. For an account of
Spanish activities in Castilla del Oro, previously called
Andalucla la Nueva, see ibid., pp.247-265, and Melo,
Historia de Colombia, pp.81-86. For the precise
geographical extension of Darien and Castilla del Oro,
see Kathleen Romoly, Los de la leng'ua de Cueva. Los
g'rupos indlqenas del istmo oriental en la época de la
conquista espanola (Bogota, 1987), p.21.
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river to the Serrania de Abibe and south as far as the Rio
Sucio. According to this interpretation, the Cueva were
pushed out of this area by the northward movement of the
Chocô."
In her study of the Cuevan peoples of the Isthxnian
region, Kathleen Romoly examined the size of the pre-
conquest population and discussed its rapid demographic
decline.'2 Moving ahead to the seventeenth century, Roxnoly
also considered the origins of the Cuna who were to replace
the Cueva in that area, and concluded that, despite the
generally held belief that the Cunas are descendants of the
Cuevas, the former were a completely different Indian
tribe, which migrated northward from the Chocô, pushed by
their enemies, the Emberá-Catio.' The important point to
make is that, according to Romoly's work, it was not the
Cueva who inhabited the region to the east of the Atrato
' Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.238, 288-289. See also
Hermann Trimborn, Señorlo y barbarie en el valle del
Cauca: estudio sobre la antig'ua civilizaciOn quimbaya y
grupos a.fines del oeste de Colombia (Madrid, 1949), p.50.
12 Romoly, Los de la lengua de Cueva, pp.23-37, 40-
50. As this thesis focuses on the region to the south of
the Gulf of Urabá, the effects of Spanish colonization on
the Cueva peoples will not be discussed. Suffice to say
that the consequences for the Indian population of the
establishment of castilla del Oro were drastic. Instead
of maintaining the relatively cordial relations secured
by Balboa, Pedrarias Dávila and his men took to raiding,
robbing, looting, and burning Indian settlements, and
taking Indians as slaves. By the mid-sixteenth century,
the Cuevas had virtually disappeared. See Sauer, The
Spanish Main, pp.248-252. and Romoly, Los de la lengua de
Cueva, pp.40-41.
' Ibid., pp.50-55, 91. Romoly based her conclusion
on an exhaustive study of Cueva language and culture.
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and south to the RIo Sucio, as Trimborn claimed, but the
Cuna 14
Romoly's assertion that the Cuna migrated northwards
under pressure from the Ernberá-Catlo, however, raises other
doubts, for the origins and cultural and linguistic
affiliations of the Catlo - who inhabited parts of
Antioquia as far north as the Sinü and San Jorge rivers and
ma have merged with groups of Indians migrating towards
that area from the Chocô - have also been the subject of
some debate. While Romoly maintained that the Catlo were
directly related to the Emberá, Gordon argued that there
were no historical, linguistic or cultural similarities
between the two. Reina Torres de Arauz, however, suggested
that the Chocó may have invaded and occupied Catlo
territory following the Spanish conquest of the Sinü
region.' 5 Suffice to say that both the identity of the
14 The confusion may arise from the assumption that
the Cunas descended from the Cueva. For the view that the
Cuna are descendants of the Cueva, see Trimborn, SeñorIo
y barbarie, p.50, and Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.238,
284.
15 Thus, the Indian group inhabiting the valleys of
the Saijá river early this century, Romoly argued, shared
the same language, the Chami-Catlo, as the early Emberá
inhabitants of the region lying to the west of Antioquia,
and the southern and central Chocó. However, in focusing
on the Chocó peoples who migrated to the Sinü region of
Colombia, B. Le Roy Gordon argued that there is no
evidence to indicate any affiliation between the Chocó
EEmbera] and the Catlo, despite the fact that the Catlo
have been listed as a subgroup of the Chocó, and that
their language has been classified as a subdivision of
Chocó language. Unlike the Chocô, Gordon asserts, the
Catlo lived in towns; early collections of Catlo words
show no linguistic similarity with the Chocô; their dress
also differed from that of the Chocô. Furthermore, while
the diet of the Chocó was based primarily on maize, that
of the Catlo was based on root crops. According to
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Indian inhabitants of the Atrato region, and the migrations
which may have occurred following contact with the
Spaniards, still cause considerable confusion.
Spanish Approaches from the Pacific
After 1519, Spanish contacts with the Chocó
increasingly moved along another axis: that of the Pacific
coast. Towards the end of his cycle of activities in
Castilla del Oro, Pedrarias Dávila established a settlement
at Panama, in August 1519, thereby creating a base for
Spanish exploration down the western coast of South
America.'6 As Robert Cushman Murphy pointed out, accounts
of the voyages made down the Pacific coast in the years
before the discovery of Peru are both sketchy and
contradictory. Despite the.se. obstacle.s, t"turptiy provided a
chronological outline of the Spanish advance from 'Panama
and clarified the location of several places consistently
Gordon, the confusion derives from the Chocó's eventual
occupation of CatIo territory, to whom, nevertheless,
they were not related. Reina Torres de Arauz included the
Catio among the Chocô groups inhabiting parts of
Antioquia in the 1960s, but argued that, since the
accounts of early chroniclers would suggest no
similarities between the two, it is likely that the
former invaded and occupied the territory of the latter,
following the conquest of the Sinü region by the
Spaniards. See Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos
autóctonos del litoral colombiano del PacIfico en la
época de la conquista española", Revista Colombiana de
Antropolog'Ia, Vol.12 (1964), pp.265-66; B. Le Roy Gordon,
Human Geography and Ecology in the Sinü Country of
Colombia (Connecticut, 1977), pp.51-3; and Reina Torres
de Arauz, "Aspectos histôricos del grupo Chocô", Anuario
de Estudios Americanos, Vol.XXIII (1966), p.1107, 1115-
1117.
16 Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.279-282.
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confused by the chroniclers and later historians.'7 His
outline is useful from the point of view of this study
because it shows the first contacts made by the Spaniards
with Chocô tribes along the Pacific coast.
The first expedition southward from Panama was
undertaken by Pascual de Andagoya, in 1522-23. Although
Andagoya has often been credited with being the first
discoverer of Colombia's Pacific coast, it appears that
this expedition only cruised for a short distance south of
the Gulf of San Miguel, and possibly no further than Piflas
Bay.' 8
 A second expedition, undertaken by Francisco
Pizarro in 1524, sailed beyond the coastline explored by
Andagoya, entering one of the coves of Humboldt Bay in
January 1525, which was subsequently called "Puerto de la
Hambre", and discovering Puerto de la Candelaria in
February. Although the party was held up for a time
because of food shortages, by April it had arrived at an
anchorage either in or near the Bay of Solano.' 9 One month
earlier, Diego de Almagro had sailed from Panama in search
of Pizarro, but appears to have passed him along the way.
On this occasion, Almagro reached and rounded Cape
Corrientes, explored the valley of the Baudó river, which
he called RIo Baeza, and arrived at the delta of the San
17 Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", pp.3-5, 7-13.
18 Ibid., pp.10-11, 21. See also Romoly, "El
descubrimiento ... de Buenaventura", pp.113-114.
19 Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", pp.12, 21-22.
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MAP2
EARLY SPANISh EXPLORATIONS DOWN
COLOMBIA'S PACIFIC COAST
Source: Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", p.31.
26
Juan river before returning northwards to Panama by way of
the Bay of Solano.2°
It is important to note, at this stage, that Murphy's
chronology is supplemented in this chapter with information
provided by Kathleen Romoly. Romoly argued that, despite
the many sources which document early Spanish discoveries
along the Pacific coast, historians have mistakenly assumed
that the San Juan river discovered by Diego de Almagro in
1525 was the river which cuts through the Chocô and empties
into the Pacific just north of Buenaventura. According to
Romoly, the river discovered by Almagro was in fact the San
Juan de Micay, which is located somewhat further south of
Buenaventura. The point is worth clarifying only in the
context of early Spanish explorations down the Pacific
coast: first, because the river gave its name to the first
gobernaciOn established in this area, the gobernaciôn de
San Juan, created in 1537, and secondly, because it means
that the Indians whom the Spaniards came across on this
occasion were not the Indian inhabitants of the Chocô's San
Juan, but those of the San Juan de Micay. 2' In later
years, of course, Spanish interest was to shift to the
other San Juan river, located to the north of Buenaventura,
20 Ibid., pp.12-13, 22. Kathleen Romoly believed
that, on this voyage, Diego de Almagro discovered the Bay
of Buenaventura. According to Murphy, it was discovered
by Pascual de Andagoya, but not until his second voyage,
in 1539. See pp.10-11.
21 Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos",
pp.261-62; and Romoly, "El descubrimiento de
Buenaventura", pp.113-122.
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and to the region that would henceforth be referred to as
"El Chocó".
By November 1526, both Pizarro and Almagro sailed down
the western coast again, and, in January 1527, met at and
investigated the region around the San Juan - presumably
the San Juan de Micay. While Almagro returned to Panama
with treasure, the pilot Bartolomé Ruiz de la Estrada
continued the voyage southward, to explore the coast of
Ecuador, where he obtained the first indications of the
existence of the Inca empire. 22 Having passed Cape San
Francisco, towards the end of February 1527, Ruiz sighted
and captured an Indian raft carrying textiles and other
manufactured products, and manned by Indians who were said
to be "rational", well-clothed, and wearing jewe1s.
Early contacts with Indians along the Pacific coast
were generally violent. In February 1525, Pizarro's party
raided an Indian settlement for a few food supplies in the
Humboldt Bay region. In April, the same party found a
small Indian settlement two leagues inland from Puerto de
la Candelaria, from where, according to Murphy, the
Spaniards obtained some gold artif acts. 24 Proceeding south
to the Bay of Solano region, Pizarro and his men came
across a palisaded settlement just one league inland. On
this occasion, serious fighting with the Indians broke out,
22 Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", pp.23-24.
23 Ibid., pp.17-18, 24; and Romoly, "Apuntes sobre
los pueblos autóctonos...", pp.261-62, 266.
24 Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", p.21.
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after the Spaniards stole gold ornaments and stores of
food. A few Spaniards were killed and a number were
wounded. 25 In July of that year, the same Indians attacked
Almagro's party, which had encamped and built a palisade in
their territory. The Spaniards this time responded by
burning the Indian settlement, which was then named tipueblo
Quemado". 26 Several other Indian villages were stormed and
burned in the region of the San Juan river by the Pizarro
and Almagro expedition of January 1527. Although the
Spaniards obtained some treasure from the area, they also
suffered many casualties. This region was probably very
well populated, since the size of the native population had
apparently deterred Almagro from exploring the area in
1525 27
We have few details to indicate, however, which Indian
groups inhabited the area in the 1520s. According to
Wassen, the Catrues were said to inhabit a section of the
Pacific coastal area, which may have been the region around
the Baudó river. 28
 Romoly's work on the Upper Chocó -
between Cape Corrientes and Buenaventura - shows five
native groups inhabiting the section of territory lying
between the Pacific and the San Juan and Atrato rivers -
the Moriramas, Eripedes, Orocubiraes, Cirambiraes, and
25 Ibid., p.22.
26 Ibid., pp.22-23.
27 Ibid., pp.22, 24.
28 Wassen, "Apuntes Etnohistóricos", p.10.
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Botabiraes29 - while Isacsson's work on early seventeenth
century entradas indicates that the western side of the
Atrato river was inhabited at that time by several other
Indian groups - such as the Membocana, the Burgumia and the
Soruco. 3° There is, however, insufficient data to indicate
if any of these had contacts with Spanish expeditions of
the l520s.
Despite these early contacts, moreover, no serious
attempt was made to penetrate the Chocó from the coast
during these years, partly because the Spaniards had been
attacked several times by the native inhabitants of the
coastal region, who were determined to prevent the
intruders obtaining food and water, and who were said to
use poisoned arrows, which could prove fatal within four
hours. 3' The Spaniards may also have been deterred from
investigating further inland by the difficulties involved
in exploring the terrain. Since, as Murphy pointed out,
most of the rivers between Darien and the southern
Colombian coast were impossible to enter, even for the
smallest Spanish vessels, all explorations had to be
undertaken in canoes or on foot along the river banks.32
29 Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.29. See also Map 3.
30 Isacsson, "Fray Matlas Abad", footnote 22, pp.467-
68. This would also lend some support to Wassen's theory
that Indians other than the Chocô inhabited the Pacific
coastal region, since the Ernberá language does not
contain words for maritime animals. See Wassen, "Apuntes
Etnohistóricos", p.13.
' Murphy, utEarliest Spanish Advances", pp.16-17.
32 Ibid., pp.13-15.
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But perhaps the most important reason lay in the evidence
found by Ruiz of the existence of a superior Indian
civilization beyond the coast of Ecuador, which could not
be compared with anything found in the region to the north.
As Murphy's outline shows, no further stops were made along
the Chocô coast for several years after 1527, as the
Spaniards turned their attention further south, leading to
the capture of Tumbes in January 1532, and to the
subsequent conquest of Peru.33
However, the gold of Dabeiba continued to attract the
interest of the Spaniards in the north. In May 1535,
Alonso de Heredia - the brother of the governor of
Cartagena, Pedro de Heredia - founded the town of San
Sebastian de Buenavista, near the old site of San Sebastian
de Urabâ, for the purpose of creating a base from which
further explorations in search of the gold of Dabeiba could
be undertaken. At the end of 1535, or the beginning of
1536, Pedro de Heredia organized and led an expedition
which again followed the course of the Atrato river.
However, a combination of climate, terrain, and insects
caused a considerable number of his men to fall ill,
forcing this party - like so many others - to retreat back
to San Sebastian. According to Fray Pedro Simon, the
Indians encountered by the Spaniards on this occasion built
their houses up in trees and used poisoned darts, but
Ibid., pp.27-28. According to Romoly, before 1540,
Spanish vessels en route to Peru stopped at Las Palmas
island. Romoly, "El descubrimiento de ... Buenaventura",
p.115.
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showed no promising signs of riches. Further attempts
would be made to sail up the Atrato in later years, but at
the end of the 1530s Spanish interest shifted to the lands
of interior New Granada.
New Directions of Conquest
News of the discovery of Peru, together with a growing
awareness that the proceeds from the "cabalqadas" and from
grave-robbing along the Caribbean coast were insufficient
to maintain an increasing number of Spanish arrivals, meet
the debts owed to merchants in Santo Domingo, and fund
further expeditions of exploration, fuelled numerous
attempts to penetrate the interior, from bases in Cartagena
and Santa Marta. Underlying all these efforts was the
belief, despite numerous failures, that Spanish dreams of
glory and riches would be fulfilled on finding an overland
route to Peru, or the source of the gold objects obtained
from the Indian settlements of the coastal region.
Exploration of the interior was further promoted by the
groups of Spaniards who moved northwards from Quito and
Peru, in search of the gold of El Dorado.35
Fray Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales de las
Conquistas de Tierra Firrne en las Indians Occidentales (6
vols., Bogota, 1981), Vol.V, Noticia 1, Chapter XXX,
p.149; Vol.V, Noticia 2, Chapter I, pp.169-70; and Vol.V,
Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.181. See also Melo, Historia de
Colombia, pp.116-118, who believes that the expedition
began in December 1535 or January 1536, and lasted until
April 1536. According to SimOn, the party left tJrabá in
April.
German Colinenares, Historia EconOmica y Social de
Colombia, pp.19-24, and Melo, Historia de Colombia,
pp.92-103, 111-118, 145.
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In April 1536, a party of 800 men left Santa Marta,
under the command of Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada. Having
first divided into two groups - one was to find an overland
route and the other was to follow the course of the
Magdalena river - the reunited forces entered Chibcha
territory in March 1537, and within a relatively short
space of time had conquered the centres of the Chibcha
kingdoms in Bogota and Tunja. 36
 Meanwhile, an expedition
led by Francisco César left Cartagena in August 1536,
explored the region of the Sinü river, reached the Cauca
Valley in 1537, and returned to San Sebastian de Urabá with
considerable booty and news of the existence of the Indian
mines of Buriticá. At the beginning of January 1538, Juan
de Vadillo left San Sebastian de Urabâ with the intention
of finding the producers of the gold of the interior. This
expedition followed the route taken by César on his return
to Urabá, crossed the cordillera central, and reached Cali
in December l538. By this time, however, the upper Cauca
region was already being explored by Spaniards drawn from
the south by rumours of El Dorado. The expedition which
left Quito in 1536 under the command of Sebastian de
Belalcázar reached the upper Cauca area and founded the
cities of Popayán and Cali. From Cali, Jorge Robledo was
sent to establish a settlement to the north, and in August
1539 the city of Santa Ana de los Caballeros (Anserma) was
36 For an account of Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada's
expedition, see ibid., pp.145-149.
Ibid., pp.118-119.
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founded, to be followed by Cartago, in August 1540, and
Antioquia, in November 1541.38
Colombia's Pacific coast had, meanwhile, been explored
once again by Spaniards based in Panama. An expedition
organized and led by Gaspar de Espinosa arrived at the San
Juan de Micay river in 1534. There are indications that,
on this occasion, some seven to eight thousand pesos worth
of gold was stolen from Indians in the vicinity of the
river, and that many Indians were captured and enslaved.
It was as a result of this expedition that Gaspar de
Espinosa requested and was granted the gobernaciOn of San
Juan, which, according to Romoly, extended from the San
Juan de Micay river to the Bay of San Mateo, the northern
boundary of the gcbernaciôn of Peru. Espinosa died,
however, before assuming control of his g-obernaciôn.39
In 1540, Pascual de Andagoya arrived to take over the
gobernación of San Juan, granted to him in 1538, after
Espinosa's death. According to Murphy, this expedition
sailed up the San Juan (Chocô) river, as far as the river
Munguidô, but the presence of hostile Indians forced the
party back to the coast. Although the mouth of the Raposo
river, to the south of the San Juan, was also explored,
Andagoya's aim was not to begin the subjugation of the
coast, but rather to occupy the lands of the interior
Ibid., pp.125-129, 132-138. For another account of
early explorations and rivalries among conquering
expeditions in western New Granada, see Trirnborn, SeñorIo
y barbarie, pp.36-42.
Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos",
p.267.
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conquered by Belalcâzar. Andagoya's attempt was
unsuccessful, but his short-lived period as governor of the
gobernaciôn of San Juan resulted in the establishment of
the port of Buenaventura, three leagues inland, at a site
near the Anchicayá river. This port was discovered by Juan
Ladrillero in 1540, while searching for a shorter route
between the Cauca Valley and the Pacific than the one taken
by Andagoya on his march to Cali. Four years earlier,
Ladrillero had been sent by Belalcázar to find a seaport on
the Pacific, but realizing the impossibility of the task on
that occasion, he had returned to the Cauca Valley.40
During the first year of its existence, Buenaventura
witnessed considerable activity: at times as many as 250
Spaniards were present in the port. Its prosperity was,
however, short-lived. Many of the Spaniards who remained
in the coastal region after Andagoya's defeat by Belalcázar
in 1541 were killed by Indians. In March 1542, Belalcâzar
took over Buenaventura and the area around the San Juan de
Micay. For a time, and despite the difficult route linking
Buenaventura and Cali, the port served as a base through
which manufactures from Spain were imported, via Panama,
° It is important to note that the river that gave
its name to the gobernación was not the San Juan which
cuts through the Chocô, but rather the San Juan de Micay,
situated just south of Buenaventura. When originally
created in 1537, the qobernaciôn extended from the San
Juan de Micay to the Santiago River, on Peru's northern
border. Andagoya's concession, however, included the
region to the north of the San Juan de Micay, thus giving
him rights over Buenaventura. See Romoly, "El
descubrimiento de ... Buenaventura", pp.113-118; Romoly,
"El Alto Chocó", p.14; and Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los
pueblos autáctonos", pp.261-62.
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into the Province of Popayán. By the seventeenth century,
however, the port's activities had come to a virtual
standstill. By 1582, only three Spaniards resided there,
and these were said to live a very miserable existence. In
1597, the few remaining houses were destroyed by Indians
from the Chocó. Although the port's demise was blamed on
Indian attacks and on the decline in the number of Cali's
Indians, who served as carriers, the principal cause lay in
the reorientation of trade that took place as a result of
changes in the location of gold production, the rise of
Cartagena as the main port for European trade, and the
increasing importance of Quito as a supplier of cheap
textiles. From the seventeenth century, Buenaventura
formed part of the province of Raposo - which lies outside
the scope of this study - and by the beginning of the
nineteenth century Mollien was lamenting the port's
condition: despite the importance and beauty of its
situation, Buenaventura was barely inhabited.4'
The discovery of the lands of the interior opened a
new area through which penetrations of the Chocó could be
made.	 The first expedition, led by Francisco Gômez
' By the end of the eighteenth century, the port had
in fact been moved to a site closer to the sea. Romoly,
ttEl descubriiniento de ... Buenaventura", pp.117-120; and
Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos", pp.267-
68. See also "Relación de Fray Gerónimo Descobar, de la
Orden de San Agustin sobrel caracter e costumbres de los
indios de la provincia de Popayân", in Jacinto Jijón y
Caamaño, Sebastian de Benalcâzar (2 vols., Quito, 1936-
1938), pp.150-151, 162-164; Peter Marzahl, Town in the
Empire: Government, Politics, and Society in Seventeenth
Century Popayân (Austin, Texas, 1978), pp.7-B, and
Mollien, Travels in the Republic of Colombia, p.299.
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Hernãndez, left Anserina in 1540, crossed the Western
Cordillera, and, following Indian trails, discovered the
headwaters of a river which he thought to be the Atrato,
but which Romoly believed was most probably the Andagueda -
a tributary of the Atrato. The resistance of the
indigenous inhabitants of the region - compounded by the
Spaniards' lack of food - forced the party to return to the
Cauca Valley. The Spaniards suffered one or two casualties
and two of the party were injured. 42 It was said, however,
that Gámez Hernândez had travelled across a considerable
expanse of territory.43
Another expedition was planned to leave Anserma, under
the command of Capitán DIa Sanchez de Narvâez, in the early
l550s. This expedition appears never to have been
undertaken, since it was stopped by the Audiencia in 1553,
in response to a royal cédula of June 1549 prohibiting
further expeditions of discovery. But it is interesting
from our point of view because it shows not only that the
leaders and members of expeditions to the Chocó expected to
derive immense benefits from the discovery of gold deposits
in the region, but also intended to prevent, with its
conquest, the flight of Indians from Anserina to the Chocó
42 These Indians, like those encountered by Heredia
along the Atrato, were said to live in houses that were
built in trees. Their means of defense consisted of darts
and arrows. Fray Pedro Simôn, Noticias Historiales,
Vol.V, Noticia 3, Chapter I, pp.279-280; and Romoly, "El
Alto Chocó", p.14. Melo believes that the river
discovered by Gáinez HernAndez was probably the San Juan.
See Melo, Historia de Colombia, p.133.
" ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.5-37.
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region. It was said that many Indians fled from the city
to join the still unconquered Indians of the ChocO, and
that some had actually returned to the city following
rumours of Sanchez de Narváez's entrada ( expedition of
entry) . In 1557, Francisco Gómez Hernández made one
further unsuccessful attempt to penetrate the region from
the Cauca Valley, followed by an immediate and equally
unsuccessful attempt at penetration up the Atrato. 45 Then,
in the mid-sixteenth century, Spanish interest in the
Pacific lowland areas declined markedly, as richer, easier
returns became available elsewhere.
Colonization in New Granada
Two main regions awoke the interest of the Spaniards
who settled the lands of the interior. Although the
highlands of the Eastern Cordillera contained a few placer
deposits and the important emerald mines of Muzo and
Somoridoco, relatively few gold mines were discovered in the
area. Nevertheless, the region became a focal point of
Apparently, Sanchez de Narváez had been ordered to
conduct the campaign by the governor of Popayán,
Francisco Briceño. He challenged the Audiencia's decision
not to authorize the entrada, on the grounds that, given
the number of expeditions already conducted to the area,
this one could not be classed as an expedition of
discovery. By 1562, however, the expedition had not yet
been conducted. Dia Sanchez de Narváez had apparently
financed the purchase of horses, arms, and supplies, and
the payment of the soldiers by borrowing between four and
six thousand pesos from vecinos of Anserma. Presumably,
the gold obtained in the Chocó was to be used to repay
these debts. See ibid.
' Fray Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales, Vol.V,
Noticia 4, Chapter VIII, pp.397-399, and Chapter XI,
pp. 410-411.
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Spanish settlement because it was inhabited by a large,
dense, hierarchically organized population, which was
supported by an intensive sedentary agriculture and by a
system of commercial exchange with Indian tribes in other
parts of the country. The existence of peaceful native
groups, living within a relatively advanced social,
political, and economic order encouraged the establishment
of a network of Spanish towns, dedicated to the supply of
agricultural products to these towns and to the mining
settlements that were beginning to emerge in neighbouring
regions. It was here that the Audiencia of Santa Fe was
established in 1549, with its seat in Santa Fe de Bogotã.
More crucial to the future development of the Chocô
was the establishment of the Spaniards in the Cauca region
and the Antioquian region of the Central Cordillera. While
the Indian groups discovered in these areas could not
compare with the Chibchas in social and economic
complexity, they, too, were relatively large, and boasted
well-organized agricultural lands, and a tradition of
native gold mining that led to the rapid development of a
gold mining industry and the establishment of several
Spanish towns in the vicinity. 47 Indeed, during the
sixteenth century, the qobernación of Popayán was the
46 For an analysis of the early development of the
colonial economy in New Granada, see McFarlane, "Economic
and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada",
pp.2-26, especially 7, 10, 14-15. See also Colmenares,
Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.32.
" McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the
Viceroyalty of New Granada", p.7.
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largest of the four provinces created by the Conquest -
Santa Marta, Cartagena, the New Kingdom, and Popayán - and,
until the establishment of the province of Antioquia in
1563, it also enjoyed almost complete independence from the
Audiencias of Santa Fe and Peru.48
Thus, the discovery of rich and extensive gold mines
in New Granadan territory marked the end of the looting and
pillaging that had characterized the first three decades of
Spanish colonization of the mainland, and the beginning of
a more thorough exploitation of precious metals. As a
result, several mining districts, based on both vein and
placer deposits, were developed in the interior. 49 One
major mining district was established along the eastern
flank of the Cordillera Central, overlooking the Magdalena
Valley. This region extended from the mines of Remedios,
which were later transferred close to Zaragoza and became
particularly significant in th 15s, to t'os ot
discovered in 1543. Also included within this district
were the important gold and silver deposits of Mariquita,
exploited after 1543, and the gold vein mines of Ibagué,
opened in the l580s. Another mining district, situated
close to the city of Pamplona, at the northern end of the
Eastern Cordillera, was first exploited in 1552. To the
west of the country, along the banks of the Cauca river,
48 Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de
Colombia, pp.17-18.
' For a study of the development of New Granada's
mining districts, see Robert C. West, Colonial Placer
Mining in Colombia (Baton Rouge, 1957), pp.9-34.
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the gold-producing region of Anserrna-Cartago was discovered
by the Robledo expedition of 1539-1540, and included the
mines of Arma and Caramanta. In the upper Cauca region,
another major raining district was established in the
vicinity of the city of Popayán, where mines were already
being worked in 1544. Gold deposits were also discovered
to the south of the city of Popayán, leading to the
foundation of Almaguer, in 1551. The gold deposits of the
Cerro de Buriticá, at the northern end of the Cordillera
Central, were exploited after 1541, and from there
Spaniards spread out to the placers of Santa Fe de
Antioquia. By the 1580s, the rich gold mines of Cáceres
and Zaragoza had been added to this district.50
The discovery of Câceres, in 1576, and Zaragoza, in
1581, temporarily postponed a recessiri in tne itkiniri
sector, caused by the exhaustion of the gold deposits
discovered during the first decades of settlement in the
interior, and the decline of the native population, which
supplied the mining enterprises with labour. Other new
deposits were also discovered within the older mining
districts: in 1597, for example, an important new source
was found in the vicinity of Almaguer. However, by the end
of the sixteenth century, the levels of gold production
registered in Câceres, in Zaragoza, and in the recently
incorporated mines of Remedios, far surpassed those
registered in other regions. This increase in production
was reflected in the levels of transatlantic trade, which
° Ibid., pp.9-14, 20-34.
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rose to a peak between 1590 and 1610.51 However, in the
1570s, the first signs of crisis also appeared in the
mining sector, due to the exhaustion of the gold deposits
discovered in the interior and the decline of the native
population. It was at this time, prior to the discovery of
the mining districts of Cáceres and Zaragoza, that a new
attempt was made to locate the rich mines that were already
known to exist in the Chocó, and that the first effective
expedition of conquest and colonization to the Chocó was
organized, in 1573.
As German Colinenares argued, the survival of New
Granada's mining economy depended on the continuous
incorporation of new deposits to replace the exhausted
mines. Productivity had to be maintained at high levels
because gold fuelled commercial exchange with the
metropolis, and financed both the supply of European goods
to the colonists and the introduction of slaves needed to
replace a rapidly decreasing native labour foroe52
doubt these considerations, together with the need to put
an end to repeated Indian attacks against Spanish
settlements in the Cauca Valley and against Spaniards
travelling along the trails linking the city of Cali with
Anserma and Cartago, led the Governor of Popayán, Don
Gerónimo de Silva, to order Melchor Velasquez to undertake
51 Colmenares, Historia EconOmica y Social de
Colombia, pp.264, 272, 312, 317, 334-335, and NcFarlane,
"Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New
Granada", p.18.
52 For an analysis of New Granada's mining cycles,
see ibid., pp.257-276.
43
the pacification of the Chocô and Chanco Indians, in
October 1572. Velasquez was instructed to found one or two
Spanish settlements in Chanco territory and several more in
Chocó territory. 53 This decision marked the beginning of
two decades of a partial Spanish occupation of the Chocô.
First Colonization in the Chocó
In fact, the territory where Velasquez was to settle
was more than simply that of the Chanco and Chocó Indians.
Kathleen Roinoly's careful study of the sources relating to
this period of more prolonged Spanish contact with native
groups in the Upper Chocô - the region extending from Cape
Corrientes to just beyond the mouth of the San Juan river -
shows that the Chocó and Chanco Indians were only two of
nineteen different native Indian groups inhabiting the
region in the 157Os. Romoly's work on this period
provides the first firm indications of both the number of
Indian tribes inhabiting this region and of their identity.
Although the size of the sixteenth century population
cannot be established with any certainty, Romoly concluded,
on the basis of a thorough analysis of estimates made at
the time of the first Spanish contacts with native groups
and of later reports, that the total population numbered
For the background to the expedition of 1573, see
Roinoly, "El Alto Chocó", pp.14-15. As late as 1598, Chocó
Indians destroyed the town of Caramanta. Colmenares,
Historia Econôrnica .' Social de Colombia, p.338. See also
Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.46-53.
For Romoly's list of the Upper Chocó's pre-
conquest tribes, see "Las Gentes", pp.27-29.
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between 35,000 and 40,000. Each Indian group, Roinoly
observed, was independent and autonomous within a limited
area, and an uninhabited neutral zone separated each Indian
I provjnce II
 from the others. The northernmost Tootuma
groups, for example, inhabited an area lying at a distance
of two to three days from their nearest Chocó neighbours.56
However, relations between different Indian provinces were
not uniform. Although, in general terms, these were
characterized by distrust and by occasional warring
expeditions against each other, alliances between native
groups did exist. While the Chanco allied, at least
occasionally, with the Chiloma and the Coponamá, a Botabirá
enclave survived within Noanama territory, and the Chocó
were on friendly terms with both the Tatainá and the
Tootuma. 57 The attitude of Indian groups in the Chocó to
the Spaniards also varied greatly, and it was this
diversity that both determined the pattern of settlement
established by the Spaniards in the region and limited
their expansion.
The expedition which left the town of Roldanillo in
May 1573 under the command of Meichor Velasquez, a vecino
of Buga, represented the first successful attempt to
establish a Spanish foothold on the Pacific side of the
Ibid., pp.37-48, especially, p.48.
56 Ibid., p.29.
Indeed, the Tootuina informed the Spaniards that
going to war with the cacique was one of the duties of a
subject. Ibid., p.32. on this subject, see also Chapter 5
of this thesis.
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Western Cordillera. Between May and November 1573, the
party, which was composed of 94 armed men, 2 priests, and
2 Dominican friars, founded the city of Nuestra Señora de
la Consolacián de Toro on the banks of the Chancos river,
within the jurisdiction of the city of Cartago, explored
the provinces of Yngará and Tootuma, and carried out an
expedition, led by Capitân Pedro Moriones, to the province
of Chocô. By December 1573, Toro had been transferred to
a site within Tootuma territory. For reasons that are not
entirely clear, Velasquez's group had been amicably
received by both the Yngará and Tootuma nations: in
addition to being housed and fed, the intruders were
provided with considerable numbers of Indians to serve in
expeditions of exploration to neighbouring areas.58
Indeed, Roinoly believed that the Indians who took part in
an expedition to the province of Chocô in September 1575
were Yngará. Indians. On this occasion, the city of Nuestra
Señora del Socorro de Ocaña was established, but, due to
the resistance of the Chocô, the city was abandoned three
days later.59
In December 1575, a second Spanish city, Nuestra
Señora de la Concepción de Cáceres, was established by
Francisco Redondo on the eastern edge of the province of
Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", pp.15-18. See also Fray
Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7,
Chapter I, pp.234-235. Priests and friars accompanied
this expedition because Governor de Silva instructed
Meichor Velasquez to attempt to indoctrinate the region's
native population. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia
documental.
Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.35.
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Chanco, about 25 leagues from Toro. 6° Although
repartimientos of Indians were made in Cáceres - the
sources show 25 encomenderos receiving 1,720 Indians -
Romoly believed, and the subsequent history of the region
would seem to suggest, that these were probably never made
effective. Despite a continuous Spanish presence in
Câceres, in 1582, Fray Jeránimo de Escobar reported that
the 3,000 Indians of the district remained unconquered, and
that less than 20 had been baptized. Nevertheless, in
1583, it was also reported that the city had stable
residents, some form of municipal organization, a parish
priest, and in addition, had achieved some agricultural
development 61
In 1578, after having obtained the title of governor
of the newly-established qobernaciôn of Chocó, Melchor
Velasquez led another expedition, from 'roro, into the
region occupied by the Chocô Indians. On this occasion,
60 It is not entirely clear why Redondo was
commissioned to enter Chocô territory at the same time as
Melchor Velasquez was conducting his entradas. See
Roinoly, "El Alto Chocó", pp.19, 25-26. See also Ortega
Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.75-81. A villa of
Cáceres had earlier been established by Redondo within
Chanco territory, but it had been abandoned.
61 Ibid., p.26. For the repartimiento that was
carried out in Cáceres, see ibid., Table 1, p.27,
"Relación de Fray Gerónimo Descobar, in Jijôn y Caamaflo,
Sebastian de Benalcázar, pp.165-166. Fray Gerônimo was at
that time the Procurador General of the province of
Popayân. See Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.37. The right to
make repartimientos de indios was granted to Meichor
Velasquez under the terms of the instructions given to
him by Governor de Silva. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia
documental. It is unlikely, however, that these were ever
made effective, given the mobility which characterized
the Indians of the region.
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the Spaniards appear to have been at least temporarily
successful: a new Spanish settlement, the city of Santiago,
was founded within the province sometime during or just
after November 1578. However, Santiago does not appear to
have survived for long; by 1580, the settlement had
disappeared, and may indeed have met a violent end. 62
 In
spite of repeated failures, Velasquez continued in his
attempts to extend the territory under his control. In
1588, he carried out a final, and again unsuccessful,
entrada into the province of Chocô; two years later, he
organized and led an overland expedition to the province of
Noanama, in which 40 Spanish soldiers were killed in an
Indian ambush. Two or three months later, Velasquez's son,
Melchor Velasquez - Melchor "el mozo" - led a further
expedition to the Noanamas, only to find desolation,
possibly as a result of a serious smallpox epidemic.63
In January 1592, Velasquez resigned as governor of the
Chocô, and was replaced, in February 1593, by Melchior
Salazar, a vecino of Cartago. During Salazar's period as
governor, Spanish mines and encomiendas in the occupied
provinces suffered attacks from Chocó, Tatamá, and Noanama
Indians. Upon his arrival in the Chocó, Salazar
immediately sent out punitive expeditions in several
62 Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20; Romoly, "Las
Gentes", p.34.
Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20; Romoly, "Las
Gentes", pp.31-2. For an account of the expeditions
carried out by Velasquez between 1588 and 1590, see Fray
Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7,
Chapter II, pp.237-240.
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directions, and ordered the withdrawal of certain mining
camps that had been established on the outer edge of the
occupied territories, bordering with the province of
Noanama. In addition, he organized an expedition,
undertaken between March and May 1593, which explored the
San Juan river region and discovered the Calima river.
Despite violent encounters with the Noanama, this
expedition returned with a booty of maize, gold, captured
Indians and canoes.
Despite Salazar's successes in the region, and despite
the existence of several rich mining camps along the
Yarrarna, Tuturrupi, and Negro rivers, by 1595, the
gobernaciôn of Chocó had been suppressed, and the district
of Toro had been incorporated into the gobernaciOn of
Popayân. The 'city' of Toro was transferred to a new site
on the banks of the Cauca river and Cäceres simply ceased
to exist. Although Salazar would later attempt to regain
the gobernaciôn, he was not successful. This was, it was
said, the result of the divisions that had emerged between
the Spanish residents of Toro. However, Spanish problems
in the Chocó were undoubtedly compounded by the
difficulties involved in supplying the area, due to its
geographical isolation. Neither horses nor beasts of
burden could be employed over sixteen of the more than
Roinoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20. For a description
of Salazar's activities as governor of the Chocô, see
Fray Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia
7, Chapter III, pp.241-244, and Chapter IV, pp.245-248.
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eighteen leagues that separated Toro from Cartago. 65 In
spite of the wealth that was already known to exist in the
Chocó, few Spaniards risked living there: in 1583, only 50
Spaniards resided in Toro, of which 28 were said to be
encornenderos. In addition, in 1582, it was said that no
priest was willing to reside there either, as two had
already died en route to the town.
Indian resistance also hindered Spanish colonization
of the region, as the survival of the Spaniards in Chocô
territory depended on native cooperation. The
establishment of the Spaniards in Toro had been possible
only because they had been accorded a relatively friendly
reception by the Yngará and Tootuma Indians. Indeed,
according to the Dominican Fray MartIn de Medrano, 1,000
Yngará Indians had been provided for the exploration of the
province of Tootuma. VelâsqDez was aoe to move Toro o
Tooturna territory because their presence there had been
65 Rornoly, "El Alto Chocô", pp.19, 21-22, 24; Fray
Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7,
Chapter III, pp.242-243, and Chapter IV, pp.247-248; and
Colmenares, Historia Econômica y Social de Colombia,
p.275. However, a royal cédula of 1634 noted that Toro
had been abandoned because of an Indian uprising. This
cédula, which authorized Don Juan Vélez de Guevara y
Salamanca to undertake and entrada to the ChocO in order
to "reduce" and pacify the native population and
reestablish both the city and the mines of Toro stated
that "the mines of Toro... are depopulated having
previously been very useful to my royal treasury and
their value ceased [due to] some Indians
having.. .rebelled.. .". See AGI Santa Fe 357, Royal
Cédula, Madrid, 27 September 1634.
Romoly, "El Alto ChocO", p.20; "RelaciOn de Fray
GerOnimo Descobar", in JijOn y Caamaño, Sebastian de
Benalcãzar, p.165. According to Fray GerOnimo, Toro only
had 24 residents, many of whom were either mestizos or
mulatos.
51
accepted by the Indians, who also provided the intruders
with food and housing. 67 However, despite the foundation
of two cities and several mining camps, Spanish expansion
in the Chocô was limited by the resistance of neighbouring
Indian groups. 68 All attempts to penetrate Chocó and
Noanama territory, for instance, were fiercely resisted,
and, as the attacks carried out by the Chocó, Noanama and
Tatamá Indians on Spanish mines in 1593 suggest, any
attempt to move beyond the boundaries of the occupied
territories were met with violence. Salazar had had to
order the withdrawal of the mining camps that had been
established on the Tuturrupi river, which bordered with the
Noanamas. It was also reported that, in 1592, one Capitán
Luis Franco and two other Spaniards had been killed by
Chocô Indians, for penetrating Chocó territory in search of
gold. That same year, the Noanama also killed nine Indians
working for Capitán Diego de Paredes, who had established
an estancia on the banks of the Yarrama river, which also
bordered with the Noanamas. Moreover, as Romoly pointed
out, although the city of Toro was never attacked, the
Chocô terrorized the Yngará for consenting to Spanish
occupation, and the disappearance of the latter tribe over
the following years was due more to the attacks of the
former than to the effects of Spanish colonization.69
67 Romoly, "El Alto Chocô", p.17.
68 Ibid., pp.22-23.
69 Ibid., p.22. See also Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.32-
33, 35.
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It must also be said that the methods of pacification
employed by the Spaniards during this period did not
encourage amicable relations. The expedition sent into the
province of Chocô in 1573 under the command of Pedro
Moriones represented the first contact between Spaniards
and Chocô Indians since Gómez Hernández's expedition of
1540, and was intended as the first step in an expected
process of pacification. However, as the Dominican Fray
MartIn de Medrano's account makes clear, the methods
adopted by the Spaniards included an attack on an Indian
settlement, the capture of Indians, and the theft of gold
and jewels. Similar methods were employed during the
expedition to Noanama territory in 1593: houses and maize
crops were burned, Indians were captured, and canoes were
taken. 7° It was not until the middle of the next century
that a more peaceful approach to native groups in the
region was adopted by the Spaniards. Of course, as we
shall see, by that time their numbers had dwindled to the
point of extinction, in the case of some Indian groups.
The Chocó in the Late 16th and Earl y 17th Centuries
Despite the suppression of the gobernaciôn of Chocó,
Spanish interest in the region did not disappear. Fray
Pedro Simon reports two expeditions up the Atrato from
Urabá. The first of the expeditions, which was organized
° Romoly, "El Alto ChocO", pp.17, 23, and Romoly,
"Las Gentes", pp.33-34. See also Fray Pedro SimOn,
Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7, Chapter I,
p.235, and Chapter IV, pp.246-247.
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and led by Pedro Martin Dávila, left Santa Fe de Antioquia
in 1596, and reached the Oromira (or Sucio) river in 1597,
only to be forced back by hunger and sickness. The
following year, the governor of Cartagena, Pedro de Acufla,
sent a large vessel to sail up the Atrato. This expedition
sailed for 130 leagues and passed the Oromira before
encountering any Indians. The party also returned to
Cartagena after six Spaniards had been killed by Indians.
Even so, as Colmenares points out, the abundance of gold
extracted from the mines of Toro survived in the
imagination of the miners of the Cauca Valley.7'
Renewed exploration focused on previously neglected
areas in the lower Chocô region. From the very beginning
of contact, the Spaniards had been aware of the existence
of many other Indian groups in the Lower Chocô, the region
extending to the north of Cape Corrientes. As we have
seen, many of the expeditions undertaken from the Gulf of
Urabá had had encounters with Indian groups along the
Atrato. The only account of Meichor Velasquez's expedition
of 1573 also mentions several native groups that were known
71 Colmenares, Historia EconOmica y Social de
Colombia, p.275. See also Fray Pedro Simon, Noticias
Historiales, Vol.V, Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.181; Vol.VI,
Noticia 7, Chapter V, pp.249-252, Chapter VI, pp.255-256,
and Chapter VII, p.258. Other Spaniards are also
mentioned in the sources as having led expeditions to the
ChocO, such as, for example, Juan de Cavalla, and
CristObal Quintero. Published documents relating to
sixteenth century Spanish activities in the region also
show that the Crown and the Audiencia entered into
contracts with other individuals planning entradas, such
as Lucas de Avila. There are very few details about
these, however. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental,
pp.67-74, 83-90.
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to inhabit the western side of the Atrato between Cape
Corrientes and Panama and which were thought to be enemies
of the Chocó. 72 The region lying to the east of the
Atrato, at least as far south as the Rio Sucio, was also
inhabited by Indians, whom Trimborn thought to be Cuevas.
Meanwhile, Fray Pedro Simon referred to the numerous native
Indian groups whose settlements were dotted along the banks
of the many rivers that emptied into the Darien (Atrato)
river. 73 It was to this region - particularly to the
province of Citará - that the Spaniards would direct their
attention when a new attempt at colonization was made at
the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Renewed attempts at expansion coincided once again
with declining gold production in other areas of the
colony: the prosperity that resulted from the discovery of
Cáceres, Zaragoza, and Remedios, was followed by a
prolonged period of recession, which began at the turn of
the century and became acute by the 1630s. 	 Although
72 According to Fray Martin de Medrano's account, "on
the other side of the River Darien and towards Cape
Corrientes [and towards] Panama and Nombre de Dios it was
known that there were very large numbers of Indians [who
were] enemies of the Chocoes, among whom were the
province of Guaxi and the province of Aguagaxi and the
province of Obuesuna.. . the province of the Chiquytos and
Cebana Indians whom the Chocoes call Mundabida which are
said to be [impossible to] number and below lies the
province of Perena where it is said. .. [is situated] the
house of the Devil whom the Spaniards call Dabaybe and
later the province of Peaberna and then below the
province of Indian women. . .who are called Caciguayas who
do not have men but only women". Transcribed in Romoly
"El Alto ChocO", p.18.
See, for example, Fray Pedro SimOn, Noticias
Histcriales, Vol.V, Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.180, and
Vol.VI, Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.234.
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regional variations in gold production did occur, the
Antioquian region was particularly affected by the
recession. The virtual elimination of the native
population, compounded by the region's geographical
isolation and the absence of an adequate agricultural base,
forced mine owners in this region to import many basic food
supplies and to invest heavily in the importation of a
slave labour force, raising the cost of mining operations
considerably. A high mortality rate among slaves, caused
by both labour in the mines and an inadequate diet,
resulted in declining levels of gold production, which in
turn prevented mine owners from maintaining sufficiently
high levels of investment in slaves. Although other
regions were less affected - Popayán was able to depend on
the recently discovered mines of Caloto and on the
development of agricultural activities in the province -
there is no doubt that in terms of total production the
colony was undergoing a serious mining crisis. For
example, the decline in gold production levels in the Santa
Fe mining district became very marked between 1630 and
1644.	 While in the five year period between 1625-29,
451,180 pesos were registered in Santa Fe,
	 the
corresponding figure for 1640-44 was only 96,910. Gold
production in the Antioquia mining district, where
1,122,994 pesos were registered in 1625-29, fell to 437,414
in 1640-44. Gold production in the Popayân district fell
from 179,396 in 1625-29, to 46,500 in 1640-44. Moreover,
the reduction of total gold output was immediately
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reflected in the levels of trade conducted through the port
of Cartagena, which declined rapidly after 1610.
As had occurred in the 1570s, the survival of the
colony's mining economy once more had to depend on the
incorporation of new mining districts, and it was during
this period of crisis that several new attempts were made
to occupy the Chocó, both from the Gulf of tlrabá, and the
Cauca Valley. The first of these expeditions, led by
Francisco Maldonado Saavedra, left San Sebastian de
Buenavista in February 1622. Despite the size of the
Spanish force - 800 people were taken in total, including
many women, children, and servants - Maldonado's attempt
proved to be a complete disaster: in addition to countless
desertions, the Spaniards suffered food shortages, disease,
and attack from Indians along the lower Atrato area. This
was perhaps the last attempt to conquer the Darien from
Urabá.75
As we shall see in Chapter 2, during the first
decades of the seventeenth century, the Spanish
inhabitants of Popayän and Cali were beginning to expand
their activities to the southern region of the Pacific
littoral, to the south of the port of Buenaventura. See
Colmenares, Historia Econôruica y Social de Colombia,
pp.273-274, 315-317, 333-336, 338, 342-343. See also
McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the
Viceroyalty of New Granada", p.18.
' Interestingly, the Crown appears to have taken
some interest in this expedition, appointing Maldonado as
Governor and Captain General of the provinces of Darien -
which were to be independent of both Cartagena and
Antioquia - and ordering that 400 men should participate
in the expedition. 250 of these were to be taken from
Spain, and of these, 50 were to be accompanied by their
wives and families. However, only 30 left Spain with
their wives and families, and only 80 of the expected 250
Spaniards eventually took part in the expedition. See
Fray Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Chapters
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The expedition which left Anserma in 1628 under the
command of Martin Bueno de Sancho, accompanied by 12
soldiers, represented the first attempt to reach the
headwaters of the Atrato river - early Spanish activity in
the area was mostly concentrated in the mining region of
the upper San Juan - and conquer the province of Citará.76
Aided by the Tatamá, and possibly the Chocó, the Spaniards
reached the province of Citará and attacked an Indian
settlement, capturing or killing 100 Indians before
returning safely to Anserma. A second attempt, made by
Martin Bueno de Sancho ten years later, ended in disaster,
despite the assistance of 200 Tatamá Indians. After
tempting the Spaniards on board a large number of Indian
canoes with promises of aid and food supplies for an
expedition to the province of "Ynbocona" (possibly
Membocana), who were thought to inhabit the eastern side of
the Atrato, the Indians attacked and killed the entire
company, with the exception of a few women and children: it
was said that the Spaniards were decapitated and that their
teeth were torn out. Following the attack on the
expedition, the Citarâ and the Tatamá retreated northwards
to the Arquia river for fear of reprisals. The Spaniards,
for their part, responded by sending at least two punitive
expeditions to the area to avenge the deaths of Martin
Bueno and his men.	 Capitàn Fernando Oslo y Salazar
LIX-LXI, pp.483-497.
The following account of Martin Bueno de Sancho's
entradas is based on Isacsson, "Fray Matias Abad",
pp.457-62.
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penetrated the region and killed approximately 80 Citará
Indians; he was followed, in 1640, by Gregorio Céspedes y
Guzmân who killed 25 Indians and captured 30.
Although very little is known about these entradas,
the information that is available indicates that the
methods of pacification employed by the Spaniards at the
beginning of the seventeenth century were similar to those
employed during earlier attempts at conquest. The native
response - clearly conditioned by inter-tribal relations -
had not changed either. As noted above, the success of the
Spaniards' exercise in colonization in the 1570s had been
based on the collaboration of the Tootuma and Yngará
nations, while the failure of all further attempts to
expand the region under Spanish control had been caused by
the violent resistance of surrounding Indian provinces.
Similarly, the Spaniards' success in first reaching, and
then attacking a Citará settlement in 1628 depended on the
cooperation of the Tatamã and possibly the Chocô, which
suggests that Indian groups of the Chocô region were
willing occasionally to ally with the Spaniards against
others with whom they were at war. The same occurred in
1645, when 380 Citará Indians apparently accompanied an
expedition led by Pedro Santiago Garcés to the province of
Meinbocana, in the Baudô river region. The Membocana were
said to be enemies of the Citarâ. However, the response of
the Tatainâ to the Citará attack on Martin Bueno in 1638,
suggests that the Indians of the region were equally
willing, and indeed likely, to ally with groups with whom
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they were previously at war - it was said that the Tatainâ,
too, were enemies of the Citarã - to either defeat the
Spaniards or retreat from them out of fear of reprisals.
Despite the lack of success of these attempts to
conquer and colonize the Indians of the Chocó region, its
immense wealth continued to attracted the attention of the
Spanish inhabitants of neighbouring regions, conditioned
also by the fact that the recession in the mining industry
continued unabated. If the recession was to be halted, and
the gold deposits of the Chocô were to incorporated into
the mining districts, the Indian inhabitants of the region
would have to be pacified. By the middle of the
seventeenth century, however, the task of the Spaniards'
was facilitated by one crucially important factor: the
resistance of the region's Indians had been badly weakened
by serious demographic decline. The impact of the decline
on Indian resistance, and the Spaniards' activities in the
region after mid-century, will form the subject of Chapter
2.
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CHAFFER 2
TIlE CROWN AND THE COLONIZATION
OF THE CHOCO, 1656-1674
From the mid-1660s, the Spanish Crown began to take a
much greater interest in the pacification of the Chocô
provinces, issuing several cédulas designed to promote the
peaceful penetration of the region and the Christianization
of its native population. During the first half century of
the Spanish occupation of the mainland, repeated attempts
had been made to penetrate the Chocô, first, from the Gulf
of Urabâ, and then from the Pacific coast. Following the
conquest of the interior, and the establishment of a mining
economy with its associated mining cycles, further attempts
were made - from bases to the north and east of the Chocó -
to incorporate the many rich gold deposits that were known
to exist in the region within the older mining districts,
in order to redress the effects of recession in the mining
industry. Due to the nature of inter-tribal relations,
some successes were achieved among certain tribes: the
twenty-year occupation of Toro, for instance, was the
result	 of	 Indian	 collaboration	 with	 Spanish
expeditionaries. However, these successes were always
short-term, and were limited by the resistance and
aggression of neighbouring Indian groups.
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The Crown and the Con quest of the Chocô
The Spanish Crown's growing interest in the
pacification of the Chocó was a response to the
recommendations of the President of the Audiencia of Santa
Fe, Don Diego de EgQes y Beaumont. In November 1664, Don
Diego de EgUes advised the Spanish Crown that, as the
system of capitulaci ones 1 previously employed to promote
penetrations to the Chocó had failed to achieve the desired
results, these contracts should now be abandoned. Instead,
a major effort to conquer the Chocô region, which was
undoubtedly as rich as had been reported, should be
undertaken jointly by the governments of the surrounding
provinces - Antioquia, Panama, Popayán, and Cartagena.
Once the conquest had been completed, the provincial
governments would assume jurisdiction over the area each
had conquered. The President argued that, while he did not
favour the use of force to convert Indians to Catholicism,
the military conquest of the Chocô was fully justified by
the fact that its native population would not be peacefully
"reduced", and was more fiercely resistant to the Spaniards
than that of other regions.2
This was a notable departure from President Diego de
EgUes' usual policy regarding frontier Indians in the New
Kingdom, whom he considered to be "the most neglected and
For examples of capitulaciones entered into by the
Crown and individuals leading expeditions to the Chocô,
see Chapter 4 of this thesis.
2 AGI Quito 67, Don Diego de Egües y Beaumont to
Crown, Santa Fe, 25 November 1664.
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backward of his subjects". Indeed, EgUes, who governed New
Granada between 1662 and 1664, did much to foster the
missions on the colony's frontiers, particularly in the
Lianos region. In 1662, for instance, he organized the
Junta de Propaganda Fide, composed of the archbishop of
Santa Fe, the provisor (a cleric exercising a bishop's
judicial authority), the vicario general (art eccsatca1
judge with authority throughout the diocese), the prelates
of every religious order represented in the New Kingdom,
and the senior oidor of the Audiencia. The Junta, which
also included EgUes among its members, met once a week to
discuss the work of the church in New Granada, and it was
as a result of their deliberations that the Llanos region
was divided into five large territories, each of which was
assigned to one of the religious orders for the purpose of
converting the Indian population. In addition to placing
all Christianized Indians under royal protection, EgUes
prohibited any further armed entradas into the Llanos.3
Why the President of the Audiencia should have advised
a military conquest of the Indians in the Chocô, in view of
his policy towards the Indians of the Llanos frontier, can
only partly be explained by their history of violent
resistance to the Spaniards.
	 Two further factors
Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier, pp.52, 60.
According to Juan Manuel Pacheco, EgUes particularly
favoured the Jesuit order. See J.M. Pacheco, Los Jesuitas
en Colombia (2 vols., Bogota, 1959-1962), Vol.2, pp.187-
188. J.J. Borda, too, noted Egiles' special interest in
the New Kingdom's missions. See J.J. Borda, Historia de
la Cornpañia de Jesus en la Nueva Granada ( 2 vols., Paris,
1872), Vol.1, pp.126-127.
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influenced Egües' recommendations on the conquest of the
Chocó: first, he was concerned to provide the provinces of
Popayán and Antioquia with an overland route to Panama
through the Chocó; secondly, and most importantly, he was
acutely aware of the revenue that would accrue to the Royal
Treasury following its conquest4 - a crucial consideration
at a time of decreasing remittances to Spain. As we saw in
Chapter 1, at the beginning of the seventeenth century New
Granada entered a period of economic decline from which it
had not recovered by the 1660s. Colmenares' figures on
gold production in Popayân, for example, show that the
levels of production registered in the four year period
between 1656 and 1659 were the lowest for over a century.5
Production figures for the district of Antioquia - which
included the mines of Antioquia, Zaragoza, and Cáceres -
show a similar downward trend. 6 The quantities of gold
minted in the Casa de Moneda in Santa Fe also show the same
AGI Quito 67, Don Diego de EgUes y Beaumont to
Crown, Santa Fe, 25 November 1664.
From a peak of 344,825 pesos in 1595-99, levels of
gold production began to decline, falling to 159,850
pesos in 1630-34, 85,400 in 1635-39, 46,500 in 1640-44,
and 18,710 in 1656-59. See German Colmenares, Historia
EconOmica y Social de Colombia, Table 22, p.316.
6 Levels of production, which reached a peak of
1,748,526 pesos in 1595-99, fell sharply thereafter, to
1,122,994 in 1625-29, 437,414 in 1640-44, 131,326 in
1655-59, and a mere 109,756 in 1660-64. See ibid., Table
23, p.317.
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signs of crisis: less gold was minted between 1660 and 1664
than in the entire century between 1635 and 1739.
The potential benefit to be derived from the conquest
of the Chocó contrasted markedly with that which could be
expected from the pacification of the Lianos region - and
it is perhaps this difference which explains Egües'
contrasting policies towards the native populations of the
two regions. While some sections of the Llanos -
especially the Llanos of Casanare - had large sedentary
Indian populations and became important sources of
foodstuffs, livestock, cotton, and textiles, 8 these could
not compare with the gold deposits of the Chocô. Indeed,
in 1668, the governor of Popayán, Don Gabriel DIaz de la
Cuesta, suggested that the gold deposits discovered there
would lead to the recovery of all the provinces of the New
Kingdom. 9	By the	 -seventeenth ceritr'j, 	 t
conquest and settlement of the Chocó was officially
In the ten year period between 1650-54 and 1660-64,
gold minted in the Casa de Moneda in Santa Fe fell from
4.4 million grams to 1.6 million grams. Levels of gold
minted, measured in grams, would not again reach 4
million until 1720-24. Ibid., Table 25, p.323.
Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier, pp.52, 55.
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Popayán, 7 May 1668, f.130. This and the following
chapter draw on the documents contained in two
"Testimonios de Autos", both of which can be found in AGI
Quito 67. One of these was prepared by the Audiencia and
the other relates specifically to the Franciscan mission
in the Chocô. In order to differentiate between the two,
the first will be referred to as "Testimonio de Autos
(Audiencia)", and the second as "Testimonio de Autos
(Franciscans)".
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regarded as the key to the economic recovery of the entire
colony of New Granada.
Thus, on 27 November, 1666, the Spanish Crown issued
a royal cédula ordering the governors of Antioquia,
Popayán, and Cartagena, and the President of the Audiencia
of Panama, to begin the "reduction" of those sections of
Chocó territory which bordered with their own provinces.
Once the region had been pacified, each of the provincial
governments would assume jurisdiction over the area whose
pacification they had achieved. In this the Crown followed
Diego de EgUes' advice. However, its decision regarding
the methods by which this "reduction" process was to
proceed differed from those advocated by its president in
the Audiencia of Santa Fe. The cédula directed that the
pacification of the Indians was not to be achieved by
military conquest. Missionaries were to be sent to the
region from Spain, and while these were to be accompanied
by a military escort, arms were not to be used: the Indians
were to be "reduced" by preaching and good treatment alone.
And, echoing its decisions regarding the reduction of
Indians in other marginal parts of the empire, the Crown
decreed that the pacified Indians were to come under the
control of the Crown, were not to be distributed to
individuals in encornienda, and were to be exempt from
tribute payments for a ten-year period, unless, by
rebellion, they forfeited this privilege. The cédula made
one further provision that was to be significant for the
future development of events in the Chocó: while the
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Audiencia of Santa Fe was entrusted with the overall
coordination and administration of the enterprise, which it
was to assist in all possible ways, it was ordered to
ensure that this assistance did not take the form of
Treasury funds.'°
Thus, while the cédula incorporated some of the advice
of the former President of the Audiencia, it did not order
a full-scale military conquest. The pacification was to be
carried out, but the process was to be a peaceful one, and
it was to be conducted by missionaries. The combination of
interests that guided Spanish policy towards the region is
reflected in the words of the fiscal of the Council of the
Indies. In 1669, the fiscal noted that the conquest of the
Chocó and the subsequent exploitation of the region's gold
mines would benefit the royal treasury - as well as
promoting commercial activities in surrounding regions -
but he insisted that the Crown's principal objective was to
achieve the conversion of the native population." In the
Chocó, colonization and conversion were to go hand in hand.
'° AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27
November 1666, inserted in Royal Cédula, Madrid, 6 June
1674, ff.1-4. Some of the provisions included in this
cédula were not uncommon. C.H.Haring, for example, noted
in referring to the case of New Spain, that by cédulas of
1551 and later years, the Crown ordered that dispersed
Indians gathered into settlements organized by the friars
were to be exempted from tribute payments for ten years,
and that they were also promised that they would not be
distributed in encorniendas. See C.H. Haring, The Spanish
Empire in America (New York, 1975), footnote 65, p.65.
" See AGI Quito 67, Don Benito de Figueroa to Crown,
Cartagena, 2 July 1668. The fiscal's remarks are dated
Madrid, 24 May 1669.
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It was to be significant for the future of the Chocó
that although the Crown had instructed the governor of
Cartagena and the president of the Audiencia of Panama to
cooperate in this endeavour, neither participated in it.
Although we have no details to indicate why the president
of the Audiencia of Panama failed to make any moves towards
complying with the Crown's directive, we do know why the
governor of Cartagena chose not to take part in these
activities. In 1668, Governor Don Benito de Figueroa y
Barrantes informed the Crown of his reluctance to undertake
the "reduction" of the Indian population inhabiting the
area which bordered with the gobernación of Cartagena. He
reported that he had received a request from the president
of the Audiencia of Santa Fe to prepare 50 arme. 'itte.n
priests for entry to the Chocó, but that he had refused to
do so, given the danger involved in sending his men through
Urabá and Darien, a land known to be inhabited by "wild
Indians".'2 As we have seen, this region was inhabited by
Cunacuna Indians, who continued successfully to resist all
Spanish incursions into their territory, and it was for
this reason that the governor took the decision not to risk
his men in the planned entrada. Cartagena did not, then,
take part in the pacification of the Chocó: in 1672, the
Audiencia of Santa Fe reported that the governor of
12 Ibid., Royal Cédula to Governor Don Benito de
Figueroa y Barrantes, Madrid, 27 November 1666; and
Benito de Figueroa y Barrantes to Crown, Cartagena, 2
July 1668.
68
Cartagena had withdrawn from the enterprise completely.'3
Eventually, the main thrust of the drive to colonize the
region was to come from Antioquia and Popayán.
Before examining the role and competition of men from
these provinces in the Chocó, we will first review the
character of the region's native peoples and their
interaction with Spaniards in the first half of the
seventeenth century. We will see that the initial
resistance of the native peoples had been weakened by the
many changes that had taken place there since the
Spaniards' early attempts at conquest. Then, we will
return to the period after the royal cédula of 1666,
focusing in particular on the entradas carried out by
individuals from th two gobernaciones of Popayán and
Antioquia, and at the ensuing conflict between them. We
will see that, because of the Crown's unwillingness to
organize and finance expeditions of its own, and because of
the way in which it divided jurisdiction over the area
between neighbouring and competing gobernaciones, the royal
cêdula actually encouraged conflict among Spanish
colonists, which in turn facilitated the resistance of the
Indians. In the final section, we will consider the ways
in which the social structure and patterns of settlement of
the region's native population militated against the
success of the Spaniards' pacification campaign.
Ibid., Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe,
18 June 1672.
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The Chocó in the Mid-Seventeenth Century
The three Indian "provinces", as they are called in
the documents, which came under the control of the
Spaniards during the second half of the seventeenth century
inhabited a stretch of territory lying between the ArquIa
river, a tributary of the Atrato, and the mouth of the San
Juan river, as well as the eastern tributaries of both the
Atrato and the San Juan, and the three rivers lying to the
south of Buenaventura - the Anchicayá, Dagua, and Raposo.'4
In geographical terms, this section of the Chocô cut across
the regions which Kathleen Rornoly referred to by the names
of Upper and Lower Chocó - the former lying between Cape
Corrientes and Buenaventura, and the latter between Cape
Corrientes and Panama.'5
Our understanding of the pre-conquest history of the
Indian population of the Chocó is limited by the fact that,
although Romoly has undertaken a very careful analysis of
the tribes inhabiting the Upper Chocó when the first
contacts with the Spaniards took place, comparable work on
the Indians of the Lower Chocô has not been carried out.
Nevertheless, Romoly's studies show that 19 independent
Indian tribes inhabited the Upper Chocó area alone in the
pre-conquest period, and that their total population may
have ranged between 35,000 and 40,000 by the last quarter
14 Father Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó",
in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, Vol.2, pp.494-95. See also
Wasseri, "Etnohistoria chocoana", pp.17-19, and Vargas
Sariniento, "La fundaciôn de pueblos", Map 1, pp.58-9.
' Romoly, "El Alto Chocô", p.10.
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of the sixteenth century.'6 By the mid-seventeenth
century, many of these Indian groups, which had so
successfully subverted the Spaniards' attempts at conquest
during the previous century, no longer existed, and the
size of the surviving native population had declined
dramatically. There are few indications to explain why
certain groups disappeared during the years between the
1570s and the l660s, and what caused the numerical decline
of the remaining groups. Inter-tribal warfare probably
accounted for part of this decline. As Romoly noted, the
disappearance of the Yngará in the years following the
establishment of Toro had been primarily due to the attacks
of an Indian group to which she refers as the ChocO: the
latter terrorized the former for consenting to the Spanish
occupation. The Tootuma, who also collaborated with the
Spaniards,' 7 perhaps disappeared for the same reason. In
addition to inter-tribal warfare and warfare with the
Spaniards, the diseases the latter introduced accounted for
another proportion of the demographic decline. In 1590,
Meichor Velasquez conducted an expedition against the
Noanama, but he found only desolation in the province, as
a result, according to Fray Pedro Simon, of a "cruel
16 Roinoly, "Las Gentes", pp.37-48. The 19 tribes
Romoly identified as inhabiting the Upper Chocó region in
the pre-conquest period are the following: Botabirá,
Burgalandete, Cagacimbe, Cirambirà, Cobira, Coponama,
Chanco, ChocO, Ebirâ, Eripede, Guarra, Morirama, Noanama,
Orocubirâ, Sima, Tatama, Tatape, Tootuina, Yaco, Yngarâ.
See ibid., p.27.
' Romoly, "El Alto ChocO", p.22.
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pestilence which had overcome them one year earlier".'8
Romoly also found evidence to indicate rapid demographic
decline in the region to the south of Buenaventura in the
1560s and 1570s. A smallpox epidemic eliminated large
groups of Indians in 1566-67, and reduced the number of
Indian inhabitants of the region to a fraction of the total
number inhabiting the area in the years before contact with
the Spaniards took place.'9
Disease appears to have continueô. t
	 ti4c &z. tk'.
region's population well into the seventeenth century. In
1669, Francisco de Quevedo reported that, on his arrival in
Poya, he came across only two Indians suffering from
smallpox: the rest had abandoned the area out of fear of
his entrada and of contracting the disease. 2° The secular
priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva also reported that his
first attempt to establish a settlement and build a church
for the Noanaina Indians had to be abandoned "because they
all became ill of a great disease which struck them".2'
And, in 1672, the Spaniard Lorenzo de Salamanca referred to
18 Fray Pedro Simon, Noticias Historiales, Vol.6,
Chapter 2, p.240. See also Romoly, "El Alto ChocO", p.20,
and Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.31-32.
' See Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos
autOctonos", p.269.
20 AGI Quito 67, Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de
Noanaina, 15 May 1669, f.2.
21 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", Luis
Antonio de la Cueva's declaration, f.14.
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an outbreak of smallpox which had spread across the region
towards the end of 1670.22
Thus, by the mid-seventeenth century, few independent
indigenous groups of the Upper ChocO, at least, had
survived a century and a half of contact with the
Spaniards. For reasons we have already mentioned, the
impact of early contacts with the Spaniards on the native
groups that inhabited the region to the north of Cape
Corrientes is much more difficult to determine. We know
that three Indian groups which, in 1648, were said to
inhabit the territory to the west of the Atrato river - the
Burgumia, the Soruco, and the Membocana - remained
entirely outside of the Spaniards' sphere of activity for
the duration of the century. However, one Indian
"province" of the Lower Chocô, the Citará, came under the
control of the Spanish over the second half of the certt.try.
According to the Colombian anthropologist Patricia Vargas
Sarmiento, this Indian group also suffered serious
demographic decline as a result of contact with the
Spaniards, and a proportion of these consequently migrated
22 Ibid., Auto de Of icio, Popayán, 9 May 1672.
23 The region inhabited by these three groups cut
across both the Upper and Lower Chocó. According to
Isacsson, the Burgumia were also known by the names of
Poromea, Boromea, or Burumia. They inhabited the region
between the middle Atrato and the Pacific and were
enemies of the Chocô, the Citará, and the Noanama until
they disappeared, apparently, at the end of the
seventeenth century. See Isacsson, "Fray MatIas Abad",
footnote 22, pp.467-68. As we shall see in Chapter 4, in
the 1670s, the authorities in Popayán and Antioquia began
to consider proceeding against the Soruco, although I
have found no evidence to suggest that these campaigns
ever took place.
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northwards, to an area considered to fall within their own
territorial boundaries. 24
 The subsequent history of the
Citará, in particular, and of two of the Indian provinces
from the Upper Chocó, the Noanarna and the Tatamá/Chocó,
which also came under Spanish control over the same period,
will form one of the main themes of this thesis.
It must be said, by way of clarification, that the
Spaniards who began to enter the Chocó from the middle of
the seventeenth century gave several names to the
indigenous groups they encountered: Noanama, Raposo,
Citará, Citaravirá, Chocô, Tatamá, and Poya are names that
are often used to refer to the three principal Indian
provinces of the region. Some of the confusion can be
overcome at the outset. The province known by the name of
Raposo formed part of the Noanama group: in 1678, the
Jesuit, Father Antonio Marzal, who resided in the region
for six years, reported that the Indians living along the
Raposo river were Noanamas. 26 All the Noanama formed a
single language group, still known by the name of
Waunana. 27
 These, then, will be referred to throughout
this thesis as Noanama. Citará and Citaravirá were two
24 Vargas Sariniento, "La fundación de pueblos", p.63.
25 See, for example, Bartolomé Benitez's petition, in
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", ff.1-2;
Luis Antonio de la Cueva's statement, Sed de Cristo, 16
December 1670, in ibid., "Testimonio de Autos
(Franciscans)", ff.137-38; and ibid., Don Francisco de
Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669.
26 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.494-95.
27 Isacsson, "Emberâ", p.21.
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names used to refer to the same Indian group. 28 In this
thesis they will be referred to as Citará. The Citará
spoke a different language from the Noanama - known by the
name of Emberá. 29 However, the confusion regarding the
three remaining groups - the Chocó, Tatamá, and Poya - is
much more difficult to clarify. The Tatamâ and the Chocó
were identified by Kathleen Romoly as independent Indian
groups in the sixteenth century, 3° but, by the middle of
the seventeenth century, both Tatamâ and Chocó appear to
have inhabited either the same or adjoining territories,
since both names were used to refer to the Indians who
inhabited one region - the upper San Juan and headwaters of
the Atrato. In 1676, a former governor of Antioquia, Juan
Bueso de Valdés, conducted an entrada to the region, and
all the reports on his activities refer to the Indians
encountered in this area as Tatamâ. 	 o	 tsr, L
1678, Father Antonio Marzal referred to the Indians of the
same area as Chocô, and stated that the Poya, too, formed
28 Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundaciôn de pueblos", p.59.
29 Isacsson, "Emberâ", p.21, and Vargas Sarmiento,
"La fundación de pueblos", pp.58-9. In 1678, Antonio
Marzal reported that the Chocô and Citará "speak with
little difference one same language", and, in 1713, the
oidor Vicente de Aramburu noted that the language of the
Noanama Indians was different from that of the Chocó and
Citará, who shared one language. See Antonio Marzal,
"Informe sobre el Chocô", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas,
p.495, and AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown,
Santa Fe, 8 September 1713.
30 Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.27.
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part of the same group. 3 '	 In 1689, the governor of
Popayán, Don Gerónimo de Berrio, referred to the Chocó, the
Tatamá, and the Poya as distinct Indian groups. 32
 The
Audiencia also referred, in 1672, to the Poya, Tatamá, and
Chocó as different groups, while Governor Garcia, of
Popayân, distinguished only between the Chocô and the
Tatamá. 33 To confuse matters still further, these Indians
shared with the Citará what was said to be an almost
identical language as well as many other cultural traits.
For the sake of clarity, then, and in order to enable us to
differentiate between the Indian provinces with which this
thesis will be concerned, and between these and the entire
region known by the name of "El Chocó", the third group
will be referred to as Tatamá/Chocô. Although the Poya may
have been a distinct Indian group at some time before
In reporting on the number of Jesuit missionaries
that would be necessary for the region, in the event of
the order remaining there, Marzal reported that these
should reside in Poya, in the province of Chocô. See
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los
Jesuitas, p.505.
32 AGI Quito 75, Don Gerônimo de Berrio to Crown,
Popayán, 2 March 1689.
AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown,
Santa Fe, 18 June 1672, and AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel
Garcia to Crown, Popayân, 22 December 1674.
Isacsson, "Emberâ", p.21, and Vargas Sarmiento,
"La fundación de pueblos't , pp.58. Vargas Sarmiento's
short study of the impact of the Spanish advance on the
native population of this area after the mid-seventeenth
century, in particular, groups the Tatamá/Chocô and the
Citarâ under the term "Ember&". This division has not
been adopted in this thesis because, as we shall see, the
Citaraes' reaction to Spanish occupation of their
territory differed from that of all other Indian groups
in the region.
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contact with the Spaniards took place, and although they
were sometimes referred to as an independent group in the
documents, the overall impression that remains from a close
reading of these is that, if they did survive, their
numbers were insignificant by the mid-seventeenth century.
Although the information available does not allow us
to establish with any certainty the precise geographical
area occupied by the three different Indian provinces, we
know from Father Marzal's report that while a small
proportion of Noanarna Indians lived to the south of the
port of Buenaventura - along the Anchicayá, Raposo, and
Dagua rivers - the largest proportion lived along the San
Juan, between the mouth of that river and San Joseph de
Noanama, and along the Tarnaná, SipI, Garrapatas, and Negro
rivers. Marzal also reported that the province of
Tatainá/Chocó began where the River Tamanâ meets the San
Juan. 35 The northern limits of the Tatamá/Chocô cannot be
identified clearly, but, as we shall see in this and later
chapters, these Indians were to be congregated in
settlements lying to the south of the Andagueda river. The
region to the north of the Andagueda was inhabited by the
Citaraes. The northern limits of Citará territory appears
from the documents to lie along the ArquIa river,36
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.494.
36 Patricia Vargas considered that the region
surrounding the rivers ArquIa, Baberama, and Negua was
inhabited by an unidentified Indian group independent of
the Citará. See Vargas Sariniento, "La fundación de
pueblos", p.59. This assumption probably derived from the
1671 report of antioqueno priest, Antonio de Guzmán, who
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although, early in the eighteenth century, large groups of
Citará Indians moved further northwards, to the Murri and
the Sucio rivers, the latter bordering with Cunacuna
territory
The size of the population of the region is equally
difficult to estimate. Although there is no data to
indicate the size of the pre-conquest population of the
Lower Chocó, Romoly's figures for the Upper Chocô show that
that area alone supported a population of between 35,000
and 40,000 by the end of the sixteenth century. 38 However,
between the late the l660s and 1678, several censuses of
the native population of the region, especially of the
Tatamá/Chocô and the Citará, were carried out by the
Spaniards.	 By the latter date, according to Antonio
Marzal, the province of Noanama was composed of 130
tributaries and had a total population of 650. The
provinces of Chocó and Citará were each composed of 350
tributaries, and each had a total Indian population of
1,600. Considering that these were the three principal
native groups which inhabited the area encompassing both
the Lower and Upper Chocô, and that their combined total
observed that the area surrounding the Arqula river had
been inhabited by Indians known by the name of
"guaracues", who suffered repeated invasions and were
eventually defeated by the Citaraes. See Ortega Ricaurte,
Historia documental, p.111.
See Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this thesis.
38 Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.37-48.
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocô", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.494-495.
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population was estimated to number no more than 3,850, it
is clear that the Indians of the Chocó region had suffered
a catastrophic demographic decline over the previous
century.
Spanish Advances into Chocô Territory : 1610-1660
By the mid-seventeenth century, penetrations into
Chocô territory had been made by both payaneses and
antioqueños, although the former's attempts to establish a
foothold among the Noanama had been somewhat more
successful than the latter's attempts among the Citará.
There are few details to indicate the extent of the
Antioqueños' activities in the region before 1650, but we
do know that, in the mid-1640s, the gobernación of
Antioquia began moves to penetrate Citará territory by
peaceful means, and to pacify and reduce the native
population of the area. In 1645, the goe'rnor of
Antioquia, Antonio Portocarrero, sent two Indian prisoners
from the city of Antioquia to assure the native population
of his peaceful intentions. From that year on, accorJ,q
to Patricia Vargas, no further armed expeditions of
conquest were sent to the region from Antioquia. Instead,
these were replaced by small groups of Spaniards who
entered the region for the purpose of aiding their Indian
allies against their enemies, and attempting to evangelize
the population by means of gifts of tools, beads, and other
goods. Santiago Garcés' expedition of 1645, for example,
was carried out in response to a request from the Citaraes
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for aid against the Membocana, 4° who, as we have seen,
inhabited the western side of the Atrato river.
Antioquia's activities among the Citará, however, ended
after the death of the Franciscan Fray Matlas Abad in
1649 , 41
 whose efforts to convert the population of the
Atrato river region we will examine in Chapter 3.
The gobernación of Popayán focused its early
activities in the region around the San Juan and Raposo
rivers, and the port of Buenaventura, where it had achieved
considerable successes in pacifying the native population.
According to Robert West, the pacification of the Noanama
had already taken place by the 1630s, although he does not
provide any details to indicate how this had occurred.42
In 1678, Antonio Marzal also reported that the Noanama had
been permitting Spaniards into their territory for forty
years. 43 And, in 1669, the governor of Popayán, Don Luis
Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo, observed that the Noanaina had
been paying tributes to the Crown since 1663.
40 Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundaciôn de pueblos",
pp. 63 -65.
' Isacsson, "Fray Matlas Abad", pp.465-66.
42 West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia, p.93.
See Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocô", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.495-496.
AGI Quito 13, Luis Antonio de Guzmân y Toledo to
Crown, Quito, 26 April 1669.
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MAP 5
THE PACIFIC LOWLANDS
Source: West, Colonial Placer Mining, Maps 6
	 7, pp.19,
21.
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Why the province of Noanama - which had been one of
the most violently resistant to the Spanish in the
sixteenth century - should have been among the first to be
pacified in the seventeenth century, remains unclear.
However, it is possible that the pacification of the
Noanama occurred as an extension of Spanish campaigns
against the tribes that inhabited the southern section of
the Pacific lowlands - the Barbacoas region, and especially
the Raposo-Iscuandé regions. Little is known about the
native population of these areas, or about early Spanish
explorations there, but we do know that an expedition was
conducted to the Barbacoas region in 1600, which reached
the Telembi river and founded the settlement of Santa Maria
del Puerto. Because of the hostility of the Indian
inhabitants, and the difficulties involved in obtaining
food supplies, mining activities on a large scale did not
begin in Barbacoas until the last quarter of the
seventeenth century, although there are indications that
mining was taking place there and in the Iscuandé region
before mid-century. In 1610, Francisco RamIrez de la Serna
led a punitive expedition against several tribes - the
Timbas, Piles, Cacajairtbres, Paripesos - that are thought to
have inhabited the upper and middle sections of the Saija
and Micay rivers: these were said to have been raiding not
only the port of Buenaventura but also the gold mines in
the vicinity. We also know that, on this occasion, Ramirez
de la Serna came across and defeated a small "armada" of
Noanama Indians who were travelling to Buenaventura. By
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1630, Francisco de Prado y Züfliga was observing that the
rivers Patia, Micay, Tiinbiqul, and Iscuandé, were very rich
in gold deposits. By 1640, suggestions were being made to
open trails linking the ports of Santa Maria and Santa
Barbara (in the vicinity of the Timbiqul river) to Pasto
and Popayán. In 1646, there were said to be mines along
the Timbiqui. And in 1647, the governor of Popayán
complained that the Jesuit Francisco Ruje was employing
Indians to extract gold from the placers along the
TelembI. 45
 Indians captured in the southern Pacific
lowlands were also taken to Call, where they were sold or
given in encomienda to local families. The Ramirez party,
for instance, returned with 130 captives from the Timbes
tribes, and in 1630, there were said to be Indians in Call
from the lowland tribes of the Piles and Cacajambres. By
1665, mining camps had been established just south of
Buenaventura, and a mining zone, known as "Minas de la
Montafla de Raposo" had also been established, which
included the Calima area and the streams immediately to the
south of Buenaventura. 47 As we have seen, this region was
West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia, p.94;
West, Colonial Placer Mining, pp.19-20; Colmenares,
Historia EconOmica y Social de Colombia, pp.325-326; and
Wassen, "Apuntes EtnohistOricos", p.9. According to
Romoly, the earliest attempts to colonize this area were
made in the 1540s. See Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos
autóctonos", p.268.
46 West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia, p.94.
' For an account of early Spanish-Indian contact in
this region, see the two studies by West, Colonial Placer
Mining, pp.18-20; and The Pacific Lowlands, pp.94-97. See
also Colrnenares, Historia Econômica y Social de Colombia,
pp.274, 325-326.
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inhabited by Noanama Indians, 48 lending support, although
details are scarce and confused, to the theory that their
pacification may have been an extension of Spanish
activities further south.
Jurisdictional Conflict over the Chocô
By the end of the l650s, Popayán had established an
official presence in the province of Noanaina. Sometime
before the end of that decade, the governor of Popayán, Don
Luis de Valenzuela Fajardo, appointed the Maestro de Campo
Diego Ramôn as teniente, corregidor, and alcalde mayor de
rninas in the very ambiguously defined region encompassing
the province of Noanama, the mines of Raposo, and the area
surrounding the port of Buenaventura. Very little is known
about Diego Ramán, except that his task was said to be to
work towards the Christianization of the Indian population
of the area, and that, at some time, he had had encounters
with the Tatamá/Chocá and the Citará, from which he had
only survived by taking refuge among the Noanama.49
Following Raxnôn's death, the next governor of Popayán, Luis
Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo, appointed Juan Lopez Garcia as
his teniente in the area, in November 1659, marking the
48 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sabre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.494.
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia),
f.8, and Antonio Marzal, "Informe sabre el ChocO", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.495-96. The region
incorporating the province of Noanama, the Raposo River,
and the port of Buenaventura was said by the Audiencia of
Santa Fe to fall within the jurisdiction of the city of
Cali. See AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown,
Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.
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beginning of almost two decades of activity for Lopez
Garcia in the ChocO.5°
Despite the apparent success of these advances, few
Spaniards resided in the province of Noanaina in the early
l660s. The extent of the title and duties conferred upon
LOpez Garcia - teniente, corregidor, and alcalde mayor de
minas of the Noanaina, the mines of the Raposo, and the port
of Buenaventura - suggests that this was an appointment
made for a barely explored region, where the governor's
teniente represented the only official Spanish presence and
undertook all official duties. LOpez Garcia's task was to
further the establishment of Indian settlements in the
region under his jurisdiction and to attend to the
Christianization and well-being of its native population.
It was expected that his presence there would not only
prevent the Indians being harmed, but also ensure the
security of travellers to the region.5'
Over the following years, the influence of the
government of Popayãn gradually extended over a larger
area. In 1666, Andrés Perez Serrano was appointed teniente
of the region encompassing the mines of the Raposo river
and the port of Buenaventura. 52
 Two years later, it was
said that Perez Serrano still lived in the area, and he was
certainly listed as one of the Spaniards who collected
50 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", f.8.
' Ibid., ff.8-lO.
52 This appointment was made by Governor Luis Antonio
de Guzinán y Toledo in Pasta, on 7 September 1666. Ibid.,
ff. 26-27.
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tributes paid by Noanama Indians. 53 In 1666, Lopez Garcia
was appointed teniente of the region inhabited by the
Tatamá/Chocó, M and, two years later, Governor Dlaz de la
Cuesta extended still further the title and the territory
under his jurisdiction: in that year, he became corregidor
and "Justicia Mayor Capitán A Guerra de todas las dichas
provincias" - which meant the entire Chocô region.55
Lopez Garcia's method of pacification was based partly
on commerce with the Indian inhabitants of the area. In
1672, the Audiencia informed the Crown that he had
established a system of barter with the Indians, exchanging
gold for machetes, axes, and other goods. 56 However, in
1678, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal provided another feasible
explanation for LOpez Garcia's scs
Tatamá/ChocO and Citará territory. Marzal claimed that
LOpez Garcia had planned to use the pacified
Indians to move against the Tatamâ/ChocO, and that it was
as a result of the fear of a joint Spanish-Noanama attack
that the Tatarná/ChocO people sought a peaceful agreement
Ibid., CertificaciOn, Royal Officials of the Real
Caja of Popayán, Popayán, 5 May 1668, f.12.
This appointment was also made by Governor Luis
Antonio de Guzmân y Toledo in Pasto, on 7 September 1666.
Ibid., ff.26-27.
Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Popayán, 7 May 1668, ff.l31-132. See also ibid.,
"Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", Petition presented by
Bartolomé BenItez, f.2. His son, Jorge LOpez Garcia, was
appointed deputy, in case of his father's absence or
illness.
56 Ibid., Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe,
18 June 1672.
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with the Spaniards. According to Marzal, this was
precisely what Lopez Garcia needed, for his purpose was to
move up to the RIo Negro and Sed de Cristo, in search of
gold. Following the agreement reached between the
Spaniards and the Tatamá/ChocO, slave gangs from Anserma
gradually began to enter the region, and the Citarâ, who
now feared an alliance between the Noanama, the
Tatamä/ChocO, and the Spaniards, quickly followed suit, and
opened their territory to the Spaniards, who took with them
stores of Spanish goods sought by the Indians, especially
tools and beads.57
Indeed, the many petitions and declarations that were
presented by residents of the region over the following
years show that LOpez Garcia's main aim was to set up
mining operations in the area. It was said, for instance,
that he had introduced a slave gang to exploit the gold
mines of the Raposo river and the mining camp of Sed de
Cristo, where he had made many discoveries. 58 The priest
Luis Antonio de la Cueva also reported that LOpez Garcia
had discovered rich gold mines in Toro Viejo, Sed de
Cristo, NOvita, RIo Negro, and the Garrapatas and YrO
rivers, whose exploitation he had begun.59
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el ChocO", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.496-497.
See Bartolomé Benitez petition, in AGI Quito 67,
"Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", ff.l-2.
Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Luis
Antonio de la Cueva, Sed de Cristo, 16 December 1670,
ff. 137-138.
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However, Lopez Garcia also claimed great successes in
achieving the reduction and conversion of all the native
provinces of the region. In describing his activities
during these years, he and his supporters repeatedly
claimed that he had been responsible for conquering,
reducing, and resettling the native populations of the
provinces of Noanarna, Tatamá/ChocO, and Citará. In 1670,
the secular priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva reported that,
during the eleven years that LOpez Garcia served as
corregidor of the three provinces of Noanaina, Tatamá/ChocO
and Citará, he had not only kept the peace among the
Indians, but also introduced secular priests for their
instruction in the Holy Faith, and trained them in the
payment of tributes to the Crown. 6° In 1672, the bishop of
Popayán also referred to LOpez Garcia's activities, and
noted that he had been the first person in recent times to
attempt to attract and reduce the Indians of the ChocO
through peaceful means. His actions, the bishop stated,
had resulted in the Indians accepting preactiers, ne
administration of the Sacraments, and agreeing to pay
tributes to the Royal Treasury.6t
From the end of the 1660s to the mid-1670s, however,
LOpez Garcia's record in the region was disputed by other
Spaniards undertaking entradas to the ChocO. The principle
which guided Spanish policy towards native groups in
° Ibid.
61 Ibid., Bishop Don Melchor de Liflán y Cisneros to
Crown, n.p., 3 July 1672.
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frontier regions throughout the colonial period was that of
"conqreqación" - or "reclucción", as the process was known
in the Chocó. The congregation of small, dispersed
communities into larger permanent settlements was seen as
a prerequisite to their instruction in Christianity62 and
as a means of facilitating the task of civil
administration. The performance of officials in this area,
at least, was measured in terms of the success of their
efforts in this process.
The first stirrings of conflict over rights in the
Chocá territories took place within the gobernaciôn of
Popayán, as a result of a capitulaciOn agreed between Don
Francisco de Quevedo and his uncle, Governor DIaz de la
Cuesta, in response to the Crown's royal cédula of November
1666. Under the terms of the capitulación, Quevedo
undertook to carry out an entrada to the Chocó at his own
expense (soldiers, provisions, arms) in return for certain
privileges, among which were included the governorship of
Popayán for a period of eight years and the title of
Adelantado 63
J.H. Elliott believes that these capitulaciones were
probably inspired by the contracts agreed between the Crown
and the leaders of expeditions undertaken against the Moors
during the period of the Reconquista. The purpose of these
62 W. George Lovell, Conquest and Survival in
Colonial Guatemala: A Historical Geography of the
Cuchumatán Highlands, 150 0-1821 (Kingston and Montreal,
1985), pp.75-6.
63 AGI Quito 67, Governor Dlaz de la Cuesta to
President of Audiencia, Popayán, 20 July 1672.
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contracts was to guarantee to the leaders of such
expeditions due rewards for their services, while also
guaranteeing the Crown's rights in the newly conquered
territories. The hereditary title of adelantado - which
conferred special military powers and the right to govern
the conquered region - was often included among the rewards
the expeditionary leaders might expect to receive. As
Elliott points out, and as the case of the Chocô shows, the
Crown had no alternative but to make contracts like these
when it provided no financial assistance to these
expeditions.
It was precisely on these grounds that the governor of
Popayán justified his course of action. As the Audiencia
informed the Crown, DIaz de la Cuesta had no authority to
make such a contract, since the royal cédula of 1666 had
placed overall control over expeditions to the Chocô in the
hands of its president. But, as the governor explained,
the Audiencia had been unable to provide the assistance
necessary for him to carry out the entrada personally, as
ordered by the cédula. The governor claimed that he had
first requested 100 men, which he then reduced to 50, and
then to only 50 arquebuses, but that none of these had been
provided. Moreover, his request for ammunition to the
Audiencia of Quito had simply been ignored. The Audi encia
of Santa Fe agreed that, in effect, it had been unable to
meet Diaz de la Cuesta's request because of the shortage of
J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London,
1990), pp.58-9.
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arms that existed in Popayán and Santa Fe, a result of the
fact that there were many ports in the viceroyalty which
had to be protected. The judges of the Audiencia reported
that they could not give what they did not have. 65
 Thus,
although the cédula placed the enterprise under the
supervision of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, in failing to
provide the means to finance expeditions, it had no
alternative but to leave these to people like Quevedo or
Lopez Garcia, who expected either to receive privileges
from the Crown or large returns on their investment.
Francisco de Quevedo's 1669 entrada to the ChocO was
grounded in both his family connections, as a relative of
Governor DIaz de la Cuesta, and his military experience, as
a soldier who had served the Crown for many years in the
Spanish armies. On 31 January, 1669, Quevedo left the
city of Popayân accompanied by Don Domingo de Beitia
(appointed as alférez by the governor), Don Sebastian
Correa (captain), Miguel de Rizo (sargeant), and his
cousin, the secular priest Don Pedro GOmez del Valle. In
Cali, Buga, and Toro, Que.vedo got togetter a. cotapany of up
65 AGI Quito 67, Governor Diaz de la Cuesta to
President of the Audiencia, Popayán, 20 July 1672;
Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 28 July
1669; Governor Dlaz de la Cuesta to Crown, 8 April 1669;
Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 20 July
1672; and Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18
June 1672.
Ibid., Bishop Meichor de Liñán y Cisneros to
Crown, n.p., 3 July 1672, and Governor Diaz de la Cuesta
to Crown, Popayán, 24 April 1669.
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to forty Spaniards, and in Roldanillo, 40 Indians, 20 of
whom were to serve as carriers, and 10 mules.67
The contemporary account of Quevedo's activities in
the Chocó shows that, after travelling to the settlement of
San Joseph de Noanama, Quevedo met with representatives of
the principal Indian provinces - the Noanama, Tataxná/Chocó,
and Citará. His intention was to secure the agreement of
the representatives of the native population to the
following four conditions: 1) they were to become Catholics
and receive a missionary; 2) they were to recognize the
king as sovereign; 3) they were to pay tributes (despite
the contents of the royal cédula of November 1666, which
prohibited the collection of tributes for a period of ten
years); and 4) they were to congregate in settlements. In
exchange, the Indians received Quevedo's assurance that
they would not be parcelled out in encomiendas, and that
they would receive aid against their enemies, although he
gave no indication of ho these eneie.s mitit be. kt this
stage, Quevedo appears to have had few problems: the Indian
representatives, who at first appeared reluctant, finally
agreed to his terms. 68 For the first time in a century and
a half of repeated Spanish attempts to occupy the region,
67 Ibid., Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de
Noanama, 15 May 1669.
68 Ibid. Quevedo was one of the few Spaniards who
provided a description of Indian dress in his report on
the entrada. See ibid.
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several settlements were founded in the three provinces of
Noanama, Tatamâ/Chocó, and Citará.69
However, as a result of this entrada, a dispute arose
between Francisco de Quevedo and Juan Lopez Garcia.
Quevedo's efforts were opposed by LOpez Garcia because, he
alleged, the entrada had caused consternation among the
Indians. He complained that he had had to assure them that
Quevedo was merely continuing the peaceful and voluntary
process of reduction that was already being carried out.
Fearing that his title would be suspended as a result of
Quevedo's entrada, LOpez Garcia argued that such an action
would cause the Indians great distress and prevent the
continuation of the process of conquest.
LOpez Garcia's opposition is not surprising: he had
invested a great deal of work and his entire fortune in the
enterprise. 70 After many years of complete freedom to
discover and exploit mines wherever these were discovered,
LOpez GarcIa no doubt felt that Quevedo's presence in the
province threatened his own position. Antonio Marzal
expressed similar thoughts in 1678, noting that while Juan
LOpez Garcia and his son remained in the provinces, nobody
else would be able to assume a position of authority in the
69 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el ChocO", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.498.
° Indeed, LOpez Garcia alleged that it had only been
as a result of his "buen inodo" and peaceful methods that
so many caciques and Indian parcialidades had been
reduced. See AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos
(Audiencia)", Petition presented by Bartolomé BenItez,
f.2.
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region. 7' Indeed, the Jesuit reported the disputes that
had arisen between Juan Lopez Garcia, his son Jorge LOpez
Garcia, and Capitän Salamanca, when the latter obtained the
title of corregidor of the province of Citará from the
governor of Popayán. Despite the distance that separated
the province of Citará from his mining camps, Juan LOpez
Garcia hindered Capitán Salamanca's attempts to take up his
post. Marzal was of the opinion that, in the ChocO, Juan
and Jorge LOpez Garcia were "big fish who swallow up the
little ones".72
However, Francisco de Quevedo's account of his
activities in the ChocO shows that, in fact, LOpez Garcia
had made little progress in congregating the native
population of the region in permanent settlements. Quevedo
reported, for instance, that at the time of his entrada,
Sed de Cristo was made up of only two houses. And,
although the Indians of the province of Noanama had been
paying tribute for four or five years, they had not been
congregated in settlements, nor had they been prepared to
do so until his arrival. While he was in the ChocO,
Quevedo wrote that he was in the process of congregating
the Noanainas in a settlement, San Joseph, on the banks of
the San Juan river, which was previously composed of five
uninhabited houses and a broken down church.73
71 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el ChocO", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.505.
72 Ibid., pp.504-505.
AGI Quito 67, Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph
de Noanama, 15 May 1669.
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The dispute between Quevedo and Lápez Garcia also
implicated the governor of Popayán, Gabriel Diaz de la
Cuesta, and his successor, Governor Miguel Garcia. Diaz de
la Cuesta (it must be remembered that he was Quevedo's
cousin) was particularly concerned to ensure that the terms
of Quevedo's contract were honoured. He argued that this
was essential to the success of Spanish efforts to
establish control over the region, because in honouring
Quevedo's contract, the Crown would be encouraging others
to undertake similar entradas. Thus, the governor reported
that the entrada had cost Quevedo 18,000 pesos, and that he
had personally contributed 4,000. DIaz de la Cuesta also
claimed that Quevedo had begun to congregate the native
population of the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citarâ,
that he had founded ten settlements, each with its church,
and that the Indians voluntarily had agreed to pay two gold
pesos to the Crown in tributes each year. Moreover, as a
direct result of Quevedo's efforts, more than one hundred
black slaves had been taken from Anserzna to the Chocó ( and
vecinos from Popayán were then preparing to take in one
hundred more.74
To prove Quevedo's success, the governor sent just
over 3,692 pesos to Spain, suggesting that these were
tributes collected as a direct result of the entrada.
However, as the following table shows, the 3,692 pesos sent
Ibid., Governor Diaz de la Cuesta to President of
the Audiencia, Popayân, 20 July 1672; Governor DIaz de la
Cuesta to Crown, 28 July 1669; Governor DIaz de la Cuesta
to Crown, 20 July 1672.
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by DIaz de la Cuesta to Spain included all the tributes
collected by Popayán officials in the region since 1661.
These show that the Noanama had in fact been paying
tributes to the Crown since at least 1661, and that the
Tatamâ/Chocô and the Citará had begun to pay tributes in
1667 and 1668. The point of drawing attention to these
tribute payments, however, is to show why, in 1674, Don
Miguel GarcIa, DIaz de la Cuesta's successor, and
apparently a supporter of Juan Lopez Garcia, exposed the
strategy used by the former governor to claim the credit
for a reduction which Garcia believed had taken place
before the Quevedo entrada. He accused DIaz de la Cuesta
of transferring from Anserma to Popayán all the tributes
collected in the Chocó between May 1667 and December 1671,
under the pretense that these had been collected as result
of a "new reduction". Governor Garcia claimed that no
progress had been made in the province since 1666, and that
Quevedo's entrada had actually been counter-productive,
bringing the Indian population to the verge of rebellion.75
We do not know how the Crown responded to the Quevedo
capitulaciOn, but we do know that Don Francisco died before
the Crown accepted the terms of the contract.76
Ibid., and "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Popayân, 15 December 1674, f.l20. See also AGI Quito 16,
Governor Miguel GarcIa to Crown, Popayán, 22 November
1674.
76 AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Quito to Crown, Quito,
15 June 1675.
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TABLE 1: TRIBUTES COLLECTED IN THE CHOCO, 1.66i.-1.672
YEAR	 INDIANS	 GOLD (*)	 SILVER
1661 (Oct.)	 (a) Noanarnas	 109p.lt.	 _________
1665 (Jan.)	 (a) Noanarna	 645p.	 156pt.6r.
1666 (Apr.)	 (b) Noanarna-Raposo	 ___________ l32pat.
1667 (Feb.)	 (a) Noanama-San Juan/ 199p.3t.6g
Cacique Muinia
_______________ (Tatainá/Chocó)
	 _____________ ___________
1667 (Feb.)	 (b) Noanama-Raposo	 58p.	 _________
1668 (Apr.)	 (a,b) Noanama-Raposo	 387p.4t.
& San Juan &
_______________ Tatamâ/Chocô & Citará ____________ __________
1669 (July)	 (b) Noanama-Raposo	 38p.	 __________
1670 (Apr.)	 (a) Noanama-San Juan	 550p.
& Tatamá/Chocó &
_______________ Citará
	 _____________ ___________
1670 (May)	 (b) Noanama-Raposo 	 32p.	 __________
1670 (Oct.)	 (c) Noanarna-San Juan
	 106p.	 _________
1671 (Oct.)	 (d) Noanaina-San Juan
	
894p.
& Tatamá/Chocô &
_______________ Citarâ	 _____________ ___________
1672 (Mar.)	 (b) Noanama-Raposo 	 77p.	 _________
1672 (May)	 (c) Citaraes	 398p.4t.	 __________
1672 (May)	 (e) Noanama-San Juan	 198p.	 __________
TOTAL	 3692p.4t.	 288pat.6r
Key: (*) Measured in Gold Dust
p.: pesos
t. : tomines
g.: gramos
pat: patacones
r.: reales
(a) Tributes collected by Juan Lopez Garcia
(b) Tributes collected by And.rés Perez Serrano
(c) Tributes collected by Lorenzo de Salainanca
(d) Tributes collected by Francisco de Quevedo
(e) Tributes collected by Sebastian Correa
(Source: AGI Quito 67, CertificaciOn. Don Bernardino de
Ubillus)
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Conflict over the Chocô was not limited to the
gobernación of Popayán, however. Just before the governor
of Popayän, Don Gabriel DIaz de la Cuesta, authorized
Francisco de Quevedo to undertake his entrada to the Chocó,
in 1669, the qobernación of Antioquia decided to stake its
claim to parts of the area. In 1668, Governor Luis de
Berrio, of Antioquia, empowered the secular priest, Antonio
de Guzmán, to conduct an entrada to the province of Citará
aimed at establishing settlements and congregating the
native population of the area within them. Guzmân
concentrated his efforts in the province of Citará, and it
was this area that became the cause of a serious
jurisdictional dispute between the two qobernaciones that
was to last until the end of the 1680s.
Antonio de Guzmán argued Antioquia's case for
jurisdiction over Citará on the grounds that the provinces
of Noanama and Tatamá/Chocó belonged to the government of
Popayãn because, geographically, they bordered on Popayân's
territory. The province of Citará, however, bordered on
Antioqula's territory and therefore fell within that
gobernaciôn's government. 78 In 1672, Guzxnán observed, in
support of his claim, that when he first entered the
province of Citarä, there were no friars, no clerics, and
no sign whatsoever that Christians had traversed the
See, for example, Antonio de Guzm&n's statements
in Ibid., tJTestimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Mina del
Señor Santo Domingo, 28 September 1674, f.67.
Ibid., Rio de Atrato, 20 December 1672, f.lOS.
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land. 79 The governor of Popayán, Miguel Garcia, denied
that Antioquia had any jurisdictional rights over the
Citaraes: the province of Citará lay half-way between the
two gobernaciones of Popayán and Antioquia, and in order to
pursue their interests the Antioqueños had been causing
trouble among the Indians. 80 Indeed, Governor Miguel
Garcia also reported that Antioquia's claims were based on
the assumption that Antioqueños had, in earlier times,
conducted entradas to the Chocô, but that these could not
be considered to be precedents for the gobernaciôn's
present occupation of the area, because those entradas had
not been successful in reducing the native population.8'
Despite the claims and counter-claims, tne sources
show that both gobernaciones, represented by Q.uevedo and
Guzmán, had been active in Citará: both men founded five
settlements within the province, although these were
situated in different locations. While Quevedo founded San
Sebastian de Nigua (Nigua), San Pedro de Tacoda (the
location of which is not clear from the sources), San
Francisco de Atrato (where the Atrato river met the
Andagueda river), San Miguel (on the Andagueda river), and
San Gabriel (also on the Andagueda) ,82 Antonio de Guzmán
Ibid., f.105.
80 Ibid., Governor Miguel Garcia to Crown, Popayân,
26 June 1674.
Ibid., "Testimonia de Autos (Franciscans),
Popayán, 15 December 1674, f.120.
82 Witnesses questioned as a result of this dispute
provided the location of the settlements founded by
Quevedo in Citará. See, for example, ibid., ff.52, 54,
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established the following settlements, for which he also
carried out censuses:
TABLE 2: SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED BY ANTONIO DE GUZMAN
Settlement	 Total Population	 Tributary Indians
Taita (ArquIa)	 80	 28
San Juan Bautista	 254	 75
(Nigua_river)	 ____________________ ___________________
San Pedro	 275	 77
(Atrato_river)	 ____________________ ___________________
San Francisco de	 236	 64
Atrato
(Atrato_river)	 ____________________ ___________________
San Joseph	 308	 82
Total	 1,153	 326
[Source: AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Antioquia, n.p., n.d., f.95; and RIo de Atrato, 20 December
1672, ff.l04-106.]
Although the precise locations cannot be established
with complete certainty, three of Quevedo's towns were
established on the Andagueda river, while three of Guzinân's
were founded on the Atrato. The different locations chosen
for the Indian settlements reflected the needs of the two
gobernaciones involved. This is particularly clear in the
case of Antioquia. Guzmán's 1672 explanation for the
choice of the location of Taita shows that his purpose was
to establish Indian settlements in sites that would
facilitate the entry and activities of Antiocjuefios. Guzinán
explained that Taita was very convenient for entradas from
56, and especially 59-60.
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the city of Antioquia to the province, for it was situated
at a distance of five days from the sitio de Urrao, which
itself was situated at a distance of three days from the
city of Antioquia, where he owned houses and maize fields,
and where Spaniards going in and Indians going out of the
Chocó would be able to lodge. In addition, travellers
going through Taita could be provided with supplies of
fruits, maize, plantains, fish, hens, and pigs that were by
this time being raised there. Moreover, Taita was also
situated at a distance of one and a half days from the
Bebará river, which served as a port: from there it was
possible to travel by river to the Atrato, and from there
to traverse the entire province of Citará, and the
provinces'	 towns,	 by	 river,	 thus	 facilitating
communications. A further advantage was the fact that Don
Pedro Daza resided in Taita. Daza was a ladino and
Christian Indian who had served as Guzmán's interpreter
ever since he first entered the province. 83
 The other
settlements, Guzmán would later inform the Franciscan
Comisario, had been chosen according to several criteria:
the needs of the Indians, the convenience of the
doctrineros who would assist them, and the provision of the
Spaniards who would enter the region with their slave gangs
to work the gold mines that he knew to be both rich and
Ibid., RIo de Atrato, 20 December 1672, ff.104-
106. See also Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental,
pp.107-25.
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numerous. The Payaneses said less about why Quevedo
chose particular locations for his towns, but trade routes
seem to have been a major factor: San Gabriel, for example,
was established "in the ... port of ... Dodubar because it
seemed to us very convenient ... for ... the supply of the
Spaniards... ,,85
Clearly, the Spaniards intended to choose locations
for their Indian settlements that were surrounded by rich
mining areas, for it was the promise of rich and new
sources of gold, and of new commercial opportunities, that
attracted them to the region. Thus, Guzmán was very
specific in indicating, in 1672, that San Juan de Nigua
contained the gold mines of Nemota, Naurita, Panipani, and
the port of Tutunendo; San Pedro contained the mines of
Tanando and of the banks of the Atrato river; San Francisco
contained the gold deposits of the Andagueda river, which
according to the Indians was very rich; and San Joseph
contained the deposits of the Samugrado river. 86
 Indeed,
it was also well known that the mine of Santo Domingo, in
the vicinity of the settlement of Nigua, belonged to him,87
and he personally informed the governor that he was engaged
"in the discovery of gold mines which I have achieved in
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Antioquia, 29 April 1674, f.90.
Ibid., Domingo de Beitia y Gainboa's statement,
Nuestra Señora de Belén, 28 July 1674, f.60.
86 Ibid., Rio de Atrato, 20 December 1672, f.106.
87 Ibid., 28 September 1674, f.67.
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the said province with my own black slaves I brought to
it" 88
Although the two gobe maci ones of Popayân and
Antioquia argued over the location of the Indian
settlements and over who had been responsible for
successfully reducing the Indian population to them - the
key to explaining the jurisdictional conflict between the
gobe maci ones is that they were both concerned to defend
their rights to jurisdiction over the labour of the Indians
- these conflicts bore no relation to what was actually
happening in the Chocô. All the settlements were abandoned
by the Indians almost as soon as they had been founded. As
we shall see in the next section, by the early 1670s, the
Spaniards had clarified their purpose in occupying the
Chocô, and finally understood that their peaceful moves to
relocate the Indians to settlements which suited their
interests were unlikely to be successful without a show of
force.
Spanish-Indian Relations
By the beginning of the 1670s, the Spaniards had
already recognized that slaves would have to be imported to
exploit the gold mines of the region. In 1669, Francisco
de Quevedo observed that San Joseph de Noanaina, on the
banks of the San Juan river, was situated in such an
excellent location, that it could be reached by ship from
both Panama and Peru.
	 Quevedo believed that if the
88 Ibid., f.94.
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province of Noanama was to be settled, it would be filled
with slave gangs, for it was "the richest in the
In 1672, Governor DIaz de la Cuesta argued that gold was so
abundant in the Chocó that it would enrich the Crown
immensely, if only slaves could be introduced to extract
it, for there was, at the time, a serious shortage. 9° Two
years later, the following governor of Popayán, Don Miguel
GarcIa, reported that the wealth of the Chocó was indeed
considerable, for a slave was usually able to extract as
much as one gold peso per day. This governor argued that
the royal treasury would benefit immensely if 200 or 300
slaves - with loyal administrators - were introduced to the
region.91
However, the introduction of slaves posed an
additional problem for the Spaniards, namely, the provision
of supplies for their maintenance. As Governor Garcia
noted, the cost of importing food supplies to the region
was very high, for these were usually carried over
difficult terrain and long distances.	 This situation
left only one source of provisions for the slaves of the
Chocó - the Indians.	 Juan Lopez Garcia had early
recognized how necessary the native population would be: in
89 Ibid., Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de
Noanama, 15 May 1669.
° Ibid., Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to President of
the Audiencia, Popayán, 20 July 1672.
' AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel Garcia to Crown,
Popayán, 22 November 1674.
92 Ibid.
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requesting permission to move his slave gangs and settle
mining camps within the provinces he was able to reduce, he
also asked to be permitted to employ neighbouring Indian
families and indeed communities for the provision of
supplies for the slave gangs, although he added that these
would only be Indians who voluntarily chose to be employed,
and that they would receive religious instruction from the
doctrinero who inisterd to the. sL.s. 9-1	e.e.''iw t
the province of Noanama, the priest Luis Antonio de la
Cueva reported that it would be necessary to settle Indians
along with the slave gangs for the provision of foodstuffs
and security from attack from still unpacified Indians.
A further crucial consideration - in view of the high
cost of importing supplies - was the increasing number of
Spaniards who had begun to enter the region with their
slaves and who also had to be provided with foodstuffs.
Many Spaniards followed Lápez GarcIa and Guzmán into the
Chocô. The priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva reported that,
as a result of the efforts of Juan Lopez Garcia among the
Noanama, several slave gangs from the city of Anserma had
been introduced, such as those belonging to Lorenzo Benitez
de la Serna, Francisco Diaz de la Serna, Francisco Ramirez
de la Serna, Diego Manzano, Bartolomé de Espinosa, and
SimOn Luis Moreno de la Cruz. 95 In 1672, the bishop of
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia),
Petition presented by Bartolomé Benitez, f.3.
Ibid., 29 May 1669, f.l4.
Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans), f.138.
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Popayán also noted that, since Francisco de Quevedo's
entrada, merchants as well as Spaniards and slave gangs had
entered the region. 96 Two years later, it was reported
that Antonio de Guzmân, his brother Capitán Ignacio de
Guzmán, and. his nephews Juan de Guzmãn Jaramillo, Gregorio
de Guzmán, and Juan Nuflo de Sotomayor, had taken into the
province of Citarâ more than 40 slaves belonging to them
and their relatives, as well as more than sixty other
people,	 employed,	 for example,	 as carriers and
pathfinders. According to Antonio del Pino
Villapadierna, in addition to the 40 slaves belonging to
Guzmân and his relatives, more than 80 people had entered
the province since he had discovered the new mines.
Antonio del Pino had also sent seven slaves and a miner
into the region.98
As a result of the jurisdictional conflict between the
gobernacicnes of Antioquia and Popayân, several witnesses
were questioned in the early 1670s, in order to obtain
information relating to the activities of Quevedo, Guzmân,
and Lopez GarcIa. Their statements provide a further
source for identifying the names of Spaniards who were
living or working in the ChocO at the time. In addition to
Ibid., Bishop Meichor de Liñán y Cisneros to
Crown, Santa Fe, 3 July 1672.
Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans),
Petition presented by Don Francisco Mayoral de Olivos,
Don Carlos de Molina y Toledo, Don Diego Beltrán de
Castillo, Doctor Luis Jarainillo, and Juan Jaramillo,
Valle de Aburra, 28 August 1674, f.33.
98 Ibid., ff.36-37.
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those named above, thirty Spaniards were either questioned,
or served as witnesses to the dec1arations. Thus, while
it is not possible to establish exactly how many Spaniards
worked or lived in the region at the time, or the precise
number of slaves they introduced, the sources suggest that
as many as two hundred people may have been added to the
population of the Chocô by 1673 - a number that was to
increase still further with the arrival of the Franciscans
in that year. Moreover, according to Father Antonio
Marzal, by 1678 there were at least 136 slaves across the
region, and he noted that, where there were many slaves,
there were also many "free men".'°°
For the Indians of the region, the arrival of the
settlers was destructive. Given the rudimentary nature of
Spanish government at this time, few complaints were made
The following list includes those who were either
questioned directly about the activities of the Guzmán
brothers, Lopez Garcia, and Francisco de Quevedo, or
served as witnesses to the declarations of the others:
Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa, Pedro de Casas, Bartolomé de
Alaraz, Nicolás de Castro Travada, Sebastian Garcia
BenItez, Esteban Fernández de Rivera, Joseph de
Salamanca, Lorenzo de Salamanca, Francisco Sedeflo, Marcos
Gonzalez de Velasquez, Matea Velasquez, Lope de Cárdenas,
Lorenzo Benitez de la Serna, Juan LOpez Garcia, Gregorio
Garcia de Rada, Joseph Garcia, Francisco Suárez, Gregorio
LOpez de la Pefla, Juan Dominguez de Sancibrián, Manuel
Gonzalez Siabra, Antonio RamIrez de la Serna, Rodrigo
OrtIz Diente, Agustin Ginez Fernández, Ignacio Montaflo,
Antonio LOpez Pardo, Francisco Delgado Jurado, Francisco
Ruiz Osorio Talaverano, Fernando de Irrutiel, Sebastian
de la Parra Salamanca, Joseph de Guebara, Thomas Lopez,
Juan Nuflo de Sotomayor. With the exception of Pedro de
Casas, all the others were said to be resident in the
ChocO. See ibid., ff.48-59, 66-67, 106, 122-129, 137-139,
148, 150-164.
100 Antonio Marzal, "Inforine sobre el ChocO", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.495.
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to the Spanish authorities, but in 1670, the Protector y
Administrador General de los Naturales of New Granada
petitioned on behalf of the Indians of the Chocô for the
redress of one specific grievance. The Protector
complained that when the Indians left their houses to
cultivate their maize plots, or to carry out other tasks,
such as mining for gold, they found, on their return, that
their belongings, tools, gold, and food was stolen from
their houses by the Spaniards, mestizos, mulattoes, blacks,
and non-Chocô Indians who traversed the land. For this,
the petition noted, the Indians were never paid.'°'
Of course, the main purpose of the Spaniards was to
bring the Chocó under the control of the Crown, in order to
obtain access to gold fields known to be exceptionally
rich, and to open the area to commerce with neighbouring
regions. For this to be successful, the Indians had to be
settled close to the mining camps, where they would be
employed in the provision of foodstuffs for the miners and
slave gangs. However, all attempts to congregate the
Indian population in permanent settlements met with
failure. Most observers agreed that two crucial factors
lay at the heart of their inability to congregate the
population: their traditional pattern of settlement, and
their social structure.
Although the Spaniards made little attempt to furnish
information about the Indians of the Chocó, we do know that
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonjo de Autos (Audiencia),
Petition presented by Don Manuel de Ortega Fuenmayor,
ff. 19-20.
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the pattern of settlement of the native population of all
three provinces - Noanama, Tatamá/Chocó, and Citará - was
based on small dispersed communities composed of several
extended families. In 1648, the Franciscan Fray Matlas
Abad noted the dispersed nature of the Indian settlements
of the Province of Citará. Travelling across the province
from Taita, Abad described the land as inhabited by
communities distant between one, two, and three leagues
from each other.'°2
 In 1627, the Indian Don Pascual
testified that he had seen four settlements of Chocó
Indians lying at a distance of more or less half a league
from each other. In each settlement, Don Pascal saw eight
large houses and each of these had four "hearths". From
this information, Patricia Vargas Sarmiento infers that
each "hearth" represented one nuclear family, that several
nuclear families - between four and seven - inhabited each
house, and that each community was composed of
approximately eight houses - or extended families.'°3
 But,
in 1674, the Spaniard Joseph de Salamanca said of the
Indians of San Francisco de Atrato that "according to the
style and custom of the natives of the said province each
house is composed ... of two families".'°4
In addition to living in small communities, the
Indians shifted their settlements continuously, to the
102 Quoted in Isacsson, "Fray MatIas Abad", p.463.
103 See Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos",
pp.59-60.
' AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
San Francisco de Atrato, 18 August 1674, f.124.
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areas where they cultivated their maize. In 1674, Governor
Miguel Garcia complained that no attempt at settlement
would be completely successful while the Indians were left
to their own devices, for they built new dwellings at the
time of each harvest, in places deemed convenient for the
cultivation of maize.'°5 As Isacsson noted, the humidity
of the climate, together with the absence of a sufficiently
long dry period, meant that a "slash-burn" method of
cultivation was not appropriate for the Chocó. Instead, a
"slash-mulch" ("roza de bosque") method was employed, which
involved long periods during which the land could not be
cultivated.' 06 This corresponds with the information
provided by contemporary observers. As the Jesuit Antonio
Marzal explained in 1678, this was a feature of maize
cultivation in the region: a tract of land could not
produce two consecutive crops. Referring to the Noanamas,
Marzal claimed that although they were absent from their
towns for long periods of time, this was because "where
they have cultivated [maize] once they cannot cultivate it
again immediately after".107
In the early 1670s, the Franciscan Procurador General
also complained about the distances - two to three leagues
- that separated the Indians' settlements, and, in advising
how to overcome this problem, he pinpointed the other
105 AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel Garcia to Crown,
Popayán, 22 November 1674.
106 Sven-Erik Isacsson, "Eiuberá", p.21.
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.494.
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crucial factor in the Spaniards' inability to keep them in
permanent settlements: the absence of Indian leaders. The
Franciscan noted that, in order to congregate the Indians
and administer the Sacraments, it would be necessary to
impose one native person - whom they would recognize as
leader - to force them to live in their settlements.'°8
More than twenty years earlier, Fray MatIas Abad had
reported the absence of Indian leaders in the province of
Citará. Abad claimed that many had no leaders whom they
obeyed: "there are only some capitanes and these are little
respected".'°9
 These capitanes were Indians who were
respected for their success in war and their bravery, but
whose authority over the Indians of their communities was
conditional rather than unquestioned.
With no Indian leaders to co-opt or coerce, the
Spaniards had to find other ways of forcing the Indian
population to remain in their settlements. The Franciscan
Procurador General suggested that a Spaniard with authority
and at least thirty men under his command should be placed
in a site that would be both convenient for them and safe
for the Spaniards and slave gangs of the province, since
the Indians "unless they recognize some authority in their
own lands will return to live in those places where they
used to [live] and nobody's life will be safe ... [neither
108 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
f.l6.
'° Quoted in Isacsson, "Fray Matias Abad", footnote
33, p.475.
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those of] the religious nor the rest"."° Governor Garcia,
on the other hand, believed that some show of force would
be necessary: the Indians, he asserted, would not be
reduced without violence or terror. Indeed, to think that
the influence of the doctrinero alone would reduce them to
new settlements was tantamount to "placing gates on an open
field"." Similarly, in 1672, the Audiencia had advised
the Crown that the governors of the surrounding provinces
should enter the region simultaneously, accompanied by
missionaries and armed men, to terrorize the Indians, so
that, finding thenselves surrounded by Sani.ards, th.e.'.ç
would have no alternative but to accept being reduced. To
keep the Indians there, it would be necessary to found
Spanish settlements, "which would help each other in any
incident"."2 Indeed, the Jesuit Benito de Carvajal
considered that the only reason the Noanama had not dared
to rebel was the fact that there were Spaniards in the
province. "
In Chapter 3, we will examine the way in which the
characteristics of the Indians' social structure and
settlement patterns and the resistance of the Indians to
the process of "reducciôn" proved also to be an
110 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans),
f.l6.
AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel Garcia to Crown,
Popayán, 22 November 1674.
112 AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown,
Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.
113 Ibid., "Testiinonjo de Autos (Franciscans), f.140.
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insurmountable obstacle to the efforts of the Franciscans
friars, who arrived in the region towards the end of 1673.
Their record in the region during their first three years
of missionary activity shows their complete inability to
make any progress not just in congregating but also in
indoctrinating the native population. As the reality of
the situation became clear to the increasingly desperate
friars, they too, came to the conclusion that, without some
show of force and the application of physical punishment,
their energies would be completely wasted.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FRANCISCANS IN THE CHOCO,
1673-1676
As we saw in Chapter 2, on 27 November, 1666, the
Crown issued a royal cédula which ordered the governors of
Antioquia, Popayàn, and Cartagena, and the President of the
Audiencia of Panama, to begin the reduction of the native
population of the Chocô. The cédula emphasized that this
pacification campaign was to be conducted by missionaries
from the religious orders - accompanied by a small but
purely defensive military escort - and that the conversion
of the native population was to be achieved through
preaching and good treatment alone.' In accordance with
these plans to pacify the indigenous population through
peaceful means, the Crown issued a further royal cédula, in
October 1671, ordering the Casa de Contrataciôn in Seville
to pay the travel and maintenance costs of twelve
Franciscan friars, one lay brother, and two servants, who
were to be sent to the Chocó, Dorado, and Darien mission
field.2
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27
November 1666, inserted in Royal Cédula, Madrid, 4 June
1674, ff.1-4.
2 AGI Quito 67, "Testiinonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Royal Cédula, Madrid, 30 October 1671, ff.4-5, and Royal
Cédula, Madrid, 30 October 1671, ff.2-3. In referring to
the mission as "Chocó, Dorado, and Darien" - a term that
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The concept of peaceful pacification contained within
these cédulas was neither new nor unusual. In 1573, Philip
II promulgated the Qrdenanzas sobre Descubrimientos, 3 which
forbade both the use of the term "conquest" - to be
replaced by the words "discovery" or "pacification" - and
all armed entradas and expeditions to unconquered border
regions. The Ordenanzas placed the responsibility for the
pacification of the native populations of border areas on
missionaries from the religious orders. While these were
to be accompanied, when necessary, by small military
escorts, their role was to be defensive. The Ordenanzas
envisaged that unconquered Indians should be kept under the
tutelage of the missionaries for a period of ten years,
after which the new converts were to be handed over to the
secular clergy, freeing the missionaries to move one step
further into the interior and thus begin the process once
again .
was also used by the Franciscan Vicecornisario in
approving Fray Matlas Abad's expedition in 1649 - the
Crown was clearly declaring its intention to extend the
pacification campaign to the Indian population of the
Gulf of Darien. For the term as it was used in 1649, see
Fr. Gregorio Arcila Robledo, O.F.M., Las rnisiones
franciscanas en Colombia (Bogota, 1950), p.19.
According to Geoffrey Parker, it was Juan de
Ovando, as president of the Council of the Indies, who
masterminded the Ordenanzas. See Geoffrey Parker, Philip
II (London, 1988), pp.113-114.
C.R. Boxer, The Church Militant and Iberian
Expansion, 1440-1770 (Baltimore, 1978), pp.71-2.
According to Herbert Bolton, the common mission lands
were supposed to be distributed among the Indians once
the friars' task was accomplished and the mission was
handed over to the secular clergy. However, on the
northern frontier of New Spain, the region covered by
Bolton's study, ten years were found to be insufficient
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Philip II's Ordenanzas marked the beginning of what
Boxer terms the "golden age" of the frontier missions in
the Spanish empire, 5 officially replacing the encornienda-
doctrina system that had been employed in Mexico,
Guatemala, and parts of Peru. 6 Tinder the encornienda-
doctrina system, the encoinendero was responsible for
protecting, converting, and civilizing the Indians, as well
as for supporting the friars needed for their religious
instruction: in exchange, he received a grant of land and
the labour of the Indians under his control. 7 In practice,
however, the encornendero rarely complied with his duty to
protect, civilize, and convert his charges, and the
expected cooperation between encomendero and doctrinero did
not materialize. 8
 While the institution of the encomienda
continued to thrive in many parts of the colonies - in
to Christianize the Indians. See Herbert E. Bolton, "The
Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American
Colonies", HAHR, 22 (1917), p.46. In fact, ten years were
found to be insufficient in many other areas as well, and
indeed, native groups in some frontier regions remained
entirely oblivious to missionary endeavours after a
century and more of activity by the regular orders.
The mission had already been recognized as a frontier
institution in the New Laws of 1543, which also allowed
for a ten-year period of proselitization before being
handed over to the civil authority and the secular
clergy. See Hennessy, The Frontier, p.55.
Boxer, The Church Militant, pp.71-2.
6 Antonine S. Tibesar, "The Franciscan Doctrinero
versus the Franciscan Misionero in Seventeenth-Century
Peru", The Americas, Vol.14 (1957-1958), pp.115-6.
Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution",
p.44.
S Tibesar, "The Franciscan Doctrinero", p.116;
Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution", p.44.
Over time, the encomienda was gradually abolished.
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1690, for example, 1,819 Indians were held in both royal
and private encomiendas in the Llanos of Casanare, in New
Granada - the aim of Philip II's Ordenanzas was to make the
mission the principal method of converting Indians to
Christianity.9
This chapter will examine the extent to which the
Crown's objectives were achieved in the Chocô. For the
sources show that, during the many decades of Franciscan
activity in the Chocó region, the missionaries failed
miserably to make any progress in converting the native
population to the Christian Faith. Some attempts were made
to improve the situation as early as 1680, when, as a
result of a serious conflict involving the Indians and the
missionaries, as well as a recently appointed royal
official, three Franciscans were expelled from the area and
were sent back to Santa Fe. The Padre Comisario appointed
to take over the mission after this dispute was resolved,
Alvarez de Aviles, reported to the Governor of Antioquia
soon after arriving in the region that the Indians had not
learned even the most basic rudiments of Christianity.'0
However, neither this second group of Franciscan
missionaries nor the rest who followed were to be any more
successful. In 1737 - more than sixty years after the
order began its activities in the Chocó - the bishop of
Popayân informed the King that the Indians were as ignorant
Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier, p.58.
'o AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Nigua, 14 January 1681,
f. 60.
117
of Christianity as they had been before their conquest:
they had no knowledge whatsoever of Christian Doctrine, and
never confessed or received Communion.1'
Despite the bishop's indictment of the order's
efforts, the situation in the Chocô by the eighteenth
century was no more critical than it was in other frontier
regions of the empire, including New Granada. In 1772, for
instance, Viceroy Messia de la Cerda expressed his general
disillusionment with the performance of frontier missions
in the entire viceroyalty. Over the previous century,
Messla de la Cerda noted, the mission effort had produced
few results, and Christianized Indians were still prone to
return to the wilderness and to their old pagan ways.
Messla de la Cerda blamed the situation on the
missionaries' lack of evangelical fervour and dedication
for a ministry which required a greater interest in the
conversion of souls than in the missionaries' own
comforts.'2 The Viceroy's doubts about the effectiveness
of the missionaries as frontier agents had a firm base in
the experience of the regular orders in several parts of
the viceroyalty.	 Thus, in the final decades of the
eighteenth century, vigorous pacification campaigns were
' AGI Quito 185, Bishop Diego FermIn de Vergara to
King, Popayán, 1 December 1737.
12 Allan J. Kuethe, "The Pacification Campaign on the
Riohacha Frontier, 1772-1779", HAHR, Vol.50 (1970)
p.470; and "Relación del estado del Virreinato de
Santafe, que hace el Exmo. Sr. D. Pedro Messla de la
Zerda a su sucesor el Exino. Sr. D. Manuel Guirior - Aflo
de 1772", in E.Posada and P.M.Ibáflez (eds.), Relaciones
de Mando (Bogota, 1910), pp.98-9.
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launched against the native groups that had successfully
remained outside Spanish control throughout the entire
colonial period - such as the Guajiros of Riohacha and the
Chimilas of Santa Marta.' 3 A variety of factors
contributed to the decision to proceed against these
groups,'4 but the significance of the decision, for the
religious orders, was the greater participation in these
later campaigns of armed forces and white colonists,
marking a change in Crown policy that shifted the emphasis
away from a religious to a secular approach to the problem
of unpacified Indians.'5 This shift represented a growing
awareness on the part of the colonial government that, in
many parts of the empire, the efforts of missionaries had
been insufficient to assimilate and convert the native
population.
' Kuethe, "The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha
Frontier", p.467and MarIa Dolores Gonzalez Luna, "La
politica de poblacion y pacificación indIgena en las
poblaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena (Nuevo Reino de
Granada), 1750-1800", Boletln Americanista, 1987, p.88.
' The factors which contributed to this decision in
the case of the Guajiros of Riohacha were Spanish fears
of a British attack, the close relationship which the
Guajiros were said to have established with the British,
and the Guajiro rebellion of 1769, which resulted in the
destruction of six of eight missions. See Kuethe, "The
Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier", pp.467-
70. In the case of the Chimilas, the defense of the
coast, the control of contraband, and the development of
agricultural activities, were all factors contributing to
the desire finally to pacify the peoples of the coast.
See Gonzalez Luna, "La politica de población y
pacificaciôn indlgena", p.87.
15 See, for example, Manuel Guirior's pacification
programme for the Guajiros, in Kuethe, "The Pacification
Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier", p.469. See also
p.467.
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Indian defiance of the missionaries' attempts at
conversion raises questions not only about the
effectiveness and commitment of the missionaries
themselves, but also about the factors that facilitated the
Indians' resistance. It is true that the efforts of the
regulars were successful in some frontier areas of the
empire - the Jesuit missions of Paraguay being the most
notable. However, there were also many others - such, for
example, were the Capuchin missions among the Guajiros and
Chjmjlas of northern New Granada and the Franciscans in the
Chocô - where, after more than a century of activity, even
the missionaries had to recognize that progress among the
Indians had been either slow-or non-existent.'6
In focusing on the experience of the Franciscans in
the Chocô during their first three years of missionary
activity there, this chapter will address the issues raised
in the preceding paragraphs. The first section provides a
brief outline of earlier religious activity in the area.
In the second section, we will examine both the aims with
which the Franciscans arrived in the Chocó, and the
pressures they were under to succeed in the process of
reducing the population to permanent settlements. The
third section looks specifically at the methods used by the
friars to set up a mission and at the problems they faced
in their dealings with the native population. This section
also looks at the conflicts which arose between the
Franciscans and the secular clergy, and at the extent to
16 Ibid., pp.469-70.
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which their efforts were supported by the Crown and by
royal officials within the region. The fourth section will
focus on the extent to which the missionaries themselves
were prepared for the task, in view of the complaints made
against them by Indians and other Spaniards resident in the
area. The opinions and experiences of the friars'
Franciscan, Jesuit, and secular predecessors in the region
are also scattered throughout the text, and serve to
compare their relative performances.
The limitations of our sources should be mentioned at
the outset. While the Franciscans' writings and complaints
on many of the issues brought up in this chapter will
enable us to glimpse the ways in which the Indians'
patterns of settlement, social structure, and continuing
resistance to Spanish occupation of their territory
undermined the Franciscan's effort to first congregate and
then convert the Indians in their charge, there are
important gaps in the information furnished by the friars.
For instance, there are few details in the sources
regarding Indian religious practices, the extent to which
these contributed to their resistance to Christianity, or
the extent to which these survived during the period of
Franciscan administration of the mission. Until the 1730s,
no attempts appear to have been made in the Chocó to
identify surviving native religious practices; and the
importance of learning native languages appears never even
to have been considered. In this respect, the experience
of the Franciscans in the Chocó did not follow the patterns
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of missionary activity in other more settled areas.
However, and wherever possible, the clergy's views on
native culture, settlement patterns, social structure, and
resistance to Christianity have been included.
Early Religious Activity in the Chocó
The Franciscans who began to arrive in the Chocó
towards the end of 1673 were not the first clergymen to
come into contact with the native population. The
expedition to the Chocô organized and led by Meichor
Velasquez in 1573 counted two priests and two Dominican
friars among their number, and, by 1583, it was said that
the city of Cäceres had a parish priest. Clerical
influence in the last quarter of the sixteenth century was
slight, however. Fray Jerônimo de Escobar reported that
the 3,000 Indians of the Cáceres district had not been
conquered, and that only 20 had been baptized.' 7 More than
half a century passed before more serious efforts to
evangelize the Chocô's Indian population began. In 1637,
the bishop of Popayán, Don Diego de Montoya y Mendoza,
together with his brother Don Francisco de Montoya, and his
cousin, Don Ventura de Montoya, attempted to reduce the
indigenous inhabitants of the provinces of Noanama and
Tatamâ/Chocó. It was said that the bishop had taken part
in the enterprise personally, and that a settlement, Sed de
Cristo, had been established as a result. This settlement,
17 Romoly, "El Alto Chocô", p.26; Romoly, "Las
Gentes", p.37; and "Relación de Fray Gerónimo Descobar",
pp.165-6.
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like so many established before, was temporary: Sed de
Cristo was destroyed by the Tatamá/Chocó and the Citará a
few years later.'8
At the end of the 1640s a more serious attempt was
made to convert one of the Indian groups of the region -
the Citarâ. In 1648, two priests - Fray Matias Abad, a
Franciscan, and Fray Miguel Romero, from the order of San
Juan de Dios - left the city of Antioquia,' 9 and, after
spending nine days among the Indians of the ArquIa river,
proceeded to the Atrato river - the most densely populated
zone - to begin the conversion of the Indians settled in
the vicinity. 20 The friars, who had apparently been well
received by the Indians, began the task of congregating the
population in a settlement called San Francisco de Atrato,
on the banks of the Atrato river. 2' A church was built
where, according to Abad, all the Indians of the vicinity
willingly attended prayer. Abad believed that the Indians
18 Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, Vol.2, p.447. See also
Father Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó, in
ibid., p.495, and AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to
Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.
' According to Pacheco, Fray Miguel Romero was
already engaged in missionary activity among the Indians
when Abad arrived. See Juan Manuel Pacheco, Historia
Extensa de Colombia, Vol .XIII, Tomo 2. Historia
Eclesiástica: La Consolidaciôn de la Iglesia, Sig'lo WII
(Bogota, 1975), p.670.
20 Isacsson, "Fray Matias Abad", p.463.
21 See ibid., pp.463, 467-9, for the precise location
of the settlement, which he believes to have been
situated where the Andagueda River meets the Atrato.
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reacted favourably to his activities there. 22 Fray Matlas
requested additional missionaries to assist in the task of
conversion, but his efforts were cut short by his death at
the hands of the Cunacuna, in January 1649.23 The two
priests and the lay brother who travelled to the Chocô in
response to Abad's request for assistance - Fray Bernardo
de Lira, Fray Jacinto Hurtado, and the lay brother, Fray
Juan Troyano - were also said to have abandoned the region
after his death, but at least one of these, Fray Jacinto
Hurtado, may have stayed in the area for a longer period.
In the mid to late 1650s, Hurtado submitted to the Crown a
report which he claimed was based on seven years of
experience among the Chocó Indians.24
22 Ibid., pp.463-4. According to Arcila Robledo, Abad
left the city of Antioquia accompanied by three Chocô
Indians, who apparently spoke very little Spanish. This
suggests that, as Patricia Vargas claims, contacts
between Indians from the Chocá region and Spaniards in
Antioquia were increasing, as a result of Governor
Portocarrero's more peaceful policies. Indeed, Isacsson
believes that, in view of the violent resistance put up
by the Citaraes over the previous decades, it must have
been the peaceful policies implemented by the governor
that explains the Citaraes' warmer reception of Abad. The
existence of interpreters also suggests some earlier
contact. See Arcila Robledo, Las misiones franciscanas,
p.17, and Vargas Sarmierito, "La fundación de pueblos",
pp.64-5. See also Isacsson, "Fray Matlas Abad", pp.473-4.
23 Abad and Romero, accompanied by 22 Indians, left
San Francisco de Atrato to journey down the Atrato River,
only to be killed, by Cuna Indians, on the coast of
Urabá. Isacsson believes that although it has generally
been claimed that Abad was killed by the Citarâ, it was
in fact the Cuna who were responsible for his death. See
ibid., pp.465-6, and Pacheco, La ConsolidaciOn de la
Iglesia, pp.670-71.
24 Arcila Robledo, Las raisiones ifranciscanas, pp.16-
9. See also Isacsson, "Fray Matias Abad", p.474, and B.N
Ms 19699', "Declaraciôn que hizo el Padre Fray Jacinto
Hurtado, franciscano, estando por morir, de algunos
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There is no record of any further Franciscan activity
in the region from the end of the 1650s to the early 1670s,
but several secular clerics and two Jesuits were residing
in the region when the Franciscan group arrived in 1673.
Jesuit activity among the Indians of the province of
Noanama began in 1651. In that year, a Panamanian Jesuit
priest, Father Pedro de Cáceres, established two
settlements and provided each of these with a church, but
within a year he had left the region, apparently
disillusioned by the Noanamas' reluctance to congregate in
his settlements. An equally unsuccessful and short-lived
attempt to organize a mission was made later by Father Juan
de Santacruz. In response to a request from the bishop of
Popayán, Melchor Liñán y Cisneros, in 1669, the Jesuits
agreed to take over the task of converting the Indian
population of the region. 26 Thus, Father Benito de
Carvajal had a short spell in the region in 1669, and
returned to the area, accompanied by Father Antonio Marzal,
puntos tocantes a la conversion de los indios de la
provincia del ChocOt, n.p., n.d. This report was probably
in or before 1658, for, in 1672, the Audiencia of Santa
Fe reported that Fay Francisco Hurtado had travelled to
Spain to report on the Chocó, and that his trip had
resulted in the Crown issuing a royal cédula, dated 1
November 1658. See AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to
Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.
25 Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.449. J.J.Borda named
another Jesuit, Francisco de Orta, who had apparently
been in the ChocO, but gives no further details about his
activities there. Borda, Historia de la Cornpanla de
Jesus, pp.78-9.
26 Juan Manuel Pacheco considers that the Jesuit
decision was partly based on their wish to ensure the
establishment of a college for the order in Popayán.
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.449, and footnote 17, p.449.
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in 1672. The responsibilities of these two missionaries -
both of whom arrived in New Granada with a Jesuit
expedition in 1662 - extended across the entire Chocô
area. 27
 Accordingly, between 1672 and 1674, Carvajal and
Marzal divided between them the task of evangelizing in the
Chocô. Carvajal took San José de Noanama, including the
mining camps of Sed de Cristo, Nóvita, and San Agustmn de
SipI, while Marzal, based in the settlement of San
Francisco de Atrato, took charge of the province of Citarâ.
Carvajal stayed only for a short time: struck by ill
health, demoralized by the behaviour of the white settlers,
and fearful after having been attacked by an Indian, the
Jesuit left Noanarna in 1674 and returned to Popayán.28
Marzal remained in the province of Citará until the
Franciscans arrived, when he moved south to San José de
Noanama and began activities among the Noanamas of the
Raposo river and the mines along the SipI river. In 1678,
he was said to be accompanied by another Jesuit, Father
Juan de Escuder. The Jesuits remained in the Noanama
region until 1689.29
The Chocô was not left entirely in the hands of the
regular orders: secular clerics followed the miners into
the Chocó and were present in the area from the mid 1660s.
In 1664, the secular priest Simon Amigo was appointed
Ibid., pp.449-50, and Appendix 1, p.486.
28 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Bishop Meichor de Liflân y Cisneros, 4 June 1672, f.82.
See also Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.450.
29 Ibid., pp.451, 453.
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doctrinero of the settlement of Poya, in the province of
Chocó, and of the mining camps of Nóvita and Sed de Cristo,
in the province of Noanama. Simôn Amigo's duties included
missionary work in the province of Citará. There, he
claimed to have built a church, and to have celebrated Mass
and preached Christian Doctrine continuously for four
months. In July 1666, another secular, Luis Antonio de la
Cueva, was appointed priest of the provinces of Noanama and
Tatamá/Chocô. His duties also included missionary work in
the province of Citará. Luis Antonio de la Cueva claimed
to have built a church in the settlement of San Joseph de
Noanama, and to have entered the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó
and Citará at the beginning of 1667, where he baptized more
than 500 Indians.30
Another secular priest, Pedro Gôxnez del Valle,
accompanied Francisco de Quevedo on his entrada in 1669,
and apparently remained in the region for a little over two
and a half years. 3' The documents mention a fourth secular
priest, Joseph Garreto, who served as doctrinero of the
30 AGI Quito 67, "Testiinonio de Autos (Audiencia)",
Luis Antonio de la Cueva's declaration, 29 May 1669,
ff.13-4, and Simon Amigo's declaration, 29 May 1669,
f.15. See also ibid., "Testimonio de Autos
(Franciscans)", 16 December 1670, ff.137-8; and Pacheco,
Los Jesuitas, pp.447-8.
' AGI Quito 67, Don Gabriel Diaz de la Cuesta to
Crown, Popayan, 28 July 1669. In requesting the reward of
a prebend in the Cathedral of Popayän for Pedro GOmez del
Valle, Bishop Meichor de Liflán y Cisneros informed the
Crown that this priest had remained in the Chocó for two
years and seven months. See Ibid., Bishop Meichor de
Liñân y Cisneros to Crown, Santa Fe, 2 July 1672. The
bishop also requested a prebend in the Cathedral for Luis
Antonio de la Cueva.
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settlement of Carrapa (or ChamI), but he was said to have
abandoned his parish because there were insufficient
Indians to maintain him. 32 And, of course, Antonio de
Guzmán, the antioqueño cleric whose conflicts with the
gobernación of Popayán we examined in Chapter 2, also
served as missionary in the province of Citarâ. 33 His
appointment had been made by Bishop Melchor de Liñán y
Cisneros in l668.
Unlike the regular orders, the secular clergy reported
considerable progress in the evangelization of the native
population. Luis Antonio de la Cueva, for instance,
reported that the Holy Faith was spreading rapidly and
easily among the Indian population of the area. 35 As we
shall see, the experience of the Franciscans, as well as
that of the Jesuits, shows that these reports were both
overly optimistic and exaggerated, but they were perhaps
based on the experience of the secular priests. When, in
1676, censuses of the population of the province of Citará
were carried out, the Indians were asked their ages, and if
they had been baptized, and if so, by whom. The censuses
show that the seculars, in particular Luis Antonio de la
Cueva and Pedro Gómez del Valle, had been very active in
32 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Fray
Juan Tabuenca to Fray Miguel de Castro, Nigua, 28
November 1673, f.75.
Ibid., 16 January 1674, 101-2.
Ibid., Mina del Señor Santo Domingo, 28 September
1674, f.67.
Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", Luis
Antonio de la Cueva's declaration, 29 May 1669, ff.13-4.
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the region, and had travelled widely, baptizing Indians in
and around all of the settlements of the province.
According to the censuses, Luis Antonio de la Cueva had
baptized a total of 334 Indians, principally in the region
of LLorô and San Francisco de Atrato. 363 Indians claimed
to have been baptized by Pedro Gómez del Valle, and the
vast majority of these came from the area around Nigua and
San Francisco de Atrato. 36 Although the details are
unclear, it appears that, with the exception of Antonio de
Guzmán, the secular clerics either abandoned the region, or
moved south to the province of Noanama, when the
Franciscans arrived to take control of their mission.
The Establishment of a Franciscan Mission
In entrusting the work of pacification of border
regions to the regular orders, the Crown's principal
objective was to use the missionary as an agent of the
State as well as of the Church. The Hispanization of the
Indian was to take place through his conversion to
Christianity and through his assimilation of the basic
elements of European civilization. For this to be
successful, the missionary first had to congregate the
Indians in settlements, where the task of teaching
Christian Doctrine could be carried out. Thus was born the
policy of "reducciOn", or "cong-reg'aciôn". The policy was
36 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, San Juan de Nigua, 24
October and 3 November 1676, ff.75-93, 95-6; Nuestra
Señora de la Concepción de Lloró, 21 December 1676,
ff.l43-54; and San Francisco de Atrato, 16 and 19
December 1676, ff.122-42.
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aimed at congregating scattered, often small, Indian
communities into larger, more centralized, permanent
settlements, for the purpose of advancing the Indians'
instruction in Christianity by the missionaries. The
spiritual aspects of "ccnqreqación" - or "reducciôn", as
the policy was called in the Chocô - were explicitly
emphasized in the Reccpilación de las leyes de Indias.
These stated that
"the Indians should be reduced to villages and
not be allowed to live divided and separated in
the mountains and wildernesses, where they are
deprived of all spiritual and temporal comforts,
the aid of our ministers, and those other things
which human necessities oblige men to give one
another ... the viceroys, presidents and
governors [are] charged and ordered to execute
the reduction, settlement, and indoctrination of
the Indians".37
For the Franciscans of the Chocó, the congregation of
the Indians in permanent settlements was important for
another reason as well: the missionaries' own livelihood
depended on their ability to secure foodstuffs and other
supplies from the Indians. The Franciscans in this
mission, at least, did not receive any financial assistance
from other sources. The royal cédula of 30 October, 1671,
which ordered the Casa de Contrataciôn in Seville to pay
the costs of sending twelve missionaries, one lay brother,
Quoted in Lovell, Conquest and Survival in
Colonial Guatemala, pp.75-6. According to Lovell, the
spiritual aspects of the policy had already been
incorporated into the Laws of Burgos (1512). See also
Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution", p.44.
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and two servants to the Chocó 38 , shows the extent of the
financial investment made by the Crown in the mission.
Each member of the expedition was to be provided with
sufficient funding to cover the cost of travel and
maintenance from their place of residence to their port of
embarkation - Sanlücar de Barrameda or Cádiz - and from
there to Cartagena. The costs of travel and maintenance
from Cartagena to Honda were to be paid by royal officials
in Cartagena, and those from Honda to Santa Fe were to be
met by royal officials in the New Kingdom. 39 Likewise, the
governor of Antioquia, Don Francisco Montoya y Salazar, was
ordered to pay the costs of sending the members of the
expedition on to the mission, as well as to provide them
38 The following list includes the names, places of
origin, and ages of the twelve Franciscan friars, the lay
brother, and two servants who were chosen for the Chocô
miss ion: Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra (Galicia, 37);
Fray Joseph Marton (Zaragoza, 40); Fray Juan Tabuenca
(Zaragoza, 27); Fray Francisco Moreno (Zaragoza, 25);
Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga (Zaragoza, 26); Fray Bernardo
Pascual RamIrez (Logroflo, 31); Fray Juan Chaverri
(Navarra, 27); Fray AgustIn Navarro (Burgos, 26); Fray
Francisco Garcia (Logrono, 26); Fray Pedro Arbues
(Zaragoza, 40); Fray Miguel de Vera (32); Fray Pablo Ruiz
(Zaragoza, 25); Fray Francisco Garrido (Burgos, 32);
Pedro de Villa Verde (15); Bartolomé Garcia (15). See AGI
Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans), ff.6-8.
Ibid., Royal Cédula, Madrid, 30 October 1671,
ff.4-5.
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with chalices, missals, and church ornaments. 40 No mention
was made in this cédula of stipends for the missionaries.
No other special provisions were made during these
years to assist the Franciscan mission financially - not
even those explicitly made for their Jesuit counterparts.
In November 1673, for instance, the Crown issued a royal
cédula ordering royal officials in Popayán to provide the
Jesuit doctrineros of the Chocô with an annual stipend of
50,000 maravedls. The Jesuits probably did not receive
these funds - Father Juan Escuder was said to have had
great difficulties in maintaining himself in the region
because he could not obtain from the Indians the plantains
upon which his diet was based 4' - but the Franciscans were
not even offered such support.
Instead, the cédula of November, 1666, as well as
later cédulas and royal provisions, directed that the
Indians of the Chocó were to be exempt from tribute
payments for a period of ten years, and that no demands
were to be placed on them for stipends for the clergy. It
° Ibid., ff.2-3. This cédula clearly followed the
pattern established in the Recopilación (lib.I, tit.14,
laws 4 & 6) for the sending of missionaries to the
colonies. According to Haring, "Friars selected by the
Orders for missionary work in the colonies were
recommended by them to the Council of the Indies, which
issued passports to the Casa de ContrataciOn. Travel
expenses from the monasteries to Seville was furnished by
the crown, the cost of clothing and food for the voyage
by the Casa, and the passage money by the royal treasury
in the Indies after safe arrival". See Haring, The
Spanish Empire, footnote 20, p.172.
The cédula was dated November 17, 1673. Pacheco,
Los Jesuitas, p.451. By this time, the Franciscans had
already arrived in the region.
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was thought that, in not making financial demands of the
Indians, the task of reducing and converting them would be
facilitated, because they would be persuaded that the Crown
was concerned only about the Indians and their interests,
and not about its own. 42 However, it was expected that the
Indians of the region, while exempt from tribute and
stipend payments, would provide the friars with foodstuffs.
Unless further funding, in the form of charitable
contributions, could be found for them, this was to be
their only source of maintenance. In 1675, the Crown's
position on the matter was made clear. In that year, it
was officially acknowledged that the Franciscans of the
Chocô mission were facing financial difficulties, but a
royal provision merely ordered the governor of Antioquia,
Juan Bueso de Valdés, to do his utmost to secure charitable
contributions for the missionaries in the Chocô. Should
these not be forthcoming, Bueso de Valdés was permitted to
make a modest contribution from royal treasury funds,
although this, too, was conditional on the treasury's
situation. Principally, however, Bueso de Valdés was
ordered to ensure that the friars were maintained from the
42 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, 27
November 1666; Royal Cédula, Madrid, 6 June 1674, ff.1-4,
and Real Provision, 29 April 1675, ff.13-19.
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"produce of the land". 43
 There is no evidence that any
treasury funds reached the Franciscans at this time.
The experience of the Franciscans in the Chocó was
similar, in this respect, to that of their counterparts in
eastern Peru. In 1666, the Franciscans of the Pantaguas
missions, near Guánuco, complained to the King that the
fifteen missionaries serving the mission had been unable to
obtain an annual stipend from the viceroys, and that they
only received funds from them at long and irregular
intervals. They complained that they had not received any
financial aid since 1660, and were not, in fact, to receive
any further assistance until 1709. Even at the beginning
of the 18th century, the situation had not improved. One
Franciscan, Fray Francisco de San Joseph, received a
payment in 1711, but had to wait for the next until l732.
The missionaries' early enthusiasm was influenced
greatly by the firm resistance they encountered in their
dealings with the Indians. Their first decade of activity
in the Chocô was marked not by missionary effort to convert
the Indians, but by repeated attempts to congregate the
population, a prerequisite to the process of conversion,
and to barter with them in order to obtain food. It was
Ibid., Real Provision, 29 April 1675, ff.13-19. In
1719, Fray Diego Barroso, a member of the Franciscan
Province of Santa Fe, recalled that the Crown contributed
only 1,500 pesos to the sending of the missionaries in
1671, and that the Province of Santa Fe had had to
contribute 4,556. AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Diego Barroso,
Santa Fe, 18 November 1719.
See Tibesar, "The Franciscan Doctrinero", footnote
9, pp.119-20.
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also marked by a growing awareness that the instructions of
the Crown could not be observed in the Chocô, and by a
growing desperation which manifested itself not only in the
number of Franciscans who abandoned the region altogether,
but in the increasingly violent disputes in which the
remaining Franciscans became involved.
Upon their arrival in the Chocó, in 1673, each of the
Franciscan missionaries was immediately assigned to either
one or two of the region's settlements. Three missionaries
were sent to the province of Tatamá/Chocó, to administer
the five principal settlements: Fray Cristôbal de Artiaga
went to San Francisco Ytaguri, Fray Pablo Ruiz to Nuestra
Señora de la Paz de Pureto and San Pedro de Alcántara de
Maygara, and Fray Francisco Moreno to Poya and Yragugu. In
the province of Citará, one missionary was assigned to each
of the three main settlements: Fray Francisco Garcia went
to San Francisco de Atrato, Fray Joseph de Côrdoba was sent
to Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de LLorô, and Fray Juan
Tabuenca to Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zaragoza, on the
Nigua river. In addition, two Franciscans - Fray Bernardo
Pascual Ramirez and Fray Miguel de Vera - were sent to the
small settlement of Taita. 45
 These were the settlements
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Fray Miguel de Castro, n.p., n.d., f.46. According to
Fray Juan Tabuenca, San Gabriel del Citará (which later
became Lloró) had been burned down. Ibid., Fray Juan
Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, Nigua, 28 November 1673,
f.76. Three of the twelve original members of the
Franciscan group - Agustin Navarro, Pedro Arbues, and
Francisco Garrido - did not arrive in the Chocó, but
Joseph de Córdoba, who was not included in the original
list, did travel to the Chocó as part of the mission.
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that the Franciscans believed to be both permanent and the
most densely populated, and each was to receive the
Services of a Franciscan missionary.
TABLE 3:
PROVINCES OF TATAMA/CHOCO AND CITAR.A:
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRANCISCANS, OCTOBER 1674
FATHER COMISARIO: FRAY MIGUEL DE CASTRO RIVADENEYRA
PROVINCE OF TATAHA/CHOCO
FRANCISCAN	 I	 SETTLEMENT
Fray Cristôbal de Artiaga
Fray Pablo Ruiz
Fray Pablo Ruiz
Fray Francisco Moreno
Fray Francisco Moreno
San Francisco Ytaguri
Nra. Sra. de Pureto
San Pedro de Alcántara
Poya
Yragugu
PROVINCE OF CITARA
FRANCISCAN	 SETTLEMENT
Fray Francisco Garcia 	 San Francisco de Atrato
Fray Joseph de Córdoba 	 Nra. Sra. de Lloró
Fray Juan Tabuenca	 Nra. Sra. de Zaragoza
Pascual Ramirez	 Taita
Miguel de Vera	 Taita
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MAP 6
THE CIIOCO: MAIN AREA OF SEI1IEMENT,
1673-74
Source: Isacsson, "Embera' t , p.19.
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However, some of the settlements, as the Franciscans
were soon to realize, were more imaginary than real. For
example, when Francisco de Quevedo passed through the area
en route to San Joseph de Noanama in 1669, he noted the
size of two of these: Poya was merely a "hamlet" made up of
two houses, while Yragugu was described as a hamlet
consisting of five dwellings. In 1673, Father Joseph
Garreto's settlement of Carrapa - to which a Franciscan was
not sent - was said to consist of little more than the
house in which he lived, a small church, and another house
inhabited by one Indian. 47 Similarly, Nuestra Señora del
Pilar de Zaragoza apparently consisted of a small chapel,
Fray Juan Tabuenca's house, and the house of an Indian
named Dadura. 48
 The efforts of payaneses and antioqueflos
in the years prior to the Franciscans' arrival to
congregate the Indians in settlements had been decidedly
unsuccessful. By 1673-74, all the settlements founded by
Quevedo and Antonio de Guzinán had been either burned down
or abandoned. 49 Furthermore, the churches which Guzinán had
built in the settlements he founded were said to be in a
sorry state: according to Castro Rivadeneyra, these served
Ibid., Don Francisco de Quevedo, San José de
Noanama, 15 May 1669.
Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Fray
Miguel de Castro, n.p., n.d., f.46.
48 Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.47.
Ibid., Domingo de Beitia y Gambca, Real de Minas
de Nuestra Señora de Belén, 28 July 1674, f.60.
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as hencoops and workshops for the construction of canoes.5°
This claim was supported by the Spaniard Esteban Fernández
de Rivera, who reported that Guzmán had built three
churches, which now served as workshops for the making of
canoes and arrows.5'
The reality of congregating the Indians in these
settlements did not match the Franciscans' initial
expectations. The Franciscan Padre Comisario, Fray Miguel
de Castro Rivadeneyra, reported that, soon after arriving
in the region, he had travelled to an Indian community on
the banks of the Atrato river with the aim of informing its
population - through an interpreter - that he had come in
the name of the king of Spain to teach them to pray, to
celebrate Mass, and to instruct them in the Holy Faith. In
exchange, the Indians should choose the location for a
town, build a church, and settle there. The Indians were
said to have chosen San Francisco de Atrato as their
settlement and to have agreed to build a church. But as
soon as the church was completed, all the Indians abandoned
the town: the Comisario tried to coax them to remain, but
to no avail. 52 Fray Miguel de Castro reported similar
problems in the province of Tatamá/Chocó, where the Indians
50 Ibid., Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra, n.p.,
n.d., f.44.
' Ibid., Esteban Fernández de Rivera, Nuestra Señora
de Belén, 27 July 1674, f.57.
52 Ibid., Fray Miguel de Castro, n.p., n.d., ff.47-8.
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had also abandoned the settlement of Nuestra Señora de la
Paz de Pureto.53
Franciscan difficulties in fixing settlement were no
doubt due to native patterns of settlement, which, based on
small dispersed communities composed of several extended
families, moved regularly from area to area, in accordance
with their agricultural needs. Their social structure,
based on communities composed of small family units, meant
that there were no leaders who could be co-opted by the
Spaniards. The Indians did have "capitanes", but these
were figures whose reputations had been made in wars
against enemy Indian groups, and they had no permanent
authority over the Indians of their communities. As the
Jesuit Antonio Marzal observed in referring to the
provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citarã, the Indians "are a
people without leaders, who do not obey or respect anyone
even in war, and if they have capitanes it is not because
they obey them in anything, but because they have a
reputation for being brave... ". Thus, while the
Franciscans working among the Maya of the Yucatan peninsula
in the mid-sixteenth century focused their early activities
on indoctrinating the children of the native nobility, who
were expected to be returned to their villages to teach
Ibid., f.45. See also Real ProvisiOn, Santa Fe, 1
April 1675, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.53-4.
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el ChocO", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.501.
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their fellow Indians simple routines of worship, 55 the
Franciscans of the Chocô entered a quite different culture,
in which they had first to create positions of leadership
among the Indians. Without leaders, the Franciscans
alleged, they would not be able to make the Indians obey
them. In recommending ways to congregate the Indians in
settlements and ensuring that the Sacraments were
administered to them, the Franciscan Procurador General,
Fray Lucas de Villa Vezes, noted that one Indian leader
would have to imposed on the others, who would be given the
task of ensuring that his fellow Indians remain in their
settlements. 56
 For, as Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramlrez
noted, "no progress is made nor will be made until a way is
found to make the Indians obey the religious, ordering them
to attend [the teaching of] Doctrine". Fray Miguel de
Vera, who in fact abandoned the settlement of Taita,
observed that he had done so because the Indians resisted
any form of subjection. Although he claimed that he called
the Indians to learn Christian Doctrine, they not only
refused to attend but in fact escaped from the settlement
altogether
Indian resistance to Franciscan activities in their
territory also manifested itself in their refusal to
Inga Clendinnen, "Disciplining the Indians:
Franciscan Ideology and Missionary Violence in Sixteenth-
Century Yucatan", Past and Present, No.94 (1982), p.33.
56 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
n.p., n.d., f.l6.
' Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.23.
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provide the friars with food supplies. Fray Miguel de Vera
and Fray Bernardo Pascual RamIrez claimed that they had had
to leave Taita because they had been unable to obtain
foodstuffs, despite attempting to barter with the Indians
with beads, bells, axes, and other goods. 58 According to
the Franciscan Procu.raa'or, the Indians expected to receive
these goods for allowing the friars to live in their
lands. 59
 However, in 1673, Fray Juan Tabuenca claimed that
the Indians were willing to provide some foodstuffs in
exchange for certain goods, particularly those made of
iron, such as machetes, knives, axes, scissors, and
needles, and, of course, beads - although these were not to
be made of glass. Nevertheless, Tabuenca advised that all
missionaries assigned to the Chocó region should take
supplies of meat with them, because the land only produced
plantains and maize, and these were not available
everywhere and at all times.60
Missionaries in the Chocô were not the only Spaniards
faced with having to barter goods for foodstuffs with the
Indian inhabitants of frontier areas in Spanish America.
Indeed, the exchange of Spanish goods for Indian products
is a feature of Spanish-Indian relations that has been
identified by several historians. James Schofield Saeger,
for example, indicated the extent to which the economy and
Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.23.
Ibid., n.p., n.d., ff.l4-5.
60 Ibid., Nigua, 23 November 1673, f.77; and Nigua,
29 May 1674, ff.79-80.
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society of the Guaycuruan Indians of the Chaco region
underwent a significant transformation as a result of
trading with the Spaniards: their subsistence-based economy
gradually became an economy based on barter with the
Spaniards. Consequently, their traditional diet of game,
fish, and wild plants began to be supplemented with
horsemeat and beef. Spanish animals became a part not only
of the Guaycuruans' diet but also of their conunerce:
Spanish animals and horses, in addition to Spanish and
Indian captives, honey, wax, and skins, were bartered for
Guaycuruan captives, knives, fishhooks, iron, hatchets,
beads, and clothing.6'
The value of iron in general and of Spanish tools in
particular were recognized by Indian groups across Spanish
America from the very beginning of conquest. At the end of
the sixteenth century, a Spanish soldier based in Chile
reported that the Araucanian Indians looked forward to the
campaigns the Spaniards launched against them: it was
during those campaigns that the Indians replenished their
stores of horses and stirrups, swords, knives, machetes,
and especially axes. 62 In the Chocó, Fray MatIas Abad also
recognized, in 1648, the value of these goods for the
missionary effort.	 In writing to his Provincial, Abad
61 James Schofield Saeger, "Another View of the
Mission as a Frontier Institution: The Guaycuruan
Missions of Santa Fe, 1743-1810", HMIR, Vol.65 (1985),
p.496.
62 Louis De Armond, "Frontier Warfare in Colonial
Chile", Pacific Historical Review, Vol.XXIII (1954),
p.131.
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requested needles, knives, fishhooks, and beads, for these
greatly facilitated the missionaries' attempts to obtain
food supplies and made the Indians more willing to become
Christian. 63
 However, the experiences of other Franciscans
in the region show that barter could not be relied upon: by
September 1674, for instance, Fray Pablo Ruiz was said to
have moved to Llorô because he had not been able to obtain
supplies from the Indians in the vicinity of his
settlement.
Indian resistance could also take the form of violent
attack against individual missionaries. In 1676, Fray
Francisco Caro, President of the Franciscan hospice of
Antioquia, reported an incident involving Fray Francisco
GarcIa, who was attacked by an Indian whom he had called to
attend prayers.	 The Indian apparently attempted to
strangle the priest and, holding him down on the ground,
lifted an axe to kill him. The intervention of other
Indians saved Fray Francisco on this occasion. 65 Indian
violence against clerics was not directed only at the
Franciscans, though. A few years earlier, the Jesuit
Benito de Carvajal was also said to have been attacked by
an Indian, and to have been saved only by the presence of
Isacsson, ItFray Matias Abad", p.472.
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Llorô, 15 September 1674, f.1l3.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January
1676, ff.6-8. Fray Joseph de Côrdoba also reported the
attack on Fray Francisco Garcia. See AGI Quito 67,
"Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Lloró, 15 September
1674, ff.113-14.
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some Spaniards. As we have seen, it was as a result of
this attack that Carvajal decided to abandon the region and
return to Popayán. In May 1674, the other Jesuit,
Antonio Marzal, reported that the Indians of Lloró had
taken up arms against the Franciscan Comisario, Fray Miguel
de Castro Rivadeneyra. 67 In September 1674, Fray Joseph de
Côrdoba wrote from Lloró that the Indians had again
attempted to kill the Spaniards, and that they were
planning to form an alliance to attack the Spanish. 68 In
fact, by January 1676, it was said that the Indians had
tried to kill Fray Joseph de Córdoba. First, he had
suffered an Indian ambush and then the house in which he
lived was burned down. 69 This fear of attack was in fact
generalized, for all the Spaniards in the area, not just
the missionaries, appear to have felt at risk. In
September 1674, Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa, reported from
Lloró that "the Indians ... every day say that they want to
kill us". 7° Indeed, several references were made to
"disturbances" taking place in the region: Castro
Rivadeneyra and Fray Juan Tabuenca, for instance, both
See Father Marzal's report, in Pacheco, Los
Jesuitas, p.499. See also AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de
Autos (Franciscans)", Bishop Meichor de Liflán y Cisneros,
4 June 1672, f.82, and Pacheco, op.cit., p.450.
67 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Noanama, 22 May 1674, f.80.
68 Ibid., Lloró, 15 September 1674, ff.].l3-14.
69 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January
1676, ff.6-8.
70 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Llorá, 16 September 1674, f.112.
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reported minor "rebellions" and "uprisings" among the
Indians. 7' Fray Francisco Caro, of Antioquia, argued that
such outrages were experienced daily by the friars, who
were justifiably distrustful and fearful.72
The missionaries' dismal experience is reflected in
the Jesuit Antonio Marzal's account of his activities among
the Citará Indians in the early l670s. He recalled that,
after travelling through the province of Citará over a
period of 17 months, his only achievement had been the
baptism of a few Indian children; he had had no success in
either congregating or converting the native population of
the area. In fact, Father Marzal expressed profound doubts
about whether it was lawful to baptize the children. For
although ecclesiastical law accepted that it lawful to
baptize the children of infidels when the parents were in
the process of becoming Christians, or the children of
Christians even if the parents found the practice
loathsome, this could take place only when the children
could be given a Christian education. This was clearly not
possible in the case of the Citarä children, given the
resistance of the parents. Thus, Marzal concluded that he
could not understand how it could be lawful to baptize the
Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.59, and Fray Juan Tabuenca to
Castro Rivadeneyra, RIo de Nigua, 17 September 1673,
f.74.
72 AGI Santa Fe 204, Raino 1, Antioquia, 3 January
1676, ff.6-8.
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children,	 "given the present state of the said
provinces" .
After the arrival of the Franciscans, Marzal moved
down to San Joseph de Noanama and continued his missionary
activities among the Indians who resided along the Raposo
river and the mining camp of San AgustIn. But he noted of
the Indians that "if they are spoken to of God they mock
us, if of ... hell they don't believe it, if of vices these
are what they most love, and in criticizing their way of
life, they say very clearly that we live much worse".
Moreover, Marzal observed, there was little point in
attempting to prevent the children leaving the settlements
so as to ensure that they attended prayer and learned to
become Christians, because their elders - at their
"meetings of elders or drinking sessions" undid all the
missionaries' efforts.74
By 1674, just one year after the Franciscans arrived
in the Chocó, some of the friars had come to the conclusion
that the order should leave the mission. In May 1674, Fray
Juan Tabuenca wrote to Castro Rivadeneyra and informed him
that, in his opinion, the Franciscan order should abandon
the region altogether: it would be to the greater credit of
the order to leave the mission at that stage than to be
forced to leave years later without having achieved the
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.499-500.
Ibid., pp.502.
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task it had been set. 75 Others, however, had concluded
that the process of "reduction" would not be successful
without the introduction of some form of punishment,
despite the Crown's directives. In September 1674, Fray
Joseph de Côrdoba - who, as we shall see, was to have a
particularly difficult relationship with the Indians in the
following years - claimed to have lost his patience, and
seemed prepared to leave the enterprise, for the Indians
"do nothing" except "through force". 76 Even the Jesuits,
who had much more missionary experience as they had been in
New Granada since l662, expressed similar doubts. In May
1674, for example, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal argued that
"because they are so barbarous", no good could be expected
from the Indians until punishment was used to enforce
obedience. It was a mistake to think that the Indians
would "understand the truth through ... spiritual means",
for they were It lacking in reason" and had an excess of
"malice" 78
The perceptions of these Franciscans and Jesuits in
the mid 1670s were no different from those of another
Franciscan, Fray Jacinto Hurtado, who had spent some time
in the region twenty years before. Hurtado spent about
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Fray Juan Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, 29 May 1674,
f.78.
76 Ibid., Lloró, 15 September 1674, f.113.
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, Appendix 1, p.486.
78 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Noanama, 22 May 1674, f.80.
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seven years attempting to reduce the Indians of the Chocô,
and when, towards the end of the 1650s, he travelled to
Spain, he reported to the Crown that it would not be
possible to "reduce" the Indians of the region through
preaching alone. Hurtado noted that the Indians could be
baptized by the thousands if they were given Spanish goods,
but they soon returned to their "infidelity". Fray Jacinto
advocated a combination of preaching and armed force to
achieve their reduction, for "it has been seen by the
experience of all the conquests carried out throughout the
Indies [that] ... not even the smallest town has been
reduced through ... preaching, unless supported by
force".79
By the mid-1670s, the Franciscans in the Chocô were
certainly contravening the Crown's instructions, which they
had come to regard as unenforceable. Because of the
problems they faced in obtaining food supplies from the
Indians they began to advocate the collection of tributes
and stipends, despite explicit prohibition by royal cêdula
of November, 1666. In this, they received the support of
the Franciscan Procurador General. Fray Lucas de Villa
Vezes reported that since the Indians had been paying
tributes for many years - against, of course, the wishes of
the Crown - and since the friars had no financial
EN Ms. 1969931, "DeclaraciOn que hizo el Padre Fray
Jacinto Hurtado, franciscano, estando por inorir, de
algunos puntos tocantes a la conversion de los indios de
la provincia del ChocO", n.p., n.d.
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assistance, part of the tribute, or at least a payment from
the royal treasury, should be provided for them.'°
Their frustration also led them to become involved in
disputes with the secular clergy and the few royal
officials resident in the region: their lack of success
among the Indians, they alleged, was a result of both
Antonio de Guzmán's influence in the region and the royal
officials' refusal to cooperate with their endeavours. For
instance, they claimed that Antonio de Guzmán's presence
had a deleterious effect on the native population: Castro
Rivadeneyra argued that Antonio de Guzmán, and his brother
Ignacio, encouraged the Indians to disobey the friars.8'
The Franciscans also levelled other, less credible
accusations against the Guzmán brothers. It was said, for
example, that they had told the Indians many lies, among
which the most notable were that there were three kings,
that the friars had not been sent by the king, and that
they should therefore not be obeyed. Fray Miguel de Castro
reported that the mission could only be successful if the
Indians had a good concept of the missionaries. 82
 The
Franciscans clearly wanted Antonio de Guzmán and his
associates expelled from the province, and it was for this
reason that they claimed that these men undermined the
80 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
n.p., n.d., f.16.
Ibid., Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra, n.p.,
n.d., f.43.
82 Ibid., ff.44-45; and AGI Santa Fe 204, Ranio 1,
Real Provision, Santa Fe, 1 April 1675, ff.53-54.
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process of conversion in the region. In fact, although in
1672 Antonio de Guzmän had been ordered to leave the
province in the care of the Franciscans, the friars claimed
that problems still arose because he had left his brother
and other relatives there.83
These accusations should be read within the context of
missionary frustration and of their decision to demand
stipends from the Indians in their charge, for the
Franciscans believed that the Guzmán brothers had informed
the Indians that the missionaries would be maintained by
the King. Guzmán himself had no need of a stipend, since
he owned and operated at least one mine in the province of
Citará. However, Fray Miguel complained that the Indians
had agreed with Juan Lopez Garcia that they would make a
two-peso payment twice a year: one peso in tribute, and the
other peso by way of a stipend to the priest in charge of
their religious instruction. According to Castro
Rivadeneyra, the Indians had in fact paid this sum many
times, and he concluded that, by telling the Indians that
the missionaries would be maintained by the Crown, the
Guzmân brothers intended to undermine support for the
Franciscans.	 The problem was compounded by the fact
83 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
n.p., n.d., ff.45-46. The real provisiOn ordering Guzmán
to leave the province in the care of the Franciscans was
dated 24 December 1672. Ibid., Real de Santo Domingo, 16
September 1673, ff.66-67.
Ibid., Fray Miguel de Castro, n.p., n.d., f.44.
Fray Juan Tabuenca also reported that "todas estas
provincias pactaron Librernente de dar dos pesos de
tributo cada Tercio". See ibid., Fray Juan Tabuenca to
Castro Rivadeneyra, Nigua, 28 November 1673, f.76. See
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that, as Fray Lucas de Villa Vezes, the Franciscan
Procurator, argued, Antonio de Guzmán had also instructed
the Indians not to provide any Spaniard with food supplies
- namely, maize and plaritains - without first being paid
for them. 85
 In fact, in 1674, Antonio de Guzmân reported
that he had assured the Indians that they were only obliged
to pay tributes to the Crown, and that although in time the
doctrineros too would have to be provided with a stipend,
this would be drawn from the tributes, and no further
contributions would be demanded of them.86
The Franciscans also believed that their efforts among
the Indians of the Chocô were being undermined by the
bishop of Popayán. Indeed, the bishop was said even to
have disputed the Franciscans' jurisdictional rights over
the region. For instance, the Comisario, Castro
Rivadeneyra, alleged that the bishop had advised him to
move on to Darien - the region lying to the north of the
Chocó, inhabited by the Cunacuna - because he had already
appointed secular priests to administer the ChocO.
Apparently, the bishop had appointed Nicolás de Lara as
parish priest of the mining camp of Sed de Cristo and the
Indian settlements of Poya and Yragugu, where, Castro
Rivadeneyra claimed, a Franciscan missionary was already
administering the Sacraments to the Indians settled there.
also AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Real Provision, Santa Fe,
1 April 1675, 53-54.
85 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
n.p., n.d., ff.l4-l5.
86 Ibid., Antioquia, 29 April 1674, f.90.
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The Franciscan Comisario also complained that, with the
exception of Joseph Garrete, who ministered to the Indians
of Carrapa (or ChamI), there were no other secular clerics
or settled towns in the province of Tatamá/Chocô, and that,
in fact, Father Garrete had decided to leave Carrapa when
the Franciscans arrived in the region. In addition, the
Comisario alleged that the bishop had appointed a second
secular priest, Antonio de Borja, as doctrinero of the
Indian settlement of San Francisco de Ytaguri, to which he
had already assigned Fray Cristôbal de Artiaga.87
Although these complaints are the only ones that have
been found to indicate some regular-secular tension in the
Chocó, and although there is no evidence to suggest that
any of the appointed priests resided in their parishes, by
1675, the governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés, was
expressing to the Crown his doubts about whether any
progress would ever be made in the region while there were
secular clerics and missionaries from the regular orders in
the region at the same time. While seculars and regulars
remained in the Chocô together, all their time would be
wasted in disputes. The governor considered that either
the seculars or the regulars should be entrusted with the
work of the mission, that it should be entrusted to the
group that would also undertake the reduction of
unconquered neighbouring Indian groups - the Soruco and the
Burgumia - and that all those who were not involved in the
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
n.p., n.d., f.46.
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"reduction" should be expelled from the area. The Governor
noted that, as the Chocó would be very useful to the royal
treasury, the problem required an immediate solution.88
What is clear, however, is that the bishop of Popayán,
Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros, did not support the
Franciscans' Chocó mission. He not only openly favoured
the Jesuits, but indeed stated, in 1672, that secular
priests had already been appointed to the parishes of the
Chocó, in accordance with the Crown's Patronato Real.89
Governor Diaz de la Cuesta also preferred the Jesuits to
the Franciscans, and in 1669, requested from the Jesuit
Father Provincial the services of three missionaries for
the Chocô. Both bishop and governor wanted the region
administered by Jesuits.° There is no evidence, however,
of conflict between the orders, for the only Jesuit
remaining in the region by the time the Franciscans
arrived, Father Antonio Marzal, willingly moved to the
province of Noanama, which was not included in the
Franciscan mission.
Within the Chocó, the Franciscans also perceived that
they were receiving little support from royal officials.
88 Ibid., Governor Juan Bueso de Valdés to Crown,
Antioquia, 12 July 1675.
89 Ibid., Bishop Meichor de Liflán y Cisneros to
Crown, Santa Fe, 3 July 1672. See also "Testimonio de
Autos (Franciscans)", Bishop Meichor Liflán y Cisneros,
Popayän, 4 June 1674, f.83. For a description of the way
in which the Patronato Real functioned in colonial Latin
America, see Chapter 7 of this thesis.
° Ibid., Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to Crown,
Popayán, 28 July 1669.
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In May 1674, Fray Juan Tabuenca reported from Nigua that
the Indians had "so much freedom" that, if any attempt was
made to "reduce" them, they complained to Lopez Garcia, or
to Joseph de Salamanca, or to Domingo de Beytia, or to Luis
de los RIos, all of whom apparently served as officials in
the region. Tabuenca was of the opinion that "...I do not
believe that this is the [right] ... method for
indoctrinating them, but for them to do with us what they
please". The Franciscan believed that either they or the
officials should leave the province, for, while the
situation remained as it was, everybody's energies went
into disputing the extent of each other's jurisdiction.9'
He did not explain, however, what benefit the Indians
derived from complaining to these officials.
The Jesuit Antonio Marzal also expressed similar
concerns and gives us further evidence that there was some
tension between missionaries and royal officials in the
region. In 1678, Marzal reported to the Jesuit Father
Visitor that the children of the Citarâ could not be
provided with a Christian education, first, because of the
resistance of their parents, but secondly, because of the
complete lack of assistance the missionaries received from
the secular authorities, despite the numerous official
posts that had been created there.	 Indeed, Marzal
believed that many of the difficulties encountered by the
' Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Nigua,
29 May 1674, f.77.
Antonio Marzal, "Iriforme sobre el ChocO", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.502.
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missionaries could be overcome with the assistance of the
secular authorities, which had not, until then, been
forthcoming.93
The Franciscan Missionaries
The number of Franciscans who abandoned the Chocó
mission field within the first few years of activity there
reflects the problems they faced in their attempt to settle
and convert the Indian population. Fray Miguel de Vera and
Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramlrez - the two missionaries who
had been assigned to Taita - had left the settlement by
July l674. By 1676, Miguel de Aguinaga, the new governor
of Antioquia, claimed that four of the missionaries who had
been sent from Spain to the Chocó were residing in the city
of Antioquia, despite the fact that the Chocô was short of
clergy. 95 In fact, by 1676, only three Franciscans
remained in the entire Chocó region: Fray Joseph de Córdoba
continued to serve the settlement of Nuestra Señora de la
Concepción de LLoró, in the province of Citará, and Fray
Francisco Moreno and Fray Pablo Ruiz between them served
the settlements of Tadó, San Juan de Yró, and Santa Cruz de
Yragugu, in the province of Tatamà/Chocó. As many as four
of the original settlements to which the Franciscans had
been sent in the province of Tatamá/Chocô - Poya, Nuestra
Ibid., pp.502-03.
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Antioquia, 18 July 1674, f.22.
" Antioquia, 30 December 1675, in AGI Santa Fe 204,
Rarno 1, ff.5-6.
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Señora de Pureto, San Pedro de Alcántara, San Francisco
Ytaguri - had either ceased to exist or had been abandoned
by the missionaries. And, if only Llorô, in the Province
of Citarà, enjoyed the services of a priest, the other two
settlements of the province - San Juan de Nigua and San
Francisco de Atrato - clearly had also been abandoned. In
1676, Fray Francisco Caro, of the Franciscan hospice in
Antioquia, justified the missionaries' absence on the basis
of the Indians' continuing defiance.
However, one should beware of placing all the blame
for the friars' difficulties and disillusion on the
situation in the mission field. Some of the Franciscans
who had been sent to the Chocó - Fray Agustin Navarro, Fray
Pedro Arbues, and Fray Francisco Garrido - never actually
arrived, and at least one other - Fray Joseph Marton - left
the area before he had even been assigned to any of the
settlements, making his way to Antioquia and then to
Cartagena. Thus, out of a total of twelve Franciscans
who formed part of the original expedition, only eight
remained in the Chocó at the end of l673, a number that
96 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January
1676, ff.6-8.
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
f.99. According to a petition presented by a group of
Antioquia residents, Fray Joseph Marton and Fray Miguel
de Vera had left the region within one and a half months
of arriving there. See the petition of Francisco Mayoral
de Olivos, Don Carlos de Molina y Toledo, Don Diego
Beltrán de Castillo, Don Luis Jaramillo, and Juan
Jaramillo, Valle de Aburra, 28 August 1674, in ibid.,
f.33.
98 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January
1676, ff.6-8.
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had been reduced to three by 1676. Fray Juan Tabuenca was
among the last of the Franciscans to desert. As we have
seen, he had decided by May of 1674 that the order should
leave the Chocó mission. But in fact, as early as November
1673, Tabuenca had informed the Comisario that it was
pointless even to attempt to make Christians out of "these
barbarians", since he could find no way of teaching people
who could not understand him. As we have already noted,
no consideration was ever given to the learning of native
languages.
Although we do not know what became of those
Franciscans who do not appear in the list of friars sent to
the region's settlements, Pedro Borges Moran's study of
missionary expeditions sent to Spanish America during the
colonial period shows that missionary desertions were not
at all rare.	 Some missionaries died en route to the
colonies. Others deserted their expeditions at various
ports before arriving at their intended destinations, and
there were also those who preferred to opt for the easier
life offered in some other area of the colony to which they
had been sent. Another proportion did go to the missions
to which they had been assigned, only to abandon their
respective mission territories after only a short spell of
activity there. Borges Moran cites several examples to
illustrate this feature of missionary activity, and shows
that, from the sixteenth century, royal orders were
AGI Quito 67, tTestimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Fray Juan Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, Nigua, 28
November 1673, f.77.
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repeatedly issued in an attempt to prevent further
desertions. 100
Moreover, many complaints were made against the
Franciscans for the methods they employed to settle the
Indians and to obtain stipends from them. Some of these
complaints were made by the Antioqueños and by the secular
priest Antonio de Guzmán, and thus, like those made by the
missionaries against Guzmán, should also be read
cautiously. These clearly had more to do with the
jurisdictional dispute between the gobernaciones of Popayãn
and Antioquia, to which we have referred in Chapter 2, than
with the reality of what was occurring among t'ne 1n1ans of
the Chocô. For example, Guzmân opposed the methods used
by the Franciscans to congregate the native population. He
reported that the friars had attempted to reduce the number
of settlements existing in the province of Citarã from five
to three, and that these attempts had caused disturbances
among the native population. Guzmán claimed that he had
founded the five settlements, and that he had chosen
locations suitable for the cultivation of maize and other
produce.'°' His brother-in-law, Antonio del Pino
Villapadierna, also complained that the Franciscans had
attempted to resettle the Indians in different places,
forcing them to leave the five settlements founded by
100 Pedro Borges Moran, El envIo de misianeros a
America durante la época espanola (Salamanca, 1977),
pp.544-65.
101 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Juan de Leon Castellanos, n.p., n.d., f.86.
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Guzmán, which had been the only way that had been found to
make the Indians come out of their retreats to be
indoctrinated.'°2 In 1674, a group of vecinos of Antioquia
also reported that in the six months since the Franciscans
had been in the province of Citará, "troops of infidels"
had travelled to Antioquia to complain that the Franciscans
compelled them to congregate in different settlements and
leave the ones that Antonio de Guzmân had founded in places
they deemed to be convenient for agricultural purposes.'°3
Antonio de Guzmán also argued that, despite the fact
that the Franciscans had tried to discredit him and blame
him for the problems which had arisen with the Indians, it
was they who had caused them, for having demanded from the
Indians 300 pesos in payment of their stipends. It was
also said that one of the friars had beaten and badly
injured an Indian - one capitán Cupamay, who was apparently
well respected by the native population of the area.'°5
While some of the accusations may well have been false
- we have already seen that Guzmân's attempts to congregate
the native population in permanent settlements were as
unsuccessful as those of Quevedo, the Jesuits, and the
Franciscans - repeated complaints were certainly made
102 Ibid., n.p., n.d., ff.36-37.
103 Ibid., Francisco Mayoral de Olivos, Don Carlos de
Molina y Toledo, Don Diego Beltrân de Castillo, Doctor
Luis Jaramillo, and Juan Jaramillo, 28 August 1674, f.33.
'	 Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.87.
105 Ibid., Antonio and Ignacio de Guzmán, Mina del
Señor Santo Domingo, 15 July 1674, f.41.
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against the missionaries over the payment of stipends, and
about the ill-treatment the Indians received for refusing
to pay these. In 1674, Ignacio de Guzmân reported that
Capitân Bolivar and other Indians had complained that the
beating one of the Franciscans had given Capitán Cupamay
had been a result of his refusal to make the payments.'°6
That same year, the governor of Antioquia, Don Francisco de
Montoya y Salazar, reported to the Crown that the
missionaries insisted upon receiving a one-peso stipend
from the Indians, in addition to the one-peso they paid in
tribute to the royal treasury. Moreover, the tributes that
had been collected to be sent to Antioquia on the last
occasion these were due, had been taken by the friars, who
insisted that tributes should be paid in Popayán, and not
in Antioquia.'°7 Two of the friars - Fray Joseph de
Côrdoba and Fray Pablo Ruiz - appear to have had a
particularly difficult relationship with the Indians.
Complaints against them reached the Audiencia of Santa Fe.
Although the Franciscan Father Provincial, Fray Pedro de
Soto, was asked to order their return to Santa Fe,'°8
Córdoba and Ruiz remained in the mission. As we shall see
106 Ibid., Mina del Señor Santo Domingo, 15 July 1674,
f.4l. See also the petition presented by Francisco
Mayoral de Olivos, et.al., ff.32-35.
107 Ibid. Don Pedro de Salazar Betancur also
complained that two of the friars - Fray Joseph de
Côrdoba and Fray Pablo Ruiz - ill-treated the Indians.
See ibid., Anserma, 10 December 1674, f.119. The
correqidor Lorenzo de Salamanca complained about the same
two missionaries whom, he claimed, had stolen money from
him. See ibid., Anserma, 4 March 1675, ff.168-69.
'° Pacheco, La Consolidaciôn de la Iglesia, p.673.
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in Chapter 5, the Franciscan Provincial's failure to
withdraw these two missionaries was to have serious
consequences, during the following decade, for both the
Franciscans and all other Spaniards resident in the region.
In addition to the specific grievances that the
Antioqueñcs had against the Franciscans, other more general
issues were raised as well, which suggest that they
believed the missionaries to be unprepared for the task
they had been set in the Chocó. These interpretations of
the Franciscans' lack of ability are particularly
revealing, for they also allow us a few glimpses of the
Spaniards' attitudes towards the Indians and also of the
Antioqueños opinion of missionaries sent from Spain. In
complaining about the friars' ill-treatment of the Indians,
a group of men from Antioquia noted that as the friars were
"chapetones" who had just arrived from Spain, they had no
experience in dealing with or understanding the Indians.
The Indians were not only "rustic" and "bellicose", but the
vast majority did not understand or speak the Spanish
language. Indeed, there was at best only one Indian in
each settlement who could serve as interpreter, and these
could not be present at all times.'°9 According to the
Spaniard Antonio del Pino, the Indians were "barbarians
incapable of reason ... a people recently reduced after
having been accustomed to treacherous [acts] ... which the
109 AGI Quito 67, "Testiinonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Petition presented by Francisco Mayoral de Olivos,
et.al ., 28 August 1674, ff.34-35.
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religious are ignorant of, as they are chapetones recently
arrived from ... 5painhI.O
Similar doubts about the Franciscans' abilities were
voiced by the Audiencia of Santa Fe, and even by Fray Juan
Luengo, General of the Franciscan order. In reply to a
royal cédula of 24 August 1674, requesting information
about whether more members of the regular orders would be
required for missionary work, the Audiencia replied that
they would not, for the results expected from those who
were already there had not materialized. The Audiencia
reported that the Franciscan friars who had been sent did
not have the necessary wisdom. Thus, at least for the
moment, the Audiencia argued, the sending of missionaries
could be suspended."
The Audiencia's reply was passed on to Fray Juan
Luengo. Luengo agreed - on the basis of reports he had
received from Santa Fe - that no results had been obtained
from that mission, but pointed towards the friars'
inability to maintain themselves in the region as the
reason for its lack of success: the region was sterile, and
all the Indians were "cirnarrones" who had no houses in
which to live. For this reason, some of the friars had
abandoned the region, and some had been recalled. Luengo
added, however, that the mission was accepted against the
better judgement of the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe,
"° Ibid., n.p., n.d., ff.36-37.
" AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown,
Santa Fe, 17 June 1675.
163
which had previously and unsuccessfully attempted the task
of reduction in the area. As for the Franciscans who had
been sent to the Chocó, these were no more than
inexperienced young men, faced with a difficult terrain,
intractable Indians, and hunger. Luengo contrasted the
Franciscan record in the Chocó with the activities of some
of the friars in the Lianos, where the number of 'infidels'
was greater, but where they also had settlements, and
results were already being experienced."2
Undoubtedly, all these factors contributed to the
failure of the Franciscans. But the failure to convert and
discipline the Indians was not due only to the fact that
the Franciscans were unprepared for the task, or to
conflict between the two gobernaciones, or to disputes
between seculars and regulars, even though they blamed each
other for the situation. While the Indians did have
specific grievances against the Franciscans - to do with
tribute payments, stipends, ill-treatment - the crucial
reason for their refusal to settle in the Franciscan towns
had more to do with their traditional lifestyles,
agricultural methods, social structure, and general
resistance to the Spaniards than it did with the
missionaries themselves. We also saw in Chapter 2 that the
area over which the Franciscans and Antonio de Guzmán
112 Ibid., Fray Juan Luengo to Don Francisco Fernández
Madrigal, 23 April 1676. Luengo did not expand on the
reasons why some of the missionaries had been recalled,
nor did he give any indication about which of the
Franciscans he was referring to. For an account of the
activities of all the orders in the Lianos region, see
Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier.
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conflicted was only a small part of the Chocó region - the
province of Citará. Yet the same problems identified by
the missionaries working among the Citará in the 1670s were
also evident there in previous decades, as they were in the
provinces of Tatainá/Chocó and Noanaina during the same
decade, and, as we have seen, much of this evidence was
provided by the Jesuits. Indeed, in 1688, the Governor of
Popayán, Don Gerônimo de Berrio, felt it necessary to urge
the Jesuit order not to abandon its mission in the Chocô.
By this time, the Jesuits theoretically controlled three
Indian settlements in the province of Noanama - San José de
Noanama, with 50 tributaries; San Ignacio de Loyola, with
a total population of 10 or 12 Indians; and San Francisco
Javier, with 50 tributaries. But even the Jesuits, who had
almost twenty years of work in the area, and concentrated
their activities after the arrival of the Franciscans among
Indians who were supposed to have been finally pacified in
the 1630s, had had virtually no success in either
congregating or converting the native population.H3 In
1689, the Jesuit order finally abandoned its activities
among the Noanama in favour of their mission in the Marañón
river region. In October of that year, the General of the
Jesuit order, Tirso Gonzalez, wrote that the mission among
the Chocô and Noanama had not had a missionary for more
than four years, and that he felt it would be wiser to
113 Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, footnote 31, pp.452-53.
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leave the area, for little progress and few results could
be expected from the peoples of the Chocô."4
The process of congregating and converting small,
dispersed and very mobile Indian communities was unlikely
to be successful without some show of force on the part of
the Spanish. The peaceful approach had been tried and had
failed. Within a very short time after their arrival, the
Franciscans of the Chocô mission came to the conclusion
that some form of physical punishment would have to be
implemented to punish recalcitrant Indians, while other
members of the order, such as Fray Lucas de Villa Veces,
the Procurador General, had concluded that the missionary
effort was doomed to failure unless a force of Spanish
armed men were sent to the area to force the Indians to
remain in their settlements. Villa Veces advised that at
least thirty armed men should be sent to the Chocó to
prevent the Indians returning to the retreats: should this
not be possible, he argued, all Spanish lives in the region
would be at risk."5 Although we do not know whether this
advice was taken seriously, by 1675, the governor of
Antioquia had ordered Juan Bueso de Valdés, former governor
of the gobernaciôn, to lead an entrada to the region. It
is Juan Bueso de Valdés' entrada, carried out in 1676,
which will form the subject of Chapter 4.
" Quoted in ibid., p.453.
" AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
n.p., n.d., f.l6.
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CHAFFER 4
JIJAN BUESO DE VALDES' ENTRADA
TO TIlE CHOCO, 1676-1677
By 1676, the reduction of the Chocó had come to a
virtual standstill. All but three of the original group of
Franciscans had left the province, blaming the lack of
assistance from the secular authorities, the continuing
conflict with the Guzmán brothers, and the increasing
defiance of the Indians, which had caused considerable fear
and distrust among the missionaries.' The Indians had
continued to resist all efforts on the part of the
Franciscans to congregate them in permanent settlements,
and to teach them Christian Doctrine. They continued also
to refuse to provide them with foodstuffs, unless they were
paid, and sold their produce at prices deemed excessive by
the miners. While several miners stayed in the area, the
withdrawal of the Franciscans left the region without the
assistance of those who were principally responsible for
the pacification and conversion of the Indian population.
Furthermore, their desertion rendered less likely any
expansion beyond the area already known to the Spaniards -
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Fray Francisco Caro,
Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8; and Real Provision,
Santa Fe, 1 April 1675, ff.5l-3.
167
the region inhabited by the Tatamá/Chocó, Citar&, and
Noanama.
This was a matter of particular importance, at a time
when plans were being considered for further pacification
campaigns against Indian groups thought still to remain
outside the reach of the Spanish. As we shall see, the
gobernaciôn of Antioquia was beginning to consider
extending its influence northwards towards the Gulf of
Darien, the region inhabited by the Cunacuna. Meanwhile,
the gobernaciôn of Popayán, already well-entrenched in the
province of Noanama, was particularly concerned to achieve
the pacification of the Soruco, an Indian group which
inhabited an ill-defined territory and remained oblivious
to the presence of the Spaniards in the region. There were
two reasons why the Spaniards of Popayán decided to proceed
against this group: first, according to Governor Diaz de la
Cuesta, because the Soruco were continuously at war with
the other Indians of the region, "infesting [the land of]
the Chocoes killing their people and destroying their maize
fields in ambushes..."; 2
 and secondly, because their
pacification was seen as a prerequisite to the
establishment of an overland route linking the Chocó to
Panama and Portobelo. 3 There was one further factor which
contributed to these plans to penetrate Soruco terrttory:
2 AGI Quito 67, Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to Crown,
Popayân, 20 July 1672. See also AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2,
Tadó, 4 December 1676, f.49.
AGI Quito 67, Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to Crown,
Popayân, 8 April 1669.
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Spaniards in the gcbernaciones of Antioquia and Popayán,
both of which were still in the grip of a mining recession,
believed that the land inhabited by the Soruco was rich in
gold, and that continuous warfare prevented them from
exploiting their mineral wealth. 4
 The importance of this
factor cannot be underestimated: in the mid-1670s, gold
production in Antioquia and in Popayán remained at very low
levels. Although quinto figures for Popayán in the 1670-74
quinquennium show a slight improvement relative to the
previous five years - 24,000 pesos in 1670-74, compared
with 20,705 in 1665-69 - gold production in Antioquia, as
measured by fundición figures, reached an all time low in
1673 and 1674 - a mere 4,461 and 4,053 pesos respectively.5
Although the pacification of the Soruco was considered
to be a matter of utmost importance, the location of the
territories they inhabited and the size of the Indian
population was much less clear. In 1669, Governor Diaz de
la Cuesta reported to the Crown that the Sorucos' territory
lay close to the Gulf of Darien, and that they were
estimated to number some 5,000 in total - excluding women
and "chusma". 6 By July of the same year, however, the
AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel Garcia to Crown,
Popayán, 22 November 1674. See also AGI Santa Fe 204,
Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.189-90.
Colmenares, Historia EconOmica y Social de
Colombia, Tables 22 & 27, pp.316, 327; and Ann Twinam,
Miners, Merchants, and Farmers in Colonial Colombia
(Austin, Texas, 1982), Table 1, p.28.
6 AGI Quito 67, Governor Diaz de la Cuesta to Crown,
Popayân, 8 April 1669, and Governor Diaz de la Cuesta to
Crown, Popayân, 24 April 1669.
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governor informed the Crown that the Soruco were estimated
to number 3,000 adult men. 7 By 1672, no further progress
in the pacification of the Soruco had been reported.
Instead, the Spaniard Lorenzo de Salamanca noted that these
were "such warlike Indians that they never let go of their
arms. They continuously and without pause organize wars
attacking the peaceful Indians [who are] reduced to the
Royal Crown ... on several occasions they have burned many
houses and caused the death of many Indians".8
Reports on the Soruco's "warlike" nature, and the
immense mineral wealth to be found in their territory
continued for several years into the 16705. In Noveriiber
1674, Diaz de la Cuesta's successor, Governor Miguel
Garcia, who also began to consider moving against the
Cunacuna of the Darien region, informed the Crown that the
reduction of the Soruco was indeed desirable, given their
large numbers and the many gold deposits they allegedly
possessed. 9 By 1676, Juan Lopez Garcia, too, was advising
the Crown that the Soruco should be reduced without delay.
Soruco territory, LOpez GarcIa observed, was situated
between the provinces of Noanama, Tatamã/ChocO, and Citará,
and the Indians were so "bellicose" that they had caused
considerable anxiety among "the natives of these
Ibid., Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to Crown,
Popayân, 28 July 1669.
8 Ibid., Auto de Oficio, Popayân, 9 May 1672.
AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel Garcia to Crown,
Popayân, 22 November 1674, and AGI Quito 67, Governor
Miguel Garcia to Crown, Popayán, 26 June 1674.
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provinces", because of the numerous deaths they had
inflicted some three months earlier. The same applied,
Lápez Garcia claimed, to the Burgumia - another Indian
group remaining outside the Spaniards' control, whose lands
were said to border on those of the Soruco.'° Although, by
1677, no further moves had been made to proceed against the
Soruco or the Burgumia, we do have some clearer indications
about the location of the lands inhabited by the latter
group, at least. In June of that year, it was reported
that Burgumia territory was situated between the province
of Soruco and the Pacific, close to the river Bojaya and
the Panamanian border. It was also said that Dominican and
Mercedarian friars, as well as other Spaniards, resided in
Burgumia lands, and that some of their number, captured and
imprisoned by Chocô Indians, knew a few prayers in
Spanish."
Notwithstanding all these indications of the existence
of large unconquered Indian groups within Chocô territory,
it has to be said that one of the most surprising aspects
of the documents dealing with this period of Spanish
activity in the region - from the mid-seventeenth to the
mid-eighteenth century - is that, for some inexplicable
reason, the Soruco and the Burgumia disappeared completely
from official documents after the late l680s. In the
l7lOs, one other Indian group, the Oromira, who were
'° AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2, Tadó, 4 December 1676,
f.49.
" Ibid., Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677, f.190.
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thought to inhabit a stretch of land bordering on Cunacuna
territory, began to attract the attention of Spaniards in
Antioquia. In this case, as in the case of the Soruco and
the Burgumia, Spanish interest was short-term, and the
Oromira, too, ceased to be an issue in later documents.
Nevertheless, in the l670s, the existence of
unconquered, unpacif led Indians in regions bordering those
officially under the control of the Spaniards was a matter
of some importance, not just for royal officials, but also
for the Crown. In June 1674, a new royal céclula was
issued, which essentially repeated the instructions
contained with the cédula of November, 1666. The governors
of the surrounding provinces were once again instructed to
attend to the pacification and "reduction" to the Holy
Faith of both the Indians of the Chocó and those inhabiting
neighbouring areas. However, in 1674, the Crown remained
as unwilling as it had eight years earlier to commit any
financial resources to the pacification. While the
Audiencia of Santa Fe - still in overall control of the
Chocô region - was expected to assist in the process, it
was, once again, ordered to ensure that this assistance did
not take the form of treasury funds.'2
The absence of royal funding for expeditions of
pacification to the Chocô did not hold up the process of
Spanish penetration of the region. In the case of the
ChocO, the interests of the Crown and royal officials on
12 Ibid., Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 6 June 1674,
ff.l-4.
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the one hand, and those of individual organizers, leaders,
and financiers of expeditions of pacification coincided
perfectly. In Chapter 2 we saw how the royal cédula of
November 1666 led several individuals, authorized by the
governors of Popayán and Antioquia, personally to finance
and conduct entradas to the Chocô, all of which were aimed
at reducing the native population and preparing the ground
for the entry of Spanish miners and slave gangs to work the
region's gold deposits. The cédula of 1674 also led to the
organization of a new entrada, to be financed and conducted
by the former governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés.
Juan Bueso de Vald€s' entrada, 'h&c toc	 ace
between September 1676 and January 1677, will form the
subject of this chapter. First, we will consider the
interests which guided Spanish policy towards the Chocó
region during the last quarter of the seventeenth century,
through the instructions which the governor of Antioquia
gave to Bueso de Valdés. In examining how the campaign was
organized, staffed, and financed, we will also consider
what motivated so many individual Spaniards from
neighbouring regions to continue to risk death and
financial ruin in the Chocó enterprise. Secondly, we will
take a closer look at how far the pacification had
progressed by 1676, analysing the performance of the
Franciscan missionaries over the previous three years,
establishing the extent to which the Spaniards had assumed
control over the indigenous population, and examining the
specific problems faced by miners and missionaries in the
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region. Finally, we will focus on the measures which Bueso
de Valdés took to solve the problems of the Chocô, and at
the extent to which these were successful.
This chapter will show that, in spite of a continuing
and perhaps growing Spanish presence in the region, by the
mid-1670s, Spanish control over the Indian population of
the Chocô remained extremely weak. Juan Bueso de Valdés'
entrada was aimed primarily at increasing the level of
control exercised by the Spaniards over the indigenous
population, and it is for this reason that the expedition
should be examined in detail. As we shall see in Chapter
5, the decade of the 1680s was a period of intense conflict
between Spaniards and Indians in the Chocó, but since the
sources are very rarely specific about Indian grievances,
our only route to ascertaining the causes of a conflict
which resulted in the massacre of most of the Chocó's
Spanish residents lies in establishing the demands the
Spaniards had begun to make on the Indian peoples of the
region in the years before 1680. Indeed, the measures
implemented by Juan Bueso de Valdés show very clearly that
the purpose of the Spaniards in reducing the native
population of the Chocô was to ensure a steady source of
supply of foodstuffs for the Spaniards in the region, and
at facilitating the entry of miners and slave gangs to
exploit its sources of precious metals.
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Organizing the Entrada
The interests which guided official policy towards the
pacification of the Chocó are particularly clear in the
case of the entrada of 1676-77, for one important reason:
the instructions Bueso de Valdés received were explicit and
specific because the order to conduct and finance the
expedition came directly from the governor of Antioquia,
Miguel de Aguinaga.' 3 The governor's instructions dealt
with three major issues of interest to the Crown. Bueso de
Valdés was ordered, first, to inform the native population
that they should obey the missionaries and provide them
with sufficient supplies to maintain themselves and to
enable them to expand their activities to neighbouring
regions. The missionaries were to be employed as a
vanguard force in the pacification of the Indian groups
still outside Spanish control, while the Indian population
of the territories being occupied by the Spaniards were to
provide the resources to enable them to fulfill this role.
Secondly, Bueso de Valdés was instructed to undertake a
reconnaissance journey down the Atrato to the sea: he was
to establish whether the river was navigable, identify the
Indian groups inhabiting the riverbanks, locate and
identify the rivers which flowed into the Atrato, and
acquire some sense of the distance separating the territory
occupied by the Chocô Indians and the sea. As Governor
Aguinaga informed Bueso de Valdés, if the Atrato river was
found to be navigable, supplies could be introduced from
13 Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, f.9.
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the coast, by river, to the Indian settlements. The river
would not only greatly facilitate the introduction of
supplies and the entry of missionaries, and armed men,
should these be necessary, but it would also be of great
benefit to the royal treasury. Thirdly, and most
importantly, Bueso de Valdés was instructed to inspect the
provinces' mineral deposits and the extent of the sources
of precious metals existing in neighbouring areas. It is
clear that the benefits that would accrue to the royal
treasury from a successfully pacified region were uppermost
in the governor's mind.'4
It should be mentioned at the outset that, although
the entrada was to extend across two of the Chocô's
provinces, it was somewhat limited in its geographical
scope. Governor Aguinaga's instructions to Bueso de Valdés
covered the province of Citará, the area over which the
gobernacion of Antioquia believed it had a legitimate case
for jurisdiction, and the province of Tatamá/Chocó. But
the province of Noanama fell clearly within the
jurisdiction of the qobernación of Popayán. Governor
Aguinaga made no reference to this region in his
instructions, and Bueso de Valdés made no attempt to
penetrate that stretch of territory claimed by the
payaneses.
There were several reasons why Bueso de Valdés was
chosen to lead the expedition. Whilst serving as governor
of Antioquia, the Audiencia of Santa Fe had, in 1675,
' Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, ff.9-13.
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appointed him Juez Auxiliador Superintendente - or
Assistant Superintendent - of the Chocó mission for the
gobernaciOn of Antioquia, and in this capacity he was
entrusted with promoting the interests of the mission.'5
In April of the same year, he was also authorized by the
Audiencia to conduct an entrada, in response to continuing
reports of conflict between the Franciscans and Antonio de
Guzmán. Since Bueso de Va1ds was ordered to Sticte
and report on this matter, to assist the Franciscan
missionaries, to ensure that they were maintained from the
"produce of the land", and to enforce the provisions of the
royal cédulas of 1666 and 1674 which concerned the Indians'
exemption from stipend and tribute payments, 16 he was
clearly the favoured choice of the Audiencia of Santa Fe.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Bueso de Valdés was
also in a position to contribute considerable sums of money
to the Chocó enterprise. When, a few years earlier, the
city of Cartagena was threatened by invasion, he had
offered to meet the costs of sending 100 men to defend the
city. As the expected invasion did not take place, Bueso
de Valdés left his offer open until such time as the need
for his assistance arose again. This, clearly, was
considered to be the right time to call on his services.
AGI Quito 67, Governor Bueso de Valclés to Crown,
Antioquia, 12 July 1675. See also AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo
1, Real Provision, 1 April 1675, ff.58-59.
16 Ibid., Real Provision, Santa Fe, 1 April 1675,
ff.51-59; Real ProvisiOn, Santa Fe, 29 April 1675, ff.13-
19; and Real ProvisiOn, Santa Fe, 24 February 1676,
ff.25-26. See also Fray Francisco Caro to Governor
Aguinaga, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8.
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Thirdly, Bueso de Valdés had endeared himself to the
Franciscan order because of his willingness to provide
financial support to the Franciscans living in Antioquia as
well as those working among the Indians of the Chocó. In
a 1674 letter to the Franciscan Comisario, Fray Miguel de
Castro, Bueso de Valdés promised to provide sufficient
funds to prevent the friars abandoning the mission, and to
pay the costs of sending back those friars who had already
left the region but wished to return.' 7 The Franciscans
clearly trusted Bueso de Valdés: Fray Francisco Caro,
president of the Franciscan monastery of Antioquia,
informed Governor Aguinaga that the missionaries who were
then resident in the city would willingly return to the
Chocó if accompanied by Bueso de Valdés, as he was known to
be a person who would support them.'8
While we can understand why Bueso de Valdés was seen
as a likely leader for the entrada, his own willingness to
finance it raises important questions not only about why he
was prepared to do so, but also about the factors which
drove so many Spaniards to risk their fortunes in this
enterprise. In the early decades of the seventeenth
century, the capitulaciones - or contracts - agreed between
17 Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, ff.9-13, and 14
July 1677, f.205. See also ibid., Real Provision, 1 April
1675, ff.5l-60. Bueso de Valdés had in fact already given
considerable financial help to the Franciscan mission in
the Chocó. See ibid., Antioquia, 7 January 1676, f.9, and
AGI Quito 67, Governor Bueso de Valdés to Crown,
Antioquia, 12 July 1675.
' AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January
1676, ff.7-8. In 1676, Bueso de Valdés was an "alcalde
ordinario" of the city of Antioquia. Ibid., f.19.
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the Crown and individuals who led and financed expeditions
to the Chocó included not only the obligations of the
expeditionary leaders but also the privileges which they
could expect to receive upon completing their campaigns
successfully. For example, a royal cédula of November 27,
1634, set out in detail the privileges that Don Juan Vélez
de Guevara would receive in return for carrying out an
entrada intended to achieve the pacification and conversion
of the Indians of the Chocó, and the re-establishment of
the city and mines of Toro, abandoned, the document said,
as a result of an Indian uprising. In addition, Vélez de
Guevara proposed to found two further cities in the region
- each with at least 50 vecinos - within three years of
entry. He was to pay all expenses - soldiers,
missionaries, supplies, defense - at an expected cost of
30,000 pesos.' 9 In return, Vélez de Guevara would receive
several privileges, among the most important of which were
the governorship of Antioquia for a five-year period, once
it became vacant; the governorship of the Chocô, once the
region was pacified; the title of Adelantado of the Chocó;
an encornienda; a repartimiento within the district of each
Spanish town founded; and a reduction of the royal quinto
to one-tenth of all metals mined in the region.20
' "de a ocho Rs en plata doble".
20 AGI Santa Fe 357, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27
September 1634.
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Before 1630, another hopeful leader of an expedition
to the Chocô, Don Antonio Maldonado de Mendoza, 2' proposed
to carry out an entrada aimed at achieving the pacification
of several Indian groups in the Chocó region within six
years of taking up the governorship of the Chocó - this was
one of the privileges he requested from the Crown in
return. In addition, he proposed to resettle the mines of
Toro, to open a trail to the Chocó, in order to facilitate
the resettlement of the slave gangs which were then said to
be idle in the gcbernación of Popayán and the Audiencia of
Santa Fe, to establish a fort for the protection of Spanish
residents within the district of the Toro mines, to found
three further Spanish cities in the region, and to lead an
expedition every summer, composed of 140 armed men, until
such time as the region was completely pacified. In
addition to the governorship of the Chocô, Maldonado de
Mendoza requested several other privileges, such as the
governorship of Popayán, the title of Adelantado, and the
right to a repartimiento in each town he founded.22
21 This document must have been written before 1630,
because, in a letter of April 1669, the governor of
Popayán, Don Gabriel DIaz de la Cuesta, referred to a
royal cédula of 7 March 1630, which ordered the cabildo
of Popayân to report on Don Antonio Maldonado de
Mendoza's capitulaciôn. See AGI Quito 67, Governor DIaz
de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayân, 24 April 1669.
22 B.M. Add.l3,992, No.45, ff.357-9: "Papel Original
de don Antonio Maldonado de Mendoza, sobre la
pacificaciôn de los indios Chocoes, Noanamas, y
Cirambiraes y población de las minas de Toro". There are,
in fact, many examples of capitulaciones for expeditions
to the Chocô. In July 1574, for instance, Lucas de Avila
requested the governorship of the Chocó for a period of
20 years, the reduction of the royal guinto to 5% of gold
extracted the region, the right to bring from Spain, free
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However, with the notable exception of Don Francisco
de Quevedo, by the second half of the seventeenth century
the Crown no longer offered such extensive privileges to
individuals undertaking entradas to the Chocô. Quevedo was
an exception only because Antonio Maldonado de Mendoza's
1620s capitulaciôn served as the basis for the agreement he
reached with his cousin, Don Gabriel DIaz de la Cuesta, the
governor of Popayán. 23 The privileges that Quevedo was to
receive for funding the expedition - at a cost of 18,000
pesos, according to the Governor - included the title of
Adelantado and the governorship of Popayán for a period of
eight years. 24 As we have seen, Quevedo undertook the
entrada but died before the Crown accepted the terms of his
contract.
of duties, 300 slaves who were to be introduced to the
Chocó, a salary of 3,000 gold pesos per year, to be paid
out of quinto revenues, the title of Adelantado, the
right to appoint the first treasury officials in the
region, who were to be paid 1,000 gold pesos per year,
and a repartimiento in each settlement, town, or port
founded by him. In exchange, Lucas de Avila proposed to
finance the entrada, including the cost of supplies, to
found as many Spanish settlements as could be sustained
there, to introduce 200 slaves, in addition to the 300
brought from Spain, at his own expense, to work the
region's mines, and to fund the entry of as many priests
and friars as deemed necessary. See Ortega Ricaurte,
Historia documental, pp.56-66, and also pp.67-74. Other
examples of capitulaciones include those of the governor
of Popayân, Bermüdez de Castro, in 1630. See Colmenares,
Cali, pp.133-34.
23 AGI Quito 67, Governor DIaz de la Cuesta to Crown,
Popayán, 24 April 1669.
24 Ibid., Governor DIaz de la C'uesta to Crown,
Popayán, 20 July 1672.
25 Ibid., Audiencia of Quito to Crown, Quito, 15 June
1675.
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On the whole, by the 1660s, Spaniards who risked
their lives and fortunes in the Chocó did so without
expecting privileges from the Crown in return - or at
least, not in the short term. Indeed, according to the
royal cédula of 27 November 1666, in theory these
individuals could no longer expect to receive an encomienda
or even to benefit from the collection of tributes: the
cédula made it quite clear that pacified Indians were not
to be distributed in encomienda, nor were they to pay
tributes for a period of ten years following their
reduction. 26
 Of course, some of these individuals,
principally those who were already employed in the service
of the Crown, may well have expected special consideration
in future dealings with the Crown. This, no doubt, was why
Governor Aguinaga promised Bueso de Valdés that he would
"inform His Majesty so that he might bear you in mind and
remunerate you with the posts you can expect from His Royal
HandII. V
 Other Spaniards planning to lead expeditions to
the Chocô were more direct in requesting favours in return
for services. In 1669, for instance, Governor Diaz de la
Cuesta offered to undertake and finance an expedition to
the province of Soruco, in exchange for the post of
"Consejero de guerra".28
26 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27
November 1666, inserted in Royal Cédula, Madrid, 4 June
1674, ff.l-4.
27 Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, f.13.
28 AGI Quito 67, Governor Dlaz de la Cuesta to Crown,
Popayàn, 24 April 1669.
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The prospect of receiving preferential treatment from
the Crown may also have been the reason why Spaniards never
failed to report the financial contributions they had made
to the pacification of the region. In 1675, Bueso de
Valdés informed the Crown that he had contributed a
significant portion of his fortune to financing Franciscan
missionaries. 29
 In 1669, the former governor of Popayán,
Don Luis Antonio de Guzmân y Toledo, reported that his
activities in the Chocô - amongst which he included the
pacification of the Noanama - had not cost the Crown "one
single maravedi of any branch of the royal treasury ... I
have provided all at my own expense... •30 A few years
later, the antioqueño priest Antonio de Guzmán reported
that, although the sending of the Franciscan missionaries
had cost the Crown 20,000 patacones, his activities had not
involved the King in any expense. 3' In 1672, he reported
further that he had personally financed the opening of a
trail linking the city of Antioquia and Urrao.32
However, the prospect of preferential treatment alone
is unlikely to have been a sufficient incentive to lead so
many Spaniards to undertake or participate in expeditions
to regions as inhospitable as this. Nor did the Spaniards
29 Ibid., Juan Bueso de Valdés to Crown, Antioquia,
12 July 1675.
° AGI Quito 13, Luis Antonio de Guzmän y Toledo to
Crown, Quito, 26 April 1669.
31 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Juan de Leon Castellanos, f.87.
32 Ibid., Rio de Atrato, 20 December 1672, ff.104,
106.
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ever expect to settle the Chocó. This region was never an
attractive place of residence for the Spaniards who lived
in neighbouring areas: long after the native population
finally had been pacified, the Chocó remained badly
underdeveloped. For example, in 1731, more than fifty
years after Bueso de Valdés conducted his entrada, the
oidor of the Audiencia, Martinez Malo, described the
settlement of Nôvita in the following terms:
At present, this settlement or mining camp has
fewer than twenty dwellings, made of wood and
straw ... there are no vecinos or other people
to introduce order and form repüblica, for its
inhabitants are travellers without residence
here, and only those who work as miners reside
in their mining camps, and these are composed
of one or two houses of the same
materials. .
Indeed, throughout the eighteenth century, no town in the
Chocó was large enough even to merit the establishment of
a cabildo, and the white population was always very small.
Owners of large mines usually employed miners and overseers
to manage and administer their mines and slave gangs, while
they continued to live in the more developed cities of the
interior, such as Popayán, Buga, and Cali.M
It was the gold of the Chocó that attracted wealthy
Spaniards from the neighbouring areas of Popayân and
Antioquia to conduct, or finance, repeated expeditions to
the region. The pacification of the Chocó's indigenous
population was a prerequisite to the introduction of slave
gangs and miners, which in turn was a prerequisite to the
Quoted in Colmenares, Popayân, p.31.
Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, pp.14, 18.
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continued financing of lifestyles which, given declining
levels of gold production in both gobernaciones, appeared
under serious threat. For some people, including Juan
Bueso de Valdés, the investment paid off. By 1684, he was
an important mine and slave gang owner in the Chocó,
holding his slaves in partnership with Domingo de Veitia,
who had entered the region with Francisco de Quevedo's
expedition of 1669.
For the benefits which he later enjoyed, Bueso de
Valdés made a very large initial investment: the entrada of
1676 was expected to cost approximately 4,000 gold pesos.36
This figure was to cover the cost of supplies and of
employing the soldiers who were to join the expedition,
together with 32 Indian carriers to take the supplies as
far as the Port of Chaquinindo. 37 In order to reduce his
AGI Quito 67, Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph
de Noanama, 15 May 1669; and AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6,
Mateo's statement, Lloró, 16 October 1684, f.26.
36 See Appendix 1, for a breakdown of the way the
money was spent.
Ibid., Ramo 1, Peticiôn, Juan Bueso de Valdés,
n.p., n.d., ff.19-2l, and Petición, Juan Bueso de Valdés,
Antioquia, 4 May 1676, ff.26-27. On 12 August 1676,
Governor Aguinaga issued instructions on the way in which
the Indians were to be paid: each carrier was to be paid
10 gold pesos per month - 6 pesos in advance and the
balance on their return. See ibid., ff.44-45. The
following list includes all the Spaniards who took part
in the expeditions: Juan Bueso de Valdés, Alexos
Rodriguez, Joseph de Lescano, Cristóbal de Viflola, Juan
Antonio Velasquez, Joseph Rodriguez, Geróniino Garcia,
Juan de Muriel, Juan RamIrez Osorio, Laureano de
Benalcázar, Francisco Antonio de la Cruz, Pedro Pablos
Moreno, Francisco Degois, Alejandro de la Cruz, Gaspar
Francisco de la Cruz, Pedro Ordofles, Pablo Ordoñes, Roque
Ordoñes, Gregorio Ordoñes, Pedro Ordofles, and SimOn de
Betancour. See ibid., f.61.
185
costs, Bueso de Valdés attempted to include among his
company of men "those who for their crimes have been
sentenced to enter the Chocó at their own expense... 38
These, however, apparently escaped from Antioquia at the
prospect of being taken to the Chocô.39
While these "delinquents" may have fled at the
prospect of being sent to the Chocó, another group of men
actually volunteered their services. Alexos Rodriguez de
Manzanos and Joseph Lescano, for example, both volunteered
their services and that of a second soldier, at their
expense, in order to further the services of their
forefathers, who had been among the first conquerors and
settlers of the province of Antioquia. Cristôbal de Viflola
y Burgos volunteered in order to be employed in the
services of the Crown. 4° All or some of these may have
expected to benefit financially from the entrada, or to
improve their standing in future dealings with the Crown.
Other factors induced a second group of volunteers to
offer their services. The case of the Ordofles men
illustrates the types of privileges that could be expected
in return for participation •in expeditions of this sort.
Pablo, Pedro, Gregorio, and Pedro Ordoñes petitioned in
their own name and that of their absent brothers - Gabriel
and Joseph - to be included in the Bueso de Valdés
Ibid., Antioquia, 4 May 1676, ff.26-27.
Juan Bueso de Valdés to Governor Aguinaga, 10
August 1676, in ibid., ff.43-44.
4° Ibid., ff.31-3.
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expedition. They claimed that their uncles, Pedro and
Lázaro, had served the King as soldiers in previous
entradas to the Chocó, and that, in recognition of their
services, they and their descendants were granted freedom
from paying tribute, a privilege that they continued to
enjoy. In exchange for serving in Bueso de Valdés'
entrada, they asked to be granted the right to carry
swords. 4' Their petition was accepted and the privilege
was granted. 42 These men, all of whom claimed to be
legitimate children of mestizo women, saw service for the
Crown as a way of improving their own social standing.
Thus, those who chose to join expeditions such as
this did so for a variety of reasons. Some, in particular
those already serving as Crown officials, expected to be
favoured by the King in his appointments; others may have
joined simply to receive the salaries paid to its members;
a third group - the case of the Indians - expected to
receive privileges reserved for those who were employed in
the service of the Crown; but a fourth group clearly
expected to benefit from the great wealth that was known to
exist in the Chocó. The absence of a strong secular
government meant that there were few controls on the
Spaniards who set up operations there. 	 This lack of
control manifested itself in several areas. The royal
cêdula of November 1666, for instance - which expressly
prohibited the collection of tributes and stipends from the
41 Ibid., ff.29-32.
42 Antioquia, 2 June 1676, ff.30-31.
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Indians - was repeatedly flouted: payaneses, antioqueños,
and Franciscans were locked in conflict precisely over this
issue. In addition, as Bueso de Valdés reported after
returning back to Antioquia from the Chocó in 1677, quintos
were not being paid on the output from the mines which had
already begun to be exploited in the region. Bueso de
Valdés observed not only that some small slave gangs were
employed in the extraction of gold from deposits in the
vicinity of Nigua, from which the royal treasury had
derived little benefit, but that some of the gangs were
withdrawn from the area when it became known that he was to
conduct the entrada. This, he believed, was because the
miners feared that he would investigate the matter.43
While there were clearly advantages in setting up
operations in regions where the authority of royal
government was weak, there were also considerable
disadvantages. Conflicts could remain unresolved for long
periods of time, to the detriment of all concerned. And,
of course, as the next section will show, Spaniards in the
Chocó had considerable difficulty in controlling the Indian
population. It was not just that they resisted
congregation in permanent settlements and indoctrination in
the Christian Faith; they also refused to provide the
Franciscans with foodstuffs unless they were paid, and,
according to the miners, set excessive prices for their
produce.	 It was problems such as these, which can be
interpreted as a deliberate ploy on the part of the Indians
Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ibid., f.185.
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to make life difficult for the Spaniards in the Chocô, that
Bueso de Valdés' entrada was intended to solve.
Indian-Spanish Relation in the Chocó: 1676
The party that Bueso de Valdés led from Antioquia on
31 August 1676, was composed of two missionaries, Fray
Esteban de Iruñela and Fray Bernardo Pascual RamIrez, and
twenty armed soldiers, apart from Bueso de Valdés. Thirty-
two Indian carriers, armed with machetes, lances, and
arrows, accompanied the expedition as far as the Port of
Chaquinindo, from where the rest of the group continued the
journey alone. The expedition took the route followed on
many previous occasions by Antonio de Guzmán: from
Antioquia to the sitio de Urrao, and from there to Nuestra
Señora de la Candelaria de Taita, the first Indian
settlement of the province of Citará. From Taita, the
party continued on to the other three principal settlements
of the province - San Juan de Nigua, Nuestra Señora de la
Concepción de Lloró, and San Francisco de Atrato. Bueso de
Valdés did not visit each settlement in the province of
Tatamá/Chocô - an injured foot (perhaps a diplomatic ploy
to avoid confrontation with the gobernación of Popayán)
apparently prevented this - but he did travel to the town
of Tadô, where he was said to have called before him the
principal capitanes of the province. 45 The fact that Bueso
de Valdés did not visit every settlement in the province of
Ibid., f.60.
Tadó, 26 November 1676, ibid., f.101.
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Tatamâ/Chocô is reflected in the documents, insofar as
fewer details are provided about this region. However, we
do know that many of the problems identified by the
missionaries and miners of the province of Citará were also
identified in the province of Tatamâ/Chocô, and that the
measures Bueso de Valdés took during the entrada applied to
both provinces.
By 1676, four permanent settlements had been
established in the province of Citará: Taita, Nigua, Lloró,
and San Francisco de Atrato. The latter three were the
largest settlements, and they all contained a few houses
and a church. The province of Tatainá/Chocó was composed of
eight settlements: Tadô, San Juan de Yrô, Santa Cruz de
Yragugu, Poya, San Lorenzo de Maygara, Santiago de Ytigusu,
San Francisco de Ytauri, and San Juan de Carrapa (Chami).
The confusion about the location of the settlements that
had characterized the first few years of Franciscan
activity in the region (the result of the jurisdictional
conflict between the gobernaci ones of Popayán and
Antioquia, which had led to the foundation of at least ten
different Indian settlements in the province of Citarâ
alone), had evidently been clarified by the time Bueso de
Valdés arrived in the region.
Although the Indian population of both the provinces
of Tatamâ/Chocó and Citarâ continued to resist the process
of reducciOn, greater and more continuous contact between
Spaniards and Indians in these two provinces, and perhaps
some expansion of Spanish activities to outlying areas,
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meant that, by 1676, some firmer estimates about the size
of the native population were provided. As the following
table shows, the censuses carried out by Bueso de Valdés in
the province of Citará towards the end of that year showed
a slightly larger Indian population inhabiting Citará
territory - 1,663 - than had been estimated by Antonio de
Guzmán in 1672 - 1,153. This apparent increase in the
size of the native population does not, however, permit us
to draw any conclusions about population growth. As we
shall see, the sources suggest that the increase can be
accounted for more by Spanish expansion to areas inhabited
by Indians who had previously had no contact with
Spaniards, than by growth.
AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Antioquia, n.d., f.95; Rio de Atrato, 20 December 1672,
ff.104-5.
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TABLE 4: TOTAL POPULATION, PROVINCE OF CITARA, 1676
SETTLEMENT	 TOTAL POPULATION
Taita	 66
Nigua	 474
Lloró	 430
San Francisco de Atrato
	 693
Total	 1,663
[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1: Nuestra Señora de la
Candelaria de Taita. 18 September 1676; San Juan de Nigua,
24 October 1676 and 3 November 1676; Nuestra Señora de la
Concepción de Lloró, 21 December 1676; and San Francisco de
Atrato, 16 and 19 December 1676. See ff.63-4, 75-93, 95-6,
143-54, 122-42.)
Bueso de Valdés did not carry out censuses as
detailed as this in the province of Tataxná/Chocô. Instead,
he relied on the information provided by the Franciscans
Fray Pablo Ruiz and Fray Francisco Moreno, and by the
Spaniards Juan and Jorge Lopez Garcia. Here, it was the
number of Indian tributaries that was of greater importance
to both the missionaries and the representatives of the
civil authorities. The instructions of the Crown - that
the Indians should not pay tributes for a ten-year period
following their reduction - had clearly not been enforced.
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TABLE 5: TOTAL TRIBUTARY POPULATION,
PROVINCE OP TATAMA/CHOCO, 1676
SETTLEMENT	 TRIBUTARY POPULATION
Tadó	 34
Yró	 29
Yragugu	 30
Poya	 18
Maygara	 20
Ytigusu	 30
Ytauri	 70
Carrapa (Chami)	 30
Total	 261
[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Raino 1, Nuestra Señora del Pilar
de Tadó, 2 December 1676, ff.].16-l9.)
It is difficult to estimate the total population of
the province of Tatamá/Chocô on the basis of the size of
the tributary population, because we do not know with any
certainty what the ratio of tributaries to non-tributaries
was in the Chocô region. In 1672, Antonio de Guzmán
reported that, out of a total population of 1,153 for the
There was not complete agreement on the number of
tributaries inhabiting each settlement. In the case of
Tadô, administered by Fray Pablo Ruiz, all the witnesses
questioned agreed on the figure of 34 tributaries. There
was also agreement on the number of tributaries
inhabiting the settlements of Maygara and Ytiguso. Fray
Francisco Moreno served as doctrinero of Yró and Yragugu,
so his figures have been used for those two settlements.
In the cases of Poya, Ytauri, and Carrapa ChamI), Fray
Francisco Moreno, Jorge Lopez Garcia, and Juan LOpez
Garcia agreed on the number of tributaries - their
figures have been used to draw up this table. See AGI
Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, 2 December 1676, ff.116-19.
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province of Citarâ, 326 were tributaries - a ratio of
1:3.5. In 1678, the Jesuit Father Antonio Marzal reported
that the provinces of Tataxná/Chocô and Citarâ both had a
total Indian population of 1,600, of which 350 were
tributaries - a ratio of 1:4.6.48 If we apply these ratios
to the province of Tatamá/Chocô, we can tentatively
estimate that, in 1676, the total population of that
province was estimated at between 913 and 1,200.
The figures contained in these tables do not,
however, reflect the success of the process of reclucción,
nor do they reflect a systematic effort on the part of the
Franciscan missionaries to convert their Indian charges.
Indeed, at least in the province of Citarâ, very little
religious activity appears to have taken place since their
arrival. In Taita, Bueso de Valdés was informed by the
Indian Don Pedro Daza that the Franciscan Joseph Marton,
and Miguel Devera, a Jesuit lay brother, had resided in the
settlement for two and five months respectively, 49 and that
they had celebrated Mass and prayed with them daily; he
also claimed that Antonio de Guzmân always stopped for a
day, to celebrate Mass, on passing through Taita. But the
number of Indians who claimed to have been baptized in
Taita suggests that very little effort had in fact been
made to convert the Indians of this settlement: only 15
48 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
Antioquia, n.d., f.95; ibid., RIo de Atrato, 20 December
1672, ff.l04-l06; and Father Antonio Marzal, "Informe
sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.494-5.
In Chapter 3 we saw, however, that Joseph Marton
left the Chocó region almost immediately.
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Indians, out of a total population of 66, had been baptized
by 1676.°
The picture did not look as bad in the other three
settlements of the province of Citará. In Nigua, 295
Indians out of a total population of 474 - 62.2% - had been
baptized before Juan Bueso de Valdés' arrival in the Chocó
region. In Llorô, the percentage of Indians who claimed to
have been baptized before the entrada took place was even
higher - 68%, or 293 out of a total population of 430. The
corresponding figure for San Francisco de Atrato was 69% -
or 478 out of a total population of 693.' But the
interesting feature of the data is not so much the number
of baptized Indians, but the number of Indians baptized by
the Franciscans who formed part of the group sent from
Spain to the Chocó for the specific purpose of converting
the Indian population. As the following table shows, the
number was remarkably small:
° AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nuestra Señora de la
Candelaria de Taita, 18 September 1676, ff.63-65.
' Ibid., San Juan de Nigua, 24 October and 3
November 1676, ff.75-92, 95-6; Nuestra Señora de la
Concepción de Lloró, 21 December 1676, ff.143-54; and San
Francisco de Atrato, 16 and 19 December 1676, ff.122-42.
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TABLE 6: CITARA INDIANS BAPTIZED BY THE FRANCISCAN
MISSIONARIES BEFORE JUAN BUESO DE VALDES' ENTRADA
FRANCISCANS	 Taita Nigua Lloró Atrato Total
Fray Miguel de
	
-	 1	 2	 2	 5
Castro
Rivadeneyra	 ________
Fray Joseph	 7	 1	 -	
-	 8
Marton
FrayJuan	
-	 9	 -	
-	 9
Tabuenca
Fray Francisco	 -	
-	 8	
-	 8
Moreno
Fray Francisco	 -	 -	
-	 14	 14
Garcia
Fray Pablo Ruiz
	 -	
-	 2	
-	 2
Fray Joseph de
	 -	
-	 3	 2	 5
Córdoba
Total	 7	 11	 15	 18	 51
[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1: Nuestra Señora de la
Candelaria de Taita. 18 September 1676; San Juan de Nigua,
24 October 1676 and 3 November 1676; Nuestra Señora de la
Concepción de Llorô, 21 December 1676; and San Francisco de
Atrato, 16 and 19 December 1676. See ff.63-4, 75-93, 95-6,
143-54, 122-42.]
If we take these census figures at face value - and
there appears to be no reason for us not to, since the
Franciscans made no objection to the numbers and indeed
carried out hundreds of baptisms while the censuses were
being carried out - we may conclude that in three years of
missionary activity in the province of Citará (between 1673
and 1676), the Franciscans had baptized a total of 51
Indians, out of a total population of 1,663. In fact, most
of the Indians who claimed to have been baptized had been
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baptized by the secular clergy, in particular by Pedro
Gómez del Valle and Luis Antonio de la Cueva. 52 An equally
interesting feature of the census data is the relatively
small number of Indians baptized by Antonio de Guzinán: a
mere 73 individuals, after many years of activity in the
region. 53 As we have already noted, Bueso de Valdés did
not carry out detailed censuses in the province of
Tatamá/Chocô, and it may be that the Franciscans who
administered the settlements of that province - by 1676,
only Fray Pablo Ruiz and Fray Francisco Moreno remained
there - had attempted to convert more Indians. However,
given that the problems which they claimed to have had in
congregating the population were the same as those of the
Franciscans in the province of Citará, this is unlikely.
The Franciscans' poor performance also manifested
itself in the state of the region's settlements. It was
said, for instance, that although there were 10 houses in
Nigua, 10 in Lloró, and 19 in Atrato, most of these were
uninhabited. And although all three settlements contained
a church, Mass could not be celebrated in Nigua because its
church was in ruins; the church of Lloró was too small and
needed enlarging; and the church of San Francisco de Atrato
was considered to be virtually unusable. Indeed, the
church of Lloró was said to have been used before the
52 363 and 334 respectively. See Sources Table 1.
Ibid.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nigua, 5 October 1676,
f.66; Lloró, 15 November 1676, f.97; and Antioquia, 30
June 1677, f.184.
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arrival of the Franciscans for the construction of
canoes •
Despite Bueso de Valdés' findings, the Franciscans of
the Chocó refused to accept any responsibility for the fact
that very little progress had been made in the reducciôn
process. They maintained that, since they had put all
their efforts into carrying out their duties, shortcomings
could not be blamed on them. Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramlrez
explained, for example, that there were many Indians who
were supposed to form part of Lloró, but that they did not
reside there because their dwellings were located at
distances of up to four to five leagues from the
settlement. Fray Esteban de Iruñela added that many of the
Indians who theoretically formed part of San Francisco de
Atrato lived at distances of one or two days from the
settlement. Both these Franciscans agreed that unless the
Indians were settled, they could not be taught Christian
Doctrine 56
These friars' statements were supported by Fray
Joseph de Côrdoba, who noted that many of the Indians of
the province of Citará lived along the Baberama river, at
a distance of three days' travel from Nigua, and that more
than 50 lived along the Ychô river. In addition, along the
headwaters of the Tutunendo river, in a place called
Burebara, there lived a community of Indians which had not
See, for example, the statement made by Sebastian
Garcia, Nigua, 24 October 1676, in ibid., f.168.
56 Ibid., Lloró, 14 November 1676, f.97; and San
Francisco de Atrato, 18 November 1676, f.98.
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yet had any contact with Spaniards. The Indians had not
received any instruction in Christian Doctrine, and the
children had not been baptized. There were also other
Indians who, at least in theory, formed part of LLorô and
San Francisco de Atrato whom Fray Joseph had not been able,
despite all efforts, to reduce to their settlements.57
Bueso de Valdés confirmed these statements and added that
many Indians also lived along the Nigua and Naurita
rivers. 58 The same problems were said to exist in the
province of Tatamá/Chocó, where all the witnesses agreed
that the Indians of the settlements not served by a
doctrinero lived in their retreatst. According to Fray
Pablo Ruiz, this was because there was nobody in the
settlements with the authority to oblige them to remain.59
We have already seen why the friars had such
difficulties in congregating the Indian population, which
lived dispersed in small conununities at considerable
distances from the main settlements of the province. The
Indians' social structure, patterns of settlement, and
resistance to Spanish occupation of their territory led
some of the missionaries to conclude, within months of
their arrival, that there was little point in persevering
in the conversion of the Chocô's Indian population, and
many soon abandoned the task. Consequently, by 1676, only
three missionaries remained in the entire region
Nigua, 20 October 1676, in ibid., f.73.
58 Nigua, 5 October 1676, ibid., f.66.
Tadô, 2 December 1676, ibid., ff.l].6-1l9.
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encompassing the two provinces of Citará and Tatamá/Chocô,
which consisted of twelve settlements and together
accounted for an estimated known total Indian population of
between 2,576 and 2,863. According to Bueso de Valdés, in
spite of the shortage of priests in the Chocó, three of the
missionaries from the original group of twelve remained in
the city of Antioquia and another lived in Anserma. As
Bueso de Valdés noted, they had no particular duties or
occupations there, and although he offered to finance their
re-entry into the province, they had refused.6°
There were two main reasons why these Franciscans
refused to return to the Chocó mission. The first was that
they had faced severe shortages of both food and money to
buy other necessities. Fray Joseph de Côrdoba insisted
that, unless he could assure his fellow Franciscans of
their maintenance and a source from which to acquire wine,
tallow, and hosts for the celebration of Mass, he could not
justifiably ask them to return to the mission. Indeed, if
the remaining friars did not receive this assurance, and if
they were to suffer further shortages, the mission would be
abandoned completely, for the Indians demanded payment even
for a bunch of plantains: "and if they give us something,
however small it might be, they expect us to give them
something ... [which is] impossible because of our
poverty...". 61 Iruñela and Ramlrez, the two Franciscans
who had returned to the Chocó with Bueso de Valdés, were
60 Nigua, 24 December 1676, ibid., ff.120-21.
61 Nigua, 20 October 1676, ibid., ff.72-3.
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also concerned about their maintenance, given how badly
they were assisted in this by the Indians.62
The second reason the Franciscans' refused to return
was that they believed they had not had sufficient
assistance from the secular authorities. According to Fray
Joseph de Córdoba, "this is not because of a shortage of
corregidores because there are many". 63
 The question of
royal officials and their lack of support for the
missionary effort in the Chocó is an issue of some interest
to us, because it is clear that, by the 1670s, no attempt
had been made by either the gobernación of Popayán or that
of Antioquia to introduce an efficient system of royal
administration in the region. Indeed, the men to whom the
Franciscans referred as royal officials - or corregidores -
in the 1660s and 1670s, were invariably miners whose
principal objective was the pursuit of their own interests
- that is, the search for mines in which to place their
slave gangs.
Although there are few details to indicate how many
royal officials there were in the region by the 1670s, who
their appointments had been made by, or what their duties
were supposed to be, we do know that Juan and Jorge Lopez
Garcia both served as corregidores in the ChocO, as did
62 LiorO, 14 November 1676, and San Francisco de
Atrato, 18 November 1676, ibid., ff.97-8.
63 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)",
LlorO, 15 September 1674, ff.113-14.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Raino 1, Nigua, 20 October 1676,
f.7l
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Ignacio de Guzxnán, brother of the antioqueño priest Antonio
de Guzmán. We have discussed the mining activities of all
three in Chapter 2. One other name crops up in the
documents: Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa, who later held a
mining company in partnership with Bueso de Valdés, was
also said to have served as ccrreqidor in the Chocó. The
duties of corregidores in the region during what can only
be called a transitional period of Spanish colonization in
the Chocô are difficult to determine, but they appear to
have been limited to the collection of tributes. 65
 This
activity, too, was unsystematic and infrequent.
The effects of such an inefficient system of
administration - controlled by officials whose interests in
the Chocó region were largely personal - became clear not
only to the Franciscans but also to the Jesuit priest,
Antonio Marzal. The Franciscans focused their objections
on the reluctance of the authorities to punish Indians
alleged to have mistreated individual friars. As Fray
Joseph de Côrdoba complained, when Fray Francisco Garcia
was ill-treated by the Indian Juan Papayo - who was said to
have grabbed the friar by the hair and dragged him on the
ground - Ignacio de Guzmân, then serving as "juez" in the
province of Citará, offered no assistance. Nor were the
Indians punished for their attitudes towards the friars.
According to Córdoba, this was the reason why, when the
65 See, for example, AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de
Autos (Franciscans)", ff.61-2, 152-3, 154.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nigua, 24 December 1676,
ff. 121-2.
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missionaries called on the Indians to pray, they "respond
very rudely". However, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal, a far
more shrewd observer, understood that while miners served
as royal officials in the Chocó, the missionaries were not
only unlikely to find any support or assistance from that
source, but were in fact more likely to be undermined by
it. Thus, Antonio Marzal reported to his Father Visitor in
1678 that, instead of supporting the aims of the friars,
these officials actually sent the Indians away from the
settlements to cultivate maize, unconcerned about the
progress of their instruction in Christianity. The effects
of these actions were clear: ten months of every year were
taken up with cultivating and harvesting maize, during
which time the Indians were absent from the settlements.
The rest of the time was taken up in making canoes. As
Marzal observed, this was a necessary and indeed inevitable
effect of the presence of Spaniards and slaves in the
region: if the doctrinero attempted to prevent the Indians
working on their maize plots, a shortage of maize for the
mines would immediately follow.67
Although Antonio Marzal pinpointed what was and would
continue to be one of the principal obstacles to the
successful instruction of the Indians well into the
eighteenth century, his observations should not be read as
indicating that miners and miner/officials in the Chocó in
the l670s had had any success in establishing for the
67 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.502.
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Indians the role they would assume in later decades. The
miners, for instance, complained of the considerable
difficulties they faced in their attempts to obtain from
the Indians foodstuffs for themselves and their slave
gangs. For example, Don Bartolomé de Borja, Juan Nico].ás
Nuño de Sotomayor, Jacinto Roque de Espinosa, and Luis de
Acevedo Redez were miners who claimed to have spent four
years in the Chocô region, where they had been engaged in
the discovery of mines with their slave gangs. They
reported that, despite the length of time they had spent in
the area, they had not made any financial gain, because of
a shortage of supplies, and because those that were
available were sold by the Indians at arbitrary prices.
Although maize and plantains were abundant in the province,
the Indians sold a fanega of maize to the miners at between
5 and 6 gold pesos; a bunch of plantains cost between 6
tomines and 1 peso. In view of these problems, the miners
claimed, they had made little progress in exploiting the
region's gold mines. Many miners had been forced to
withdraw their slaves, and many others had been dissuaded
from setting up mining operations in the area.68
The cost of supplies purchased from the Indians was
not the only concern of the miners. As the following
example suggests, by the mid-1670s, Spanish miners in the
Chocó were equally concerned to establish for the Indians
a role in the emerging mining economy of the region. Thus,
68 Bartolomé de Borja et.al. to King, Nigua, 30
October 1676, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2, f.225.
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two Spaniards engaged in mining in the province of
Tatamá/Chocó, Simon Luis Moreno de la Cruz and AgustIn
Ginés Fernández, reported that the Indians did not in fact
produce enough maize to maintain them and their slave
gangs, because "they only cultivate once each year". They
requested that all the natives of the Chocó, and in
particular those of the San Juan and YrO rivers (where,
presumably, these miners had placed their slave gangs),
should be forced to harvest maize twice each year, and that
they "should give maize generally to all the slave gangs
there are [here now] and might be [here in the future]
threshing the maize and basketing it and taking it in their
canoes to the mining camps or warehouses assigned for the
purpose", in the same manner as the native population of
the province of Noanama had been doing ever since slave
gangs were introduced to the mining camps of Sed de Cristo,
NOvita, Rio Negro, and San Agustin. The Indians of the
province of Noanama, the Spaniards claimed, were paid one
gold peso for each basket containing six airnudes of
maize 69
Thus, the true nature of the Spaniards' interest in
the ChocO region is obvious enough: gold and the means of
obtaining it were their primary preoccupations. Should
this need any illustration, we have only to turn to Bueso
de Valdés, to examine the way in which he carried out the
instructions of Governor Aguinaga and the Audiencia, and
the detailed instructions he gave the native population
69 Ibid., Ramo 1, n.p., n.d., ff.114-5.
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concerning the quantities and prices of supplies they were
to provide the Spanish settlers. The entrada shows very
clearly that the activities of the indigenous population of
the Chocó were to be directed towards meeting the needs of
the Spaniards.
Measures to Control the Native Population
As a result of his findings during the entrada, then,
Bueso de Valdés proceeded not only to act on the
instructions of Governor Aguinaga and the Audiencia, but
also to implement measures designed to facilitate the
activities of Spanish miners in the Chocô, and the control
of the indigenous population. As we saw in the second
section of this chapter, Aguinaga had instructed Bueso de
Valdés to secure the maintenance of the Franciscan friars,
to conduct a journey down the Atrato, and to determine the
value of the region's sources of precious metals, while the
Audiencia had ordered him to ensure that the native
population was aware of the Crown's directives regarding
their exemption from tribute payments.
With few exceptions, Bueso de Valdés' reports on the
way in which he carried out the instructions of Governor
Aguinaga were couched in the language of a Spaniard whose
principal interest was to facilitate the exploitation of
the Chocô's sources of mineral wealth. Thus, an otherwise
uneventful journey down the Atrato - during which Bueso de
Valdés, accompanied by two missionaries and five canoes of
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Indians, had a minor skirmish with Cunacuna Indians 70 -
became a means of advising the governor of Antioquia of the
advantages of utilizing the river for the introduction of
goods to supply the region's gold miners. This would
benefit not only the miners of the region, whose profits
were much diminished by the cost of introducing supplies
overland, but also the vecinos of Cartagena, and,
indirectly, the Crown. Merchants in Cartagena would be
much attracted to commerce with the Chocó's miners, and the
ships which brought in the supplies could also transport
however many missionaries became necessary, thus cutting
the costs to the royal treasury. Equa11i, the patioi
of the Cunacuna was seen as prerequisite to the successful
implementation of these plans, and of course, there would
be one other major advantage: the Spaniards would thus be
able to enjoy Itthe immense wealth of their [the Cunacunas']
lands" 71
Bueso de Valdés was very clearly impressed by the
potential wealth of the Chocó's gold deposits, although he
reported that, at that stage, very few slave gangs were
employed in the exploitation of the region's mines.	 For
70 See ibid., Nigua, 23 December 1676, ff.l55-6;
Nigua River, 15 January 1677, ff.157-8; RIo Darien, 25
January 1677, ff.l58-9, 163-6; and Antioquia, 30 June
1677, f.190.
71 Ibid., f.192.
72 It should be noted, however, that these
observations referred only to the provinces of Citará and
Tatamâ/Chocô, and that much more mining activity was
taking place, at least by 1678, in the province of
Noanama. In that year, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal reported
that two slave gangs (30 slaves in total) were exploiting
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example, he observed that, in 1677, there were a few slave
gangs - amounting to no more than about 30 slaves -
employed in the extraction of gold from deposits along the
Mungarra river, in the vicinity of the settlement of Tadô.
However, after closely examining the potential of that
river alone, he concluded that there was sufficient gold to
justify employing as many as 200 slaves.
The success of Spanish activities in the Chocó,
however, was dependent on several factors, one of which
involved the supply of foodstuffs to the miners. On this
point, Bueso de Valdés issued two sets of instructions.
The first dealt with the cost of foodstuffs - namely,
maize, plantains, and hens - which the miners had informed
him were both arbitrary and excessive. On some occasions,
a fanega of maize could cost 6 pesos, and on others 4 or
less. This situation was prejudicial to the Crown, first,
because the mineowners found that the profits from their
mining operations were consumed by the cost of supplies,
and secondly, because it dissuaded Spaniards from
increasing the size of their slave gangs. In order to
prevent further anomalies, Bueso de Valdés set a scale of
gold deposits along the Raposo river; another two gangs
(a total of 30 slaves) were employed in the mines of San
Agustmn, along the SipI river; and five slave gangs (36
slaves) were employed in the mines of San Gerónimo de
Nóvita and Sed de Cristo. Marzal also observed that some
twenty slaves were employed in extracting gold from
deposits along the Nigua and other rivers, in the
province of Citarâ. See "Informe sobre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.495.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677,
ff. 186-7.
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prices for the sale of Indian produce: two gold pesos for
each .fanega of maize; two tomines for each hen; and between
one and two tomines for each bunch of plantains, depending
on its type. Furthermore, weights and measures were to be
rationalized in each of the region's settlements, in order
to prevent "fraud".74
The second set of instructions was issued in response
to the petition of the miners from the province of
Tatamâ/Chocó. In the settlements of that province, Bueso
de Valdés ordered the Indians that, henceforth, they should
harvest twice each year. As the former governor explained,
a more abundant supply of maize would be advantageous to
the sustenance of the slave gangs.75
The Indians' willingness to supply the Spanish
settlers with maize and other produce, however, was also
dependent on an additional factor. Thus, Bueso de Valdés
reported that the settlements of the region should be
rebuilt and that doctrineros should be provided for each of
these. This was necessary, he said, "not only to achieve
the principal aim [which is] the wellbeing of the souls of
their natives [but also] so that they will become more
docile and [willingly] provide maize for the maintenance of
Ibid., Nigua, 12 October 1676, ff.69-70; Lloró, 15
November 1676, f.97, and San Francisco de Atrato, 19
November 1676, f.99.
Ibid., Tadô, 27 November 1676, ff.115-16, and 29
November 1676, ff.101-02.
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the mines which they [Presently] lack because such order
[has not been introduced]976
Given these interests, it is clear that, in
instructing the Indians that they were to provide their
missionaries with food supplies, Bueso de Valdés recognized
that the survival and continuing presence of the
missionaries would also facilitate the activities of the
miners. In order to avoid the problems which the
Franciscans claimed to have had in obtaining supplies from
the Indians, the former governor introduced a set of
guidelines to ensure that each Indian made an equal
contribution to the priests' upkeep. Thus, each gandul -
male over the age of 15 - of every settlement was ordered
to provide his priest with half a fanega of maize - or one
colado, an equal measure - per year. As Bueso de Valdés
observed, such a quantity would not cause the Indians any
difficulty, given the large amounts that were harvested and
the fertility of the land. Nothing could be done,
however, about the missionaries' other needs - such as
wine, tallow, and clothing. As Fray Joseph de Córdoba
noted, this problem could be overcome if the Indians were
obliged to pay a one-peso stipend, in place of the colado
of maize, thereby allowing the friars to remain in the
76 Ibid., Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.186-88.
Ibid., Taita, 17 September 1676, f.63; Nigua, 7
October 1676, f.67; Nigua, 23 October 1676, f.75; Llorã,
15 November 1676, f.97; San Francisco de Atrato, 19
November 1676, ff.98-99; and Antioquia, 30 June 1677,
ff.184-85.
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mission in comfort. 78 While Bueso de Valdés turned down
the request on this occasion, on the grounds that his
orders had to be observed, he did in fact recognize that
the missionaries suffered shortages of wine, wax, clothing,
and other foodstuffs, and he believed that an annual
stipend of two pesos per Indian was necessary, especially
since the easily accessible mines meant that they were able
to acquire gold easily. 79 Clearly, he recognized that the
comfort of the Franciscan missionaries was of crucial
importance to the future of Spanish operations in the
region - their role was to ensure the continued presence of
the Indians in their settlements.
Bueso de Valdés also made several provisions on the
issue of Indian settlement. For instance, the Indians of
Nigua were informed that, henceforth, they should have
large houses in the settlements, for habitation, and small
ones in their fields - "to keep the maize while they
harvested it and brought it to the towns". Similar
instructions were issued in Llorô and San Francisco de
Atrato. The Indians of Lloró were also ordered to begin
the job of lengthening the church. 8° The case of the town
of Nigua shows the distance that separated the settlements
from the Indians' own retreats. Those who lived along the
78 Ibid., n.p., n.d., ff.154-55.
Ibid., Nigua, 24 December 1676, f.155; and
Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.184-85.
80 Ibid., Nigua, 7 October 1676, f.68; Lloró, 15
November 1676, f.97; San Francisco de Atrato, 19 November
1676, ff.98-99.
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Baberama, Neinota, and Ychó rivers were to be brought to
Nigua to settle. So, too, were the Indians of Barebara
(whom Côrdoba had reported had never had any contact with
Spaniards). It was said that these retreats lay at
distances of 2 or 3 days from Nigua - an indication of how
far the Indians were to be moved from their own
communities. The process was to be systematic, for, as
Bueso de Valdés noted, following their example others
returned to their retreats.8'
That Bueso de Valdés was guided by very specific
interests becomes clear in the case of the settlement of
Taita. Lying half-way between the departure point of Urrao
and the town of Nigua, Taita had a small population and
does not appear to have had any particular attraction for
the Spaniards. Described as "abundant in the produce of
the land", its importance lay precisely in its half-way
location: although at first Bueso de Valdés considered
adding its population to that of another of the settlements
of the province, he decided that Taita was a necessary
resting place for tho who travelled in and out of the Chocó
from neighbouring regions.82
The provinces left by Bueso de Valdés in January 1677
had clearly changed considerably, and, at least in the
short term, the entrada was undoubtedly a great success.
One marked change was in the settlement of the Indians.
81 Ibid., Nigua, 5 October 1676, f.66; 7 October
1676, f.68; 20 October 1676, f.73; 23 October 1676, f.94.
82 Ibid., Antioquia, 30 June 1677, f.l83.
212
Nigua, which had contained 10 uninhabited houses at the
time of his arrival, contained, by the end of the entrada,
29 houses, a church, and a sacristy. By the beginning of
January, 20 houses had been completed in the settlement of
San Francisco de Atrato, and a further 5 houses were in the
process of completion. In Lloró, 10 houses had been
completed, and a further 4 were in the process of
completion. 83 An additional consequence of the entrada was
the baptism of a large number of Indians: Ramlrez stated
that he had carried out 117 baptisms in Llorô, while
Iruñela carried out 187 in San Francisco de Atrato.
Furthermore, all three friars stated that the Indians of
the towns attended Doctrina punctually, according to
Córdoba, with an obedience never before experienced in the
four years he had spent in the province. 85
 The miners,
too, reported considerable progress. The Indians sold
their maize at 2 pesos the fanega, as they had been ordered
to do, and prices were fixed on all other produce.86
One important point should be emphasized within the
context of the measures taken by Bueso de Valdés during his
entrada. The Indians of the Chocó region were said to have
reacted peacefully to the entrada, and to have accepted
wholeheartedly the instructions they received from Bueso de
83 Ibid., San Francisco de Atrato, 5 January 1677,
ff.l60-61; Lloró, 9 January 1677, ff.161-62.
Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Bartoloiné de Borja, et.al., to King, Nigua, 30
October 1676, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2, f.225.
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Valdés. One possible explanation for such behaviour among
these Indians, who had successfully resisted the Spaniards
for more than a century, was provided by the former
governor himself: he reported that the Indians' obedience
was a result of "the fear they had of my entrada" -
apparently due to rumours which had preceded the arrival of
the expeditionary force. As the Indian Pedro Daza, from
the settlement of Taita, explained, they had been informed
that Bueso de Valdés was to be accompanied by "many armed
men". This indicates clearly that, as many observers from
Popayân and Antioquia had been suggesting since the late
1660s, only force or the threat of force was likely to make
any impact on the region's native population.
There are no details to indicate what happened in the
Chocó over the following three years, but it is clear that,
by 1680, Juan Bueso de Valdés' entrada had at least begun
to achieve the desired results: the number of miners and
other Spaniards residing in the region, as well as the
number of mining operations, had increased considerably.
The demands made by the Spaniards on the Indian population
increased apace. So, too, did Indian grievances, and the
protests of the Indians of the province of Citará, limited
to a few individual Spaniards at the beginning of the
decade, had become violent confrontation by 1684. It is
that five year period in Indian-Spanish relations in the
province of Citará which will form the subject of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
PROTEST AND REBELLION:
THE PROVINCE OF CITARA, 1680-1687
Despite the apparent success of Bueso de Valdés'
entrada in 1676-77, by 1684, a mass Indian rebellion had
occurred in the province of Citará. The uprising, which
began on 15 January in the settlement of Nigua, resulted in
the massacre of most of the Spanish miners and all of the
Spanish missionaries resident in the province,' as well as
mestizos, mulattoes, Indian carriers, and "tratantes" - or
traders. 2 More than 100 people were killed in the
violence, 3 which involved hundreds of Indians and spread
rapidly throughout the province, although some Indians
remained loyal to the Spaniards, 4
 and many others were
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Francisco Onofre's
testimonies, RIo de Murri, 11 August 1684, f.2; and
Llorô, 17 October 1684, f.3l.
2 Ibid., Esteban Fernández de Rivera's testimony,
Lloró, 16 October 1684, f.28.
Ibid., Francisco Onofre's testimony, 17 October
1684, f.32. A close reading of the statements made by
both the survivors and the captured Indians shows that at
least 112 people were killed. However, in 1689, the
Governor of Popayán reported to the Crown that in one day
the Indians killed more than 126 Spaniards - this figure
appears not to include the slaves and Indians who were
killed. See AGI Quito 75, Don Gerônimo de Berrio to King,
Popayán, 2 March 1689.
Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre were among
the loyal Indians, and Don Rodrigo Pivi was in fact
entrusted with "reducing" those Indians who were released
back to their towns. See AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, 13
August 1684, f.8.
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thought not to have participated actively. The Indians who
did rebel, however, also burned down their settlements and
churches, took church ornaments and stole the property of
Spaniards. 5
 In the settlement of Nigua, for example, all
the Spanish and mestizo inhabitants were killed - of 11
bodies found in the town, 4 had been decapitated and the
Franciscan Padre Cornisario's body had been burned - and all
the Spaniards' belongings were taken.6
Six Spaniards survived the rebellion, for they had
been warned that the uprising had occurred and had been
able to take refuge - along with more than 70 other slaves
and "free people" - at one of the mining camps of the
province. 7 Despite the fact that approximately 300 Indians
returned to attack the survivors twelve days after the
rebellion occurred, the Spaniards remained in Juan Bueso de
Valdés' mine of Naurita - aided and fed by the loyal
Indians - until 24 July 1684, when Jacinto de Benalcázar
arrived from Antioquia with arms and ammunition sent by
Bueso de Valdés, and Juan de Caicedo Salazar arrived from
Popayán with six soldiers and canoes, and led them to the
Ibid., Cabeza de Proceso General, Rio de Murri, 15
August 1684, ff.8-9
6 Ibid. See the testimonies of Don Juan Joseph
Azcárate de Castillo, Lloró, 14 October 1684, ff.22-23,
and Esteban Fernández de Rivera, Lloró, 16 October 1684,
f.27.
Ibid. See the testimonies of Don Juan Joseph
Azcárate de Castillo, f.22, and Francisco Onofre, Lloró,
17 October 1684, f.31. The six Spaniards who survived
were Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, Juan Nuño de
Sotomayor, Sargento Pedro Blandôn, Francisco and
Cristóbal Rodriguez, and Esteban Fernández de Rivera. See
ff.22-3, 27.
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settlement of L1oró. Two separate expeditions were sent
to rescue the survivors, pacify the population, and punish
the leaders of the rebellion. One came from Popayán, the
other from Antioquia, the gobernaciones which claimed
jurisdiction over the province of Citará. From Antioquia,
Bueso de Valdés led a company of 40 armed soldiers, 8
"aventureros", and more than 40 Indians. 9 From Popayân, a
force was sent under the command of Juan de Caicedo
Salazar, consisting of more than 100 armed men, and aided
by 130 Noanama Indians and 30 Indians from the town of
Tadó.'°	 In return for cooperation in putting down the
Citarâ revolt, the Noa'
	
were pro .Lee.ci etLo.
tribute payments for a period of ten years." A second,
even larger force from Popayân followed, led by Cristóbal
de Caicedo and consisting of 200 Spaniards and 200
Indians. 12
Following the rebellion, all but the loyal Indians
fled in several directions.	 Some were known to have
Ibid, Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo's
testimony, f.24.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, Don Diego Radillo
de Arce, Antioquia, 9 May 1684, ff.1-2. See also the
lists of Spaniards and Indians who accompanied Bueso de
Valdés, Antioquia, 14 May 1684, ff.4-5. Bueso de Valdés
had "juridicion civil y criminal". AGI Santa Fe 204, Ranio
6, f.l.
'° AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, Auto, Bueso de Valdés,
Lloró, 8 October 1684, f.3, and Auto, Bueso de Valdés,
Llorô, 12 November 1684, f.1l.
" Auto de exhorto, Lloró, 7 October 1684, in ibid.,
f .l.
12 AGI Quito 75, Don Gerônimo de Berrio to King,
Popayán, 2 March 1689.
217
retreated to the hills in the vicinity of Lloró, while
others - Don Pedro de Bolivar, Don Juan Chigre, and Don
Fernando Tajina, for example - retreated further away,
westward across the Atrato river to the Bojaya river, to
the region thought to be inhabited by the Burgulnia, and
northwards to the Murri river.'3
 Between the months of
July and October 1684, Bueso de Valdés conducted what were
known as "correrlas" - expeditions to capture the Indians
in their retreats - in the regions of the Murri and Bojaya
rivers.'4 Meanwhile, Juan de Caicedo Salazar and his men
were occupied in building a fort and conducting further
"correrlas" in and around Llorô. A large number of Indians
were captured during the campaign, all of whom were
questioned about their role in the rebellion. As we shall
see, punishment was administered on the basis of the
Indians' own confessions.'5 However, although many Indians
were captured soon after the arrival of the expeditions
from the interior, a large number - there is no evidence to
indicate how many - held out until 1687. In that year, the
head of the Indian Quirubira - who was thought to have been
the main leader of the rebel Indians - was sent to the king
' AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, Bueso de Valdés,
Rio Bebara, 30 July 1684, f.30.
14 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, Auto, Bueso de Valdés,
Llorô, 8 October 1684, ff.2-3.
Ibid., Auto, Juan de Caicedo Salazar, Lloró, 7
October 1684, f.1.
218
as proof that these finally had been defeated, after a war
lasting from 17 January 1684 to 31 August 1687.16
In this chapter we will present an account of the
rebellion itself and examine the background to the events
that occurred in 1684, for the possibility that a large-
scale rebellion might occur in the province of Citará had
been considered just a few years earlier, in 1680. We saw
in Chapter 4 that, for a variety of reasons, the population
of the province of Citará reacted favourably to Bueso de
Valdés' entrada of 1676, and that, by the time he left in
1677, the province had changed considerably. The three
Franciscans who were left in charge of the settlements
reported, for instance, that the Indians attended the
teaching of Doctrina punctually, according to one of them,
with an obedience never before experienced in all the time
he had spent in the region.' 7 In 1679, however, a serious
conflict developed in the province of Citará, between the
Indians of the province and a sizeable number of Spaniards
on the one hand, and a recently appointed royal official
and the few remaining missionaries on the other. On this
occasion, the protest mounted by the Indians resulted in
the imprisonment of the royal official and the expulsion of
the Franciscans.	 But despite the willingness of the
16 AGI Quito 75, Certificación, Don Carlos de Alcedo
Lemus de Sotomayor, n.p., 21 September 1687; and Don
Gerônimo de Berrio to King, Popayân, 11 March 1689.
' AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Certificación, Fray
Joseph de Córdoba, Nigua, 24 December 1676, f.160;
Certificación, Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramlrez, Lloró, 9
January 1677, f.162; Certificación, Fray Esteban de
Iruflela, San Francisco de Atrato, 5 January 1677, f.161.
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authorities in the gobernación of Antioquia to meet the
demands that the Indian population made then, a full-scale
rebellion broke out only four years later.
While the account of the events that occurred over
that five year period will necessarily be descriptive, it
will nevertheless allow us to look a little more closely at
Spanish-Indian relations in the province of Citarâ during
that period, and ascertain the extent to which these
contributed to the outbreak of rebellion in 1684. The
account will also allow us to see how far the province had
changed by the early 1680s: we will see that the number of
outsiders residing in Citarâ territory had increased
considerably - miners, slaves, traders, blacksmiths, pajes,
some women, are all mentioned in the list of those who died
during the rebellion. The conflict of 1679-80, and the
response of the appointed officials will show how, alone in
the region, the representatives of the Crown could act with
absolute impunity. This lack of overall control - the
consequence of the Crown's policy to divide jurisdiction
over the area between neighbouring gobernaciones under the
overall control of the Audiencia - led to all sorts of
abuses, and meant, first, that no systematic policy for
administering the region had been put into effect, and
secondly, that any intervention in the affairs of the Chocó
had to await the authorization of the Audiencia of Santa
Fe.
The confessions of the captured Indians will also
allow us to look a little more closely at Indian values,
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and more specifically, at the importance of war in the
culture of the Citarã. These confessions are particularly
valuable because they enable us not only to establish the
sequence of events but to examine the role of the Indian
capitanes in organizing the rebellion, and to understand
why the Indians, for whom success in war was a sign of
bravery, confessed to the crimes they had committed. We
will also see that, in informing Bueso de Valdés of exactly
who had been responsible for the deaths that had occurred,
the Indians in fact facilitated the immediate task of
pacification, and saved the Spaniards the time and effort
that would have been required in a long drawn out process
of identifying those responsible. The process of
pacification was also made easier by the existence of a
small group of loyal Indians, who informed Bueso de Valdés
of the location of the retreats used by the rebel Indians,
thus facilitating their capture.
Indeed, the rebellion of 1684 marked a turning point
in the fortunes of the Indian population of the Chocó, in
particular of the Citarâ. Despite repeated attempts to
conquer the Chocô from the beginning of the sixteenth
century, the Citará tribe in particular had violently
resisted all intrusions into their territory until the
second half of the seventeenth century. The conflict and
lack of coordination that characterized relations between
the disparate groups of Spaniards that began to enter the
region in growing numbers from the 1660s facilitated the
Indians' continuing resistance to the process of reduction,
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which manifested itself in their refusal to live in the
settlements established by the Spaniards, to maintain the
friars and attend the teaching of Christian Doctrine, and
sell their produce to the miners at prices deemed
reasonable by the Spaniards. For their part, the Spaniards
- limited by continuing disputes - were unable to mount a
concerted campaign to force the Indians' compliance.
Despite the presence of the Spaniards, their hold over the
population was far from secure. The rebellion of 1684
changed all this. Following the pacification campaign, a
more concerted and more successful effort was made to bring
the Citarâ under the control of royal authority,
represented by officials from the gobernaciôn of Popayán
alone, and as a result, the position of the Indians changed
dramatically.
This chapter, like the previous one, will be based
almost entirely on the documents relating to the activities
of the antioquenos in the province of Citará, because it is
only in looking closely at these that we are able to get a
view of events in the region over the period between 1676
and 1684. There are three reasons for this: first, because
Juan Bueso de Valdés' 1676 entrada was an Antioquia
initiative; secondly because, when conflict erupted in
1679-80, the Indians of the Citará region appealed to the
governor of Antioquia for assistance against the
Franciscans and the teniente appointed by the governor of
Popayàn, leading to Bueso de Valdés' return to the region;
and finally, because of Bueso de Valdés' involvement in the
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pacification of the native population following the
rebellion of 1684.
Indian Protest, 1680-1681
The first indications of conflict in the province of
Citarâ came in September 1679, when a group of seven or
eight Indians appeared before the governor of Antioquia and
complained about the ill-treatment received by the Indians
of the province at the hands of Fray Joseph de Córdoba and
Fray Pablo Ruiz 18 - the two friars whom the Audiencia had
asked had the Franciscan Father Provincial to recall to
Santa Fe in l675.' Between April and October 1680, the
governor of Antioquia received further complaints, not just
about Fray Joseph de Côrdoba, but also about Lope de
Cârdenas, 2° the official - or teniente de qobernador -
appointed to the province of Citará by the governor of
Popayãn. The complaints of the Indian inhabitants of the
three main settlements of the province of Citará - Nigua,
Lloró, San Francisco de Atrato - were rarely specific:
these usually referred simply to the extortions suffered at
the hands of Lope de Cârdenas and the ill-treatment
received from Fray Joseph de Côrdoba. 	 However, the
s AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Antioquia, 7 August
1681, ff.l-2.
' Pacheco, La Consolidación de la Iglesia, p.673.
20 Lope de Cárdenas probably began his activities in
the Chocó region as a miner. In 1674, he was said to be a
resident in the region, and to have arrived there in
1671. See AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos
(Franciscans)", Nigua, 14 August 1674, f.154.
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Spaniard Jacinto Roque de Espinosa claimed that Lope de
Cárdenas - "a poor man, servant of the said father" - was
hated by the Indians because he had killed one of their
number. 2' In addition, the Indians of two of the smaller
settlements of the province, Taita and Guebara - this
latter settlement had not been mentioned before in the
documents - had other quite specific grievances against
him.
We saw in Chapter 4 that one important consequence of
Bueso de Valdés' entrada of 1676 had been the reduction of
a substantial proportion of the native population of the
province of Citará to three settlements in the Atrato area:
Nigua, Llorô, and San Francisco de Atrato. We also saw
that, during the entrada, Bueso de Valdés had considered
adding the population of Taita to that of one of the other
settlements, but, in 1676, Taita remained intact due to its
half-way location between the departure point of Urrao - in
the province of Antioquia - and Nigua: its value as a
resting place for those travelling in and out of the Chocô
from Antioquia outweighed other considerations. 22
 By 1680,
however, tension was mounting among the Indians of Taita
and the other settlement of Guebara because an attempt was
being made to move their populations to another of the
settlements on the Atrato river. For the Indians of Taita
and Guebara this meant being moved to an area located at a
21 Pacheco, La Consolidaciôn de la Iqiesia, p.673.
22 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677,
f. 183.
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distance of four days from their maize fields and plantain
groves. Moreover, the Indians claimed that, in order to
force them to move, their axes had been confiscated and
their pigs had been slaughtered. The fear that their maize
and plantain fields would be cut down, so that they would
be forced to move, added to the general climate of
suspicion. The Indian Bogasaga, from the settlement of
Taita, claimed that Fray Joseph de Côrdoba had actually
ordered that their maize fields and plantain groves should
be cut down, and he ref erre.d. ie.r'j ep 	 icU'j t tbs.
planned to move the Indians as "people from Popayán".
Another factor contributing to the tension, however, was
the rumour spreading through the province that the governor
of Popayán, Don Fernando Martinez de Fresneda, was about to
embark on the conquest of the Soruco nation - a conquest
that was supposed to take place with the aid of the Citará
Indians. 23
 Finally, complaints were also made to the
effect that Fray Joseph de Côrdoba "has ... a stick", to
use as punishment against the Indians.24
The gobernaciôn of Antioquia did not have an official
presence in the province of Citará after Bueso de Valdés
conducted his entrada in 1676-77. In 1679, Don Diego
Radillo de Arce, who had replaced Aguinaga as governor of
Antioquia, commented that there had not been an official
representative of the gobernación of Antioquia in the
23 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Antioquia, 5 April 1680,
ff.4-5. See also the statements of Gregorio Bogasaga,
ff.7-8; and Antonio Quintana, ff.5-6.
24 Ibid., Gregorio Bogasaga's statement, f.7.
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Citarâ region for three years, despite the fact that Juan
Bueso de Valdés had been appointed "assistant
superintendent ... with considerable authority" by the
Audiencia of Santa Fe. The absence of an official
antioqueño presence in the region effectively meant that
Lope de Cárdenas was the only official in the entire region
encompassing the two Indian provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and
Citará. Consequently, the governor of Antioquia's advice
on dealings with the Indians were ignored. Limited by the
fact that the Audiencia of Santa Fe had overall control of
the entire Chocó region, the governor could do no more than
wait for further instructions from the president and issue
a "request" to Lope de Cárdenas to the effect that "the
said Chocô Indians shall be maintained and protected in
their settlements and shall not be removed from them". In
addition, the Governor urged "that the said Indian
capitanes and their parcialidades be treated and protected
in the same peaceful [manner in which they have lived for
more than ten years". He also ordered the return of the
Indians' confiscated tools and other belongings and the
repayment of the value of all the slaughtered hens and
chickens 26
But the issue of jurisdiction again emerged at the
beginning of this dispute. While the governor of Antioquia
claimed authority over Lope de Cárdenas on the basis of the
fact that the settlements had been founded by Antonio de
Ibid., f.2.
26 Ibid., ff.8-ll.
226
Guzmán, on the authority of the Audiencia of Santa Fe,
Lope de Cárdenas retorted that Antioquia had no
jurisdictional rights at all over the province of Citará.
According to Cârdenas, the reduction of the province had
been achieved thanks to efforts of the payaneses alone:
that is, Governor Luis Antonio de Guzmân; Governor DIaz de
la Cuesta, who ordered Francisco de Quevedo to undertake
his entrada; and finally, Governor Miguel Garcia, who
appointed Don Juan Joseph Azcárate to replace Juan Lopez
GarcIa.28
In spite of his refusal to comply with any
instructions, Lope de Cárdenas nevertheless justified his
position before the governor, and denied all accusations
that the Indians had been ill-treated, as indeed he denied
plans to take the Indians to the conquest of the Soruco.
Although he admitted that the governor of Popayán was
planning to proceed against the Soruco, they would only be
taking Indian "volunteers". The Indians' complaints, Lope
de Cárdenas stated, should not be taken seriously, as he
had never "molested nor harassed" the native population.
However, on the question of Taita, Lope de Cárdenas did
report that the two dwellings of Taita - it must be
remembered that these housed several families - could not
form a settlement, and that, therefore, it would be
advantageous to bring the Indians to Nigua. The same
applied to the three or four other Indian "places",
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., f.16.
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probably including Guebara, which consisted of only two
dwellings and lay at distances of three or four leagues
over difficult terrain. The Indians who inhabited these
places were dangerous, Cárdenas claimed, as they had killed
a mulatto slave of Ignacio de Guzmán who was travelling to
Antioquia with gold. 29
 In fact, Lope de Cárdenas and the
"people from Popayán" wanted the Indians moved to one of
the other settlements simply because they were of no use to
the payaneses where they were. Bueso de Valdés
deliberately kept the Indians of Taita in their settlement
because he recognized the value of a resting place for
antioqueflos travelling in and out of the province from
Urrao. This was not the case for the payaneses, who
travelled over different routes, via Anserma and Popayán,
which were located somewhat further south.
Like Lope de Cárdenas, the missionaries defended their
position and denied all accusations against them. Fray
Cristôbal de Artiaga, for instance, claimed not only that
the reports received by the governor were "sinister" and
"false", but also that his assumption that the Indians had
been pacified for many years was incorrect. Fray Cristóbal
suggested that the governor should consult with other
residents of the province, who would make him aware of the
fact that the Indians had taken up arms on numerous
occasions. Indeed, Artiaga claimed that his only desire
was to teach the Indians Christian Doctrine, but explained
29 Ibid., Lope de Cärdenas to Governor of Antioquia,
ff. 15-17.
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that although the governor might consider the Indians to be
"lambs", he had learned that it would be "easier to reduce
the wildest of beasts to communication with and subjection
to man" 30
The missionaries' frustration at the Indians'
resistance to their efforts to teach them Christian
Doctrine almost certainly led them to adopt corporal
punishment as a form of coercion. Indeed, Fray Joseph de
Córdoba was not the only missionary to have become
convinced of the need to introduce some form of punishment,
on the assumption that "the Indians do nothing except
through force". Even the Jesuit Antonio Marzal concluded
that the Indians "will never do anything good until
punishment is applied". 3' One specific incident, involving
Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga, 32 shows that, by 1680, the
Franciscans were using corporal punishment to punish
Indians who disobeyed them.
The incident occurred in Nigua, when a few Indians
from the town were putting a roof on the house of the
Indian Batassa. According to Fray Cristôbal de Artiaga,
the Indians were called for Mass, a call which they
apparently ignored and continued with their work. Artiaga
claimed that, as he lightly struck Batassa on the leg - "he
30 Ibid., ff.l4-15.
' AGI Quito 67, Testimonio Franciscans, Lloró, 15
September 1674, ff.1].3-l14, and Pacheco, Los Jesuitas,
Appendix 1.
32 Fray Cristóbal was not living in the Chocó when
Bueso de Valdés conducted the entrada of 1676.
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gave him a light blow on the leg with a small stick" - his
son exploded "like a wild beast" and the friar was thrown
to the ground and beaten by the Indians. Had he not been
helped by some other people, he asserted, he would have
died at the hands of "those barbarians". 33
 The Indians'
story is a different one. According to Bogasaga, when the
Indians had replied that they would go to Mass in a moment,
as they had almost finished putting the roof on Batassa's
house, the friar reacted by beating and then apprehending
Batassa and his son Garaupa. They claimed not to have
harmed Artiaga at all. Lope de Cárdenas also referred to
the incident, and claimed that the only punishment the
Indians received for their attack on the friar was "to be
placed in irons for an hour".35
However, it was not only the Indians of the region who
reported their grievances against Lope de Cârdenas and the
Franciscans. Indeed, one of the interesting features of
the events of 1679-1680, which differed markedly from those
of a few years later, is the fact that many Spanish
residents of the province found common cause with the
Indians against Cárdenas and the missionaries, to the
extent that the complaints received by the governor of
Antioquia culminated with reports that Cárdenas had
executed three Spaniards and imprisoned many others.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, f.15.
Ibid., ff.17-18.
Ibid., f.16.
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As early as 4 April 1680, two vecinos of Antioquia,
Antonio Quintana and Sebastian Velâzquez, appeared before
the governor of Antioquia to complain that their fear of
Cárdenas and Côrdoba had forced them to abandon the
discovery of mines in the region, which they had been
employed to do by a number of other vecinos of Antioquia.
Quintana and Velázquez were not the only two Spaniards to
complain to the governor. During 1680, as many as 20
Spaniards either wrote letters, signed petitions, or
travelled to Antioquia to report to the governor in person,
and Francisco de Borja advised Radillo de Arce that unless
Cârdenas was replaced, all the Spaniards would abandon the
region.37
The absence of precise dates in the documents makes it
impossible to establish the exact sequence of events. But
what is clear is that, after July 1680, the situation
became more explosive and more violent. Conflict - which
at first had taken the form of letters and petitions for
the removal of Cárdenas and Côrdoba - became confrontation.
In July and August 1680, two events took place which led
36 Ibid., ff..5-6.
' Ibid., f.10. The following list includes all of
those who reported their complaints to the governor
during 1680: Antonio Quintana, Sebastian Velasquez, Don
Francisco de Borja, Cristôbal de Viñola y Villegas, Juan
Nuflo de Sotomayor, Sebastian Garcia Benitez, Jacinto
Roque de Espinosa, Diego Diaz de Castro, Francisco
Gonzalez Valdés, Bartolomé Garcia, Nicolás de Murcia,
Miguel Fernández, Rodrigo Blandón Jaramillo, Juan de
Dios, Salvador Vidal, Francisco Onofre, Manuel Quintero
Principe, Manuel de Burgos, Joseph Enrique, and Alonso de
Baca. See ibid., ff.4-7, 10, 13, 19-20, 22-4, 27-8, 31,
36-9, 45-6.
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Lope de Cárdenas to seek the aid of the teniente de
gobernador of the province of Noanama - Santiago de Arce
Camargo - to act against the Spaniards. For, taking
advantage of Fray Joseph de Côrdoba's absence from the
province, allegedly to seek aid in Popayán, some Indian
capitanes decided - apparently in consultation with others
in the province - to prevent the friar's return to the
settlement of Nigua. According to some of the Spanish
residents of the province, two Indian capitanes, Don
Rodrigo Pivi and Don Pedro de Bolivar, warned that if
Côrdoba returned to Nigua, he would be killed. The
Spaniards claimed that, because they recognized the risk to
all the Spaniards and slaves in the region, since few
Indians were unarmed and Pivi's parcialidad had been seen
"that they were ready for war", they persuaded Córdoba to
leave the province, which he did with the other
missionaries. Their departure was said to have quietened
the Indians.38
The second incident involved Lope de Cârdenas. On
this occasion, again according to the evidence presented by
the Spaniards, this official had without cause attempted to
"garrotte an Indian". Believing that all the progress made
would be lost and that all the Spaniards would be killed,
they took the decision to deprive him of his office,
because "that is what was requested by the said Indians,
Ibid., Sebastian Garcia, Juan Nuño de Sotomayor,
Jacinto Roque de Espinosa, Rodrigo Blandón Jaramillo,
Diego DIaz de Castro, Cristôbal de Viflola y Villegas,
Francisco Gonzalez, Joseph Enrique and Juan de Dios to
Governor of Antioquia, 21 July 1680, ff.22-23, 24.
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whom they feared...
	
It was for this reason that Lope
de Cârdenas sought the aid of the teniente of the province
of Noanama.
To punish what was considered an act of treason,
Santiago de Arce Camargo set of f for the settlement of Tadó
- in the province of Tatamá/Chocô - where he met up with
Côrdoba and the other missionaries who had been forced out
of the province of Citará. In Tadô, Arce Camargo enlisted
30 armed men, with whom he arrived in the settlement of
Nigua on 28 August, accompanied by the Franciscan
missionaries. In Nigua, Arce Camargo arrested Diego DIaz
de Castro, the Spaniard who had been most responsible or
the incident, placing his feet "in two irons and his hands
in handcuffs...". His property was also 	 aroed.4°
after, Diego DIaz de Castro was executed and quartered.4'
In sentencing Diego DIaz de Castro to death, Lope de
Cârdenas ordered that "after he has been garrotted ... he
shall be quartered and [each quarter] shall be hung on the
accustomed paths and his head shall be placed ... in this
Ibid., Juan Nuflo de Sotomayor, Sebastian GarcIa,
Jacinto Roque de Espinosa, Rodrigo Blandón Jaramillo,
Cristóbal de Viflola y Villegas, Diego DIaz de Castro,
Francisco Gonzalez, Joseph Enrique, and Juan de Cbs to
Governor of Antioquia, Nigua, 25 June 1680, f.19.
4° Ibid., Auto, Santiago de Arce Camargo, 29 August
1680, ff.66-68.
" Ibid., 29 August 1680, ff.67-8. According to Arce
Camargo, several Spaniards (Diego DIaz, SebastiAn Garcia,
NicolAs de Murcia, Cristôbal de Viflola, and some other
"mozos" forced CArdenas to relinquish the title granted
to him by Governor Martinez de Fresneda, took his
"bastón", and declared that he should no longer be
recognized as teniente of the province.
233
town of San Sebastian de Nigua for his own punishment and
as an example to others".42
Other Spaniards were imprisoned and lost their
property. Fearing for their lives, a number of Spaniards
fled from the province: Jacinto Roque and Francisco
Gonzalez left for Antioquia; Sebastian Garcia and Nicolás
de Murcia retreated "to the protection of the Indians of
Guebara". Others were less lucky: Juan Nuflo de Sotomayor
and Alonso de Baca were imprisoned "with handcuffs on their
hands and irons on their feet". These were later freed but
exiled from the province for ten years, together with
Capitân Manuel Quintero Principe. Others, too, were
captured and later released - among them, Rodrigo Blandôn,
and the blacksmith Santiago Ruiz. The silversmith Joseph
Enrique was also released, but Córdoba ordered that he
remain in Nigua as his servant.43
The decision of the Spaniards, in particular Dlaz de
Castro, to force Cârdenas to relinquish his staff of office
led the latter to act with considerable violence towards
the former. Although those who were captured and later
released were spared their lives, they nevertheless lost
their property: Manuel de Burgos reported "the
confiscations of belongings, mines and slaves" which took
place. Juan Nuflo de Sotoinayor reported that Cârdenas
"appropriated ... Capitán Juan de Guzmán's mine which he
operates in partnership with Jacinto Roque and they
42 Ibid., 29 August 1680, f.7l.
Ibid., ff. 27-8, 37-8, 38-9, 45, 46.
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appointed a miner for the blacks" - the gold thus extracted
was taken by Fray Joseph de Côrdoba.
Cárdenas and Fray Joseph de Córdoba proceeded quite
ruthlessly against the Spaniards, and appropriated all
their belongings. All of Diego Diaz de Castro's property -
letters, clothing, papers, a bed, one male slave and one
female slave - was taken. 45 Jacinto Roque lost a female
slave, gold, and clothing. Don Alonso de Baca lost 100
gold pesos. Francisco Gonzalez lost his clothing;
Francisco Onofre, too, lost his clothing, his bed. It was
said that Cârdenas and Côrdoba were personally carrying out
these errands, "collecting the debts owing to the above
named [Spaniards]". 	 Quintero Principe claimed to have
lost his clothes and 150 gold pesos in the town of Nigua.47
Most of these Spaniards were not the important
mineowners who would begin to enter the region, principally
from the cities of the gobernaciôn of Popayán, a few years
later, bringing with them relatively large slave gangs.
Diego DIaz's belongings, for example, amounted to little
more than two slaves and a bed, although he was referred to
as an "owner of slaves". Jacinto Roque, who worked a mine
in partnership with Juan de Guzmán, was also referred to as
an "owner of slaves", but there is no indication of how
many slaves he owned. Juan Nuflo de Sotomayor was simply
Ibid., ff.39, 45.
' Ibid., f.72.
' Ibid., ff.37-38.
Ibid., f.45.
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referred to as a miner. Some may have been merchants
trading in the region: Alonso de Baca, for example, lost
"eight jars of wine from Peru", which were said to be worth
50 pesos each in the Chocô. Antonio Quintana and SebastiAn
Velasquez claimed to be engaged in the discovery of mines,
and to have been employed by vecinos of Antloguia. Rodrigo
Blandôn Jaramillo was a miner employed to oversee the
slaves belonging to Diego Manzano. Joseph Enrique was said
to be a silversmith, and Santiago Ruiz was said to be a
blacksmith. Others were referred to as "mozos". While
Antonio Quintana, Sebastian Velasquez, and Juan Nuflo de
Sotomayor all claimed to be vecinos of Antioquia, Cristóbal
de Viñola was said to be a vecino of Mariquita, and Jacinto
Roque de Espinosa and Diego DIaz de Castro were both sa.d
to be vecinos of Anserma.48
Nevertheless, the violence with which Cárdenas and
Córdoba - with the aid of Arce Camargo - proceeded against
the Spaniards proved to be counter-productive, and led,
just a few months later, to their expulsion front the
province. Their arrival set off another series of reports
about their conduct and resulted in the retreat of the
Indians from their settlements. In addition, the trails
from Anserma and Popayán into the Chocó were closed, arid
the settlement of Lloró was burned down.. There were, in
fact, many reports of damages done to the Indians by
For the names, occupations, or places of origin of
those involved in the dispute with Cârdenas and Crdoba,
see ibid., ff. 4-7, 10, 13, 19-20, 22-4, 27-a, 31, 3-3
45-46.
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Santiago de Arce's expedition. In addition to the fear
that had caused the Indians' retreat, Don Juan Mitiguirre
complained that the two tenientes - Cárdenas and Arce
Camargo - and their men ate the Indians' maize, plantains,
hens, and pigs, and that, as a result, the Indian children
were dying of hunger in the hills. 49 The Indians demanded
that Cárdenas and Côrdoba - who were said to be in Nigua
"extracting gold with the slaves belonging to the
Spaniards" - should be replaced b'j a re terilente anci a
doctrinero from the gcbernaciân of Antioquia, and that
Cárdenas should be forced to pay the Indians for what had
been stolen from them. Interestingly, they also demanded
that the priests should have neither arms nor dogs. Their
demands were now accompanied by a threat: unless these were
met, the Indian population of the province would retreat to
the still unconquered Soruco nation, with whom they claimed
to be at peace. 5° Initially, the Indians had appealed to
the governor of Antioquia for justice, but since his
strategy had amounted, as late as September 1680, to no
more than sending letters to the official and friars
concerned, "in which they are entrusted with the protection
and calm of those natives and other people who reside there
and the avoidance of the inevitable incident which is
feared", 5' they were now prepared to take direct action.
Ibid., 14 October 1680, ff.39-40.
50 Ibid., ff.4l-2.
' Ibid., Antioquia, 20 September 1680, f.32.
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However, by October 1680, the possibility that the
province would be deserted, and that all that had been
achieved in terms of its pacification would be lost, led
the governor to send Bueso de Valdés to the region
immediately. He was to attempt, by peaceful means, to
return calm to the province, and the Indians to their
settlements. In addition, he was to deal with the friars
Côrdoba and Ruiz - who were, in any case, about to be
replaced - and ensure that Lope de Cârdenas should refrain
from becoming involved in matters over which he had no
authority. The Indians were to be compensated for all the
damage suffered, and the Spaniards whose property had been
confiscated were to be allowed to give testimony in this
regard. 52
By November 1680 - just before Bueso de Valdés'
arrival in the province53
 - two more Spaniards, Nicolás de
Murcia and Sebastian Garcia, had been killed by Lope de
Cârdenas. 54
 It was this final event that led Bueso de
Valdés to detain Lope de Cárdenas, and take him to Nigua,
where he was put under guard. 55
 Bueso de Valdés reported
of Lope de Cârdenas that "it is difficult to explain the
52 Ibid., Antioquia, 17 October 1680, ff.47-8. Bueso
de Valdés still held the title of "juez superintendente
auxiliador por lo que toca esta provincia de Antioqula de
dha miss.n del choco".
Bueso de Valdés left Antioquia on 9 November,
accompanied by 9 men and 15 Indian carriers. See ibid.,
ff.49-50, 55-6.
Ibid., Bueso de Valdés to Governor of Antioquia,
Port of Chaquinindo, 1 December 1680, ff.57-58.
Ibid., Nigua, 14 January 1681, f.59.
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violence and harm he had done ... and the clamourings of
Indians and Spaniards". Due to his departure, however,
"the Indians with their families and the Spaniards have
come out from the hills". 56 In addition, three friars -
Côrdoba, Ruiz, and Moreno - were arrested, and sent to
Santa Fe de Bogota to appear before the Father
Provincial. 57 The new friars who had been sent to replace
them - the Padre Comisario Esteban Alvarez de Aviles, the
Padre Presidente Fray Dionisio de Camino, and the lay
brother Fray Joseph Flores - were left with the task of
reconstructing the towns and churches, the teaching of the
Indians, and their reduction to town life. 58 It was clear
to the new group of Franciscan clergy that little progress
had been made in the conversion of the native population.
The new Padre Comisario reported to the governor of
Antioqula that he had found that the Indians were unable
even to "cross themselves". 59 Earlier that year, the
Spaniards of the province had also claimed that the Indians
56 Ibid., f.60.
Ibid., f.60. Fray Joseph de Côrdoba did not cease
to cause trouble in the Chocô. In 1690, it was said that
Córdoba continued to travel in and out of the region, and
that his presence there had led to many complaints being
made against him. And, in the early 1720s, it was
suggested that Córdoba had been accused of opening a
trail to facilitate the entry of the "enemies of the
Crown" to the Chocô region. The Franciscans, however,
denied these charges against him. See AGI Quito 75, Don
Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca to King, Popayán, 16 May 1690;
and AOl Santa Fe 403, Fray Diego Barroso, Santa Fe, 18
November 1719.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Antioquia, 1 February
1681, f.61.
Ibid., f.60.
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had not been taught Christian Doctrine by the missionaries,
as could be seen from the fact that "they do not yet know
how to cross themselves after so many years of peace".
According to Don Antonio de Legarda, brother-in-law of the
Indian Don Rodrigo Pivi, "their children do not know how to
pray because the priests were occupied in collecting money
for the clothing they sold".6°
Indian Rebellion, 1684-1687
Despite the fact that, in 1680, the governor of
Antioquia and the Franciscan Father Provincial agreed to
the demands made by the Indian population of the province
of Citarâ, a large-scale rebellion occurred just three
years later. This time, there was no cooperation between
Spaniards and Indians for the removal of the offending
officials or priests. The Indians killed as many Spaniards
as they were able to surprise, as well as all those
associated with the Spanish presence - slaves, servants,
women, children, itinerant traders. The absence of
specific reasons for the rebellion in the Indians'
statements makes it difficult to identify their immediate
motives for revolt. But it is clear from the statements
made by the Indians after their capture that the rebellion
was not a spontaneous act, but had been well-planned,
involved widespread Indian participation, and ended quickly
and successfully.
60 Ibid., f.44.
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On 15 January 1684, the day the rebellion began, the
Indians of Nigua surrounded the houses of the Spaniards of
the settlement and killed them and the Padre Cornisario.6'
Spanish miners and missionaries were also killed in the
settlements of Lloró and San Francisco de Atrato. The
rebellion spread outside the settlements as well. Other
Spaniards were killed in Joseph Diaz's mine, in the mine of
Naurita, in Domingo de Veitia's mine and house, in the mine
of Ingipurdü, along the beach of Guacogo, by the mouths of
the Quito, Cavi, and Bebara rivers, along the Andaguera and
Atrato rivers, and at the port of Dodubar. 62 The Spaniards
who survived listed 59 people who had been killed. 63 There
were many others who were also said to have died: witnesses
mentioned 12 slaves belonging to Bueso de Valdés and
Domingo de Veitia, many Indian servants and pajes", Indian
carriers, slaves, mulatto slaves, female slaves and one
child, others who were referred to as niulattoes, Indians,
or "inozos". Suffice to say that as many as 112 people may
have been killed during the rebellion. The fact that this
was a surprise attack prevented a Spanish response: only
six Spaniards, and 70 rnestizos, mulattoes, and slaves
61 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Tidrapagui's statement,
Rio de Murri, 15 August 1684, f.9.
62 Ibid., ff.24-5, 30-32, 32.
It must be remembered, however, that these were
mentioned by the survivors from memory, and may thus be
inaccurate.
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escaped the massacre, and there are no reports of
casualties among the rebel Indians.M
Indeed, the Indian Miguel Baquera's statement
indicates that the rebellion had been planned well in
advance, and had been organized by a small group of
Indians, most of whom are referred to throughout the
documents as "capitanes". Miguel Baquera claimed that many
days before the rebellion occurred, Don Fernando Tajina
went to see Don Pedro de Bolivar in Nigua and informed him
that he, Capitán Chuagra, Capitán Aucavira, and Chaguera
had decided to kill all the Spaniards, and reminded him
that he had also decided on that course of action months
earlier. Tajina was accompanied by Capitán Chevi, who
informed Juan Chigre and Cecego. According to the Indian
Nicolás Yapeda (he had been brought up among Spaniards and
tried to warn them of the rebellion), several Indians -
Capitán Chuagra, Biva, Capitán Aucavira - went to the
settlement of San Francisco de Atrato to ask all the
Indians who inhabited the river to join with them to kill
all the Spaniards resident in the province. Mateo, a
mulatto slave belonging to Domingo de Veitia, who was
killed in the rebellion, reported that when the uprising
occurred, he was in the mine of Ingipurdü with his
companions, part of his slave gang, and Ambrosio, Mateo,
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6. See the following
statements: Ygaragaida, ff.3-4; Udrapagui, f.9; Capitán
Francisco Ignacio Betu, f.10; Capitán Tajina, ff.11-12;
Guaguirri, ff.14-16; Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de
Castillo, ff.24-25; Esteban Fernández de Rivera, ff.30-
31; Francisco Onofre, f.32; Soberano, f.43.
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and Pedro Carrasco. Four Indian capitanes - ManzaflO,
Gongera, Tevasa, and Chuagra - arrived in the mine
accompanied by a large group of Indians, took some of the
slaves, killed 12 others, and also killed Pedro, Mateo, and
Ambrosio Carrasco.65
From the declarations made by the captured Indians it
is possible to ascertain who the leaders of the rebellion
were, for the following Indians, mostly capitanes, are
repeatedly mentioned in the documents: Capitán Quirubira,
Juan Chigre, Capitán Pedro de Bolivar, Tajina, Capitán
Manzano, Dechegama, Capitán Tavachi, Capitán Chuagra,
Capitán Chuaru, Capitán Aucavira, Capitán Gongera, Capitán
Miarri,	 Devanado,	 Parimendo,	 Capitán Tevasa,	 and
Pidigara. Many of these - and others, including Capitán
Dequia, Don Pedro Paparra - were later recognized by the
Spanish survivors at the Naurita mine. 67 Although we do
not know from which towns all the leaders originated, it is
possible to establish, from the Bueso de Valdés census of
Ibid. See the statements made by Miguel Baquera,
f.33; Nicolás Yapeda, ff.34-5; and Mateo, f.26. The
slaves who were killed were said to have belonged to Juan
Bueso de Valdés and Domingo de Veitia.
Ibid. See the following statements: Ygaragaida,
ff.3, 5-6; Udrapagui, f.9; Francisco Ignacio Betu, f.1O;
Capitán Tajina, ff.l1-12; Miguel Baquera, f.33; Don Pedro
Paparra, f.4l; Soberano, ff.42-3.
67 The following Indians were also recognized by the
Spaniards of the Naurita mine: Guebara, Aycerama,
Yciguma, Tabugara, Capitán Anugama, Sadragama, Dami,
Jerupueda, Guasarapi, Cecego, Legarda, Capitán Sanjua,
Ganjua, Baragoia, Chaquera, Ysapa. See ibid., Don Juan
Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, op.cit., f.24; Esteban
Fernández de Rivera, op.cit., f.27; and Francisco Onofre,
17 October 1684, f.32.
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1676, that the leaders came from the three principal
settlements of the province. Juan Chigre, Don Pedro de
Bolivar, Devanado, and Tavachi are listed in the census as
inhabitants of the settlement of Nigua; Capitân Miarri,
Tevasa, and Don Pedro Paparra are all mentioned in the
census of San Francisco de Atrato; and Capitán Dequia
figures in the census of Lloró. 68
 The distribution of the
leaders suggests that the rebellion was not limited to any
one these settlements, but involved the population of the
entire province.
The rebellion was not limited, however, to the Indian
capitanes, for many Indians willingly joined in the
massacre of the Spaniards. In his declaration, the Indian
Guaguirri claimed, for example, that he was on the Bebará
river when the rebellion occurred, and that he received
orders from Quirubira, through Ubira, to kill the Spaniards
who were on the Bebará river. He, together with some other
Indians, went to the house of Francisco de la Carrera,
where they found him and another man called Antonio. Other
Indians went in search of Bejarano, Bernardo, and another
Spaniard to a mine they were working. Each of the Indians
killed a Spaniard. This group of Indians also went after
Juan de Guzmân and his companions to a ravine known by the
name of Tabusido. Noquia confessed that when he was in the
house of Tomás on the Andaguera river, Guagone arrived to
68 Dami, Cecego, Baragoia, and Ysapa are also listed
as residents of Nigua and Legarda is listed as a resident
of San Francisco de Atrato. See AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1,
ff.75, 76, 79, 85, 87, 90, 131, 132, 134, 141, 143.
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report that the Spaniards were being killed, and that they
were to do likewise. He, together with a large group of
Indians, went after three people whom he referred to as a
mulatto, a mestizo, and a mestiza. The two men were killed
on the Quito river, and the Indian Baragoia captured the
rnestiza. Noquia stated that he had been told by Masupi
that, if there were any Spaniards, each Indian was to kill
one. Juananui claimed that Yvagone went to the Andaguera
river and informed him and his companions that Spaniards
were being killed, and that they were to deal with the
Spaniards from Anserma who were due to arrive at the Port
of Dodubar. A group of Indians went to the port and killed
the Spaniards and four Indian carriers. 69 The Indians,
however, had few arms: Ygaragaida stated that Quirubira
killed the blacksmith's lad with a machete; Guaripua
confessed to killing Francisco de la Carrera with an axe
and Juan de Guzmán's son with a dart; Chaqueranvido claimed
to have drowned an Indian; and Soberano confessed to
beating two slaves to death.7°
Two important issues arise from the statements made by
the captured Indians. First, that it was because of this
widespread participation, despite the shortage of arms,
that so many people were killed over such a wide area and
69 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6. See the following
statements: Guaguirri, ff.l4-16; Toquia, f.44; and
Juananui, f.47.
° Ibid. See the statements of Ygaragaida, f.5;
Guaripua, f.19; Chaqueranvido, f.38; Soberano, f.43.
Ordinary sticks were also used as arms: see Esteban
Fernández de Rivera's statement, f.28.
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very few survived. The Indians who lived along the many
rivers that cut through the region quickly joined the
rebellion, and ensured the elimination of all the Spaniards
scattered across their territory. Secondly, the number of
people who died, added to those who survived in the mine of
Naurita, suggests that a large number of outsiders, many
more than at any other time during all the years of contact
between Spaniards and Chocó Indians, lived in Citará
territory by 1684. The fact that the Spaniards were
scattered over a wide area, and the mention of so many
mines also suggest that mining operations had increased
considerably.
However, it is also true that many Indians claimed to
have participated in the rebellion not to kill, but to
steal. The Indians stole slaves, church ornaments, and the
belongings of dead Spaniards. According to Ygaragaida, the
Indian Dami took the Padre Comisario's cook and the Indian
Ybicua took a slave belonging to Capitán Domingo de Veitia.
According to Capitân Tajina, four female slaves were taken
from Capitán Domingo de Veitia's mine. Biramia claimed
that his uncle Umia had taken a female slave from the mine
of Yngipurdü. Ygaragaida reported that Juan Chigre had
taken Fray Esteban's "jewels" and ornaments, and that
Pidigara had taken the chalice from the church of Nigua.
Ygaragaida was himself found to be in possession of a paten
when he was captured, which he claimed had been given to
him by Bidigama. Guaguirri confessed that he and three
other Indians divided the clothing and "jewels" found in
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Francisco de la Carrera's house, which he still had the day
he was captured. The group that went after Juan de Guzmán
divided the tasks between them: while some killed the
Spaniards, the others gathered the victims' clothing and
"jewels". Noquia confessed that the Indian Natucama stole
a chest, while he and his father Pichorre took some
articles of clothing. Guaripua, who confessed to killing
Francisco de la Carrera, claimed that they also divided the
gold among themselves: Guaripua's share amounted to 20
pesos, which he used to buy axes.7'
It is clear from the statements that many Indians were
only interested in taking the Spaniards' belongings.
Beruga claimed that the Indian Caguera had informed him
that "the Spaniards are to be killed, let's go and take
their things". Manigua, too, stated that he had been
informed that the Spaniards of Nigua were to be killed and
that they should go in order to take their belongings.
Umia said that he was in his house on the Samugra river
when Meachama arrived and asked him to go to the mine of
Ingipurdu, for, as the Spaniards were to be killed, it was
possible that "they might give them some [of their]
belongings". Soberano also claimed that he had been told
to "gather the belongings of the Spaniards". 72 Indeed,
among the contents of the canoes of the Indians captured by
' Ibid. See the following statements: Ygaragaida,
ff.3-5; Capitán Tajina, f.12; Guaguirri, ff.14-l6;
Guaripua, f.19; Biramia, f.41; Noquia, f.44.
72 Ibid. See the following statements: Soberano,
f.43; Manigua, f.45; Beruga, f.46; tJmia, f.48.
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Bueso de Valdés' men on the Murri river in August 1684,
were church ornaments, bedclothes, hammers, machetes, axes,
steel, and salt. When Minguirri's family was captured in
September 1684, they were found to be in possession of 16
axes, machetes, a relic on a chain, three pesos in gold
dust, and old clothing, among other things. 73 Ygaragaida
confessed that, although he had not taken up arms against
the Spaniards, he went to the town of Nigua "as he saw that
the Spaniards were to be killed and that they had a lot of
salt which he came to take for him to eat". 74 The taking
of slaves, however, appears to have been a Citará custom,
for the censuses carried out by Bueso de Valdés in 1676
show a large slave population in the settlements, made up
of Indians captured in war from other Indian groups.
Despite such widespread participation, it is important
to note that not all Indians were involved in the
rebellion. Indeed, a core group of Indians remained loyal
to the Spaniards throughout the events of January 1684, and
some appear to have been out of the province at the time
the Spaniards were killed. According to Azcárate de
Castillo, two of these - Don Pedro Tegue and Capitân Pancha
- were away when the rebellion occurred, apparently
building canoes.	 Although the number of Indians who
supported the Spaniards was very small, they were,
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Declaración, Lucas
Rodriguez et.al ., Rio de Murri, 9 August 1684, f.34; and
Auto, Juan Bueso de Valdés, Rio Bebarä, 25 September
1684, ff.50-51.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Ygaragaida's statement,
f.5.
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nevertheless, crucially important to their survival. Don
Rodrigo Pivi took letters from Antioquia to the Naurita
mine, and Mitiguirre, Don Pedro Tegue, and Taichama all
took letters requesting help to the province of Noanama.
Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre also advised the
Spaniards on the defense of the mine. In the immediate
aftermath of the rebellion, Pivi provided the survivors
with baskets of fruit and canoes full of plantairis, for
which he received no payment. The Spaniards did, however,
have to pay for supplies provided by other loyal Indians,
particularly Capitán Pancha, who was paid for all his
services. Capitân Pancha was paid 9 gold pesos, for
example, for returning to the Naurita mine three female
slaves who had belonged to Capitán Domingo de Veitia, and
an Indian woman. Capitân Taichama and Capitán Certegui
were also among the Indians who offered aid to the
survivors .
In addition, Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre
provided Bueso de Valdés with information which facilitated
the capture of rebel Indians. Bueso de Valdés reported
that Pivi and Mitiguirre had informed him that many Indians
had retreated to the Murri and Bojaya rivers, and that
there were, among the Indians who were hiding there, many
who had taken no part in the violence and had retreated for
Ibid. See the statements of Don Juan Joseph
Azcárate de Castillo, ff.23-24; Esteban Fernández de
Rivera, f.27; and Francisco Onofre, f.32.
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fear of the rebels. 76
 Don Rodrigo Pivi also turned in to
the Spaniards at least one Indian, and Mitiguirre turned in
another, referred to as a "delinquent". 77 According to the
Spaniard Fernández de Rivera, Quirubira had since been the
enemy of Pivi, Mitiguirre, Pancha, and Tegue, and it was
said that Quirubira had attempted to kill the loyal
Indians. Indeed, Pivi claimed that his wife had been taken
by the rebels, and that his belongings had been stolen from
his house.78
What is not entirely clear is why this small group of
Indians supported the Spaniards, since they originated from
the same towns as the rebels: in the census of 1676, Don
Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre are listed as
residents of the settlement of Nigua, while Capitán Pancha
and Don Pedro Tegue are listed in the census of San
Francisco de Atrato. 79 Even more surprisingly, some of the
loyal Indians had been directly involved in the conflict
with Lope de Cárdenas and Fray Joseph de Córdoba just a few
years earlier. It had been Pivi's Indians, for example,
that had been seen to be "ready for war", and it was Pivi
himself who had threatened, together with Don Pedro de
76 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, Juan Bueso de
Valdés, Rio Bebara, 30 July 1684, f.30; and RIo de Murri,
11 August 1684, f.35.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6. See Juananui's and
Sadragama's confessions, ff.46, 54.
Ibid. See the statements of Esteban Fernández de
Rivera, ff.28-29, and Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de
Castillo, f.24.
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.76, 87, 122, 126.
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Bolivar, to kill Fray Joseph de Córdoba if he returned to
Nigua. Don Antonio de Legarda, Pivi's brother-in-law, had
reported to the governor of Antioquia that the Don Pedro
Tegue was planning to burn down the church of Lloró, and it
was Don Juan Mitiguirre whom the governor had tried to
appease by promising that three Franciscans were on their
way to the Chocô to replace the other missionaries. 80 One
possible explanation derives from a reference made by Bueso
de Valdés in 1684 to the Indians who had been honoured by
the governors of Popayán and Antioquia with the titles of
"governors " of the Indian towns. 8' Although there is no
evidence to indicate whether all the Indians who remained
loyal had received titles of "governors", we do know that
at least one of these - Don Rodrigo Pivi - was later made
hereditary cacique by the Spaniards for his role in
assisting the pacification process. 82 Of course, it is also
possible that a small group of Indians preferred to
maintain good relations with the Spaniards for the benefits
that this could bring. As we have seen, some Indians sold
food supplies to the Spaniards at the Naurita mine, while
Capitàn Pancha was paid for all the services he provided.
As early as 1674, Capitàn Pancha was said to be a friend of
the Spaniards, and he, together with Don Pedro Tegue, were
among the Indians who accompanied Bueso de Valdés on his
80 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, ff.22-4, 41-2, 44.
81 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Cabeza de Proceso
General, Rio de Murri, 15 August 1684, ff.8-9.
82 Isacsson, "Emberá", p.31.
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journey to Darien. 83 Indeed, Don Pedro Tegue had had
fairly close relations with the Spaniards since 1668. In
that year, the Spaniard Juan Lopez Garcia reported that
Tegue was prepared to negotiate Indian resettlement and
tributes with the Spanish. Tegue was also one of the
Indians who had agreed to meet the conditions laid down by
Francisco de Quevedo in 1669GM
Although Bueso de Valdés was aware that many of the
Indians captured had played no part in the rebellion, 85 a
considerable number clearly had participated - certainly a
sufficient number to prevent the Spaniards mounting any
form of defense or fleeing the province. While there is no
evidence to indicate exactly how many Indians were
involved, the survivors estimated that, in the days
following the rebellion, 300 Indians went to the Naurita
mine. 86
 In October 1684, Bueso de Valdés noted that 600
Indians had been captured, leaving 900 - out of an
estimated total population of 1,500 -still to be "reduced"
AGI Quito 67, Testimonio Franciscans, Domingo de
Veitia y Gamboa, Sitio y Real de Minas de Nuestra Señora
de Belén, 28 July 1674, f.62; and AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo
1, Nigua River, 15 January 1677, f.157.
Ibid., ff.112-l3; AGI Quito 67, Don Francisco de
Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669; and
"Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", 5 May 1669, f.7.
85 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, RIo de las
Piedras, 23 August 1684, f.39.
86 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Francisco Onofre's
statement, f.32.
252
and punished, 87 although he was clearly aware that not all
of these had been participants in the uprising.
There are several possible motives for the rebellion.
According to one of the surviving Spaniards, Azcárate de
Castillo., after the rebellion, the Indian Quirubira
admitted to having killed Capitán Domingo de Veitia because
they had been told that Veitia planned to kill all the
Indian capitanes. Quirubira added that the Spaniard Martin
de Ardanza had killed an Indian and wounded another. 88 And
although some of the captured Indians affirmed that they
joined the rebellion because other Indians were killing
Spaniards, and others claimed not to have been involved in
the violence but confessed to going to the towns to steal,
it is clear that the Indians' intention was to eliminate
all traces of the Spanish presence in their territory,
hence the killing not only of Spaniards but all those
associated with them - mestizos, mulattoes, slaves, and
Indian carriers from the interior. The most probable
explanation for such violent and widespread discontent
among the native population is that the changes they had
earlier brought about through negotiation with the governor
of Antioquia failed to lead to any real improvement in the
behaviour of the region's Spanish residents. No doubt this
was why, following the rebellion, the rebels went to the
Naurita mine, and offered the survivors canoes and food
AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, Auto, Bueso de Valdés,
Lloró, 8 October 1684, f.4.
88 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Don Juan Joseph Azcárate
de Castillo's statement, ff.23, 25.
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supplies to enable them to leave the province, for they
wanted no more war.89
In the months between August 1684 and March 1685, the
captured Indians were closely questioned about the
rebellion. 90 Particular attention was to be paid to
identifying the rebel leaders and the Indians who remained
loyal to the Spaniards. 9' Punishment was administered on
the basis of the evidence provided by the captured Indians
themselves, and could be one or a combination of the
following: 100 lashes, confiscation of belongings, personal
service for 10 years (wives and children over the age of 17
were also to provide personal service for the same period
of time), or death (in the event of which, wives and
children over 17 had to provide personal service for 10
years). Bueso de Valdés did not intend to use the death
sentence widely, however: his policy was to use death as a
punishment only for the leaders of the rebellion and for
those who admitted to having been personally involved in
the killings.92
89 Ibid., f.23.
90 Joseph de Perianes acted as "defensor" of the
Indians between August and October 1684, when he was
replaced by Diego de Galvis. See ibid., Auto, Bueso de
Valdés, RIo de Murri, 11 August 1684, f.3, and Lloró, 12
October 1684, f.22.
91 Ibid., Cabeza de Proceso General, RIo de Murri, 15
August 1684, f.9.
92 Ibid. See the following sentences: CapitAn Tajina,
ff.l3-14; Guaguirri, f.l7; Minguirri, f.2l; Udrapagul,
f.40; Guatupue, Dane, and Chaquiranvira, f.40.
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An interesting feature of the Indians' statements was
their willingness to confess to their crimes and an equal
willingness to inform on their relatives who were
personally involved in, or present at, the massacres.
Thus, Guaripua confessed to killing Juan de Guzmán's son
and one of Bueso de Valdés' male slaves. Tajina confessed
to killing two people in Nigua - Leandro, and Perucho, a
servant of Don Juan Joseph de Azcärate. Minguirri
confessed to killing Francisco de Ia Carrera's servant
Antonio, and Guatupua confessed to killing an Indian boy
who accompanied Manuel de Borja. Dare confessed to killing
a mulatto boy called Bernardo while Soberano claimed that
he had killed two slaves. In addition, Guaguirri informed
Bueso de Valdês that his son Guaripua helped to kill
Capitán Juan de Guzmán, while Guripua confessed that one of
his brothers, Bequigui, had killed Bernardo de Mafia, and
that another of his brothers, Ubira, killed Bejarano. Don
Pedro Paparra confessed that his brother Soberano killed
Carrasco and a slave belonging to Bueso de Valdés.93
Others, however, only confessed to being present when the
killings took place.
The reasons why they should be willing to confess may
reside in the importance attached by their society to the
capture and killing of the enemy. This was a feature of
Indian society identified by the Jesuit, Father Antonio
Ibid. See the following statements: Capitán
Tajina, f.11; Guaguirri, ff.14-15; Guaripua, f.19;
Minguirri, f.20; Guatupua, f.36; Dare, f.37; Don Pedro
Paparra, f.42; Soberano, f.43.
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Marzal, in 1678: in reporting that there were no leaders or
figures of authority among the Citará, Marzal observed that
if they have capitanes it is not because they are
obeyed in anything but because they are
considered to be brave ... they go to war out of
the vanity of being considered brave ... for he
who kills the most is considered the most
brave. . .
Thus, in his confession, Don Fernando Tajina informed Bueso
de Valdés that he was a capitán "because he has killed five
Cunacunas and Burgumias". Guaguirri referred to his
occupation as "cultivating maize to maintain his children
and to go to war". 95
 Indeed, the Spaniards recognized that
the Indians rarely left their houses unarmed. When
Juananui claimed that he was not armed during the
rebellion, he was asked how had he gone to the settlement
of Maygara and returned to Dodubar without arms, since the
two places were separated by a distance of two days, and
the Indians were known never to leave their houses unarmed
even to travel short distances. 96 In sentencing the
Indians, Bueso de Valdés noted the inherent truthfulness of
the Indians: "these Indians very rarely deny what they have
done".	 The de.fensor Diego de Galvis considered it
advisable to believe the witnesses because "they are so
Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in
Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.501.
See Don Fernando Tajina's and Guaguirri's
statements, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, ff.1l, 14.
Ibid. See Juananui's statement.
Ibid., Juananui's and Dare's statements, ff.46,
37.
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truthful that none denies having committed a crime knowing
from experience that they are to be killed".98
In seeking to understand the reasons for the Indians'
behaviour, Diego de Galvis, appointed as "defensor" of the
captured Indians, provides some of the very few existing
indications of Spanish attitudes towards the Indians of the
Chocó. Diego de Galvis considered that the Indians'
willingness to confess their crimes demonstrated their
natural tendency to kill and steal. In his defense of the
Indian Udrapagui, Galvis reported that he should not be
held directly responsible for the death of the blacksmith
Guina, for "he was driven only by the curiosity of seeing
people killed due to this nation's natural tendency towards
anything related to war". In his defense of Birrainia,
Noquia, Manigua, Barruga, Juananui, and Bumia, Diego de
Galvis noted that their involvement in the rebellion was a
result of "their interest in gathering the belongings of
the Spaniards", for the Indians were "greedy" and
"attracted to anything novel". In his defense of Dane,
Guatupua, and Chaquiranvira, Diego de Galvis tried to
explain what he called "the propensity that these Indians
have to [become involved] in war", noting that "they spend
all their lives in this exercise killing and capturing
[Indians] of different provinces and nations situated among
these hills". He also spoke of their "stupidity", their
"misery", and their "tendency to kill" which was "not seen
98 Ibid., Peticián, Defensor, f.53.
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as a crime".	 Meanwhile, Bueso de Valdés appeared not to
understand what had sparked these events, reporting that
the Indians had no cause to rebel, "for they lived
without ... tributes".'00
Some of the Indians captured by Spanish forces in the
immediate aftermath of the rebellion were killed for their
participation in the revolt. Don Fernando Tajina, for
instance, one of the first capitanes to have rebelled, was
sentenced to death - to be publicly hanged, in fact - and
his belongings were to be distributed among the soldiers,
while his children were to provide personal service to the
Spaniards for a period of ten years. The same sentence was
passed on Guaguirri - "for his own punishment and as an
example to the others". Others had their property taken,
or were lashed, or were ordered to provide personal service
to the Spaniards. For example, Guatupue, Dane,
Chaquiranvira, Minguirri, Guaripua, and Soberano were all
sentenced to the loss of their property and to provide
personal service for a period of ten years. Many others -
Ygaragaida, Birramia, Umia, Manigua, Noquia, Barruga,
Juananui, Cadragama, Don Thorivio Chivadomia, Pedro Paparra
- were sentenced to a combination of 100 lashes and
personal service. 101
Ibid., Peticiones, Defensor, ff.38-39, 49, 50.
100 Ibid., Culpa y Cargo, Bueso de Valdés, ff.12-13.
101 Ibid., ff.7-8, 13-14, 17, 20-21, 40, 49, 51, 53-
54, 56.
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However, it is significant that, with the exception of
Don Fernando Tajina and Don Pedro Paparra, none of the
Indians whom the survivors of the Naurita mine recognized
as rebel leaders were among those captured in the immediate
aftermath of the rebellion. According to the governor of
Popayân and Don Carlos Alcedo Lemus de Sotomayor (appointed
by the Audiencia to take overall control of the
pacification campaign), at least seven of the rebel
capitaries had retreated to a region 150 leagu.es distant
from the province of Citará, from where they continued to
attack Spanish forces. The appointment of Alcedo de
Sotomayor, and his subsequent assurance to the rebels that
all Indians who surrendered to the Spaniards would not be
punished, were said to have created divisions among the
rebel group. Many Indians, such as the group led by
Anugama, turned themselves in; others, led by Capitán
Aucavira, retreated to the Soruco nation; Capitân Chuagra's
men moved further north towards Cunacuna territory, where
they were all said to have been killed; and Sesego and
Tabugara and their men were said to have split off from the
main group, led by Quirubira, and to have set up their own
fortification to defend themselves from the Spanish attack.
Once the Indians had divided and disbanded, the process of
defeating the individual groups was completed swiftly. By
31 August 1687, Quirubira and Sanjua had been killed, and
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the four Indian capitanes who continued to resist the
Spanish advance were killed soon after.'°2
The rebellion of 1684 and the subsequent pacification
campaign marked a turning point for the history of the
Indian population of the Chocó, in several respects. In
1689, the governor of Popayán, Don Gerónimo de Berrio,
informed the Crown that the serious jurisdictional disputes
which had arisen during the pacification process as a
result of the clash between the two gobernaciones of
Popayán and Antioquia, represented by Don Cristôbal de
Caicedo'°3 and Juan Bueso de Valdés, respectively, had led
the Audiencia of Santa Fe, officially in overall control of
the activities of both gobernaciones in the Chocó, finally
to endorse the claims of the gobernación of Popayán over
those of Antioquia. In the short term, the Audiencia's
decision led to the appointment of Don Carlos de Alcedo
Sotomayor as "governor of the conquest";'°4
 in the longer
term it meant that, henceforth, the Chocô region was to be
administered by tenientes appointed by the governor of
Popayán. Don Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca, who had, by May
1690, replaced Gerónimo de Berrio as governor of Popayán,
proceeded with the appointment of tenientes to all the
102 AGI Quito 75, Don Gerónimo de Berrio to King,
Popayân, 2 March 1689; and "Certificaciôn", Don Carlos de
Alcedo Lemus de Sotomayor, n.p., n.d.
103 Don Juan de Caicedo had been killed by the
Indians.
' AGI Quito 75, Don Gerónimo de Berrio to King,
Popayân, 16 May 1690.
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Chocô's provinces,' 05 thus introducing, finally, the system
whereby the region was to be administered until a separate,
independent governor was appointed to the Chocó in 1726.
The defeat of the rebels was the last attempt on the
part of the Indians to rid themselves of the Spaniards by
force. Although, in 1690, a small group of six Indians
were said to have planned a conspiracy to kill the
Spaniards, the incident was averted by the teniente of the
province of Citará, Don Antonio Ruiz Calzado, who proceeded
ruthlessly against the Indians, detaining eighty and
sentencing four to death.'° 6 It was, moreover 1
 at this
time that the Indian population of the province of Citará
adopted flight as the only method of resistance to the
Spaniards: all the Indians of Nigua, for instance,
abandoned their settlement out of fear of Ruiz Calzado.'°7
The pacification marked a turning point in another
sense as well. By 1690, the Spaniards of the gobernaciôn
of Popayân had begun to move their slaves to the Chocô: in
that year, four of Popayán's principal slaveowners sent
slave gangs, accompanied by a large group of Spanish
'o Ibid., Don Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca to King,
Popayán, 16 May 1690.
106 Ibid., and Lorenzo de Salazar's statement of 24
September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno. . .sobre la
entrada al rio Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales
de oro. . .", ff.81-2.
'° Ibid.
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miners, to set up operations in the region.'° 8 The number
of miners and slaves in the Chocó began to increase at a
very rapid rate, and the Indians of all three provinces
were rapidly drawn into the mining economy, as builders of
dwellings and canoes, as transporters of goods, and as
suppliers of foodstuffs. The problems that arose in the
Chocô as a result of the system of administration
introduced after the rebellion had been quelled, and the
situation of the Indian in the economy which developed in
the region, centred around gold deposits mined by a slave
labour force, will form the subject of the next chapter.
108 AGI Quito 75, Don Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca to
King, Popayán, 16 May 1690.
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CHAPTER 6
SPANTARDS AND INDIANS IN
TIlE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
In the early 1720s, Don AgustIn de Morales y Mendoza,
who referred to himself as a "natural" of the New Kingdom
of Granada, sent a letter to the Crown in which he proposed
to undertake the reduction of the Indians of the Chocô, at
his own expense, in exchange for the governorship of the
region for a period of ten years.' This proposal recaive
considerable attention in the Council of the Indies, but,
by the second decade of the 18th century, it was not
because a region known to be rich in gold remained
unexplored by Spaniards fearful of Indian resistance, as
had been the case half a century before, but because a
large proportion of the Indians of the area, who had been
so violently rounded up after the rebellion of 1684, had
See AGI Santa Fe 362, Don AgustIn de Morales y
Mendoza to Crown. Don Agustin de Morales' letter is not
dated, but the Council discussed its contents between May
and November 1724. Later in this chapter we will see that
Don AgustIn de Morales y Mendoza requested the
governorship of Popayán because, in his attempts to
improve the efficiency of royal administration in the New
Kingdom, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero appointed a
Superintendente to administer the provinces of Nóvita,
Citará, Tatamâ/Chocô, and Raposo. This Superintendente
was to be independent of the Governor of Popayán, who
had, since the pacification campaign of the late 1680s,
assumed complete jurisdiction over the region. See ibid.,
Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de
Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.
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adopted another form of resistance to the Spaniards -
f light.2
As we shall see throughout this and the following
chapter, this latest form of resistance was a response to
ever-growing Spanish demands on the Indian population of
the Chocó. The number of Spaniards residing there had not
increased significantly: in 1711 there were only 48 miners
owning slave gangs in the entire region, and by 1778, the
number of white residents had reached only 332, including
royal officials and priests. 3 However, the presence of the
Spaniards began to be felt as never before, for mining
operations began in earnest once the rebellion of 1684-88
was finally quelled. The number of slaves increased
accordingly. William Sharp's population estimates for the
Chocô show that their numbers rose to 600 in 1704, 2,000 in
1724, almost doubled, to 3,918, by 1759, and that they
continued to rise at a steady pace until 1782. By this
2 In his letter, Don AgustIn de Morales observed that
the number of Indians who had fled from their towns was
larger than the number who remained there. See Ibid., Don
Agustin de Morales y Mendoza to Crown, n.p., n.d. This
phenomenon was also said to be occurring in the Barbacoas
region. In 1691, the governor of Popayán informed the
Crown that the encomenderos of the province of Barbacoas
were making very little profit from their encomiendas,
because of the large number of Indians who were absent
and whose whereabouts were unknown. See AGI Quito 75, Don
Rodrigo Roque to Crown, Santa Maria del Puerto de
Barbacoas, 16 March 1691.
See Colmenares, Popayán, p.73; and Sharp, Slavery
on the Spanish Frontier, Table 7, p.199. Although the
number of miners owning slave gangs amounted to no more
than 48 by 1711, the sources indicate that there were
also many other Spanish residents in the Chocó.
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time, the number of free people of colour was also very
large, reaching 3,899 in l782.
The growth of the slave population reflected a very
significant expansion in mining activity in the Chocô,
giving rise to what German Colmenares termed a "new gold
cycle in New Granada's economy". Figures on the Chocó's
registered output after 1724 show a significant upward
trend which continued until mid-century: the value of gold
declared per average year rose from 113,064 castellanos in
1724-25, to 165,022 in 1741-45, falling slightly, to
161,604, in l746-50.
The expansion of the mining sector during the first
half of the eighteenth century was mirrored in the growing
prosperity of the cities of the Cauca Valley, whose
fortunes were linked to the mining operations of the Chocó
in two ways. First, the expansion of mining in the Chocô
' The number of slaves increased to 4,231 in 1763,
5,756 in 1778, 5,916 in 1779, 6,557 in 1781, and to 7,088
in 1782. Thereafter, the number of slaves began to fall,
to 4,968 in 1808. See ibid., Table 7, p.199. It appears
that the size of the slave population grew dramatically
after the turn of the century. In 1724, Fray Manuel
Caicedo reported that, when he first entered the Chocô 21
years earlier, there were only 30 slaves in the region.
By the time of writing, the number had risen to 2,000,
and these were divided between some fifty to sixty
cuadrillas, or slave gangs. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray
Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724. According to
Colmenares, the slaves working in the Chocó at the
beginning of the century had been moved there either from
abandoned mining operations in Popayân, or from
agricultural activities. See Colmenares, Historia
Econórnica y Social de Colombia, p.327.
Colmenares, Cali, p.136. See also Sharp, Slavery on
the Spanish Frontier, Table 9, p.2O1, and McFarlane,
Anthony, "Economic and Political Change in the
Viceroyalty of New Granada", pp.84-5, 88, 90.
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was organized largely by the leading families of the Cauca
Valley, principally Cali and Popayân; and secondly, many of
the cities - Buga, Cali, Popayán - carried on an important
trade with the region, supplying the mines with many
products, such as dried and salted meat, sugar products,
wheat, and tobacco.6
However, although the fortunes of the gold mining
sector in the Chocó after the mid-l720s and the resulting
prosperity of the cities of the Cauca Valley have been
examined in several studies of the eighteenth century,7
little is known about Spanish activities in the area during
the first thirty years of the century or about the impact
their operations had on the native population during that
period. While we know that gold output increased markedly
after 1724, we do not know, for instance, why so little
gold was declared before then. Yet there can be little
doubt that gold production was very significant before the
mid-1720s. Indeed, the evidence suggests that this was the
case even before the end of the seventeenth century.
William Sharp studied the profitability of one such mining
operation, belonging to Francisco de Arboleda Salazar, over
a six month period in 1690. His mine was in fact the most
profitable of the twelve whose records Sharp analysed,
6 Ibid., pp.90-1. See also Colmenares, Cali, pp.153-
5.
See, for example, Sharp, Colmenares, and McFarlane.
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eleven of which correspond to the eighteenth century.8
Arboleda Salazar was not, moreover, the only miner who was
closely involved in mining in the Chocó. In 1708, the
Mosquera family, from Popayán, was embroiled in a long
dispute with the teniente of the province of Nôvita over
access to Indian labour for the upkeep of their mines on
the Iró river. We also have a clear indication of the
existence of several mines in the province of Noanama at
the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century: in
1709, the fiscal of the Audiencia of Santa Fe petitioned on
behalf of the Indians of Tadô, Los Brazos, Noanania, and San
AgustIn that they should not be forced to travel to mining
camps located at long distances from their own settlements
and that they should, instead, be assigned to those
situated closest to them.9
By 1721, it was said that the Chocô was the "jewel" of
the colonies, and that not only large numbers of black
slaves were involved in mining, but also mulattoes,
mestizos, zarabos, freedmen of colour, and many whites.
Three years later, Fray Manuel Caicedo said of the land
that it was "the richest ... ever discovered", not only
because of the large number of mines there, but because of
See Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, pp.179-
80, and Table 15, pp.204-OS. Arboleda is said to have
been the only miner to declare any of the gold extracted
from the mines of the ChocO between 1670 and 1690. See
Colmenares, Historia EconOrnica y Social de Colombia,
p. 327.
colmenares, German, et.al . (eds.), Fuentes
Coloniales para la Historia del Trabajo en Colombia
(Bogota, 1968), pp.128-141.
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the high quality of the gold extracted. He added that gold
mining was the only occupation in which its inhabitants
were engaged.'° And, in 1729, the former president of the
Audiencia, Don Antonio Manso, observed that the gold of the
Chocó was extracted not by the arroba, but by the "load".'1
The amounts of gold extracted from the Chocó's mines must
have been very high, for, over the course of one year
between 1718 and 1719, a single conscientious royal
official collected 4,000 gold pesos in quinto payments in
the province of Citará alone.'2 And when, in the following
year, Don Luis de Espinosa served as superintendente of the
Chocó, he was said to have collected and sent to Santa Fe
three arrobas of gold, worth 7,400 pesos.'3
Certainly, mining operations in the Chocó in the first
two decades of the eighteenth century must have been
sufficiently profitable to justify high expenditure on
slaves, whose numbers were, as we have seen, increasing
rapidly, particularly after the regularization of the slave
trade under the foreign asiento companies, and the
'° AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24
July 1724.
11 
"Relación hecha por el Mariscal de Campo D.
Antonio Manso, como Presidente de la Audiencia del Nuevo
Reino de Granada, sobre su estado y necesidad en el aflo
de 1729", in E.M.Posada & P.M.Ibáñez, Relaciones de
Mando: memorias presentadas por los gobernantes del Nuevo
Reino de Granada (Bogota, 1910), p.4.
12 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y
Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720.
13 Ibid., Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don
Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721, and AGI Santa
Fe 693, Don Luis de Espinosa to Don Antonio de la
Pedrosa, Nóvita, 21 September 1719.
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establishment of the South Sea Company's asiento in 1713
offered the miners access to a larger supply of slave
labour. 14 They must also have been sufficiently profitable
to enable miners to keep large numbers of slaves in the
region despite the high cost of foodstuffs, tools, and
other products imported from Cartagena and the cities of
the interior. In 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo stated that
many products, including iron and steel for tools, brought
from Cartagena and other cities, had to be carried over
long distances to supply the Chocó because of the
prohibitions on navigation along the Atrato and San Juan
rivers, which increased the cost of supplies immensely.
Because of the prohibitions, each quintal of iron cost 50
gold pesos and each quintal of steel 80 pesos. If brought
in from Cartagena through the Atrato, iron would cost no
more than about 20 pesos the quintal, and steel would be
sold for no more than 30 pesos the quintal. Some basic
foodstuffs - such as salt, sugar, meat - also had to be
imported, as did clothing and tobacco, and all of these
fetched exceptionally high prices. Although Fray Manuel
Caicedo claimed that the high cost of supplies prevented
the miners from making large profits, he nevertheless
observed that each slave working in the mines or along the
river banks left his master one gold peso every day.'5
14 McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the
Viceroyalty of New Granada", pp.84-5.
15 According to Fray Manuel, each arroba of meat cost
six gold pesos, except for pork, which cost 12 gold
pesos. Each head of cattle fetched 14 gold pesos. The
price of salt was also exceptionally high: three gold
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Much of the output from the mines of the Chocô during
these years disappeared without trace. Vicente de Aramburu
reported in 1713 that neither the miners, the merchants nor
the traders ever declared the gold dust obtained from the
region's mines.'6 The value of gold declared in Popayân
increased in 1680-85, due to the expansion of mining
activities in the southern Pacific lowland areas of Dagua
and the Raposo (a region apparently unaffected by the
rebellion of 1684-88), and again after 1720, due to rising
production in the Chocó mines. But much of the gold
extracted in the intervening years cannot be accounted for
because of the widespread fraud in which the miners of the
region were involved.'7
In this chapter, we will examine more closely the
state of the province in the early years of the 18th
century, focusing particularly on the system of
administration introduced to control the native population,
and at the role the Indians were assigned within the
structure established by those who had control over them.
We will see that the system of royal administration was
characterized by a high degree of corruption, and that it
is this corruption which accounts for the low levels of
pesos the arroba when there was a plentiful supply, but
the price rose astronomically in times of shortage. See
AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July
1724.
16 AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa
Fe, 24 September 1713.
' Colinenares, Historia Econômica y Social de
Colombia,p. 327.
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gold declared and for many other "scandals" that were said
to be leading the Chocô to ruin. Specifically, we will
consider the reports made by several royal officials from
Bogota, Cartagena, and Spain, and the recommendations they
made to resolve the problem. This chapter will also focus
on the Indian response to the demands of the Spaniards, in
particular, at their efforts, in the 1710s, to obtain
authorization for a new settlement along the Murri river,
independent of the gobernación of Popayán and under the
authority of the gobernaciOn of Antioquia. Finally, this
chapter will consider the way in which the treatment of the
Indians served as an excuse for the old conflict between
the gobernaciones of Popayán and Antioquia to surface once
again. We will see how the gobernaciôn of Antioquia used
the grievances of the Indians as a means of attacking the
g'obernaciOn of Popayán and gaining approval for the
relocation of the Indians to a region under its own
jurisdiction. We will end by discussing the extent to
which the Indians actually benefitted from this relocation.
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MAP7
TI1J'I CHOCO: MATh AREA OF SETFLEMIENT
JN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTh CENTURY
Source: Robert C. West, Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia,
Map 5, between pp.16-17.
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Miners and Government
As a consequence of the Audiencia of Santa Fe's
decision finally to entrust the pacification of the Citará
rebels to the gobernaciôn of Popayán, the gobernación of
Antioquia lost all jurisdictional claims over the province
of Citará. From the end of the 1680s, then, the entire
region under Spanish control began to be administered by
tenientes appointed by the governor of Popayân. The
confusion about the number and names of the provinces of
the Chocô, to which we have referred in earlier chapters,
continued for some years into the eighteenth century.
During the first three decades of the century, the
provinces of Noanama (now often referred to as Nóvita),
Citará, and Tatamá/Chocó, were considered as separate
entities, and each was governed by a teniente. By the
1730s, and for the remainder of the century, only two of
these - Citará and Nôvita (previously Noanama) survived as
separate regions.
In the early years of the 18th century, the tenientes
who governed the Chocô provinces were usually members of
the leading families of the cities of the Cauca Valley - in
particular Popayán - and also leading mine and slave
owners. Thus, at the beginning of the century, the
Mosquera brothers, Francisco de Arboleda, Bernardo Alfonso
de Saa, Miguel Gámez de la Asperilla, and Agustin de
Valencia were all active in the Chocó region. These men,
all of whom were well known in Popayân, exercised the
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government of one of the Chocô provinces in turn.' 8 The
influence of the families of the Cauca Valley was also
recognized in the province of Raposo. The Raposo region
falls outside the scope of this study, but suffice to say
that the Caicedos, from Cali, were extremely influential
there, and that, between 1706 and 1709, several members of
the family were appointed as tenientes in that province.'9
In 1711, another family member, Don Francisco de Caicedo,
served as teniente of the province of Citará. 2° Several
important families were also represented in the Chocó in
another capacity: that of priests, or doctrineros, of the
Indian settlements. In 1720, the Caicedos, the Arboledas,
and the Hurtado del Aguilas, all had members of their
IS See Colmenares, Historia Ecónomica y Social,
pp.327-28. See also Colmenares, et.al . (eds.), Fuentes
Coloniales, p.142. Since the mines belonging to most of
these men were located in the province of Nôvita, they
most likely served as tenientes of that province.
However, one member of the Mosquera family - Don Jacinto
de Mosquera - did serve as teniente of the province of
Citará. See Footnote 23.
19 Colmenares, Cali, p.142.
20 See, for example, Lorenzo de Salazar's statement,
Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in AGI
Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al Rio
Murri, y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro",
f.81. The influence of the Caicedos in the Chocó went
back to the pacification campaigns of the 1680s. Two
members of the family - Don Juan and Don Cristóbal - led
campaigns against the Indians during that decade. See AGI
Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, "Autos obrados por ... Juan Bueso
de Valdés sobre la retirada de ... Don Juan de Caicedo";
and AGI Quito 15, "Traslado de los Autos de ... Don
Cristóbal de Caicedo Salazar ... sobre los servicios
hechos ... en la reducciôn y pacificación de los indios
rebeldes de la provincia del Citarâ".
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families serving parishes or doctrinas in the Chocó.2'
And, in 1711, the Caicedos were actually represented in two
capacities in the province of Citará: while Manuel Caicedo
served as doctrinero of the settlement of Quibdó, Francisco
Caicedo took up the post of teniente of the province.
The influence exercised by the tenientes of each of
the provinces of the ChocO derived from their relationship
with the governor of Popayân and extended beyond their own
post to that of the cor.regidores of the Indian settlements,
whom they appointed. According to a 1713 report, sent to
the Crown by the oidor of the Audiencia of Santa Fe,
Vicente de Aramburu, 23 the tenientes bought their posts
from the governor of Popayân for a sum which varied between
five and six thousand pesos, and the tenientes, in turn,
sold the post of corregidor in the Indian settlements. In
exposing the corruption of royal administration in the
Chocô, Aramburu observed that the effect of such actions
was the proliferation of tenientes and corregidores in that
region. The area to which he mistakenly referred as
province of Chocó but would later be called the province of
21 See AGI Quito 185, "Autos sobre la opresión en que
tienen los jueces seculares a los indios de las
provincias del Chocô ... Aflo de 1720".
22 Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24
September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre
la entrada al rio Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos
minerales de oro", f.81.
23 Aramburu had been sent to the Chocó to investigate
rumours about illegal commerce along the Atrato and San
Juan and to establish a "caja real de fundición para las
provincias del Chocó y Citará". AGI Santa Fe 362,
Testimonio de Autos, Quibdó, 16 June 1726, f.12.
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Nóvita, was composed of only five settlements (Tadó, Las
Juntas, El Barranco, San Joseph de Noanama, and San
Agustin) but was governed by one teniente and five
corregidores. The province of Citará, composed of only
three settlements in 1713 (Quibdó, Lloró, and Bebará), was
governed by one teniente and three corregidores.24
Aramburu's appears not to have been an idle
accusation. In 1720, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona,
who had been sent to the province of Citará two years
before to detain and imprison the teniente Don Luis de
Acuña y Berrio for the death of one Don Gaspar Garcia
Pizarro, reported to the King on the effects of the sale of
the tenencias. Alcantud y Gaona informed the King that the
four provinces of the Chocó, among which he included the
Raposo, were each administered by a minister or teniente de
gobernador whose duties were to administer justice and to
collect the taxes due to the royal treasury. The post was
not accompanied by a salary: indeed, it was the governor
who was paid between four and six thousand pesos for the
job, and the tenencia of the province of Nôvita had, in
fact, recently been sold for as much as eight thousand
pesos. The sums paid for the posts, combined with the high
24 AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa
Fe, 8 September 1713. The settlement of Bebarâ was
founded by Don Antonio de Veroiz y Alfaro, in 1693, on
the banks of the river Bebará. See Ortega Ricaurte,
Historia Documental, pp.149-52. The settlement known by
the name of Quibdó in the eighteenth century was known by
the name of Nigua in the seventeenth. See Lorenzo de
Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711,
AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al rio
Murri ...", f.81.
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cost of food supplies in the region, meant that, once
appointed, these ministers had to recover the amounts paid
to the governor and make a profit. Clearly, since they did
not receive a salary, the tenientes could only recoup their
investment from either the King's coffers, or his vassals,
or indeed, from both. 25 It appears, moreover, that these
tenientes had to recover their investments very quickly,
for they served for only short periods of time. In 1711,
Lorenzo de Salazar, who claimed to have resided in the
province of Citará for the previous 24 years, informed the
governor of Antioquia that, during that period, he had
known 14 tenientes, excluding the latest to take up the
post, Francisco Caicedo, and that one of the 14 had served
twice. 26 Of course, as Fray Manuel Caicedo observed in
25 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco Alcantud y Gaona
to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720. As examples of the
high cost of food supplies in the Chocó, this official
reported that fresh meat was sold for 4 patacones the
arrcba, and that salted meat went for 12 patacones. On
the subject of the sale of the tenencias, see also AGI
Quito 185, Bishop Juan Gômez FrIas to King, Popayán, 6
November 1723. However, it should be noted that one man
who served as teniente of the province of Citarâ in the
early eighteenth century, Don Bartolomé de Borja y
Espeleta, claimed that these officials did receive a
stipend. According to Borja y Espeleta, the Indians of
the region paid 2.5 pesos in tributes twice a year: 1
peso was paid to the doctrinero, 1 to the King, and the
other half peso was paid to the teniente. See AGI Santa
Fe 307, "Cuaderno. . .sobre la entrada al rio Murri...",
Antioquia, 4 January 1712, ff.144-45.
26 According to Lorenzo de Salazar's declaration,
between 1687 and 1711, the following men served as
tenientes of the province of Citará: Don Antonio Beroyes,
Don Antonio Ruiz Calzado, Don Juan Triunfo de Sosaya, Don
Manuel Herrera (twice), Don Jacinto Mosquera, Don Joseph
de Castillo, Don Antonio Ordoñez de Lara, Domingo
Meléndez, Don Francisco de Soto, Cristôbal Quintero, Don
Francisco Clemente de Olivares, Don Bartolomé de Borja,
Don Vicente Gaspar Rugero, and Don Joseph de la Cuesta,
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1724, there was one further and very damaging effect of the
sale of the tenencias: since the men who served the posts
were not career bureaucrats, they had no incentive to
honesty or integrity. As they did not expect their record
in the Chocó to affect their future career prospects, they
had no reason to dedicate themselves to serve the King
loyally, and much less to collect his taxes)
The authority exercised and the freedom enjoyed by
officials in the Chocó suited the governors of Popayân
because, it was said, they not only sold the tenencias, but
also engaged in selling merchandise to the Indians of the
region through the corregidores. Furthermore, as Don
Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona reported in 1720, when the
governors conducted visits of inspection to the region,
these amounted to little more than card-playing
expeditions. The crimes and excesses committed by the
royal officials remained unpunished. 28
 In 1711, Lorenzo de
Salazar informed the governor of Antioquia that, on his
recent visit to the Chocô, the governor of Popayán was
accompanied by 23 Indian carriers: eight of these carried
the governor's supplies, and the other fifteen carried
clothing, half of which was later sold to the mine owners
who was replaced by Don Francisco de Caicedo. See Lorenzo
de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September
1711, in ibid., f.8l.
27 AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24
July 1724.
28 Ibid., Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown,
Cartagena, 15 November 1720.
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while the other half was distributed between officials.
And, in 1721, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero, who had
been sent to Santa Fe with orders to erect the first
Viceroyalty of New Granada and undertake the reform of any
abuses in need of correction, reported that evidence of the
corruption of the governors could be found in the immense
profits they made from their five year terms of office.
All the governors, he claimed, finished their terms with
incomes many times the amounts paid to them in salaries
during that period. Thus, a governor on a salary of 2,750
patacones per year, which amounted to 13,750 patacones over
five years, could leave Popayán with savings of between
150,000 and 200,000 pesos. Pedrosa y Guerrero was in no
doubts that such fortunes could only be made through fraud
and through the "sweat" of the king's vassals.30
Formal and Informal Government
The circle of corruption involving the governors of
Popayân, the tenientes who bought their posts from the
governors, and the corregidores who bought their posts from
the tenientes resulted in a complete absence of government
in the Chocô. Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona noted that
29 See Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San
Mateo, 24 September 1711, in "Cuaderno ... sobre la
entrada al Rio Murri. ..", ff.84, 87.
30 Don Antonio de la Pedrosa also referred to the
sale of tenencias, reporting that these were publicly
sold to the highest bidder, and that the amounts for
which they could be sold depended on the profits the
tenientes could expect to make from each region. AGI
Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don
Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.
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the rest of the Spanish residents of the region - most of
whom were mine owners and merchants - were not subjected to
any form of government, and consequently, they neither paid
quintos, nor alcabalas, nor any other duties.31
Much of the output from the mines of the Chocó, it was
said, was destined to the ships of foreign nations anchored
in Portobelo. In 1721, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa reported
that all the gold of the region was taken to Panama via the
San Juan and Atrato rivers. This gold served as payment
for the slaves, clothing, and other products which were
illegally introduced into the Chocó through the Atrato and
San Juan. 32 Pedrosa y Guerrero was concerned about the
illegal commerce taking place via the Atrato and San Juan
rivers, because he believed such commerce to be detrimental
to the interests of the Crown, for four reasons: first,
because these products were introduced illegally; secondly,
because no duties were paid on the trade; thirdly, because
no taxes were paid on the gold extracted from the Chocó
that was used in payment for the goods obtained; and
finally, because the gold so extracted landed in the hands
of foreign nations. 33
 Nevertheless, in 1724, Fray Manuel
Caicedo informed the Crown that despite the prohibitions on
31 Ibid., Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown,
Cartagena, 15 November 1720; and AGI Quito 143, Vicente
de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 24 September 1713.
32 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y
Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.
AGI Santa Fe 693, "Nombramiento de Superintendente
del Chocô hecho por el Dr. Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y
Guerrero. . .en Don Luis de Espinosa y Galarza. ..", Santa
Fe, 14 November 1719, f.2.
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navigation along the two main rivers, many of the goods
sold in the Chocó were introduced in precisely this way.
This, Fray Manuel noted, occurred because the tenientes
were bribed. The governors, too, appear to have received
bribes. In 1711, Lorenzo de Salazar informed the governor
of Antioquia that, in the period he had spent in the Chocô,
many vessels had entered the Atrato illegally, and that on
one occasion when the governor of Popayán, Don Bartolomé
Perez de Vivero, made moves to confiscate the contents of
a particular vessel which had entered the region illegally,
he was bribed 400 pesos, and the owners were not punished.
Goods imported in this way were paid for in gold dust,
Salazar reported, because there was not a fundiciôn in the
Chocó.35
It was clear to many contemporary observers that the
absence of a smelting house - or .fundiciôn - in the Chocó
was one of the main reasons why so much of the gold
extracted from the mines left the region before duties were
paid, for it was in the .fundiciones that gold was supposed
AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24
July 1724.
Salazar claimed that he knew of some 18 to 20
vessels that had entered the region illegally since 1691.
See Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24
September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, t1 Cuaderno ... sobre
la entrada al RIo Murri. ..", f.89. In proposing his
entrada to the Chocô, Don Agustin de Morales y Mendoza
also noted that it would be to the benefit of all if
trade from Panama to the mouth of the San Juan River and
from Cartagena through the Atrato was ended. He noted
that payment for the goods and slaves introduced
illegally through these two rivers was made in gold dust,
on which quintos were not paid. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Don
Agustin de Morales y Mendoza to Crown, n.p., n.d.
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to be melted into bars and taxed. In 1720, Don Francisco
de Alcantud y Gaona reported that because there was not a
smelting house in the Chocá, the Crown lost the profits it
should have obtained from the gold dust extracted from the
region. In 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo informed the Crown
that, as gold dust was the only medium of exchange in the
region, it was inevitable that the dust should leave the
region without payment of the royal fifth. 36
 And, in 1721,
the governor of Popayân reported that, since the miners had
no currency other than gold dust with which to pay for
their supplies, it was in fact the merchants who made the
largest profit and defrauded the treasury in the process.37
Of course, the existence of a fundiciãn in any
colonial city did not necessarily mean that taxes on gold
production were paid promptly and in full. Ann Twinam's
study of gold production in Antioqula in the eighteenth
century shows that, even within Antioquia, a large
proportion of annual gold production escaped the
.fundiciones: some of the gold dust was used in payment for
goods bought from merchants, and some was smuggled out of
the region prior to melting and taxing. Furthermore,
miners often kept false and inaccurate production records,
making taxation extremely difficult. As Twinam points out,
the efficacy of royal laws regarding the production of gold
36 Ibid., Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown,
Cartagena, 15 November 1720, and Fray Manuel Caicedo,
Madrid, 24 July 1724.
Ibid., Governor of Popayãn to Crown, Barbacoas, 16
January 1721.
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were "directly proportional to the crown's ability to
enforce them". 38 This being the case, it is very unlikely
that the existence of a smelting house in the Chocó in the
early eighteenth century would have made much difference to
the amounts of gold declared by the region's miners.
However, it should not be assumed that the control
exercised by these individuals and the freedom enjoyed by
all Spaniards in the region was translated into some form
of real unity between them. For, as we shall see, disputes
did arise between miners, between miners and clergy,
between regular and secular clergy, and between royal
officials, miners, and clergy. Instances of conflict
between Spaniards in the Chocó during the first three
decades of the eighteenth century are numerous: in 1729,
the first governor of the ChocO provinces, Don Francisco de
Ibero, observed that the residents of the Chocó "do not
know how to live without disputes and quarrels".39
In 1708, for example, three members of the Mosquera
family, together with Don Francisco de Arboleda Salazar and
Don Bernardo Alfonso de Saa, came into conflict with the
newly appointed teniente of the province of Nóvita, Tomás
Romero Donoro. There were three reasons for the dispute.
First, the miners claimed that Romero Donoro refused to
provide them with sufficient Indians for the transportation
of the maize and plantains with which they maintained their
38 Twinam, Miners, Merchants, and Farmers, pp.22-6.
AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown,
Nóvita, 29 October 1729.
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slave gangs, and for the construction of the dwellings in
which their slaves lived. Secondly, they claimed that the
teniente forbade them to buy maize or plantains directly
from the Indians, and that, instead, they were forced to
buy their supplies from the merchants whom they believed
did deal directly with the Indians, although, as we shall
see, the merchants' dealings with the Indians were also
conducted through the corregidores. Finally, they
complained that although the Audiencia of Santa Fe had
agreed that the 100 Indians of Tadô should be employed only
in the mines of Irô and Mungarra - which be.2onged to these
miners - the teniente had redirected the Tadó Indians to
the mines of Nóvita and RIo Negro, which were already
served by 240 Indians. The miners implied that Romero
Donoro had carried out these actions because he had mining
interests of his own in Nôvita and Rio Negro. 4° In fact,
Rornero Donoro appears to have represented a clique or
faction of miners competing with another represented by the
Mosqueras. In this case, Romero Donoro was allied with Don
Miguel de la Asperilla and Don Luis de Acuña y Berrio. Two
° However, it should be noted that, in 1709, the
Protector de Naturales, in Santa Fe de Bogota, reported
that the service of the 100 Indians the Mosqueras claimed
had been granted to them by the Audiencia had in fact
been granted to them temporarily. The Mosqueras had
requested the labour of 100 Indians to assist them in
preparing for the cultivation and irrigation of plantain
groves and maize fields, but they had been granted the
service of only	 Indians for maintaining these.
Because of their positions as tenientes, the Protector
argued, they had completely ignored the Audiencia's
directive. The documents pertaining to this case are
included in Colmenares, et.al. (eds.), Fuentes
Coloniales, pp.130-48.
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clerics - the Franciscan Fray Manuel Caicedo, and Fray José
de Santa Teresa - were also involved in the dispute on
Romero Donoro's side, and one - Nicolãs de Inestrosa - was
allied with the Mosqueras. At least two of these clerics
had mining interests of their own in the Chocô. In 1709
Nicolâs de Inestrosa appears not to have been directly
involved in mining (he would be at a later date), but he
did request the support of the Mosqueras in his attempt to
obtain a parish in the province of Nôvita. By 1720,
Nicolás de Inestrosa was serving as the bishop's visitador
to the Chocô and as priest of the Mosquera's mining camps
of Irô and Mungarra. Fray José de Santa Teresa did have
mining interests in the region: he travelled to New Granada
in the company of the bishop of Popayán, Fray Mateo de
Villafañe, and bought a mine in the Chocô, apparently to
support his order, Nuestra Señora del Carmen, in Spain.
And, in 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo informed the Crown that,
in the 21 years he had spent in the Chocó, he had been
involved in mining as well as in serving several
parishes. 4' However, Fray Manuel's opposition to the
Mosqueras went back to 1706, when he first arrived to serve
as priest of the Indians of the town of Tadô. In 1709, the
Protector de Naturales reported that, at that time, Fray
Manuel came into conflict with the then teniente, Nicolás
41 ibid., pp.137-39. See also AGI Quito 190, Fray
Francisco Montiel de Fuentenovilla to King, n.p., n.d.;
AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July
1724; and AGI Quito 185, "Autos sobre la opresiOn en que
tienen los jueces seculares a los indios de las
provincias del Chocó.. .".
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de Mosquera, because the Indians had been removed from the
town of Tadó and relocated along the Irô river, where they
served the Mosquera's mining operations continuously, and
that, as a consequence, Caicedo had resigned as doctrinero
of the settlement. 42 However, Caicedo was not the only
cleric to become embroiled in disputes in the Chocâ during
these decades. Indeed, the clergy provide us with an
important source of information on the treatment of the
Indians in this period, particularly by the secular
authorities whose duty it was to protect them.
Indians and Corregidores
From the beginning of the eighteenth century, and
especially after Bishop Juan Gómez Frias took possession of
the diocese of Popayán in l7l6, the ecclesiastical
authorities began to assert their episcopal jurisdiction
over the Chocô region, despite the presence of the
Franciscans in the province of Citará, who continued
officially to administer the Chocó mission. As early as
1701, Bishop Mateo de Villafañe informed the King that he
was about to conduct a visita to the Chocó - the first ever
conducted by a bishop - where, he reported, the secular
authorities and the clergy blamed each other for the lack
42 Colmenares et.al . (eds.), Fuentes Coloniales,
p.142.
Manuel Buena y Quijano, Historia de la diOcesis de
Popayan (Bogota, 1945), p.157.
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of religious instruction being provided to the Indians.
In 1720, Bishop Juan Gômez FrIas sent a much fuller
report to both the Council of the Indies and the Audiencia
of Santa Fe relating the extortions suffered by the Indian
population of the Chocó at the hands of the secular
authorities. The bishop's report was based on the
information gathered by two visitadores - Nicolás de
Inestrosa and Fray Manuel de Abastos y Castro - who had
been ordered to ascertain the source of the extortions and
the extent to which Indians had received religious
instruction from the priests in charge of their
indoctrination. Because of the nature of the visita - all
of the clerics interviewed were determined to place the
blame for the Indians' lack of instruction on the secular
authorities - the following evidence has to be treated with
some caution.
The bishop's report shows that the corregidores of the
Chocô region had carved out for themselves a commercial
empire based on the labour of the Indians in their charge.
The Indians were employed continuously in the
transportation of goods brought in by the merchants. The
merchants paid the correqidores, not the Indians, for the
labour. The corregidores pocketed the fees, and paid the
Indians in goods, principally clothing and aguardiente,
which they had actually bought from the same merchants for
resale in the Chocô. This operation was made all the more
AGI Quito 185, Bishop Mateo de Villafañe to Crown,
Popayân, 7 June 1701. The sources do not indicate whether
the bishop conducted this visita.
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profitable by the fact that the value attached to the goods
given in payment to the Indians was decided by the
corregidor. Invariably, this value was higher than the
price the corregidcr paid the merchants for the goods, and
higher, of course, than the Indians would have had to have
paid had they purchased these goods directly from the
merchants
Other ecciesiastics in the region echoed the bishop's
complaints. In 1730, the Franciscan Father Provincial,
Fray Dionisio de Camino, reported to the oidor of the
Audiencia, Martinez Malo, that the Indians were often
forced to sell the goods received from the correqidor in
payment for their labour - which they rarely needed - to
buy other badly needed supplies. In order to sell these
goods, the Indians had to offer them at prices lower than
those at which they had received them.
Other reports show that the corregidores were allied
with the tenientes in the running of this system. In 1723,
Bishop Gômez Frias observed that, because the tenientes
sold the posts of corregidor in the Indians' settlements,
Auto, Bishop Juan Gómez de Frias, Popayán, 8 July
1720, in ibid., "Autos sobre la opresión...". See also
the comments of a later bishop, Diego Ferinln de Vergara,
on the methods by which the corregidores paid the Indians
for their work, in ibid., Diego Fermin de Vergara to
Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737.
46 Fray Gregorio Arcila Robledo, (ed.),
"Representaciôn hecha por nuestro M.R.P. Fr. Dionisio de
Camino, siendo provincial, al señor oidor don Josef
Martinez Malo hallándose en las Provincias del Chocó,
sobre lo que hallô conveniente para el remedio del buen
gobierno y aumento de aquellas misiones - Año de 1730",
.BoletIn de Historia y Antigüedades, Vol.XLIII (1956),
p.243.
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they had no choice but to allow the corregidores a free
hand in recovering their initial investment. 47 In 1724,
Fray Manuel Caicedo observed that, when the miners
requested the assistance of Indians for a task, they not
only had to pay for the labour of the Indians, but also had
to pay the teniente for providing the Indians. 48 And, as
Don Antonio de la Pedrosa reported, personal service was
tolerated and encouraged because all parties benefited.
The tenientes were bribed, and the miners obtained access
to the labour of the Indians: they all "give each other a
hand". The governors, moreover; were unable to stop the
practice, because, in being paid for the tenencias, they
lost the freedom to prevent and punish such "disorder".49
Not all the Indian population of the Chocó suffered
the same fate. The sources suggest that the Indians of the
Tatamá/Chocô province were particularly ill-treated because
of a combination of factors: the terrain they inhabited had
fewer rivers, the area was poorer in gold deposits, and it
was also closer to the cities of the Cauca Valley. Bishop
Juan Góxnez Frlas' 1720 report indicates that the work
carried out by the Indians of this area was heavier and
' AGI Quito 185, Bishop Juan Gómez FrIas to Crown,
Popayân, 6 November 1723.
AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24
July 1724.
" Ibid., Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don
Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721. Pedrosa y
Guerrero also noted that, in carrying out their
visitations to the Chocô, the governors took merchandise
to sell. Duties were not paid on these goods, and quintos
were not paid on the gold received in payment for them.
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more continuous than that carried out by other Chocó
Indians, because merchandise had to be carried overland,
and because, as the number of Indians was small, even the
children were used to carry food supplies.50
A few years earlier, in 1713, the oidor Vicente de
Aramburu had made similar observations regarding the Indian
population of the same province. He, too, reported to the
Crown that because the area did not have important gold
deposits, its Indian population was employed solely in the
transportation of goods for the merchants and traders
travelling into the region with supplies from the cities of
Anserma, Cartago, Buga, and Toro, among others. There were
only three settlements in the province - ChamI, San Juan,
and Mombü - to provide Indians for transportation duties,
and these carried exceptionally heavy weights - between
three and four arrobas - for the eleven days it took to
travel overland from the settlement of Chami to the port of
Dodubera, on the Atrato, from where supplies were later
taken by river to the province of Citarâ. 5' In November,
1720, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona further reported
that the population of the province of Tatamá/Chocó
amounted to no more than 100 tributary Indians, and that,
50 Certificaciôn del notario de visita, Popayán, 9
July 1720, in AGI Quito 185, "Autos sobre la opresión..."
AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aranthuru to Crown, Santa
Fe, 30 September 1713. See also Arcila Robledo (ed.),
"Representación...", op.cit., pp.242-3.
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because of the heavy weights they carried, the life
expectancy of the male population was very low.52
While the Indian population of the three settlements
of the province of Tatamà/ChocO took the lion's share of
transportation duties, the province of Nôvita - which
consisted of five settlements in 1729 and had a tributary
population of about 280 - had the largest proportion of
slaves: more than 3,000 by 1729. Since Nôvita was the more
important mining province, the Indian population of that
area must have taken the lion's share of the responsibility
for supplying the slave gangs with maize and plantains.
The province of Citará, which was composed, by 1729, of
five settlements (Quibdó, Lloró, Beté, Bebará, and Bojaya),
had the largest number of Indian tributaries - 550 - but
only 550 slaves. 53 According to the first governor of the
Chocó, Don Francisco de Ibero, the province had sufficient
deposits of gold to justify employing as many as nine or
ten thousand slaves, but supplies were too expensive for
the miners to set up operations in that area.M
52 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y
Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720.
By 1729, the population of the province of
Tatamá/Chocó was said to number 133 Indian tributaries,
in two settlements, ChamI and San Juan. See AGI Santa Fe
307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown, Nôvita, 29 October
1729. According to Sharp, most of the largest cuadrillas
were employed in the province of Nóvita, and although the
province of Citarâ also contained some important mining
centres and several smaller mines, the number of mines
and slaves could not compare with those found in Nóvita.
See Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, p.17.
Don Francisco de Ibero also informed the Crown of
the exceptionally high cost of supplies sold in the
region: "un tercio de harina cuesta cincuenta reales de a
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Although the Indians of the Chocó were not
systematically employed in mining, there do appear to have
been cases, at least in the first two decades of the
eighteenth century, in which they too were forced to work
in the mines. In 1711, three Indians from the settlements
of Bebará and Lloró informed the governor of Antioquia that
one of the main grievances of the Citará Indians was that
the teniente, Don Joseph de la Cuesta, and the correg'idor
of the settlement of Bebará, Manuel de Vargas, rented them
out to the miners for work in the mines, without providing
tools. Also, they complained that the miners paid the
teniente for the Indians' labor, and that they were paid
only a fraction of this amount. 55 On the whole, however,
the Indian population was utilized principally for
transportation, and to provide foodstuffs and construct
dwellings and canoes for the miners and the slave gangs of
the region, although, as Don Francisco Alcantud y Gaona
noted in 1720, "each one of the inhabitants of [the
provinces] ... even if he is rnestizo, mulatto, or black,
believes himself to be master of these poor wretches, and
ocho, una botija de vino, otros cincuenta ... una libra
de came salada cuatro reales de plata, una arroba de
sebo para velas, catorce y dieciseis reales de a echo, y
a este tenor todos los demás géneros comestibles, ropa
blanca, y de vestir...". See AGI Santa Fe 307, Don
Francisco de Ibero to Crown, Návita, 29 October 1729.
See the statements made by Esteban Fernández,
Joseph Veragone, and Bonifacio Ticaina, Antioquia, 10
March 1711, in Ibid., "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al
rio Murri...", ff.55-60.
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as such he treats them ll . 56
 No distinction was made between
Indians. As Vicente de Araniburu complained in 1713, Indian
cacigues and governors were all drawn into personal service
for the corregidores.57
Indian Resistance and Resettlement
Several contemporary observers reported the damage
done to the native population by intolerably hard work and
injustice. In fact, many of the Indians of the region
resisted the Spaniards' ill-treatment in ways which, at
various times during the first three decades of the
eighteenth century and beyond, caused them considerable
concern. In 1710, Antioquia's Protector de inclios, Rafael
de Oquendo, reported that Citarâ Indians had been
abandoning their settlements in large numbers for many
years and that the number who had left was so large that
the province was virtually uninhabited. And, in 1711, one
Indian from Bebará, Joseph Veragone, claimed that not only
had the Indians of the province been deserting their
settlements for many years, but also that several
cirnarronas - illegal and unrecognized settlements - had
been in existence in the region since the rebellion of the
56 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco Alcantud y Gaona
to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720.
AGI Santa Fe 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown,
Santa Fe, 24 September 1713. It is clear that, despite
the elimination of the Indian leaders after the rebellion
of the l680s, other leaders emerged to take their place.
As we shall see in the next paragraphs, at the beginning
of the eighteenth century, the Indians of the region
continued to be represented by their caciques, governors,
and "indios principales".
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1680s. That same year, Pedro Hato de la Banda, a Spaniard
who had spent the previous two years in Quibdô and Bebará,
informed the governor of Antioquia, Don Joseph Lopez de
Carvajal, that utsince the uprising many cirnarroneras have
been formed consisting of a large number of Indians".58
However, in 1710, a very serious attempt was made by
the Indians of the province of Citará - represented mainly
by Don Joseph Sagito, of Bebarâ. - to negotiate with the
authorities in Antioquia for relocation to a new settlement
in the region of the Murri river, which, for reasons that
remain unclear, was considered to fall within that
gobernaciOn's jurisdiction.
Such negotiations became possible because, in 1708,
the governor of Antioquia, Don Joseph LOpez de Carvajal,
became interested in expanding his gobernaciOn's mining
activities to the Murri river region, in the northernmost
section of ChocO territory. 59 According to LOpez de
Carvajal, Antioquia's miners no longer had any gold
deposits to work, and the gobernaciOn was in a state of
58 AGI Santa Fe 307, ItCuaderno ... sobre la entrada
al rio Murri. . .1t: PeticiOn, Rafael de Oquendo, n.p.,
n.d., ff.24-6; Joseph Veragone's statement, Antioquia, 10
March 1711, f.59; and Pedro Hato de la Banda's statement,
Antioquia, 14 March 1711, f.6l. Although the province of
Citará. again appeared to be the most affected by these
incidents, the problem was common to all parts of the
ChocO: in 1713, for example, Vicente de Aramburu informed
the Crown that many of the Noanama Indians of NOvita - in
particular those settled in San Joseph de Noanama and San
Agustin - had deserted the province and retreated to the
hills, away from all contact with the Spaniards. See AGI
Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 8
September 1713.
AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Joseph de Carvajal to Crown,
Antioquia, 13 June 1708.
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ruin. 6° This interpretation of Antioquia's fortunes was
the result of the considerable fluctuations which had
characterized mining in the region since 1670, as measured
by .fundición entries. The lowest levels, of just over
4,000 pesos, were recorded in 1674 (which coincides with
Juan Bueso de Valdés entrada to the Chocó). Fundi ci On
entries covering Lopez de Carvajal's period in office -
1708 to 1713 - show fluctuations ranging from 16,000 to
nearly 29,000 pesos. Entries for the following three years
- 1714 to 1716 - show even lower levels of production,
ranging between 9,746 to 11,448.61 Indeed, in 1713, LOpez
de Carvajal's successor, Don Joseph de Yarza, explained to
the Crown that it was because there were no longer any gold
deposits to work that the cities of the gobernaciOn -
Antioquia and MedellIn in particular - were in a state of
ruin, and that cities such as Zaragoza and Câceres were too
poor even to pay for the services of a parish priest.62
When news of LOpez de Carvajal's plans to conduct an
entrada became known in the province of Citará,
representatives of the Indian settlements travelled to
Antioquia to present their grievances to the governor and
60 The governor noted "la miseria y calamidad en que
se halla dicha ciudad y la provincia a mi cargo. . .por no
haber en dichas partes ya minerales que laborear...". See
Don Joseph de Carvajal to Audiencia of Santa Fe,
Antioquia, 15 May 1708, in AGI Santa Fe 307,
"Cuaderno. . .sobre la entrada al rio Murri...", ff.1-2.
61 Twinam, Miners, Merchants and Farmers, 27-29.
62 AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Joseph de Yarza to Crown,
Antioquia, 2 April 1713.
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ask for his protection. 63
 These attempts at negotiation
coincided with mass desertions in all the Indian
settlements of the province of Citará. In 1710, Don
Ignacio Bernardo de Quirôs and Esteban Fernández both
stated that only ten or twelve families remained in the
settlement of Bebará, although there had previously been
thirty-six or thirty-eight, and that similar desertions
were occurring in the other settlements of Quibdó and
Llorô.	 The Indians, Quirós and Fernández claimed, were
leaving for the river Murri. Esteban Fernández further
reported that every day more and more Indians were leaving
to join a cirnarrona located on the banks of the Sucio
river, "and that also ... in many other parts ... many of
which fall within the jurisdiction of this province there
are other cimarronas".65
The Indians' attempts to negotiate a relocation suited
the governor of Antioquia's own plans perfectly, and his
interests in the case are clear. To regain a foothold for
Antioquia in a region that was clearly producing great
wealth for its Spanish inhabitants, the governor intended
to conduct an expedition to the area of the Murri river.
63 Although the teniente of the province of Citará,
Don Joseph de la Cuesta, and many witnesses questioned on
the case claimed that the Indians had been encouraged to
desert their settlements by Bernardo de Salazar, a mulato
from Antioquia, and Juan Montaflo, also from Antioquia.
See, for example, ibid., "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al
rIo Murri...", Bebará, 5 & 6 December 1710, ff.43-7.
Bebará, 7 December 1710, and Bebará, 9 December
1710, in ibid., ff.47-9.
65 Esteban Fernández, Antioquia, 10 March 1711,
ibid., f.56.
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His aims were to both ascertain the nature and extent of
the gold deposits existing there, and to reduce and pacify
the fugitive Indians from the province of Citará. These,
he hoped, would assist him in the reduction of one other
Indian group, the Oromira, who were still thought to
inhabit the northern stretch of the region's territory,
south of the gulf of Darién.
In earlier chapters we have seen that, in the
seventeenth century, the Spaniards believed there to exist
in the Chocô several large unconquered Indian groups - the
Soruco, the Burgumia, the Membocana - and that, at various
times, plans were made to proceed against them. No
indications have been found, however, to suggest that
anything came of these plans. This is also the case as far
as concerns the Oromira, thought to be a very large and
extremely wealthy Indian group. In 1711 it was suggested
that these Indians inhabited a territory surrounded by the
Cunacuna, and that this would make any attempt at conquest
extremely difficult. 67 It is not clear, however, whether
the Oromira had been absorbed by the Cunacuna.
Nevertheless, the governor's interest in the matter of
the conquest of the Oromira - and of the Indian "fugitives"
AGI Santa Fe 362, Joseph Lopez de Carvajal to
Crown, Antioquia, 13 June 1708; Auto, Antioquia, 2
January 1710, and Auto, Valle de Urrao, 27 September
1710, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno. . .sobre la entrada
al rio Murri. ..", ff.1l-l2, 21.
67 Ibid., 24 October 1711, ff.120-1. Indeed, in 1712,
it was said that despite efforts to locate the Oroinira,
no traces of this Indian group had been found. See AGI
Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos, PeticiOn, Rafael de
Oquendo, f.18.
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from the province of Citarâ - suited the Indians, too, and
served as a negotiating tool. The Indians promised to
guide the governor to the settlements inhabited by the
"infidel" Indians - the Oromira - as well as to a large
settlement along the banks of the Sucio river which they
claimed was inhabited by fugitive Indians. According to
the Indian representatives of the settlement of Quibdó,
more than 500 fugitive Indians then lived along the Murri
river alone. Furthermore, these "offer to provide
information and discover very rich mines located within the
boundary of this land". According to Don Joseph Sagito, of
Bebará, there were in the area "many and very rich mines
some already discovered and others still to be
discovered" 68
In negotiating their agreement with the governor, the
Indians requested that they should be allowed to remain in
the Murri river area, and that they should be permitted to
establish a permanent settlement there. In addition to
their promise to guide the governor to places where there
were Indians to reduce and gold deposits to work, the
Indians committed themselves to becoming Christians, and to
allow a priest to live among them to teach them Christian
Doctrine. They would obey all ministers appointed to
govern them, and pay their tributes.
The extent to which the Citaraes actually absorbed
Christianity is a matter to which we will refer in the next
68 Peticiôn, Rafael de Oquendo, n.p., n.d., in ibid.,
ff.24-8, 33-4.
298
chapter. For the moment, the important point to make is
that Indians who had fled from the Spaniards were regrouped
in an area where, it was hoped, new mining camps would soon
emerge. Indeed, in 171]. and 1712, Indians and governor
cooperated in the process of conducting the entrada, of
establishing a mining camp, San Mateo, and a settlement,
Murri, in the vicinity of the Murri river, and in bringing
out hundreds of fugitive Indians from small settlements
scattered across a large expanse of territory stretching
from the Murri to the Bojaya rivers.
Lopez de Carva-jal and the Murri River Settlement
Unlike Bueso de Valdés in the 1670s, the governor of
Antioquia was virtually alone in organizing and in carrying
out his expedition. 69
 He met most of the costs, and was
accompanied by only two Spaniards, Don Joseph Matorel y
Balvasil, a vecino of Mariquita, and the secular priest,
Don Francisco Solano de Salazar Beltrân. 7° However, again
The expedition left the city of Antioquia on 4
September 1711. See ibid., Don Joseph LOpez de Carvajal
to King, Antioquia, 28 April 1712.
70 AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno. . . sobre la entrada al
rio Murri. . .', Auto, Antioquia, 21 August 1711, and 4
September 1711, ff.70-71. Although several vecinos of the
gobernaciOn of Antioquia offered to make contributions to
the cost of the entrada, very few actually did so. The
following list includes all those who made contributions
and what these amounted to: Dr Don Nicoläs Antonio del
Pino y Guzmân (half the cost of the arms taken), Capitán
Antonio Muriel (4 fanegas of maize), Patricio Felipe
Perez (4 pesos), Don Salvador LOpez de Usagre (3 pesos),
Martin Hidalgo (3 pesos), Antonio Angel (2 pesos). See
ibid., Antioquia, 28 June 1709, ff.3-4; 15 and 17 July
and 1 October 1709, ff.4-6; 18 December 1709, ff.9-10;
and 28 April 1712, f.160.
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unlike previous entradas to the Chocó, this expedition was
led by 13 Indians, including Don Joseph Sagito. As a
result, the entrada was short and extremely successful.
On 20 September 1711, the mining camp of San Mateo was
founded, in the vicinity of the Murri river. By 26
September, the settlement of Murri was formally founded and
a chapel was built. Between September and November, the
governor's Indian allies travelled from cimarrona to
cirnarrona bringing out hundreds of Indians to the new
settlement of Murri and, on occasion, the governor himself
was led to the places where fugitive Indian resided. 7' By
mid-November, 205 Indians had gathered in the new
settlement. The census taken of the Indian settlers shows
that they originated from all three towns of the province:
of the total 205 Indians, 68 came from Bebarâ, 93 from
Quibdô, and 42 from Lloró. 142 of the total 205 were women
and children, but of the 56 men who were questioned about
their origin and about the length of time they had been
living in the cirnarrcna, 33 claimed to have left their
settlements within the previous year. 72
 The fact that such
a large proportion of this group of Indians had only
recently left their settlements supports the oidor
Aramburu's claim that Manuel de Vargas, correqidor of
' See ibid., 4 September 1711, f.71; 21 September
1711, ff.78-9; 26 September 1711, f.94; 28 September
1711, f.95; 1 October 1711, f.l03, and 12 November 1711,
ff. 124-7.
72 Ibid., 1 October 1711, ff.97-l02; 9 October 1711,
ff.l14-l5; 24 October 1711, ff.119-20; and 12 November
1711, ff.127-8.
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Bebará, was the immediate cause of the Indians' flight, and
that it was his imprisonment and harsh punishment of Don
Joseph Sagito that sparked their defiance.73
According to the Franciscan doctrinero of the
settlement of Bebará, Fray Joseph Forero, the establishment
of the new settlement of Murri led an even larger number of
Indians to abandon the province of Citarâ. The Franciscan
claimed that Indians from Bebará, Quibdó, and Llorô left
their settlements and moved to the Murri pretending to be
part of the first group of fugitives, in order to receive
the governor of Antioquia's protection. Indeed, Fray
Joseph claimed that the Indians already settled in the
Murri river actually sent messengers to the province of
Citarâ to encourage the others to follow suit.74
The mass desertions coincided with the oidor Vicente
de Aramburu's visit to the Chocô. By mid-June 1712, the
cider claimed that only three Indians then remained in
Bebará - Miguel Mateaso, Pablo Chever, and Juan Bosoro.
Aramburu in fact attempted to attract the Indians back to
their settlements with a promise to end the ill-treatment
suffered by the native population, the personal service
demanded of them by correqidores and tenientes, and to
ensure that they should be allowed sufficient time to
AGI Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos, Quibdó, 16
June 1712, f.12. Others also claimed that the immediate
cause of the Indians' desertion was the punishment meted
out to Don Joseph Sagito. See, for example, AGI Santa Fe
307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al rio Murri...'t,
Peticián, ff.24-8.
Ibid., Antioquia, 5 January 1712, ff.l48-9.
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cultivate their fields and the freedom to work for
whosoever they chose. Furthermore, he promised that the
post of corregidor would be eliminated - Manuel de Vargas
was to be imprisoned and sent back to Santa Fe - and that
the Indians would be allowed to appoint their own caciques,
governors, alcaldes, and capitanes. Clearly sympathetic to
the Indians' plight, Aranthuru was extremely concerned about
the future of the province of Citará. 75 His attempt,
however, was said to have caused the Indians of Murri some
disquiet and that they had absolutely refused to return.76
Despite the promises of the oidor and the
protestations of the teniente of the province of Citará and
the governor of Popayán - both of whom demanded that the
governor assist them in returning the fugitive Indians to
their places of origin - the governor of Antioquia used
the Indians' grievances as a way of attacking the
gobernación of Popayán's record in the Chocó and justifying
the relocation of the Indians to the Murri river. While
the Indians' complaints served as one justification for the
relocation, and the prospect of the discovery of new gold
deposits and unconquered Indian groups as another, the
governor argued that there was a third reason why the new
settlement should be maintained. Lopez de Carvajal argued
QuibdO, 16 June 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 362,
Testimonio de Autos (Rafael de Oquendo), ff.12-14.
76 PeticiOn del Protector, n.p., n.d., in ibid.,
ff. 15-20.
See, for example, QuibdO, 15 February 1711, in AGI
Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno. . .sobre la entrada al rio
Murri. ..", f.38.
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that the Murri river was a better location for a settlement
because it was closer to the mouth of the Atrato river and
would serve better as a defence against enemy incursions
into interior New Granada. Possible enemy incursions had
become a cause of concern for the Spanish authorities. It
was said that, in 1703, 300 English had penetrated the
Chocô region through the Atrato, and that they had reached
the settlement of Bebarâ, from whence they intended to
proceed to the province of Antioquia. On this occasion,
they were prevented from doing so by the Citará Indians,
who attacked and defeated them. 78 But while these were
issues which served to justify the choice of the location
for the new settlement of Murri, it is clear that Governor
Lopez de Carvajal was principally concerned with preventing
the Indians' return to the province of Citará because,
without them, the discovery of new gold deposits and
unconquered Indian groups would cease.79
Over the following year, the number of Indians settled
in Murri increased steadily. A proportion of those Indians
brought out of the cimarronas had in fact been living - as
many of the Chocô's Spanish inhabitants claimed - in that
part of the Chocô for a considerable time. In May 1712, 13
Indians joined the new settlement in Murri. At least 11 of
these were fugitives from the settlement of Quibdó. Three
78 Ibid., RIo de Nurri, 13 November 1711, f.129. See
also AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa
Fe, 8 September 1713.
' Auto, Antioquia, 13 August 1712, in AGI Santa Fe
362, Testimonio de Autos, f.22.
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were children who must have been born in the cirnarrona,
and, of the other 10, 7 had been living there for 10 years,
and one for 8 years. 8° Between July and September 1713, 50
more Indians moved to Murri. 36 of these were women and
children, but, of the 14 men who were questioned about
their origin, two - aged 25 and 26 - claimed to have been
born in the cirnarrona and to have lived there always. Two
of the other twelve had been living in the region between
10 and 12 years, 3 had been there for 8 years, and another
3 had been there for 4 years. 10 of the 12 men came from
the settlements of Quibdó and Bebará, and one came from
Tadô, in the province of Noanama. 8 '	 In October, 1713,
Governor Lopez de Carvajal informed the King that
approximately 500 Indians were then living in the new
settlement of Murri, and that a large proportion of these
were Indians who had never before seen white men, having
been born in the cirnarronas.
The subsequent history of Murri is obscure. In 1719,
the Council of the Indies decided to support LOpez de
Carvajal's efforts and encourage him to continue with his
activities in the Murri river region, 82 despite the fact
that he no longer served as governor of Antioquia. In
1713, LOpez de Carvajal had been replaced by Don Joseph de
80 DiscreciOn de los indios, 28 May 1712, in ibid.,
f.6.
81 Ibid., Lista, DiscreciOn y Matricula de los
indios. .., 16 July 1713, and 23 September 1713.
82 Ibid., Joseph LOpez de Carvajal to Crown, 1
October 1713, and decision of the fiscal and the Council
of the Indies, Madrid, 16 August 1719.
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Yarza, who claimed that the promised new sources of gold in
the vicinity of the Murri river had never actually
materialized and that the gobernaciOn had not benefitted
from the relocation of the Indians to the Murri river.83
Although the settlement of Murri did survive, it
appears that most of the Indians from Murri were taken back
to the province of Citarâ before the end of the decade. In
1729, the first governor of the Chocô, Don Francisco de
Ibero, reported that the province of Citará had an Indian
tributary population of 550, distributed between the five
settlements of Quibdô, Lloró, Beté, Bebarâ, and San Joseph
de Bojaya. Given that, in 1712, Aramburu reported that
only three Indians remained in Bebarâ, and the censuses
taken in Murri show that many of the Indians in the
cirnarronas also came from Quibdó and Lloró, those 550
tributaries must have been the same Indians who had fled
northwards in the 1710s. What is also certain is that
Murri proved not to be as profitable as Lopez de Carvajal
had anticipated. In 1782, the total Indian population of
Murri amounted to no more than 279, as compared with 1,533
in QuibdO, 1,119 in LlorO, and a total for the province of
Citará of 4,545. Even more significant is the size of the
slave population of Murri: in 1782, only 20 lived in the
settlement. This figure compares with a slave population
83 AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Joseph de Yarza to Crown,
Antioquia, 2 April 1713.
QuibdO, 16 June 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 362,
Testimonia de Autos (Rafael de Oquendo), ff.l2-14, and
AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown,
NOvita, 29 October 1729.
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of 818 in Quibdó, 609 in Bebará, and a total for the
province of 2,156.85
While the Indians who escaped to Murri in the decade
of the 1710s might have been forced back to their original
settlements, the problem of Indian flight did not end with
this incident. In 1723, 12 years after the Indians first
requested the governor's protection, the bishop of Popayán
advised the King that the extortions, ill-treatment, and
injustice suffered by the Indians led them to flee their
towns and return to the hills. On this occasion, the
bishop referred to the case of the corregidor of Noanama,
one Don Francisco Laja, who kept the Indians continuously
at work on his fields, which were said to be very
extensive, and thereby prevented the Indians from
cultivating their own plots. 86 The effects of his actions
were clear: Noanama had 148 tributary Indians when the last
priest arrived to take charge of the settlement, but by
1723, only 60 remained. 87 In 1730, the Franciscan Father
Provincial reported, after having visited the Chocó, that
the ill-treatment accorded the Indian population of the
settlement of Mombü - which amounted by that year to no
more than 12 tributaries - had led them all to abandon the
85 Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, Tables 4,
5, 6, & 7, pp.197-99.
86 AGI Quito 185, Bishop Juan Gômez FrIas to Crown,
Popayán, 6 November 1723.
87 Juan Manuel Pacheco, Historia Extensa de Colombia,
Vol .XIII, Tamo 3. Historia Eclesiâstica: La Iglesia Bajo
el Regalismo de los Borbones (Bogota, 1986), pp.356-7.
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settlement. Mo Indians then remained in Mombü. 88 In 1737,
Bishop Diego Fermin de Vergara informed the Crown that,
oppressed and over-worked, the Indians continued to retreat
from their towns, losing the King his vassals and his
tributes, and losing the Indians their souls. 89 And, in
1751, Don Miguel de Santisteban, who reported on Viceroy
Eslava's term of office, referred to the "excessive number
of Indians" who had, in 1743, been brought out from the
cirnarronas, where some had been living for twenty years.
Despite the efforts of the teniente of the province of
Citará on that occasion, by 1744, many had again fled from
their settlements. The governor of the Chocó, Don
Bartolomé de Montes, was ordered to ensure their return:
342 Indians, of all ages, were subsequently transferred
back to the settlements of the province of Citará.9°
By the end of the eighteenth century, the problem of
Indian flight had forced the Spanish authorities, on at
least two occasions, actually to found new settlements to
accommodate Indians who had fled from their own towns. An
anonymous Descripciôn of 1777, for instance, noted the
recent foundation of a town in the vicinity of the Sucio
river, for the specific purpose of settling the Indians of
88 Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representación hecha
por. ..Fr. Dionisio de Camino...", op.cit., p.243.
89 AGI Quito 185, Diego FermIn de Vergara to Crown,
Popayàn, 1 December 1737.
° "Relacióri sobre el gobierno del virrey Eslava",
Santa Fe, 1 October 1747, in Posada & Ibáñez, Relaciones
de Mando, pp.30-31.
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the cirnmaronas located in that area. 9' In 1780, Don Juan
Jiménez Donoso referred to the settlement of Pabarandó,
which had also been created for the purpose of settling the
Indian "fugitives" of the vicinity. 	 The settlement of
Cupica had been founded for the same reason. Even these
measures failed to stop the problem. By 1789, Francisco
Silvestre was reporting the Indians' continuing tendency to
retreat to the hills. Indeed, according to Silvestre, it
was to the Indian retreats that the corregidores travelled
when they needed to employ the Indians or collect their
tributes
Abortive Attempts at Reform
The Indians' mass desertion of the province of Citará
at the beginning of the eighteenth century made no long-
term impact on the authorities in the Chocó and had no
effect on their treatment. As we saw at the beginning of
this chapter, in the early 1720s, Don Francisco de Alcantud
y Gaona and Don Antonio de la Pedrosa both reported that
the system of administration introduced in the Chocó was
corrupt, and that the Indians - as well as the royal
' Anánimo, "Descripción de la Provincia del Zitarâ y
Curso del RIo Atrato", Boletln de la Scciedad de
Gecg'rafla de Colombia, Vol.8 (1948), pp.33-4.
n "Relación del Chocó...", in Ortega Ricaurte,
Historia documental, p.210.
Francisco Silvestre, DescripciOn del Reyno de
Santa Fe de Bogota (Bogota, 1968), p.42.
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treasury - suffered as a resu1t. Pedrosa had attempted
to introduce some changes into the way the Chocó was
administered. As part of his campaign to reform the most
obviously inefficient aspects of royal administration in
the colony, in this case the corruption of local officials,
Pedrosa y Guerrero appointed a superintendente to the
Chocó. Under the terms of this measure, the governor of
Popayán formally retained his jurisdiction over all four of
the region's provinces, which meant that, with the
exception of the superintendente, the governor retained his
right to make and confirm all other appointments. The
superintendente, however, was to be independent of the
governor and answerable only to Santa Fe. 95 His principal
duties were to collect tributes and taxes, to ensure that
no illegal commerce was conducted via the San Juan and
Atrato rivers, and to prevent the ill-treatment of the
native population and their employment in the service of
the secular authorities.96
Despite the continued complaints of royal officials
and the bishop of Popayán, the Crown issued a royal cédula,
in June 1721, revoking Pedrosa y Guerrero's measure and
confirming the governor of Popayän's jurisdiction in all
AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y
Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720, and Don
Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de
Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721. See also AGI Santa Fe 693,
"Nombramiento de Superintendente del Chocó...", ff.2-4.
AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y
Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.
AGI Santa Fe 693, "Nombrarniento de Superintendente
del Chocô. . .", f.6.
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matters in the Chocô. Nevertheless, by the mid-1720s,
the Crown decided to take seriously the advice and
recommendations of its officials - in particular Don
Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero - that the Chocô region
should be separated from the gobernación of Popayán. 98 By
royal cédula of 28 September 1726, the Chocó was segregated
from the gobernaciôn and a governor, Don Francisco de
Ibero, was appointed. Ibero took up his post in January
1729.
Significantly,	 the creation of the post of
superintendente made little difference to the way the Chocó
was effectively administered.	 The collection of royal
taxes did improve: Fray Manuel Caicedo noted, in 1724, that
quinto revenues had risen and information on gold
declared also shows an increase in the years following this
appointment. Between 1720 and 1748, an average of some
80,000 gold pesos were registered annually in Nóvita and
In May 1723, Viceroy Villalonga wrote to the King
informing him that the had suspended the implementation
of the cédula because, since the post of superintendente
had been created, the Chocó had made significant
contributions to the royal treasury. In 1724, however,
the Council of the Indies decided to uphold the previous
decision. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Viceroy Villalonga to
Crown, 19 May 1723. The Council's decision is dated
Madrid, 8 March 1724.
98 See, for example, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa's and
Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona's letters, and Fray
Manuel Caicedo's report, op.cit.
Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.167-69.
100 See AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to
King, Nôvita, 29 October 1729.
'°' AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel de Caicedo, Madrid,
24 July 1724.
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citará.	 Furthermore, the participation of Anserma and
Popayän in total quinto revenues, and in the minting of
gold in the Casa de Moneda of Santa Fe, increased
markedly. 102
However, this appointment did not lead to the
elimination of the tenientes. Instead, tenientes and
superintendentes continued to coexist side by side. In
1720, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona observed that the
superintendentes had in fact been empowered to appoint
their own tenientes, and that, because the post of
superintendente was also unpaid, the measure had
effectively only prevented the governor of Popayán from
profiting from the sale of the tenencias, leaving the
superintendente to do so in his place.'°3 In addition, all
attempts to prevent the inhabitants of the Chocó
introducing goods illegally through the Atrato and San Juan
rivers appear to have failed miserably. As William Sharp
observed, the sheer repetition of cédulas issued to
prohibit navigation of these rivers (1730, 1733, 1734, and
1736) suggests problem of enforcement.'°4
 Indeed, in 1758,
102 Colmenares, Historia EconOrnica y Social de
Colombia, p.328.
103 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y
Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1729. It is not
clear whether this was a paid post: under the terms of
the appointment, the superinteridente was to receive the
salary previously paid to the corregidores and tenientes.
Since these two were not paid posts, it is possible that
the superintendente did not receive a salary either. See
AGI Santa Fe 693, "Nombramiento de Superintendente del
Chocó. . .tI, op.cit., f.5.
104 Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, p.10.
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the city of Buga informed the Crown that the trade which
the city had had with the Chocô region ever since its first
discovery had virtually ceased, because whatever goods were
needed in the provinces of Raposo, Nóvita, and Citará were
supplied by vessels entering the San Juan river from the
port of Buenaveritura. This, the city of Buga claimed,
would ruin not only that city, but also those of the entire
g'cbernaciOn of Popayán.'°5
While the separation of the Chocó from Popayân and the
appointment of a governor may have eliminated the problem
of the Chocó being governed by an unsalaried official, it
did not improve the quality of the region's administration.
Indeed, the old system of administration remained virtually
intact. When he arrived in Nôvita in January 1729, the
governor, Don Francisco de Ibero, proceeded to appoint his
own tenientes and, of course, corregidores.'°6 Indeed, in
1730, the oidor of the Audiencia, Martinez Malo, actually
dismissed the first governor of the Chocô, Don Francisco de
Ibero, for complicity with the contrabandists.'°7
Furthermore, there are indications that the corregidores,
at least, continued to pay for the privilege of occupying
the post. In 1730, Fray Dionisio de Camino reported that
although the settlement of Bebará was composed of only
105 AGI Quito 139, City of Buga to Crown, Buga, 20
January 1758.
AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown,
Nóvita, 29 October 1729.
'° Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de
Colombia, p.331.
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twenty tributaries, the corregimiento had recently been
sold for 500 pesos; the corregirniento of Beté, composed of
43 tributaries, had been sold for 800 pesos; the
corregirniento of Bojaya had gone for 700 pesos; and that of
Chami, for more than 1,000. This amounted, the Franciscan
argued, to the formal sale of the town and its Indians.'08
Later documents show that both tenientes and
corregidores continued to enjoy the fruits of the Indians
labour well into the 1740s, and that their presence in the
Indian settlements continued to be a main source of
grievance to both the Chocó's native inhabitants and,
sometimes, to the clergy. In 1749, the doctrinero of the
settlement of Murri, Fray Juan Joseph de Salazar, informed
Viceroy Eslava that, despite the fact that the protection
of the Indians and their instruction in the Catholic Faith
was his first obligation, he was unable to carry out his
duties because the corregidor kept the Indians continuously
at work in sowing maize and constructing canoes, which
resulted in the Indians frequently being absent from the
town and thus unable to achieve any progress in their
instruction. Salazar demanded prompt and effective
measures to prevent the absence of, and moderate the work
imposed on, the Indian population of Murri, and guidelines
for the corregidor, the teniente, and other officials
regarding when and how they could employ the Indians. He
also demanded that they should be ordered to pay the
Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representaciôn hecha
por. . .Fr. Dionisio de Camino...tI, p.247.
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Indians in full for their work. Significantly, Salazar
reported that there were many fugitive Indians in the
region who had threatened to found a new settlement on the
banks of the river Giguamiando, which, the Franciscan
believed, would set a bad example for other Indians to
follow, and lead, in a very short time, to the complete
depopulation of all the towns of the province.'09
The Viceroy's decision on the matter is very
significant, not for its content, since he merely ordered
that the corregidor of Murri was not to deprive the Indians
of time to cultivate their fields and that he was not to
employ them in his own fields, but because it was addressed
to the teniente de gobernador - the only change in the
administration of the region was that these tenientes were
now deputies of the governor of the Chocô rather than of
the governor of Popayân. It is also significant that,
despite Indian protestations, in the 1710s, about the ill-
treatment they received from the Franciscan doctrineros,
and their refusal to return to their settlements while the
Franciscans remained there, it was yet another Franciscan
who administered Murri in the late 1740s. Although Fray
Juan Joseph de Salazar undoubtedly appeared concerned about
the welfare of the Indians in his charge, his presence
raises important questions about the influence exercised by
the Franciscans in the Chocó in the early eighteenth
' AGI Santa Fe 290, Testimonio de la instancia
movida en el Tribunal del Superior Gobierno del. . .Virrey
de este Reino, por el R.P.Fray Juan Joseph de
Salazar. . .".
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century, and about why they remained there despite
continued complaints, from the Indians, from other
Spaniards, and even from the diocesan bishops, about their
conduct and behaviour. These questions will be addressed
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
REGULAR-SECULAR CONFLICT IN
THE CHOCO
In 1736, Diego FermIn de Vergara, bishop of Popayán,
arrived in the Chocó on the first leg of a pastoral visit
that was to take him across a large part of his diocese.'
Like all pastoral visits conducted by bishops - or by the
visitadores they appointed 2 - the purpose of this one was
to inspect the state of the parishes of the diocese,
focusing specifically on the performance of the clergy, the
No information has been found to indicate the
precise extension of the diocese of Popayán. However, it
appears that, at the time the bishopric was erected in
1546, its boundaries corresponded almost exactly to those
of the gobernaciôn of Popayân: only Pasto, Chapanchica,
and Agreda fell within the jurisdiction of the bishop of
Quito. The region northward to Antioquia also formed part
of the diocese of Popayän. When Antioqula was separated
politically from Popayán in 1576, most of the new
gobernaciôn - with the exception of six parishes -
remained part of the diocese of Popayán, until a new
bishop was appointed for Antioquia at the beginning of
the nineteenth century. The Chocó region was also
included within the boundaries of the diocese, although
Barbacoas fell within the jurisdiction of the bishop of
Quito. See "Informe del Virrey Espeleta al Gobierno real
de la PenInsula, sobre la necesidad de la creación de un
obispado en la Provincia de Antioquia", Antioquia
Histôrica, Nos.27-3l (1929), pp.462-467; and "Relación de
Fray Gerônimo Descobar", in Jijón y Caamaño, Sebastian de
Benalâzar, pp.149-76. See also B.M. Ms Add. 15,740,
"Descripciôn Histórica Geográfica Polltica Eclesiâstica y
Militar de la America Meridional.. .1796".
2 For a discussion of the authority and duties of the
bishops and of the apparatus of ecclesiastical government
over which they presided, see Marzahl, Town in the
Empire, pp.137-41.
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state of the churches, and, in the case of the Chocô, on
how far the clergy had progressed in converting the native
population to the Christian faith.3
The bishop's report on the Chocó region was very
critical. The Indian inhabitants were as "Heathen" as they
had been before their conquest. They neither confessed,
nor received Communion, and were extremely ignorant of
Christian Doctrine. The churches were also in a very sorry
state. The church of Nóvita - the principal town of the
province and residence of the governor - was infested with
snakes, frogs, and other "filthy creatures", and, since it
served to house the animals brought in by the merchants who
travelled to the region, it was no more decent than a
"cattlepen". The church of Noanama and its annexe San
Agustin was made of straw and reeds, and contained little
more than one paper image of a saint. The church of Los
Brazos was as "indecent" as the others, while in El Cajón
a hut served as chapel, and in Irô there was no church.4
Some of the settlements of the ChocO region were, in
the 1730s, administered by the secular clergy. As we saw
in Chapter 3, on arriving in the region in the 1670s, the
The bishop prepared a report on each of the
parishes inspected during his pastoral visit. All of
these can be found in AGI Quito 185.
Ibid., Diego Fermin de Vergara to Miguel de
Villanueba, MedellIn, 30 February 1737; Diego Fermln de
Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737; and
"Certificación de la visita de Nôvita". The bishop's
comments on the state of the churches has to be put in
the context of the lack of any attempt, on the part of
the Spaniards, to foster the development of the region.
See, for example, Martinez Malo's observations on Nóvita,
cited in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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Franciscans took control of only the two provinces of
Tatamá/Chocô and Citará, Noanama perhaps being left for the
secular clergy who had already established a presence there
and for the Jesuits, who did not abandon the Noanama region
until 1689. Thus, the settlements whose churches the
bishop found so appalling in the 1730s - all of which
formed part of the province which by that time had become
known by the name of Nôvita - were controlled by seculars:
in 1720, Joseph JoaquIn Hurtado del Aguila and Meichor
Jacinto de Arboleda Salazar served as priests of Los Brazos
and San Joseph de Noanama, respectively. 6
 Iró was
administered by the secular priest Nicolás de Inestrosa,
who was replaced, in the mid-1730s, by another secular,
Agustin Roso de Villalba, although the secular clergy's
control of this parish was hotly disputed by the regulars.7
In the mid-1720s, the Franciscans administered only one of
the settlements of the province of Návita - Tadó8 - but
See Chapter 3.
6 AGI Quito 185, "Informe del cura de Nóvita", in
"Autos sobre la opresiôn en que tienen los jueces
seculares a los Yndios de las Provincias del Chocó, que
por testixnonio se remite al Real y Supremo Consejo de las
Indias por el Obispo de Popayân. Aflo de 1720".
AGI Quito 144, Nicolás de Inestrosa to Crown, n.p.,
n.d. This letter was discussed by the Consejo in October
1731. See also AGI Santa Fe 406, Agustln Roso de Villalba
to Crown, n.p., n.d., and AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph
Antonio de Oliva to Crown, n.p., n.d. Later in this
chapter we will look closely at the dispute between
seculars and regulars over control of the mining camps of
Irô and Mungarra.
8 The Franciscans administered this settlement
because, in the seventeenth century, Tadó had formed part
of the province of Tatamâ/Chocó.
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they controlled all the settlements of the other two
provinces: Franciscans served as doctrineros of Quibdó,
LLoró, Beté, Bebará, and Bojaya, in the province of Citará;
and ChamI, San Juan de Aguita, and Mombü, in the province
of Tatamá/Chocó. By the mid-l730s, the order had also
taken control of the new settlement of Murri, composed, in
1736, of some sixty to seventy Indians. 9 And, after a
lengthy dispute with the secular church, the order also
retained the right to present a priest for a new parish
established in Citará for the whites, blacks, mestizos, and
inulattoes of the region.'°
Despite the fact that secular clerics served as
priests of some of the region's settlements, Bishop Diego
FermIn de Vergara - a member of the Augustinian order" -
was especially critical of the Franciscans. In this, he
was following the example set by the previous bishop of
Popayán, Juan Gômez FrIas, a secular,'2 who had repeatedly
clashed with the Franciscan order. 	 Several factors
See Fray Domingo Calderôn's statement, Quibdó, 26
October 1736, in AGI Quito 185, "Testimonio de la visita
del Citarâ".
'° AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to
Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed this letter in
May 1727.
" Bueno y Quijano, Historia de la diOcesis de
Popayán, p.158.
12 Three other bishops were appointed to the diocese
of Popayân between Juan Gômez FrIas and Diego FermIn de
Vergara, but none of these ever arrived in Popayän. It is
not clear why Juan de Lacieca Alvarado, bishop of
Tucumân, did not take possession of the diocese, but both
Fray Francisco de la Trinidad Arrieta and Don Manuel
Antonio Gómez de Silva died before they did so. See
ibid., pp.157-8.
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contributed to the bad reputation of the Franciscans in the
Chocó: they were said to have been unsuccessful in their
duty to convert the Indian population, they were accused of
corruption, and they were also said to have been the cause
of very grave scandals within the Franciscan Province of
Santa Fe.'3 Thus, this chapter will examine the
allegations made against the order, focusing specifically
on the extent to which the native population had absorbed
Christian practices by the beginning of the eighteenth
century, on the activities of Franciscan doctrineros in the
region, and on the reasons why the order became divided
over the problem of the Chocó mission. Where possible, we
will also consider the activities of the secular clergy,
whose performance appears to have differed little from that
of their regular counterparts: the results of the
evangelization effort in Nóvita were as poor as those in
the Franciscan provinces of Citará and Tatamá/Chocô, and
some of the allegations made against the Franciscan
doctrineros could equally have applied to the secular
clergy.
Against the background of a comparison between the
activities of regular and secular clergy in the Chocô, this
chapter will also attempt to ascertain the real causes of
the conflict which arose in the l720s between Bishop Juan
Gômez Frlas and the Franciscan order. We will see that, in
' See, for example, AGI Quito 185, Diego FermIn de
Vergara to Miguel de Villanueba, MedellIn, 30 February
1737, and Diego FermIn de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1
December 1737.
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the same way that the Crown's senior officials in the
colony sought to increase royal control over the region's
political administration in this period, the ecclesiastical
hierarchy, represented by the bishop, sought to increase
its authority over the religious administration of the
region. The independence of the Franciscans was a major
obstacle to the achievement of this aim. However, as the
conclusion of this chapter will show, because the secular
and ecclesiastical authorities failed to agree on this
course of action, the bishops' efforts met with no success.
Of course, the conflict between Bishop Juan Gómez
FrIas, in particular, and the Franciscan Province of Santa
Fe has to be considered in the context of a trend, evident
in many parts of Spanish America during the first half of
the eighteenth century, whereby the diocesan bishops
attempted to challenge the autonomy and independence of the
regular orders in the doctrinas they administered.'4
Partly for this reason, and partly because of the
conflicting reports reaching Spain about the activities and
integrity of the Franciscans in the Chocó, it is virtually
impossible to determine the veracity of the allegations
made against them. However, the analysis of events in the
Chocó during this period, for which we will focus
principally on the dispute between the Franciscans and
14 See, for example, Adrian C. Van Oss, Catholic
Colonialism: A Parish History of Guatemala, 1524-1821
(Cambridge, 1986), pp.126-30; and Eleanor Adams,
"Jurisdictional Conflict in the Borderlands", in Richard
Greenleaf, The Roman Catholic Church in Colonial Latin
America (New York, 1971), pp.225-28.
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Bishop Gómez Frias, highlights not only how unsuccessful
the regulars had been in their efforts to convert the
native population of the region, and the concerns which had
arisen in the order regarding the conduct of its members in
the Chocó, but also the methods which bishops in Spanish
America could employ to discredit the regular orders in
Spain and curtail their influence in the colonies.
Christianity and the Indian Population
The Chocó Indians' ignorance of even the most basic
rudiments of Catholicism attracted the attention of many
observers from the beginning of the eighteenth century. In
1700, the bishop of Popayán, Fray Mateo de Villafafle, wrote
to the Comisario of the Franciscan Order in Peru, Father
Miguel Mora, to complain about the lack of religious
instruction being provided to the Indians by the
missionaries.'5
 In 1711, the secular priest Don Francisco
Solano de Salazar, who accompanied Governor Lopez de
Carvajal's first expedition to the Murri river, observed of
the Citaraes that
...having examined ... [those] who are presently
settled on the banks of the Murri river, from the
cacique down, I have found that neither the
cacique nor the other Indian men, women, or
chusma have been educated in Christian Doctrine
nor instructed in the principal mysteries of our
Holy Catholic Faith [to the extent that] they do
not know how to cross themselves and much less
' Pacheco, La Iglesia Bajo el Regalismo de los
Borbones, pp.357-8.
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their daily prayers ... many children have not
been baptized and I have found that many are
married according to their old customs
believing the women to be their legitimate wives
without need for further ceremony.'6
Other witnesses testifying in the case of the Citaraes'
resettlement in Murri voiced similar views. According to
Lorenzo de Salazar, "the Indians of the ... province do not
attend Doctrine continuously ... for none know their daily
prayers" • 17
Of course, Lopez de Carvajal was preparing a case
against both the secular authorities of the gobernaciOn of
Popayán and the regular clergy' 8 to justify his decision to
offer protection to the Citará Indians of Murri. But the
conclusions of the antioqueno priest, Solano de Salazar,
regarding the Citaraes' lack of knowledge of Christianity
were echoed by the governor of Popayán in referring to the
Noanama Indians of the province of Nôvita: in 1729, the
16 Murri River, 1 October 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307,
"Cuaderno. . . sobre la entrada al rio Murri y
descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.95-6.
According to Isacsson, the presence of Indians referred
to as caciques by the beginning of the eighteenth century
can be explained by the fact that the Spaniards had,
after the rebellion of 1684 had been put down, created
hereditary cacicazgcs to reward the Indians who had
remained loyal to the Spanish. See Isacsson, "EmberA",
p.31.
' Real de minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in
ibid., f.85. See also AGI Santa Fe 362, Joseph Lopez de
Carvajal to Crown, Antioquia, 28 April 1712.
In 1713, LOpez de Carvajal appointed the secular
priest Gregorio de Salazar y Santillana to administer the
new settlement of Murri, but he was concerned that others
(meaning the Franciscans) would demand to take control of
the settlement as soon as maize fields were planted and
gold deposits began to be mined. See ibid., Joseph LOpez
de Carvajal to Crown, n.p., 1 October 1713.
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governor informed the Crown of his distress at finding that
the vast majority of the Indians of Nóvita had no knowledge
whatsoever of the Christian faith.' 9 So, too, were they
confirmed by the Franciscan Father Provincial, speaking on
behalf of the Franciscans of Citará and Tatamá/Chocó. In
1730, Fray Dionisio de Camino informed the oidor Martinez
Malo that, despite the many years that had passed since
their reduction, the Indians of this region continued to
practice many of their old customs, and that the teachings
of the missionaries had been insufficient to implant
Catholic practices among them. Indian "sorcerers"
continued to influence the lives of ordinary Indians,
preaching against the beliefs of the Christians which, they
claimed, served only to turn Indians into slaves. Fray
Dionisio asserted that, for instance, the Indians did their
utmost to avoid Confession, believing that it would lead to
their death. When they were sick, they turned for
assistance to their own "medicine men", and when they died,
their families buried them with their tools and other
belongings, for these were believed to be necessary for
cultivating the bountiful land awaiting them in the
afterlife.20
19 AGI Quito 137, Governor of Popayán to Crown,
Popayân, 26 August 1729. The Governor claimed, however,
that this deficiency was particularly marked in the
parishes administered by the secular clergy.
20 Arcila Robledo (ed.), tRepresentación hecha por
Fr. Dionisio de Camino", pp.242, 245-7. For an
account of the continuing influence of utmedicine men"
among twentieth century Chocó Indians, see Erland
Nordenskiöld, "The ChocO Indians of Colombia and Panama",
Discovery, Vol.8 (1927), pp.347-50.
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Several factors were said by the clergy to have
contributed to the poor results of the missionary effort,
among which one of the most important was the resistance of
the native population to Christian beliefs. Indian
religious practices in the Chocô did not coexist alongside
Catholic ones: the observations made by the Jesuit Antonio
Marzal in the late 1670s could well have applied to the
Indians inhabiting the region in the first half of the
eighteenth century. In 1678, Marzal reported to his Father
Visitor that despite all his efforts among the Chocó, he
had concluded that there was little point in attempting to
instruct even the Indian children in the Christian faith,
for their elders - at their "meetings of elders or drinking
sessions" - undid all the missionary's teaching.2'
Throughout the first four decades of the eighteenth
century, both regular and secular clergy repeatedly
emphasized how important a factor the Indians' resistance
was to the lack of success of any form of Christian
instruction. When, in the early 1710s, the Citaraes fled
en masse from their settlements, the Franciscan doctrinero
of Bebarâ, Fray Joseph Forero, informed the governor of
Antioquia that the only purpose of the Indians in fleeing
was "to retire from and refuse the teaching of
Christian Doctrine...". 22	In 1720, Francisco Marquez de
21 Father Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó",
in Pacheco, Juan Manuel, Los Jesuitas, p.502.
22 Antioquia, 5 January 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 307,
"Cuaderno sobre la entrada al rio Murri..
descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.148-49.
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Ayala reported that the Indians' resistance to Christianity
manifested itself in the dislike they showed when attending
instruction in Christian Doctrine. 23 That same year, the
two secular priests Joseph Joaquin Hurtado del Aguila and
Meichor Jacinto de Arboleda Salazar also referred to the
Indians' attitudes: they were not only "incredulous" and
very "far from God", but also "very hostile" to
Christianity. 24 In 1730, the Franciscan Provincial, Fray
Dionisio de Camino, informed MartInez Malo that the
Indians' hostility was such that the boys even celebrated
reaching the age of becoming tributaries because that
status absolved them of attending the teaching of
Doctrin&5 - the education of the children being the main
responsibility of the Chocó's clergy. And, in 1736, the
doctrinero of El Raposo claimed that the Indians actually
preferred to be employed by the corregidores than to remain
in the settlements subject to religious education.26
While Indian resistance to Christianity served as one
justification for the clergy's poor performance, the
independence and power of the correqidores served as
another. Thus, the clergy argued, their own shortcomings
23 Popayân, 9 July 1720, in AGI Quito 185, "Autos
sobre la opresión...". Francisco Marquez de Ayala took
part in the visita conducted by Inestrosa and Abastos y
Castro.
24 "Informe del cura de Nóvita", ibid..
25 Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representaciôn hecha
por...Fr. Dionisio de Camino...", pp.245-7.
26 AGI Quito 185, "Certificaciôn de la visita de
Nóvita".
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were not the result of lack of effort, but of the control
exercised by these officials over the native population.
In 1730, the Franciscan Provincial, Fray Dionisio de
Camino, reported in support of the members of his order
that, because the corregidores had to pay such large sums
of money to buy their posts, they had no alternative but to
keep the Indians employed throughout the year: no profits
would be made if the Indians were allowed to behave like
Catholics, instead of slaves. Because the Indians were
continuously employed in other activities, they did not
have the time to be instructed in Christian Doctrine. The
priests had no power to challenge the corregidores: if they
objected to the situation, they were told their authority
did not extend beyond the church. But this authority, too,
was undermined by the corregidores, because even the
children could be taken away from the priests' care when
they were required to tend to the maize fields.
Furthermore, the Provincial added, since it was in the
church that the corregidores distributed jobs among the
Indians, it was not surprising that these avoided it at all
costs 27
27 Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representación hecha
por. . .Fr. Dionisio de Camino...", pp.242-3, 247-8. A
similar allegation about the corregidores was made by
Lorenzo de Salazar in 1711: he informed Lopez de Carvajal
that the Indians "are not free [even on] feast days for
the church only serves [for them to be] to take out of it
and taken to the house of the teniente or corregidor from
which they are hired.. .". See AGI Santa Fe 307,
"Cuaderno. . . sobre la entrada al rio Murri y
descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", Real de
Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, f.83.
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The secular clergy, too, supported the claims of the
Franciscans. In 1720, Joseph Hurtado del Aguila and
Meichor de Arboleda Salazar informed the bishop of Popayán
that, with the exception of the Indian children, they had
no authority over the native population beyond the doors of
the church. Arboleda Salazar further reported that his
attempts to force the secular authorities to bring the
Indians out from their retreats, and subject them to the
settlements where they might be instructed in the Catholic
Faith, had been unsuccessful.28
Subsequent bishops of PopayAn - from Juan Gômez FrIas'
predecessor, Fray Mateo de Villafañe, to Diego Fermmn de
Vergara's successor, Don Francisco de Figueredo y
Victoria29 - recognized that the way in which the region
was administered militated against the success of the
evangelization effort. In 1720, for instance, Bishop Juan
Gómez FrIas informed the Crown that because the
corregidores kept the Indians continuously employed in
transportation duties, they were denied the time to attend
Church, learn Christian Doctrine, and be instructed by the
priests. This, the bishop argued, was why the Indians
remained ignorant of the mysteries of the Catholic Faith.3°
In 1736, Bishop Diego FermIn de Vergara also recognized
28 AGI Quito 185, "Informe del cura de Nôvita", in
"Autos sobre la opresián. . .". See also "Inforine del cura
de Quibdô" and "Informe del cura de Llorô", ibid.
29 See ibid., Fray Mateo de Villafañe to Crown,
Popayân, 7 June 1701, and Auto, Don Francisco Joseph de
Figueredo y Victoria, Nôvita, 12 September 1742.
° Ibid., Auto, Popayán, 8 July 1720.
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that the secular authorities were at least partly
responsible for the disappointing state of affairs in the
Chocô. He, too, reported that as the Indians were
continuously occupied in transporting goods for the
corregidores and the governor - the appointment of a
governor having made little difference to the way the
region was administered - the Indians neither attended Mass
nor carried out their duties as Christians. Indeed, the
bishop called the cor.regidores "great thieves", whose
houses were like warehouses stocked full of "rotten
clothing" and other "ridiculous goods" with which they
claimed to pay the Indians.3'
The Franciscan Missionaries and the Secular Clerqy
There was one other factor which many observers,
including the Indians, believed contributed to the native
inhabitants' reluctance to accept the teachings of the
clergy. In general terms, it was said that the endeavours
of the Franciscan clergy had been unsuccessful because they
exploited the Indians, failed to administer the Sacraments
to them, and in fact forced them to escape to the hills and
to die without receiving a single Sacrament. 32
 In 1712,
Rafael de Oquendo informed the Crown of the "abhorrence and
31 Ibid., Diego Fermin de Vergara to Crown, Popayân,
1 December 1737.
32 These were the allegations which the Franciscan
Fray Francisco Seco claimed were made against his order.
See AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p.,
n.d., but dated by the Consejo de Indias in February
1724.
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hate ... felt by the Indians towards the regular priests,
because the ill-treatment they receive from these is
outrageous.. For their part, the Indians of Bebará,
represented by the Indian Don Joseph Sagito, claimed of the
Franciscans that "preferring ... their own business than
the teaching of Doctrine ... they only attend to the
personal service of the chusrna...", while the Indians of
Quibdó complained that "they and their children ... are
punished and oppressed by the priests... ".' As Governor
Lopez de Carvajal informed the oidor Vicente de Aramburu:
if the ministers, tenientes and corregidores
have been so distressing and hateful for the
Indians ... the priests have been no less so, not
only for their dealings with and assistance
provided to royal officials but because they
themselves have inconvenienced and upset [the
Indians] in the same way, and have completely
omitted to teach ... Christian Doctrine ... I did
not see one adult Indian who knew how to cross
himself or understood the error of his ways..
Although the documents do not provide any specific
examples of exploitation on the part of the Franciscans,
there are some indications that they did punish the Indian
children, at least. In 1730, Fray Dionisio de Camino
complained that the corregidores objected to the priests
striking the children for not learning their prayers, and
AGI Santa Fe 362, Rafael de Oquendo to Crown,
Antioquia, 20 September 1712.
AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno. . .sobre la entrada al
rio Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de
oro. . .", ff.25, 34.
Don Joseph de Carvajal to Vicente de Aramburu,
Antioquia, 14 August 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 362,
"Testiinonio de Autos", f.25.
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added that children only learn from fear. 36 As for the
other allegations regarding Franciscan involvement in non-
religious activities, Bishop Gômez FrIas, in particular,
asserted that much of the responsibility for the Indians'
lack of knowledge of Christianity had to be placed on the
members of the Franciscan order, due to their misconduct
and involvement in affairs alien to their ministry. In
1720, this bishop informed the then Father Provincial, Fray
Francisco Antonio Felices, of the disorderly conduct of
some of the Franciscan doctrineros in the Chocó, whose
behaviour, involvement in mining, and lifestyles not in
keeping with their Christian obligations and the poverty
which they preached, had "scandalized my f lock". 37 As the
fiscal of the Council of the Indies' discussion of the
bishop's letter shows, the term "disorderly conduct"
referred to the behaviour of three of the Franciscans then
serving as doctrineros of Indian settlements in the region
- Fray Manuel Caicedo, Fray Matlas Méndez, and Fray Juan
Caballero. These, the fiscal noted, had been removed by
the Franciscan Father Provincial, Fray Francisco Antonio
Felices "for their bad behaviour ... [and their activities]
as ... miners ... merchants and other vices".38
36 Arcila Robledo, op.cit., "Representación hecha
por. . .Fr. Dionisio de Camino...".
AGI Santa Fe 287, Juan Gámez FrIas to Crown,
Popayán, 18 April 1720.
Ibid., Fiscal to Consejo, n.p., n.d. On returning
from New Granada, Pedrosa y Guerrero had recommended that
the friars should not be permitted to operate mines, even
through intermediaries. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio
de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana,
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Undoubtedly, some of the Franciscans in the Chocô were
involved in mining activities: Fray Juan Caballero was said
to have administered a mine owned by his mother in the
region, 39 and in 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo admitted in a
report to the Crown that he had spent 21 years in the
region, as both miner and priest. 40
 As Lorenzo de Salazar
informed the governor of Antioquia in 1711, the Franciscans
"only attend to their own businesses and those of their
relatives occupying themselves in the mines". 4' However,
although there is evidence to indicate some Franciscan
involvement in these activities, there is also evidence
that at least one other religious order and several secular
clerics were actively involved in mining in the Chocó
region.
In the early l720s, Fray Francisco Montiel de
Fuentenovilla, Father Provincial of the order of Nuestra
Señora del Carmen de la Antigua, in Valladolid, wrote to
the Crown about the case of Fray Joseph de Santa Teresa, a
lay brother from his convent. Having been granted the
permission of the Crown and of the prelates of his order,
Fray Joseph de Santa Teresa travelled to New Granada with
Madrid, 8 March 1721.
AGI Santa Fe 286, Jorge de Villalonga to Crown,
Cartagena, 15 March 1721.
° AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24
July 1724.
' Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in
AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al rio
Murri y descubriiniento de nuevos minerales de oro...",
f.83.
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Bishop Fray Mateo de Villafañe, for the purpose of
collecting alms with which to buy lands, the proceeds of
which would serve to support the order in Spain. This lay
brother was said to have purchased lands on the banks of
the San Juan river, consisting of mines and plantain
fields, and to have died intestate while administering the
property. The lands were then sold for 896 pesos and 6
reales, which were forwarded to the order in Spain.42
When the Council of the Indies discussed the case of
Fray Manuel Caicedo, in the early 1720s, it was said that
although he had been pulled out of the Chocô, he had left
his nephew, the secular cleric Roque de Caicedo, also a
miner, to administer his mines. 43 Although there are few
details, it is clear that at least some of the mines held
by secular priests were far more valuable than the modest
holding held by Fray Joseph de Santa Teresa - valued at
only 896 pesos. Nicolás de Inestrosa, who, in 1708, became
embroiled in the dispute between the Mosquera brothers and
other miners in the province of Nôvita over access to
Indian labour, later became priest of the mining camps of
Iró and Mungarra, where he also purchased a mine. When he
died in 1759, he left a fortune in slaves and mines, valued
42 Montiel de Fuentenovilla reported that the money
had been held up by the Casa de Contratación in Cádiz,
pending an investigation into the claims of another
member of the order, from Andalucla, who claimed the
money belonged to him. The Provincial requested the
return of the money in question. See AGI Quito 190, Fray
Francisco Montiel de Fuentenovilla to Crown, n.p., n.d.
The Consejo requested a report on the matter on 15 June
1723.
AGI Santa Fe 287, Fiscal to Consejo, n.p., n.d.
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at 60,000 patacones, to the Franciscan college of Cali.4'
The secular cleric who replaced him as parish priest of Iró
and Mungarra in the early 1730s, Don AgustIn Roso de
Villalba, was also undoubtedly involved in mining in the
province of Nôvita. In a 1750s census of the Chocô's
mining camps and their slave population, Roso de Villalba
was listed as the owner of the mining camp of San Joseph de
Piedra Piedra, and of 11 male working slaves and 5 female
working slaves. This same census also indicates the size
of Inestrosa's holding, Santa Lucia del Calabozo.
Inestrosa was listed as the owner of 46 male working slaves
and 32 female working slaves [See Appendix
We also know that, later in the century, other secular
priests both purchased and ran mining companies in the
Chocó. William Sharp studied the records of one mine owned
by the cleric Juan de Bonilla y Delgado in partnership with
Francisco de Rivas. These two men formed a company, in
1752, to exploit mines in the province of Nôvita: expenses
and profits were to be shared out equally between both
partners. The company was started with 33 slaves, costing
12,645 pesos, and 12,645 pesos worth of equipment and cash.
Colmenares, Cali, pp.138-9, 149.
AGI Santa Fe 733, "Descripción del Gobierno del
Chocô, en la jurisdicciôn del Nuevo Reino de Granada, que
se presenta, con Memorial, a S.M. por Don Pedro Muñoz de
Arjona, hijo del Coronel Don Alfonso de Arjona". Although
this document is undated, it certainly corresponds to the
1750s. It not only includes the mining camp belonging to
Inestrosa, who died in 1759, but also that of the cleric
Don Juan de Bonilla, who formed his company in 1752.
Pedro Muñoz's father, Don Alfonso de Arjona, sent the
Crown a map of the Quibdó region in 1753, which is also
included in this thesis.
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By 1759, Rivas and Bonilla y Delgado owned 98 slaves, and
in 1768, the year Rivas died, the property was valued at
78,980.1 pesos. By this time, the two men owned 212
slaves 46
Such activities were prohibited by the Recopilación de
Leyes de Indias, 47 and, by royal cédula of June 1727, the
Crown tried to enforce these provisions, further
prohibiting clerics from owning or operating mines.48
However, as Nicolâs de Inestrosa's case shows, exceptions
could and were made. In 1730 or 1731, Inestrosa appealed
to the Crown to allow him to retain control of his mine, in
the discovery and operation of which he had invested a
considerable sum of money and much effort, and in which he
employed his own black slaves rather than Indians. He
asked to be exempted from this ruling because the only
purpose of the mine was to enable him to maintain his
orphaned sisters, especially the widow with five children.
Moreover, Inestrosa claimed, he did not administer the mine
46 Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, p.182, and
Table 5, pp.204-OS.
According to the Fiscal of the Consejo, "la
libertad y beneficio de las Minas...les está prohibido
por varias cédulas y en especial por la 4. tit.12 Lib.1
de la recopilaciôn de indias". See AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray
Dionisio de Camino to Crown, n.p., n.d., and Dictanien del
Fiscal, Madrid, 22 May 1727.
Osorio, C.L., "Prohibicián de los Reyes Espafloles
a los Eclesiásticos sobre propiedad y beneficio de
minas", Boletln Histôrico del Valle, Vol.31 (1936),
p.329.
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in person, but instead employed a miner. 49 In November,
1731, the Crown asked the bishop of Popayân for a report on
the matter, and, since witnesses favourable to Inestrosa -
including one relative, Nicolás de Caicedo Inestrosa - were
called to give evidence that he properly fulfilled his
priestly duties, did not live in the mining camp, did not
employ Indians in it or as suppliers of foodstuffs to it,
and paid all quintos in full, we may assume that he was
officially permitted to keep his mine.50
Thus, Bishop Gómez Frias' allegations regarding the
mining activities of some of the members of the Franciscan
order have to be placed in the context of what appears to
have been an occupation common to both branches of the
clergy serving in the region. Indeed, as we shall see,
when Bishop Gómez FrIas was faced with the problem of
dealing with unbenef iced clerics who were said to be living
in the Chocô, he only ordered that those who were not
serving a parish or administering a mine should leave the
region. 5' But the point of focusing on the charges Bishop
AGI Quito 144, Nicolàs de Inestrosa to Crown,
n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed this letter in October
1731.
50 The Cathedral Chapter dealt with this request. See
Osorio, "Prohibiciôn de los Reyes Espanoles", pp.329-35.
Don Ignacio de Piedrahita, one of the witnesses called to
give evidence on Inestrosa's behalf, stated that he had
earlier owned another mine, El Bordo, but that this one
had been abandoned because platinum had been found in the
gold extracted.
51 "Decreto", Juan Gómez Frias, Popayän, 9 June 1721,
in AGI Santa Fe 405, "Despacho Circular que se remnite a
las provincias del Chocô para que los Vicarios de ellas
compelan a los clerigos y regulares salgan de aquellas
provincias y ejecuten lo demás de su contexto. Año de
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Gómez Frias made against the regular doct.rineros is that,
if their activities in the Chocó were so little different
from the activities of the secular clergy, and if both
regulars and seculars agreed that the authority of the
corregidores and the tenientes, and the resistance of the
native population to all forms of Christian instruction
were the main obstacles to the success of the
evangelization effort, why then was the bishop so fiercely
critical of the Franciscan order?
Bishop Juan Góznez Frias and the Franciscan Order
Two factors may have contributed to Bishop Gómez
FrIas' opposition to the Franciscans' control of the
doctrinas of the Chocó. One was that, by the beginning of
the eighteenth century, unemployment among the secular
clergy was rising in the diocese of Popayán. As Peter
Marzahl noted, opportunities for employment in the diocese
were not keeping pace with the increase in the number of
ecciesiastics. While in 1701 there were 19 priests without
a benefice in Popayán, by 1706, their number had risen to
25. 52
 This phenomenon was also found in other parts of
Spanish America. In Guatemala, for instance, the number of
young ecciesiastics grew steadily between the l630s and
1730s, while the number of benefices increased only
marginally. 53
 Although we have no details to indicate the
1721".
52 Marzahl, Town in the Empire, p.139.
- Van Oss, Catholic Colonialism, p.133.
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extent of clerical unemployment in the diocese of Popayán
by the early l720s, there are indications that many
unbenef iced priests went to the Chocô. 	 In 1721, the
Promoter Fiscal of the diocese of Popayán, Don Miguel
Chacón de la Enzina, reported to the bishop that there
were, in the Chocô, many clerics who neither served a
parish nor administered a mine, and since the only other
way of making a living there was through commerce, there
could be no doubt that these clerics were involved in
commercial activities. And, even if they were not detained
there for a legitimate purpose and were not involved in
such an "indecent" occupation, nevertheless "the common
people accuse them of being merchants and traders".
Following this report, Bishop Gômez FrIas issued a decree,
in June 1721, to the effect that all secular and regular
priests in the Chocó who were not detained there for the
purpose of administering a mine or a parish - both of which
he considered to be "legitimate" occupations - should leave
the region within fifteen days of the notification of this
order. In addition, those resident in the region without
license from the bishop, should be denied the use of
churches, chapels, and altars to celebrate Mass. Despite
this decree, and a royal cédula of 29 October 1722
Don Miguel Chacôn de la Enzina to Bishop, Popayán,
9 June 1721, and "Decreto", Juan Gômez FrIas, Popayän, 9
June 1721, in AGI Santa Fe 405, "Despacho Circular que se
remite a las provincias del Chocô para que los Vicarios
de ellas compelan a los clerigos y regulares salgan de
aquellas provincias y ejecuten lo dexnás de su contexto.
Aflo de 1721".
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confirming the bishop's order, 55 the problem of wandering
clerics in the Chocô continued to disturb the Franciscans
in the mission. By the mid-1720s, Fray Dionisio de Camino
complained that, in the doctrinas and mission towns of the
province of Tatamá/Chocó, Citará, and Nóvita (the
settlement of Tadô), the Franciscans were unable to
maintain any calm, because of the "disturbances" promoted
by some secular clerics who went to the Chocó, and
especially to the province of Citarâ, "to conspire with the
inhabitants ... to make reports against the religious". He
believed, with good cause, that their motive was to take
over their doctrinas.56
This situation arose because, in the sixteenth
century, the Crown placed the responsibility for the
pacification of the native populations of border areas on
the missionary orders. There were, at that time, specific
reasons for the Crown's decision: the regulars were greater
in number, they were thought to be more manageable, more
zealous, and more morally reliable than the secular clergy.
Nevertheless, the Crown only intended the regular orders to
assume control of unconquered Indians for a period of ten
years, after which it was envisaged that the new converts
Royal Cédula, 29 October 1722, in AGI Santa Fe
404, "Testiinonio de Autos".
56 AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to King,
n.p., n.d. The fiscal of the Consejo discussed the
contents of this letter in May 1727.
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were to be handed over to the secular clergy. 57 In
practice, however, the process of conversion took a great
deal longer - in some cases it was not achieved even by the
end of the colonial period - and the parochial and diocesan
method of administration that should have been established
- that is, parishes administered by secular clerics under
the direct control, jurisdiction, and correction of the
diocesan bishops - had not properly been put into effect
even by the middle of the eighteenth century.
Consequently, the regular orders continued to enjoy the
extensive privileges and exemptions - save for those acts
requiring episcopal consecration - which were granted by
the papacy during the period of pioneering missionary
work, 58 and which originated in the Crown's decision to
resort to the regular orders to carry out the immense task
of conversion in the New World. 59 However, once the zeal
and moral integrity of the regulars came into question, and
the number of secular clerics began to increase at a faster
rate than the number of available benef ices, it was
inevitable that the privileges of the orders would clash
with the jurisdictional claims of the bishops.
Indeed, the observations of Gôrnez Frias' successor,
Diego FermIn de Vergara, provides further evidence that the
Boxer, The Church Militant, pp.71-2, and Barnadas,
Josep M., "The Catholic Church in Colonial Spanish
America", in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History
of Latin America (London, 1984), Vol.1
58 Boxer, The Church Militant, pp.65-6.
ibid., and Barnadas, "The Catholic Church"
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root of the problem between the Franciscan order in the
Chocó and the bishops of Popayán lay precisely in the clash
of interests between the independence of the former and the
jurisdictional claims of the latter. In 1736, Diego FermIn
de Vergara claimed that the religious state of the region
would not have been as disastrous had the secular clergy
taken control of the settlements of the Chocó. The bishop
argued that, unlike the secular clergy, who were subject to
the vigilance of the bishop, the Franciscan order formed a
"formidable regiment" of clerics who were not subject to
any form of discipline. And, most significantly, he
complained that the Franciscans recognized their Father
Provincial, and never the bishop, as their superior.60
It was precisely this independence of the Franciscan
order which Bishop Gômez Frias had tried to undermine,
using a variety of tactics. For example, the allegations
which the bishop made about the conduct of Franciscans in
the mission field, and about the "scandalous" divisions
which had arisen within the Franciscan Province of Santa
Fe, related specifically to the election of a new Father
Provincial to replace the outgoing Provincial in 1723, were
used to damage the reputation of the Franciscans and the
support they enjoyed in the royal court.
Thus, in 1720, Bishop Juan Gómez Frlas informed the
Crown that the dispute which had divided the Franciscan
Province of Santa Fe had arisen because of the forthcoming
60 AGI Quito 185, Diego Fermin de Vergara to Miguel
de Villanueba, Medellln, 30 February 1737, and Diego
Fermin de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737.
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appointment of a new Father Provincial to replace the
outgoing Provincial, Fray Francisco Antonio Felices. The
bishop explained that these internal problems had been
caused by the emergence of a faction, led by Fray Diego
Barroso, which opposed the election of the candidate, Fray
Manuel de la Prada, supported by the outgoing Father
Felices. According to the bishop, Fray Diego Barroso was
putting pressure to bear on members of the order to ensure
the election of his candidate, Fray Dionisio de Camino.
Bishop Gômez Frias alleged that these opposing groups
emerged for two reasons. The first was that Father Felices
had begun a reform of the order, which involved not only
the removal, for reasons of misconduct, of the Franciscans
Caicedo, Méndez, and Caballero from the doctrinas they
served in the Chocó, but also the abolition of the
contributions that Franciscan c7octrineros were expected to
make towards the upkeep of the order - contributions which,
the bishop alleged, were responsible for the Franciscans in
that region becoming involved in commercial activities.
The second reason was that Father Felices represented a
group of Franciscans who believed that the order should
abandon the Chocó region completely. As Fray Manuel de la
Prada was expected to continue the reform initiated by
Father Felices, and to continue to work towards withdrawing
the Franciscan doctrineros from the mission, the second
faction - opposed to both the reform and the order's
withdrawal from the Chocó - had mustered up considerable
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support to ensure that he was not elected. 6' In reporting
the divisions within the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe,
the bishop's purpose was not only to declare his support
for the Felices faction, but also to discredit the opposing
Barroso faction, by alleging that Fray Diego Barroso had
caused much conflict in the order "for appointing favoured
doctrineros, guardians, and other officers" and for
endorsing the candidature of Fray Dionisio de Camino for
the post of Provincial of the order, a man of "no religious
qualities" 62
The reasons for the division within the Franciscan
order are documented in government papers. In 1719, Fray
Joseph Palos, Father Provincial of the Franciscan Province
of Chile and Visitor General of the Province of Santa Fe,
presented a motion for discussion relating to whether the
order should retain its mission in the Chocô or withdraw
completely from it. Father Felices, then Provincial,
argued in favour of abandoning the mission, on the grounds
that despite the fact that the order had held on to the
mission continuously for more than forty years, very few
results had been obtained. Father Felices based his
argument on two main points. First, that the order was
unlikely to make any further progress among the Indians,
not only because the secular authorities and miners in the
region kept them continuously employed in other
61 AGI Santa Fe 287, Juan Gômez Frlas to Crown,
Popayän, 18 April 1720.
62 Ibid., Fiscal to Consejo, n.p., n.d.
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occupations, but because the Indians themselves were all
"indomable brutes, involved in their idolatrous
[practices]...". And, although he had recently received
confirmation from Fray Juan Domingo Calderôn that the
Sacrament of Penitence had been administered to some sixty
Indians and that of Communion to a few others, it had to be
said that this was not much of an achievement after forty
years of missionary activity. Secondly, Father Felices
believed that the order's principal responsibility was
towards its own members. Clearly concerned about reports
regarding the behaviour of the Franciscans in the field, he
added that the vow of poverty taken by the members of his
order was in danger of being broken in the Chocó, "for
since the Chocô is where gold is continuously extracted
from, where greed, self-interest ... rule, who can deny
that, in that place, a Franciscan would be in grave danger,
due to interests alien to our status...". And while he
acknowledged that many of the allegations made against the
Franciscans were probably untrue, and the result of the
lawlessness which characterized life in the region, he
concluded that a uttree which bears no fruit is best cut
down..	 63
The second faction - led by Fray Diego Barroso -
argued that the order could not abandon the mission, for
three reasons: first, because it would be failing in its
duty to the King, who had entrusted the mission to the
63 AGI Santa Fe 403, Fray Francisco Antonio Felices,
Santa Fe, 13 November 1719.
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Franciscans; secondly, because the Chocó mission was the
most honourable branch of the order in the Kingdom, given
the Franciscan blood that had been spilled in the process
of its establishment; and thirdly, and most significantly,
because it would be wrong to abandon a mission that had,
only since 1707, been producing an income for the order in
excess of that necessary to maintain the priests in the
field. The Franciscans' withdrawal from the Chocó would
mean that the mission would be handed over to priests who
had played no part in its establishment. And, as far as
the allegations about the conduct of the Franciscans were
concerned, Father Barroso believed that these were the
result of the doctrineros' refusal to allow the inhabitants
of the region to have their own way with the Indians, and
their continued defense of the Indian against ill-
treatment. It was for this reason that unsustainable
charges were made against the friars, and if these were to
be punished on the basis of accusations alone, they would
all have to be punished.
In the event neither candidate won the election. The
order elected Fray Buenaventura de Vega, a friar believed
by Viceroy Villalonga to be sufficiently unconcerned about
worldly matters to put some order back into the Franciscan
Province of Santa Fe. 65 But the point of this discussion
Ibid., Fray Diego Barroso, Santa Fe, 18 November
1719.
65 AGI Santa Fe 287, Viceroy Villalonga to Crown,
Santa Fe, 8 February 1723. Francisco Antonio Felices was
said to have been supported by only one like-minded
member of the order, Fray Tomás Guerrero. See AGI Santa
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about the arguments put forward by Fathers Felices and
Barroso is that they highlight two important issues. The
first is that Bishop Gômez FrIas supported the Felices
faction precisely because it was in his interests to do so:
Father Felices was in favour of abandoning the mission and
transferring the Franciscan doctrinas to the secular
clergy. Indeed, the bishop's determination to displace the
Franciscans from the doctrinas in the Chocô actually led to
allegations being made about his own integrity. In 1721,
Viceroy Jorge de Villalonga informed the King that the
reports about the Franciscans in the Chocô had to be
treated with some caution, because it was said that Father
Felices and Bishop Juan Gômez FrIas had struck a bargain
whereby the bishop would support Felices in exchange for
his efforts to convince the order of the wisdom of
transferring the Chocô doctrinas to the secular clergy.
The second point highlighted by the cases put forward
by Barroso and Felices is that the Franciscan order had
begun, from the turn of the century, to benefit financially
from the mission, and that this is most likely explanation
for Father Barroso's determination that the order should
remain in the Chocó. Father Barroso and Fray Dionisio de
Camino, the candidate whom he endorsed for the election of
Provincial, had in fact also been accused of corruption by
Viceroy Villalonga. In 1722, Villalonga reported to the
Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p., n.d., and
Dictamen del Fiscal, 4 February 1724.
AGI Santa Fe 286, Jorge de Villalonga to Crown,
Cartagena, 15 March 1721.
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Crown that Fray Dionisio de Cainino had been detained in the
port of Honda, with ten boxes and two trunks containing
contraband goods. 67 Furthermore, it was because the order
was benefiting financially from the mission that Bishop
Gômez Frias accused the order of imposing contributions on
its members serving in the field, and that Diego FermIn de
Vergara alleged that the Franciscan Father Provincial had
carried out two visitations to the region over the course
of one single year, which had amounted to nothing more than
stealing as much as possible from the Franciscan
doctrineros 68
We have few details regarding the method of payment of
Franciscan doctrineros in the Chocó, save for one statement
taken by the governor of Antioquia, Don Joseph Lopez de
Carvajal, in 1712. In January of that year, Don Bartolomé
de Borja y Espeleta - former teniente general of the
province of Citará - informed him that, of the five peso
tribute paid annually by the Indians of the province of
Citarâ, two pesos were paid in stipend to the doctrinero of
each settlement. 69
 The doctrinerc's appear not have kept
the whole of their stipends for themselves: in the early
67 AGI Santa Fe 286, Viceroy Villalonga to Crown,
Santa Fe, 9 August 1722. The Viceroy reported that those
responsible were Fray Diego Barroso and Fray Dionisio de
Cam mo.
68 AGI Santa Fe 287, Juan GOmez Frias to Crown,
Popayän, 18 April 1720, and AGI Quito 185, Diego Ferinmn
de Vergara to Miguel de Villanueba, Medellin, 30 February
1737.
69 Antioquia, 4 January 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 307,
"Cuaderrio.. . sabre la entrada al rio Murri y
descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.144-45.
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l720s, Fray Francisco Seco stated that it was true that the
order had, since 1702, taken whatever money was left after
the doctrineros' own needs had been met. This money was
applied to the Divine Cult, the promotion of studies, and
the needs of the monasteries.70
Making allegations about the behaviour of the
doctrineros and bringing the internal problems of the
Franciscan Province of Santa Fe to the attention of the
Crown was a tactic employed by the bishop to discredit the
order. At the local level, the bishop used a variety of
other tactics to undermine the activities of the
Franciscans in the Chocá - tactics which involved a strict
interpretation of the Spanish Crown's Patronato Real.
Under the terms of the Patronato, the Spanish Crown assumed
the responsibility for protecting and maintaining the
church in the newly conquered territories and for promoting
the conversion of the native inhabitants to the Catholic
Faith.	 In exchange for its services in promoting the
Faith, and in accordance with the concessions granted by
the papal bulls of Alexander VI (1493 and 1501), Julius II
(1508), and Hadrian V (1523), the Crown was granted not
only the right to collect and administer the tithes on
agricultural and livestock production, the proceeds of
which would be used to pay salaries, and build and endow
cathedrals, churches, monasteries, and hospitals, but also
to present candidates for all ecclesiastical appointments.
70 AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown,
n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed this letter in February
1724.
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The Crown took upon itself the privilege of presenting
candidates for appointment to higher level ecclesiastical
positions. Its nominations for archbishops and bishops in
all the archdioceses and dioceses of Spanish America were
sent to the Pope, who confirmed and formally instated the
nominees in office. The Crown, or the Council of the
Indies, also nominated members of the cathedral chapters,
although in these cases, it was the local bishops who
installed the candidates in office. Nominations for lesser
benefices were also taken care of at the local level:
candidates were presented by the local prelates for the
approval of the viceroys - or the provincial governors -
acting as vicepatrons, and the nominees were formally
installed by the local bishops or archbishops. The
creation of archdioceses, dioceses, and parishes also
formed part of the privileges granted by the Patronato
Real 71
In the Chocô, Bishop Góxnez FrIas refused to cooperate
with the Franciscans by invoking the rights and privileges
of the diocesan bishops under the terms of the Spanish
Crown's Patronato. The following specific examples of
conflict over the erection of new parishes and doctrinas
and over the presentation and appointment of doctrineros,
shows the many ways in which the bishops could - and in
this case, did - curtail the independence of the regular
71 See, for example, France V. Scholes, "An Overview
of the Colonial Church", in Greenleaf (ed.), The Roman
Catholic Church, pp.21-3; Barnadas, "The Catholic
Church", pp.512-13; and Haring, The Spanish Empire,
p.167.
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orders in frontier regions which, once entirely Indian, had
become promising regions where Indian settlements existed
alongside a growing Spanish population - a perfect
environment for the erection of secular parishes. However,
these examples also show how a bishop's attempts to
displace the regular orders could be thwarted if the
prelate failed to secure the support of the vicepatron,
whose agreement to any ecclesiastical appointment or the
erection of any parish within his jurisdiction had to be
obtained before these could take effect. Indeed, in the
case of the Chocó in the early l720s, the vicepatron's
support of the Franciscan order72 proved to be the crucial
factor in the complete failure of the bishop to make any
changes in the way in which the region was administered by
the regulars, and led, in the medium-term at least, to the
Crown deciding to favour the Franciscans and protect their
doctrinas.
In 1719, Bishop Gómez Frias appointed the secular
cleric Nicolâs de Inestrosa as parish priest of the mining
camps of Irô and Mungarra, in the province of Nôvita, on
the grounds that the spiritual needs of the miners, slave
gangs, and other people who lived in the camps could not be
met by the Franciscan doctrineros of the settlement of Tadó
because of the great distances which separated the Indian
settlements from the mining camps. The basic premise upon
which this appointment was based was that Iró and Mungarra
72 See, for example, AGI Santa Fe 286, Viceroy
Villalonga to Crown, Cartagena, 15 March 1721.
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had always been a separate curato - as opposed to a
doct.rina - and that it had never been administered by the
Franciscans .7
The Franciscans, appealing to the viceroy and later to
the Crown, based their opposition to the bishop's action on
their understanding that the mining camps of Iró and
Mungarra were annexes of the doctrina of Tadó - which they
served - and that, therefore, a Franciscan had to be
appointed as priest for the miners and slaves of the
camps. 74
 On 7 October 1720, the viceroy - acting a
vicepatron - decreed that there were no grounds for the
bishop's appointment of Inestrosa, for such an action would
transform the mining camps - annexes of the Franciscan
dcctrina of Tadó - into a curato administered by the
secular clergy. The viceroy agreed that the Franciscans
alone could present candidates for appointment as priests
to the mining camps.75
The bishop either failed or refused to enforce the
viceroy's decision, and because Inestrosa remained as
priest of the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra, the
Franciscan order appealed to the Crown, and claimed that
not only these mining camps, but all the annexes of their
AGI Santa Fe 411, "Testimonio de información
recibida por el Dr. Dn Nicolás de Iriestrosa como
visitador de las Provincias del Chocó' t , ff.l-20.
AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph Antonio de Oliva to
Crown, n.p., n.d.
AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph Antonio de Oliva to
Crown, n.p., n.d. This letter was received by the Consejo
in October 1750.
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doctrinas in the region were slowly being stripped from
them. Although by royal cédula of 12 November 1724, the
Crown ordered that all annexes of Franciscan doctrinas in
the Chocô should be restored to the Franciscans, the bishop
flatly refused to enforce this ruling in Ira and Mungarra
on the pretext that these mining camps had not been
mentioned specifically in the cédula.76
Despite the promulgation of the cédula, the case
dragged on until 1735, and in that year the Audiencia of
Santa Fe - after a lengthy investigation - declared that
Inestrosa's presentation for appointment as priest of the
mining camps of Irô and Mungarra was not valid, and that
these should be restored to the Franciscans. By this time,
however, Iró and Mungarra was administered by the secular
priest Don Agustln Roso de Villalba, who also appealed to
the Audiencia - which upheld its decision of 5 December
1735 in favour of the Franciscan missionaries - and then to
the Crown.
To make their point that the mining camps of Iró and
Mungarra either were or were not annexes of the doctrina of
Tadó, both parts based their cases on historical documents.
For the Franciscans, these went back to 1649 - Fray Matlas
Abad's expedition to the region; for the seculars, to 1669
- Quevedo's expedition and the later appointment of the
76 AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph Antonio de Oliva to
Crown, n.p., nd.
' Ibid..
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secular priests Simon Amigo and Luis Antonio de la Cueva.78
The poor record of regular and secular clergy in the region
meant that both sides could only use "historical precedent"
as an argument to justify their claims to the mining camps.
Neither side, for example, based their claims on the moral
superiority of one branch of the clergy over the other, or,
in the case of the Franciscans, on their superior knowledge
of the Indians' languages or customs. These were the
arguments put forward by the regular orders of Guatemala,
for instance, when threatened with the secularization of
their doctrinas. However, as Van Oss pointed out, the
regular orders of Guatemala put immense efforts into
learning the "multitude of dialects" spoken by their
indigenous parishioners, to the extent that, in 1744, it
was suggested that the regular doctrineros forbade the
Indians to speak Spanish "in order to make themselves
indispensable in their doctrinas".79 No such
justifications were ever used in the ChocO, since the moral
integrity of the Franciscans and the secular clergy was a
matter of growing concern to many observers, while the
study of Indian language and customs was never mentioned
and apparently never taken seriously by either regulars or
seculars in this region.
78 See, for example, AGI Santa Fe 406, AgustIn Roso y
Villalba to Crown, n.p., n.d. This letter was written in
response to the Audiencia's rulings of 1735 and 1737 that
IrO and Mungarra were annexes of TadO.
' Van Oss, Catholic Colonialism, pp.126-30.
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These differences notwithstanding, the Crown responded
to Roso y Villalba's appeal with a royal cédula, of 30
August 1738, ordering the Audiencia to reinstate the
secular priest to the parish - or curato - of Iró and
Mungarra. At the same time, the cédula ordered the
Audiencia to investigate the claims of both sides and to
ascertain whether or not Iró and Mungarra were annexes of
the doctrina of Tadô. By June, 1748, the Audiencia had
concluded that Iró and Mungarra were annexes of Tadó, and
that the secular clergy should restore the mining camps to
the Franciscan order. 8° The dispute over Irô and Mungarra
had taken 30 years to resolve.
The erection of a new parish for Spaniards, slaves,
rnestizos, and mulattoes in the province of Citará became
the subject of another lengthy dispute between the bishop
and the order over who the new parish was to be
administered by. A royal cédula of 25 April 1722 - issued
in response to the bishop's request for authorization to
erect a new parish for the miners who claimed that their
religious needs could not be served by the doctrinero of
Quibdô, and who committed themselves to build a decent
church and pay the priest's stipend 8' - ordered the
viceroy, as vicepatron - to proceed with the erection and
to give his consent to the appointment of a secular priest,
° AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph de Oliva to Crown,
n.p., n.d. Father Oliva asked that the Audiencia's
decision of June 1748 be confirmed by royal cédula.
81 AGI Quito 185, Juan Gômez Frias to Crown, Popayán,
26 November 1720.
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as requested by the bishop. By November 1724, a second
royal cédula had been issued, in response to a letter from
Viceroy Villalonga suggesting that if the new parish was
proved to fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Franciscans' mission, their right to present candidates for
the appointment of a priest could not be waived. Following
the Council of the Indies' decision that the new parish did
indeed fall within the jurisdiction of the Franciscan
mission, this second cédula ordered that a Franciscan was
to be appointed to the new parish. By the end of 1725,
however, the Franciscan Fray Dionisio de Camino was
reporting to the King that the cédula of November, 1724,
had been challenged by the bishop, on the grounds that a
secular priest had already been appointed and that the
enforcement of the Crown's directive would involve
divesting the priest of his curato.82
While on the one hand Bishop Gôrnez Frias sought to
curb the authority of the Franciscans by erecting new
parishes for Spaniards and slaves and appointing secular
priests to serve them, on the other he sought to prevent
the order increasing its sphere of influence in the region
by refusing to authorize the erection of new doctrinas for
the Indian population, on 19 January 1720, Viceroy
Villalonga presented a Franciscan - Fray Juan de Ayala -
f or appointment as doctrinero of the recently founded
82 AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionislo de Camino to
Crown, n.p., n.d. See also the fiscal's discussion, dated
22 May 1727, and AGI Quito 127, Jorge de Villalonga to
Crown, Santa Fe, 13 November 1723.
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Indian settlement of Beté, Negua, and Nemota, in accordance
with the terms of the Patronato Real. 83 Juan Gómez Frias,
however, objected on two grounds. The first was that the
doctrina of Beté, with its annexes of Negua and Némota, had
not been erected in accordance with Canon Law. It was
the bishop's privilege to approve and erect doctrinas and
curatos, with the consent of the vicepatron and in
accordance with Canon Law and the terms of the Patronato
Real. As these preconditions had not been met, the
benefice could not be considered lawfully erected, and the
candidate presented for appointment could not be
installed. 85 As the Prornotor Fiscal, Miguel Chacón de la
Enzina, concluded, the erection of the doctrina and the
aggregation of its annexes by the Franciscans in this case
amounted to a usurpation of the privileges of the bishop of
the diocese.	 In the establishment of a doctz-ina, the
consent of the vicepatron follows, and does not precede,
the inspection and approval of the bishop. 86
 While
jealously guarding his authority against intrusion by the
Franciscan order or indeed the viceroy, Juan Gómez FrIas
83 Presentación sin fundación, Santa Fe, 19 February
1720, in AGI Quito 185, "Testimonio de los autos obrados
sobre la erecciôn de curato en el Citarâ Provincia de las
Chocô y informes de los curas sobre el maltratamniento que
los indios reciben de los jueces seculares, de que hace
remisión al Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias
el. . .Obispo de Popayán. Año de 1720".
Diligencia de Protocolos, 11 September 1720, ibid.
85 Decision, Popayán, 12 September 1720, ibid..
86 Respuesta del Promotor Fiscal, Pcpayân, 12
September 1720, ibid.
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constructed a case against the erection of this new
doctrina. According to the bishop, Nicolâs de Inestrosa
and Francisco Marquéz de Ayala had only recently carried
out an ecclesiastical visitation to the Chocó region, and
at that time, the settlement of Beté had been found to
consist of little more than three or four families who had
been captured in Murri, five or six houses, and a straw
covered church which contained neither an altar nor
adornments. Moreover, Beté had not been and could not be
established as a doctrina or a benefice because the time
granted to the Indians to settle in the town without having
to pay tributes had not yet passed, and therefore there was
no source from which the priest's stipend could be paid.
Furthermore, there was no evidence to indicate that the
Spanish mining camps and settlements of free people of
Negua and Nemota - claimed by the Franciscans to form part
of the new doctrina of Beté - were annexes of the
settlement. 87 However, we may assume that the bishop's
decision in this case, too, was overridden by the Crown,
for, by the mid-1720s, Fray Dioriisio de Camino reported
that Beté was one of the doctrinas administered by the
regulars in the region.88
Finally, the bishop tried to curb the authority of the
Franciscans by denying his consent to the candidates
87 Certificaciôn del Secretario, 11 September 1720,
and Certificación Fiscal, Popayân, 11 September 1720,
ibid.
88 AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to
Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed this letter in
May 1727.
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presented by the order for appointment as doctrineros of
the Indian settlements. In this the bishop based his case
on royal cédulas - that of 20 June 1720, for instance 39 -
which ordered that doctrineros were not to be removed from
their doctrinas each time a provincial chapter was
celebrated. As he informed the Crown, the frequency with
which the priests were transferred meant that they were not
encouraged to apply themselves properly to the fulfillment
of their ministry. Instead, secure in the knowledge that
they could be transferred at a moment's notice, they
completely neglected their duties, since, after all, they
were unlikely to be asked to justify their activities.90
Thus, when the viceroy presented the Franciscan Fray Andrés
Bermudes for appointment as doctrinero of Lloró, the bishop
refused to confirm the appointment on the grounds that
another Franciscan - Fray Joseph de Tapia - had been
89 This cédula was discussed by the Consejo, in
February 1724, in the context of the letter sent to the
Crown by Fray Francisco Seco. See AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray
Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p., n.d.
9° Ibid., Fray Dionisio de Camino to King, n.p., n.d.
This letter was discussed by the Consejo on 28 November
1724. The frequent transfer of friars in the doctrinas
controlled by the regular orders appears to have been a
characteristic of all the religious orders in many parts
of New Granada. In 1646, the Archbishop of Santa Fe
complained of the orders' propensity to transfer friars
from their doctrinas at two year intervals, and without
informing the Archbishop, a precondition laid down under
the terms of the Patronato. The Archbishop believed that
this policy prevented the friars from becoming closely
involved with their parishes, and it also prevented the
Archbishop from effectively correcting any problems in
the parishes, because every time a visita was conducted
the parishes were administered by different friars. See
AGI Santa Fe 227, Archbishop of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa
Fe, 28 November 1646.
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serving as doctrinero of the same settlement for the
previous year and had fulfilled his duties satisfactorily.
Although this dispute ended with the timely death of Fray
Andrés Bermudes, the case shows the way in which the bishop
sought to impose his own authority in the diocese even if
it meant coming into conflict with the vicepatron. By law,
Gômez Frias claimed, the bishop had to approve the
candidates presented by the prelates of the orders before
the vicepatron could present them for appointment. 9' While
it is not clear whether the bishop did have a legal basis
upon which to make this claim, his actions led the
Franciscan order - without success - to request the Crown's
permission to override the rights of the diocesan bishop
and to present their candidates for appointment to the
Archbishop of Santa Fe.
Despite the fact that Bishop Juan Gómez FrIas was
unsuccessful in his attempts to undermine the authority of
the Franciscan order, to damage its reputation, and to
challenge its right to administer the doctrinas of the
Chocó, since the Crown chose to support the Franciscans'
efforts in the region, this chapter has shown how the Chocó
mission became another of the frontier areas of the empire
repeatedly disputed by secular and regular clergy during
the first half of the eighteenth century. The Franciscan
' AGI Santa Fe 185, Juan Górnez Frias to King,
Popayán, 6 November 1723.
AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown,
fl.p., n.d. This letter was discussed by the Consejo in
February 1724.
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order found itself challenged on many fronts during this
period, not only within New Granada but also in many other
parts of Spanish America. In Cartagena, for instance, the
same Franciscan Province of Santa Fe came into conflict
with two bishops and the cathedral chapter over the secular
clergy's appropriation of four doctrinas in the
tlrabá/Darién/Sinü area, during exactly the same period. In
the mid-l720s, Fray Dionisio de Camino reported to the
Crown that four Indian settlements administered by
Franciscans in that region - San Pedro de Alcántara, Jesus,
Maria y Joseph, Guadalupe, and San Sebastian - had been
transferred by the bishop of Cartagena to the secular
clergy. Despite a cédula of September 1725 directing that
the settlements should be returned to the control of the
order, two subsequent bishops and the cathedral chapter had
all refused to do so, on the grounds that they had already
been erected as secular parishes served by secular
priests
In New Mexico, jurisdictional conflicts between the
bishops of Durango and the Franciscan friars over that
mission territory lasted until the end of the eighteenth
century. The dispute between the bishops of Durango and
the Franciscans over the New Mexico mission differs in some
respects from that between the bishop of Popayãn and the
order in the Chocó, in the sense that, unlike the Chocó,
AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to
Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed the letter in
August 1727 and concluded that the Franciscans were to be
reinstated as doctrineros of the settlements.
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which formed part of the diocese of Popayán, the New Mexico
mission did not form part of the diocese of Durango, and
the Franciscans defended their ground by challenging any
attempt by the bishop to interfere with their affairs or
even carry out an episcopal visitation to the region.
However, the New Mexico case, like the dispute between the
order and the bishops of Cartagena, indicates that the
Chocó dispute formed part of a broader movement on the part
of the ecclesiastical authorities in many of the Spanish
colonies to assert their episcopal authority over, and
perhaps even displace altogether, the independent
missionary orders.
At least until after mid-century, with the advent of
the Bourbons and the subsequent reform of the
ecclesiastical establishment throughout the Spanish empire,
the regular orders won a reprieve. 95 In the Chocó, as in
other areas of Spanish Aiuerica, 96 the Crown first responded
in an ambiguous and confused manner to the reports from the
bishop and the Franciscan order, supporting one side and
then the other. Finally, the dispute was resolved in
favour of the Franciscans: for instance, early attempts by
Like the Franciscans in the Chocó, the New Mexico
friars also became the subject of attacks about their
administration of the mission and serious charges were
said to have been made against them. See Adams,
"Jurisdictional Conflict in the Borderlands", pp.225-228.
Nancy Farriss's study of the ecclesiastical
reforms of the Bourbons analyses closely the application
of the reform programme in Mexico. See Nancy Farriss,
Crown and Clergy in Colonial Mexico, 1759-1821: The
Crisis of Ecclesiastical Authority (London, 1968).
Boxer, The Church Militant, p.66.
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the Crown to put a stop to Franciscan misconduct by
demanding that Fathers Barroso, Caicedo, Méndez, and
Caballero be sent to Spain, were followed by the Fiscal
of the Consejo recommending that these negative reports
should be ignored: there was no need for these friars to
appear in Spain. 98 Indeed, in 1724, the Crown even asked
Fray Manuel Caicedo, already in the peninsula, to report on
whether he thought that the Chocô region should be
separated from the gobernaciôn of Popayán.
As we saw from the pastoral visit of Bishop Diego
FermIn de Vergara, with which we opened this chapter, the
Crown's decision to maintain the status quo meant that no
changes were to take place for some time. Diego FermIn de
Vergara, like Juan Gômez FrIas, complained at length about
the Franciscans and about the corregidores. But, despite
his complaints, this bishop made no attempt to challenge
the order's control of the doctrinas of the Chocó.
Instead, his pastoral visitation was directed mainly at
establishing cofradlas, carrying out confirmations,
preaching Christian Doctrine, urging the faithful to live
as true Catholics, and ordering the building of new parish
churches. He also, of course, urged the corregidores and
Royal Cédula, 29 October 1722, in AGI Santa Fe
404, "Testimonio de Autos".
98 See the Fiscal's discussion of Fray Francisco Seco
to Crown, in ibid., February 1724.
AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24
July 1724.
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the priests to allow the Indian population to attend Mass
and instruction in the Christian Faith.'°°
Bishop Diego Ferinin de Vergara's measures, however,
had little effect. When Bishop Joseph de Figueredo y
Victoria conducted his pastoral visitation, in 1742, to the
settlements of San Joseph de Noanama and San Agustin de
Sipi, both of which were secular-controlled settlements in
the province of Nóvita, he found that the Indians
• . . after so many years [since] their reduction
and conversion are as ignorant as they were in
the beginning ... persevering in the errors of
their heathenism. And in ascertaining the root
and cause of so much wrong and of the loss of so
many souls, the priests excuse themselves [by
blaming] the corregidores ... stating that these
keep [the Indians] occupied all year in their own
activities and businesses, sometimes in the
canoes, in the transportation of goods for sale,
and others in cultivating ... maize ... [which
results] in the priests not being able to keep
them settled ... to instruct them ... and explain
the Holy Gospel. .
The Indians' lack of knowledge of Christianity continued to
concern crown officials even at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, by which time, the regular clergy had
disappeared completely from the Chocó, leaving all parishes
in the control of the seculars.
The Franciscans apparently began their retreat from
the Chocó region in 1753. In that year, the bishop of
Popayán, Don Diego del Corro, refused to appoint a
Franciscan presented for the doctrina of Quibdó, Fray Pedro
'°° AGI Quito 185, "Certificación de la visita de
Nôvitat'.
'°' Ibid, Auto, Don Joseph de Figueredo y Victoria,
San Gerónimo de Nôvita, 12 September 1742.
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RamIrez, on the grounds that he had already received a
royal cédula ordering the secularization of all regular
doctrinas in the region once they became vacant.'02 The
number of Franciscans serving doctrinas in the Chocó
certainly dwindled after the mid-eighteenth century. In
1777 and 1780, one regular priest served the town of
Murri.'°3
 By the latter date, two other regulars were
present in the town of Quibdó, although they shared the
administration of this parish with three secular clerics.
All the remaining parishes of the Chocó region were,
however, administered by seculars, of which there were a
total of 20.'°
The numbers of ecciesiastics in the region fell over
the following decades. In 1789, Francisco Silvestre noted
that the 15 towns and all the mining camps of the region -
inhabited by a total population of 15,286 - were served by
only sixteen secular clerics and three regulars.'°5
 By
1807, the governor of the Chocó, Don Carlos de Ciaurriz,
reported that many of the Chocô's towns were not actually
served by a priest. The post of parish priest of El Cajón,
for instance, had been vacant for several years, and no
candidates had been presented to fill it. And although the
102 The cédula was dated 1 February 1753. See Pacheco,
La Iglesia Bajo el Regalismo de los Borbones, pp.368-9.
103 Anónimo, "Descripciôn", p.30.
104 
"Relación del Chocó ... en que se manifiesta su
actual estado...", in Ortega Ricaurte, Historia
documental, p.212.
105 Silvestre, Descripción, p.42.
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priest of Nóvita was supposed to serve the parishioners of
El Cajôn while they did not have a priest of their own,
this was hardly possible, given that he also had to serve
the parishes of Las Juntas and Baudô, situated at distances
of two and four days from Nôvita. The towns of Chaini and
Tatamá, in the province of Citará, were also in need of the
services of a priest - particularly since these towns
together had an Indian population of 1,128. In addition,
by 1807, Murri had lost its regular priest. Ciaurriz noted
that the 115 Indians of the settlement were then served by
the priest of the tow settlements of Beté and Bebará, which
were at a distance of two days from Murri.'°6
The seculars, like their Franciscan predecessors,
clearly failed to make any impact on the religious lives of
their Indian parishioners. Francisco Silvestre, for
instance, observed that progress among the Indians had been
very slow.	 Although the Indians were taught Christian
Doctrine in childhood, this was forgotten no sooner had
they become adults.'°7 In 1807, Governor Don Carlos de
Ciaurriz confirmed that the Indians of the Chocô region had
not learned even the most basic rudiments of the Catholic
Faith. As a result, they continued to live "possessed by
superstition", and although they had all been baptised,
106 Four of the towns Ciaurriz mentioned had enjoyed
the services of a priest in 1780: Las Juntas, El Cajón,
ChamI, and Murri. See Footnote 102 and Victor A. Bedoya
(ed.), "Visita del Gobernador del ChocO, Don Carlos de
Ciaurriz, practicada en el territorio de su mando en los
aflos de 1804-1807", Revista Colorabiana de Antropologla,
Vol.11 (1962), pp.155-56, 158.
'° Silvestre, Descripción, p.42. See also p.74.
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they still referred to "the God of the Christians" - one
which formed no part of their own religious experience.'08
Both Silvestre and Ciaurriz pointed to one factor
which they believed contributed to the Spaniards' inability
to make any headway in implanting Christian concepts among
the Indians. While Silvestre observed that there were very
few Indians who had any knowledge of the Spanish language,
Ciaurriz focused on the fact that, because little effort
had been made to provide the children with a basic
education, the Indians of the Chocó continued to speak
their own native languages, making comprehension of
Christian Doctrine and the mysteries of the Catholic Faith
extremely difficult.
These, of course, are factors that would have been
affected by the size of the white population. As we saw in
the Introduction to this thesis, the number of white
settlers in the region was always very small. Despite the
fact that the Chocó's mines provided immense quantities of
precious metals for their owners and administrators, for
the traders and merchants who supplied them, for the royal
officials and the priests who served in the region, the
Spaniards who worked in the Chocó never made any attempt to
settle permanently there. Instead, they introduced
thousands of African slaves to work the mines, and
structured the lives of the Indians in such a way as to
ensure that their labours were directed towards the
108 Bedoya, "Visita del Gobernador ... Don Carlos de
Ciaurriz. . .", p.158.
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maintenance of the slaves and the upkeep of the mines. The
type of society which was created as a result is the final
subject that will concern us as we conclude this study.
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CONCLUSION
By the end of the eighteenth century the Colombian
Chocó had been thoroughly transformed. A region which until
the mid-seventeenth century had been inhabited by Indians
who successfully resisted Spanish incursions into their
territory had become a rich gold mining zone inhabited
mainly by blacks. Despite the difficult terrain, the
insalubrious climate, and the bellicosity of the native
population, from the beginning of the sixteenth century
Spaniards from neighbouring provinces - lured by the
promise of immensely rich sources of gold - made numerous
attempts to penetrate the region. But it was not until
after the rebellion of 1684 was quelled that the native
population was finally brought under the control of the
Crown. From that point on, an increasing number of
Spaniards began entering the region with their slave gangs,
and the exploitation of gold deposits began in earnest.
The effects of the rapid expansion of gold production
in the Chocô during the eighteenth century were felt
throughout the viceroyalty, but particularly in the cities
of the Cauca Valley, most notably in Popayän. Indeed, this
expansion was largely organised by members of the leading
families of the Cauca region, who also became the Chocô's
principal slave and mine owners. The towns of the Cauca
Valley were linked to the gold mining economy in another
way as well: certain towns - Cali and Buga, for example -
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developed an important trade with the Chocô, in goods such
as dried and salted meat, tobacco, wheat and sugar
products, which could not be produced locally. Thus, the
prosperity of the province of Popayán from the early
eighteenth century rested largely on the development of the
gold mining economy in the Chocô. The expansion of gold
mining in the coastal sub-provinces of Popayán - namely,
Raposo, Iscuandé and Barbacoas - also contributed greatly
to the prosperity of the province of Popayân.'
In addition to contributing to the economic well-being
of the viceroyalty as a whole, the gold of the Chocó also
enriched greatly the individual owners of the region's
mines and slave gangs, the merchants who legally and
illegally exchanged goods for gold, and the royal officials
and priests who served in the region. However, in spite of
the wealth generated by the gold mines, the Chocó remained
badly underdeveloped throughout the colonial period. For
example, although the two provinces of Nôvita and Citará
contained a large number of settlements and mining camps,2
none of the chocoano towns had a sufficiently large white
Anthony McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in
the Viceroyalty of New Granada, with special reference to
overseas trade, 1739-1810" (PhD, University of London,
1977), pp.84-87, 90-91. See also German Colmenares, Cali:
terratenientes, rnineros y cornerciantes. Siglo XVIII (Cali,
Colombia, 1975), and German Colmenares, Popayán. The area
to the south of the port of Buenaventura does not, however,
form part of this thesis. For an overview of the history of
this region, see Robert C. West, The Pacific Lowlands of
Colombia: A Negroid Area of the American Tropics (Baton
Rouge, 1957), pp.94-96, 100, 102-104, 106, 108, 110.
2 See Appendix 2.
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population to merit the creation of a cabildo. 3 Early
nineteenth century travellers were also struck by the
backwardness of the region's social development. When
Charles Stuart Cochrane visited the Chocó in 1824, he
observed that the two principal towns of the area - Nóvita
and Citará (Quibdô) - were very "miserable". Cochrane
described the white inhabitants of Nôvita as "miserably
ignorant" and "sallow". And although the town of Citará was
"far superior to Nôvita", he thought it to be lacking in
"society or amusement" and "almost destitute of the
positive requisites of life". The "respectable portion" of
Citará society he described as lacking in "education and
manners" .
The lack of political and social development
identified by visitors to the region was a reflection of
the society that the Spaniards created in the Chocô
following the final pacification of the region at the end
of the seventeenth century. 5 As William Sharp pointed out,
Sharp, Slavery, p. 14. On the absence of a cabildo
in the Chocó region, see also AGI Santa Fe 693,
Expediente No.8, f.22.
Charles Stuart Cochrane, Journal of a Residence and
Travels in Colombia During the Years 1823 and 1824 (2
Vols., London, 1825, Reprinted 1971), Vol.2, pp.417, 425-
426, 439, 442, 446-7.
The following account of the racial composition of
the Chocó region is based on Sharp, Slavery, pp.19-23 and
Tables 1 to 7, pp.195-199; Anthony McFarlane, "Cirnarrones
and Palenques: Runaways and Resistance in Colonial
Colombia", in Gad Heuman (ed.), Out of the House of
Bondage: Runaways, Resistance and Marronage in Africa and
the New World (London, 1986), pp.131-32; and Peter Wade,
"Patterns of Race in Colombia", Bulletin of Latin
American Research, Vol.5 (1986), pp.4-9.
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the terrain, climate, and isolation which the colonists
found in the Chocô made it a very unattractive region for
settlement. 6 These topographical and climactic factors
account for the fact that the region's resident white
population was very small. When the first major census was
completed in 1778, only 332 people out of a total
population of 14,662 (2.3%), were classified as white.
Thirty years later, the number of resident whites had risen
to 400, but by this time the total population had also
risen, to 25,000, which meant that whites now represented
an even smaller proportion of the population (1.6%) than
they had in 1778. Of course, it was for these residents
that all important posts were reserved. Whites served as
crown officials, priests, merchants, mineowners, or
overseers of the larger mines belonging to absentee
proprietors from the cities of the interior.
Whilst serving as a disincentive to settlement, the
climate and terrain of the Chocô did not discourage Spanish
penetration and colonization. The Chocô's sources of
precious metal could not be ignored by the people of other
regions - principally the Cauca Valley - repeatedly beset
by crises in their own mining economies. Spaniards did not
enter the region to settle, but to organize and direct all
activity in the Chocô to their own benefit. Thus, while the
number of whites who entered the region remained small, the
number of slaves introduced to work the mines increased at
a dramatic rate from the turn of the eighteenth century.
6 Sharp, Slavery, p.4.
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The development of mining, and the growth of the slave
population, meant that, at the same time, the labour of
Indians had to be directed towards the support of the
mining economy. Indians were employed in transportation,
construction, and principally in food production.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the labour
system adopted by the Spaniards to exploit the Chocó's
sources of precious metal had combined to produce the
peculiar racial composition which characterised the region
at the end of the colonial period. The censuses of 1778 and
1808 show very clearly that, by this time, Indians had been
outnumbered quite considerably by blacks. In 1778 the 5,414
Indians of the region made up only 36.9% of a total
population of 14,662. By 1808, the size of the Indian
population had fallen still futher - to 4,450, or 17.8% of
a total of 25,000.
In 1778, slaves were the largest single sector of the
region's population - 5,756, or 39.2% of the total. This
compares with an average for the New Kingdom as a whole of
7.6%. Only in Tumaco and Raposo did slaves make up a larger
proportion of the population (63% and 70%, respectively)
than in the Chocô. Everywhere else, the slave element in
the population was considerably smaller. In the province of
Tunja, for example, slaves were only 2% of the population;
in the province of Santa Fe, only 1.5%. In the southern
province of Pasto, the proportion of slaves in the total
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population was even smaller - 0.7%. Although by 1808 the
size of the slave population had also fallen, to 4,968
(19.8%) of the total, the black population continued to
grow at a dramatic pace.
As a consequence of the introduction of a large slave
labour force, there had emerged, by the end of the colonial
period, a large libre group - the freedmen. In contrast to
other regions of the viceroyalty, where mestizos (people of
mixed race, principally Indian/white) made up the fourth
important population category, in the Chocó, the place of
the mestizos was taken up by the libres, who were
predominantly black and mulatto. In 1778, there were 3,160
libres in the Chocó - accounting for the remaining 21.5% of
the region's total population of nearly 15,000. By 1808,
the number of libres residing in the region had increased
to 15,184 - a staggering 60.7% of a total of 25,000
people.8
The emergence of a libre group did not, however,
promote any form of integration. As Peter Wade points out,
the freedmen - both black and mulatto - were not
assimilated by the colonial system. Feared because of the
influence they might have on the slaves, libres had few
Anthony McFarlane, PtCirnarrones and Pal enques:
Runaways and Resistance in Colonial Colombia", in Gad
Heuman (ed.), Out of the House of Bondage: Runaways,
Resistance, and Marronage in Africa and the New World
(London, 1986), pp.131-2.
8 According to Peter Wade, the region's present
racial make-up suggests that the libre group was made up
chiefly of blacks and mulatos rather than mestizos. Wade,
"Patterns of Race", p.4.
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opportunities for employment. Although some worked as free
labourers in the mines, and others bought their own slaves,
or joined the army in segregated regiments, most retreated
to inaccessible areas to pan for gold with which to buy the
few goods they needed.9
Non-integration was also reflected in a marked
hostility between racial groups, but particularly between
blacks and Indians. When the Frenchman Gaspar Mollien
travelled through Colombia in 1822 and 1823, he remarked on
the Indians' "violent antipathy" to the blacks - whom they
nevertheless gave the title of "master" - and their dislike
and fear of the whites, with whom they never sought to form
alliances.'0 One hundred years later, in the 1920s, Erland
Nordenskiöld described the way in which the expedition's
Indian guide, "the great medicine man" Selimo, "was always
superciliously and often insultingly treated by our more or
less black servants". He also described how Selimo
eventually asserted himself by deliberately placing a
venomous snake among the clothing of the expedition's black
steersman." In 1939, Robert Cushman Murphy remarked on the
Chocó Indians' "strong sentiment against miscegenation", to
Ibid., pp.6-7.
'° Gaspar Mollien, Travels in the Republic of
Colombia in the Years 1822 and 1823 (London, 1824),
pp.306-307. In 1807, the governor of the Chocó, Don
Carlos de Ciaurriz, also noted the Indians' antipathy
towards the blacks, although he observed that they liked
the whites. See Bedoya (ed.), "Visita del Gobernador del
Chocó, Don Carlos de Ciaurriz", p.159.
11 Nordenskiöld, "The Chocó Indians of Colombia and
Panama", pp.3'V7, 349.
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the extent that "they became intolerant of association with
either negroes or half-breeds".' 2
 In the l970s, Sven-Erik
Isacssori drew attention to the fact that the Indians of the
region - now reduced to a mere 7% of the total - have
gradually been pushed towards the headwaters and upper
reaches of the Chocô's many rivers, separated completely
from the black population except for "accidental commercial
transactions" 13
From a historical point of view, the capacity of the
Indians of the Chocô to retain their racial identity is one
of the most interesting features of the Chocô's development
since the colonial period - one that refutes Elman
Service's theory that those people in the marginal areas of
the empire with the weakest social and political
organizations were the least likely to retain their racial
integrity.
The Indians' success in this regard notwithstanding,
it is clear that this has not brought any benefits. Today,
blacks and Indians in the Chocô share the neglect which has
characterised the region since the earliest days of Spanish
occupation. Despite the growing interest and concern of
many Colombian academics, blacks and Indians in the Chocó
12 Robert Cushman Murphy, "Racial Succession in the
Colombian Chocó", Geographical Review, Vol.29 (1939),
p.466.
13 Isacsson, "Emberá", p.22.
14 Elman R. Service, "Indian-European Relations in
Colonial Latin America", in Robert A. Manners & David
Kaplan (eds.), Theory in Anthropology: A Sourcebook
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968), pp.289, 292.
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also share the effects of such neglect - low life
expectancy, high infant mortality rates, and levels of
education and health care which do not compare with those
available in the rest of the country.' 5 There can be little
doubt that these features which now characterise the Chocô
derive directly from the fact that the pacification of the
native peoples and the introduction of slaves on a massive
scale was not followed by Spanish settlement.
' On this subject, see Alexander Cifuentes,
"Introducciôn", in La participaciôn del negro en la
forrnación de las sociedades latinoamericanas (Bogota,
1986), pp.13-42.
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APPENDIX 1:
GOODS AND SERVICES PURCHASED BY
BUESO DE VALDES FOR THE
ENTRADA OF 1676-1677
GOODS
Arms and Ammunition
Copper and Lead
Axes
Canoe
Rope
Flasks
Flag
Pe tacas
Paper
Beads, etc.
Fishhooks
Wax and Tallow
Blankets
Alpargatas
Shoes
Cloth
Tobacco
Wines and Aguardiente
Maize
Sugar
Salt
Cacao
Spices
Pigs
Other Foodstuffs
Other Goods
222 pesos, 4 tomines
55 pesos, 6 toinines
30 pesos
10 pesos
25 pesos
6 pesos
4 pesos
60 pesos
8 pesos
300 pesos
30 pesos
78 pesos
50 pesos
75 pesos
64 pesos
222 pesos, 4 tomines
25 pesos
116 pesos
37 pesos, 4 toinines
12 pesos
10 pesos
24 pesos
19 pesos
75 pesos
121 pesos, 4 tomines
126 pesos
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SERVICES
For the construction of
canoes
For the preparation of
meat
For the payment of
the soldiers
For the payment of
Indian carriers
For the rent of mules
for the journey
TOTAL COST
36 pesos, 4 tomines
5 pesos
383 pesos, 2 tomines
381 pesos
194 pesos
2,806 pesos, 4 tomines
[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.36-43, 46, 175, 177-
178, 180-181].
Total Number
of Tributaries
28
25
35
100
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APPENDIX 2
TUE CHOCO:
TOWNS AN]) MINING CAMPS (c.1753)
TOWNS - PROVINCE OF NOVITA:
San Gerônimo de Nôvita is the principal town of the
province of Nôvita. It is here that the governor and his
teniente reside. San Gerônimo contains a public jail, a
church, and 65 houses - including the residence of the
governor and the teniente. The remaining houses are used by
the merchants who come to the province to sell their wares.
With the exception of four miners, there are no other
residents in San Gerônimo de Nóvita. The Indian population
inhabits the province's other five towns. The province's
mining camps are divided into four partidos.
Indian
Officials
Cac iqu e
Capitlri
Alcalde
Cac ique
Capitân
Alcalde
Cac ique
Capitâri
2 Alcaldes
Cac ique
2 Capitanes
2 Alcaldes
Cac ique
2 Capitanes
2 Alcaldes
Town	 Spanish
Officials
Las Juntas Corregidor
Los Brazos Corregidor
S ipi	 Corregidor
Tadó	 Corregidor
Noanarna	 Corregidor
Total for
PrOviziCe
of Nóvita
Priests
Served by
priest of
Nóvita
Served by
priest of
Nóvita
Served by
its own
priest
Two
priests
Served by
	
108
priest of
Sip 1.
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379
TOWNS - PROVINCE OF CITARA:
This province is composed of seven Indian towns, two of
which used to form part of the province known as
Tatamá/Chocô.
Town	 Spanish	 Indian	 Priest
Officials	 Officials
Quibdó	 Tenierite	 Cacique	 Served by
3 Capitanes its own
2 Alcaldes	 priest
Lloró	 Corregidor	 Cacique	 Served by
3 Capitanes its own
3 Alcaldes	 priest
Beté	 Corregidor	 Cacique	 Served by
2 Capitanes its own
1 Alcalde	 priest
Bebará	 Corregidor	 Capitán	 Served by
Alcalde	 its own
priest
Murri	 Corregidor	 Cacique	 Served by
Capitãn	 its own
priest
Chami	 Corregidor	 Cacique	 Served by
2 Alcaldes	 its own
priest
Tatamã	 Corregidor	 Cacique	 Served by
Alcalde	 its own
priest
Total for
Province
of CitarI
Total Number
of Tributaries
161
220
23
24
3].
97
25
581
90
	 40
29
	
20
32
	
11
6
	
4
12
	
5
46
	 20
13
	
6
7
	 5
29
	
16
556
	 274
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MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OP NOVITA
Male	 Female
Working	 Working
Slaves	 Slaves
15].	 63
59	 29
Mining Camp	 Owner
La Concepción del
	
Don Salvador Gômez de
Playón y San Antonio
	
la Asprilla y Novoa
del Remolino
La Concepciôn del	 Don Francisco Gómez
Salto	 de la Asprilla y
Novoa
Santa Barbara	 Don Juan Bautista y
Barguén
La Concepcióri del	 Don Tomás de Rivas
Salto
San Felipe de Tarnaná	 Don Felipe de
Valencia y Estrada
Nuestra Señora del	 Don Lucas de Estaio y
Socorro y Sitio del 	 Fortin
Milagro
Nuestra Señora de la	 Don Gerónimo Antonio
Soledad y Pie del	 de Cabrera
Salto de Guarabal
Sed de Cristo	 Don Juan de Bonilla y
Delgado
Nuestra Señora de
	 Don Manuel Villa de
Chiquinquirá del
	 Moros
Cau c ho
San Antonio del Peñón Don Tomás Francisco
y Aguaclara	 de Urrutia
Nuestra Señora de la 	 Don Cristôbal de
Soledad de Opogodó	 Guzmãn
Nuestra Señora de	 Agustin Leuro
Chiquinquirá de
Tajuatu
Santa Rita
	
Don Bernardo Garcia
de la Granda
San Lorenzo de los 	 Don Joseph Lopez
Brazos	 Garcia AnIbal
Total
17	 14
60	 38
5	 3
Female
We rking
Slaves
13
6
32
3
5
3
5
30
19
15
5
5
2
5
10
158
381
MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF NOVITA
PARTIDO DE TADO
Mining Camp	 Owner
Sari Antonio y Santa	 Don Francisco Gómez
Lucia	 de la Asprilla
Nuestra Señora de la	 Don Santos de Obregón
Soledad
Santa Lucia del	 Don Nicolás de
Calabozo	 Inestrosa
Papagayo	 Miguel Durãn
Santa Rosa de la
	
Don Agustin de Perea
Platina	 y Salinas
Nuestra Señora de los Don Marcos de Perea
Dolores
San Joseph de Piedra	 Don Agustin Roso de
Piedra	 Villalba
Santa Barbara de Ird	 Don Cristdbal de
Mosquera y Figueroa
Santa Rita de Iró	 Don Joseph de
Mosquera y Figueroa
Señor San Joaquin de 	 Don Francisco Javier
Viró	 de Mosquera
San Miguel de Tadó 	 Pedro Salinas Becerra
Santa Rita de Ibordó	 Francisco Perea y
Salinas
San Miguel de	 Agustin Becerra y
Tadolito	 Salinas
Purdó Jondó	 Joseph Perea Salinas
San Nicolás de El	 Don Fernando Martinez
Salto	 de Caso
Total
Male
Working
Slaves
25
24
46
5
16
6
11
46
34
30
11
8
4
7
30
303
382
Female
Working
Slaves
8
9
19
MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OP NOVITA
PARTIDO DE SAN AGUSTIN
Mining Camp
Santa Rosa y Santa
Lucia
Nuestra Señora de la
Honda
Señora Santa Ana
San Antonio Bosiradó
San Antonio de las
S imarronas
Total
Owner
Don Juan de Argornedo
Don Juan Antonio de
Nieva y Arrabel
Belongs to the Holy
Souls. Administered
by Don Ignacio de
Moia y Torres.
Don Francisco
Gerónimo Mondragôn
Don Francisco Gómez
de la Asprilla y
Novoa
Male
Working
Slaves
28
16
36
57	 27
17	 10
154	 73
MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF NOVITA
PARTIDO DEL CAJON
Mining Camp	 Owner
San Joseph	 Don Pedro de Arboleda
San Cayetano	 Doña Maria Rosa de
Vergara y Daza
Santa Barbara de la
	
Doña Maria Josepha de
Bola	 Arboleda
Santa Barbara de 	 Manuel Morillo
Arriba
San Antonio de Torrã
	
Doña Antonia Gómez de
la Asprilla y Novoa
Jesus, Maria y Joseph Diego de Tovar (free
de Taparal	 black)
Total
Male
Working
Slaves
42
29
27
23
62
3
186
Female
Working
Slaves
16
25
22
5
38
1
107
383
MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF CITARA
PARTIDO DE QUIBDO
Mining Camp
Ydipurdü Pequeño
Dipurdü Grande
Negua
Negua de la
Concepción
Quebrada de San
Antonio
Ychó
Ychó de Merodá
San Bartolomé de
Necodã
San Bartolomé de
Necodã
Quebrada de Duata
Certiga
Total
Owner
Doña Josepha de la
Cuesta
Doña Balthasara de la
Cerda
Don Diego Palomeque
Doña Maria Clemencia
de Caicedo
Miguel Velasco
Don Carlos de Andrade
Don Francisco Javier
de los Santos
Don Vicente Becerra
de la Serna
Don Joseph de Tapia
José Leonardo de
COrdoba y Velasco
Francisco Gonzalez de
Tres Palacios
Male
Working
Slaves
23
9
7
36
4
18
15
3
8
54
45
222
Female
Working
Slaves
14
5
4
24
2
8
11
4
4
26
22
124
MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF CITARA
PARTIDO DE BEBARA
Mining Camp
Bebará
Bebará
Bebará
Gualaza
Saber ama
Total
Owner
Don Miguel de la
Cuesta
Doña Ignacia de Borja
Don Toribio Sanchez
de Arroyo
Ignacio de Quesada
Cristóbal de Torres
Male
Working
Slaves
46
24
13
4
5
92
Female
Working
Slaves
28
11
8
4
4
55
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MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF CITARA
PARTIDO DE LLORO
Mining Camp
La Liave
Andagueda
Andagueda
Andagueda
San Bartolomé de
Andagueda
Total
Owner
Don Antonio de la
Torre
Don Francisco de
Maturana
Don Antonio Patiño
Don Francisco
Martinez
Don Francisco de la
Torre
Male
Working
Slaves
12
45
8
58
6
129
Female
Working
Slaves
12
33
5
30
2
82
[Source: AGI Santa Fe 733, "Descripción del Gobierno del
Chocó, en la jurisdicción del Nuevo Reino de Granada, que
se presenta, con Memorial, a S.M., por Don Pedro Muñóz de
Arjona, hijo del Coronel Don Alfonso de Arjona, n.p., n.d.]
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